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1INTRODUCTION
THE ANTHROPOLOGY OF
CONTEMPORARY HONG KONG
Grant Evans & Maria Tam
When anthropologist Barbara Ward arrived in Hong Kong in 1950 she
remarked that in 'the harbour itself, all the local craft were under sail; in
the New Territories every particle offlat or terraced land was under rice
.. .'. Indeed, rural rhythms still pulsated faintly through the city: 'Street
life was also marked by seasonal changes of colour, for most men wore
Chinese suits - black in summer and soft bluish grey with wide white
turned back cuffs in autumn and winter' (1985:ix). Ward came to Hong
Kong firmly convinced that a central tenet ofanthropology is the cross-
cultural study of meaning, the attempt to see 'through other eyes'. She
herself did this by studying a group marginal to mainstream of
Cantonese society, the 'Tanka' or boat people. Like many anthro-
pologists of her day she travelled out of the city to carry out her main
fieldwork. In the academic division of labour which had developed in
both Europe and America anthropologists were allocated tribal peoples
and peasants as well as exotic (to some people 'irrational') belief
systems, while sociologists studied industrial societies, cities and
'rationality' .
But world politics also dictated where, when and how anthropological
fieldwork was done. Prior to 1950 few anthropological studies had been
written about China; the work by Fei Hsiao Tung and Frances Hsu was
exceptional. After the communist revolution in China anthropology was
vilified as an 'imperialist' discipline and disappeared from the mainland
until its recent revival (Guldin 1994). Thus, if anthropologists wished to
study 'China' they were confined to Hong Kong and Taiwan, so when
anthropologists came to Hong Kong in the 1950s and 1960s they
invariably headed off to the still rural villages of the New Territories to
study what was left of 'traditional China'. The influential work on
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Chinese lineages by Maurice Freedman was partly based on fieldwork
there, as were many other studies. Anthropologists came to Hong Kong
to investigate 'traditional China', not the rapidly growing modem city of
Hong Kong.
There were some exceptions to this rule however, including an
insightful study ofa small factory's organization written by Barbara Ward
in the mid-1960s where she tried 'to discern what, if anything, was
specifically 'Chinese' about the socio-economic relationships involved'
(1985:140). Culture came into play 'only in those areas where the
demands of technology itself were not overriding' (1985: 140), and she
found a sum of 'intangibles' (1985:169) which added up to something like
a 'Chinese style for running economic institutions' (1985: 169), or at least
a perceived difference in style. In the context of recent mythologising
about the 'uniqueness' of the Chinese firm (trenchantly critiqued by
Greenhalgh 1994), Ward's study stands out as a sober and careful piece of
research. Perhaps it is also the first real anthropological study of modem
Hong Kong. While others did some research in urban locations what they
documented there was the persistence of 'tradition'. Only in the early
1970s did urban anthropological research consciously begin with the work
ofFred Blake, Greg Guldin, John Meyers and Eugene Cooper. However,
this work soon stalled, and when the 'real China' opened up in the 1980s
anthropologists flowed across the borders.
Institutional factors also influenced the anthropological study of
Hong Kong. When an anthropology department was established at the
Chinese University of Hong Kong in 1980 following a division from the
sociology department, the emphasis of its staff was on the study on
Chinese minorities and Chinese 'traditional' culture. At the University
of Hong Kong anthropology, for various reasons, remained a minor
stream within the sociology department. In general, it was sociologists
who taught about and studied urban industrial Hong Kong.
Only recently have anthropologists begun to focus on modem Hong
Kong society. This corresponds to a global shift in anthropological
interest which has broken the straightjacket of the old academic division
of labour and allowed the anthropological gaze to roam over the whole
of human action. Furthermore, in China itself anthropology has revived
and it is no longer confined to the ethnology of minorities, but also
focuses on the Han and urban anthropological research (Guldin and
Southall 1993). In Hong Kong these re-orientations have also been
spurred on throughout the 1980s and 1990s by the prospects of re-
unification with China in 1997 and an ever intensifying cultural debate
about 'Hong Kong Identity'.
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CULTURE & IDENTITY
It was the closure of the border with China following the communist
revolution in 1949 that gave Hong Kong a heightened sense of
distinctiveness. Prior to then it was primarily seen as a place of transit.
The migrants who flooded into Hong Kong after the revolution
maintained this mood for a while in the 1950s, but soon it became
apparent that most of them were here for good. Indeed, the British
Colonial Government initially thought there would be a reflux of
refugees when conditions stabilised on the mainland. The realisation
that the thousands of refugees in their squatter settlements were here to
stay brought into existence the massive public housing programme
which has gone on ever since. Many of these migrants were from urban
China, and fortuitously combined with migrant capital from Shanghai
they provided the essential ingredients for the rapid transformation of
Hong Kong into a modem industrial society. By 1984, when the Joint
Declaration was signed between London and Beijing for the return of
Hong Kong to China, a whole new generation had been born and bred in
Hong Kong and a unique cultural formation had established itself in the
colony. Writing in the China Quarterly in 1984 Hugh Baker declared
'The Emergence of Hong Kong Man':
He is go-getting and higWy competitive, tough for survival, quick-
thinking and flexible. He wears western clothes, speaks English or
expects his children to do so, drinks western alcohol, has
sophisticated tastes in cars and household gadgetry, and expects
life to provide a constant stream of excitement and new opening.
But he is not British or western (merely Westernized). At the same
time he is not Chinese in the same way that citizens ofthe People's
Republic ofChina are Chinese.... Hong Kong Man is sui generis
and the problems of the territory's future are more difficult to
resolve because of it.
(1984:478-9)
One might remark that not only is Baker's 'Hong Kong Man' close to
journalistic cliche, but also very middle class and male. A few years
later Wong Siu-Iun argued: 'The Hong Kong Chinese may be described
as Westernized only in a superficial sense. They have adopted a
number ofwestern folkways [unspecified], but a substantial number of
them still adhere to traditional Chinese mores on various aspects of
social living' (Wong 1986:307). In 1988 Lau Siu-Kai and Kuan Hsin-
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Chi published the most comprehensive exploration of the 'mentality'
of Hong Kong in their The Ethos of the Hong Kong Chinese. They
wrote: 'In our 1985 survey, an astonishingly large proportion of
respondents (59.5 percent) identified themselves as 'Hongkongese'
(HPung Gong yahn) when they were asked to choose between it and
'Chinese'. This Hong Kong identity, though not implying a rejection of
China or the Chinese people, necessarily takes China or the Chinese
people as the reference group and marks out the Hong Kong Chinese as
a distinctive group of Chinese' (1988:2). The Hong Kong ethos, they
say, 'represents a mixture of traditional Chinese culture and modem
cultural traits .. .' (1988:2). Since then the debate over Hong Kong
'identity' has sharpened. The following book is a product of that
debate and is a concerted attempt by anthropologists and people
engaged in cultural studies to examine the nature of contemporary
Hong Kong culture and society.
As is immediately apparent from the few statements reproduced
above, the discourse on Hong Kong culture among academics often
echoes the terms found in tourist brochures: Hong Kong is a place where
'East meets West', but where 'Chinese tradition' still holds sway. The
common sense appeal of these categories to both gwai/ou (foreigner)
and Chinese academics, advertising copywriters, journalists and the
person in the street who has been brought up on a diet of this rhetoric is
itself intriguing. It is an idea which has both a history and a theory of
culture embedded within it.
The history of the idea is intimately bound up with Hong Kong's
colonial history which until relatively recently saw a radical social and
cultural separation between the British colonial officials and expatriate
population and their Chinese subjects. For a long time 'East' met 'West'
in a kind of cultural stand-off. Of course all colonial powers need to
develop a local elite that respects the achievements of the dominant
power and who is able to act as 'cultural translators' between the
foreigners and the local population. Such a group of 'Anglophiles' did
emerge in Hong Kong. We await a full social history of British
Colonialism in Hong Kong which hopefully will tease out the culturally
enigmatic lives of this 'Anglophile' elite, for they were in the vanguard
of the creation ofan identifiably modem Chinese culture in Hong Kong.
On the other hand, colonialism everywhere also produces its own
experts on the colonised peoples, many of whom engage in an extended
romance with the dominated culture. We can see this clearly among the
French, for example, in Indochina. In Hong Kong, as a counterpoint to
the indigenous 'Anglophiles' a group of expatriate 'Sinophiles'
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emerged. The speciality of the latter was the documentation of 'Chinese
tradition', and anthropologists were often found in their ranks. Indeed, in
the recent political row over 'traditional' indigenous land rights in the
New Territories and alleged discrimination against women (see the
chapters below by Selina Chan and Eliza Chan) 'tradition' found some
of its strongest supporters among this expatriate group. This colonial
history established a powerful discourse of 'East meets West', and the
'modem world meets Chinese tradition'. There was, ofcourse, for a long
time a strong 'racial' discourse as well, with the British seeing
themselves as representatives of 'civilisation' and Chinese customs as
'barbarian'; while for their part the Chinese held a mirror image ofthe
gwail6u (foreigner). But this discourse has not survived, although
academic and political debates in Hong Kong often disturbingly echo
these faded sentiments.
What are the attractions of this 'East meets West' ideological
discourse?
First and foremost, it is extremely simple. Its binary structure allows
it to accommodate an infmite variety of situations, and better still, it
works for both local Hong Kong Chinese and for expatriates. Hong
Kong Chinese, when they encounter mainlanders, are able to explain
their differences from them by their 'Westerness', when they encounter
expatriates they can explain their differences from them by their
'Chineseness'. Expatriates on the other hand quickly recognise Hong
Kong's modernity as a familiar 'Westerness', while all differences can
somehow be accounted for perhaps by 'traditional Chineseness'. And so
on. What is most bewildering about the situation is the rapid code-
switching that goes on within it.
But let's look a bit more closely at the structure of this discourse and
at the contradictory valuations of 'Western' on the one hand and
'traditional Chinese/Confucianist' on the other.
Westernisation: positive valuation.
- liberalism, freedom of thought, rationality
- egalitarianism, generally and of gender
- industrialization, affluence, science and modem education
- individualism, choice of values in relation to sexuality
- fashion and popular culture
Westernisation: negative valuation.
- family 'breakdown' and divorce
- sexual immorality
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- disrespect for authority and liberalism
- advocacy of change and future orientation
- general problems of the modem world
Chineseness ('Confucianism'): positive valuation
- familism
- respect for elders
- social order
- scholasticism
- sexual morality
-hard work
- 'China's glorious past'
Chineseness ('Confucianism'): negative evaluation
- conservative morality
- chauvinistic attitude to women
- authoritarianism
- opposed to change
This list could no doubt be extended and refined, but what is
immediately apparent from it is its contradictoriness, how an idea
valued in one context is not valued in another. In reality individuals hold
a mixture of all of these views and in different proportions, and,
depending on context, they rapidly code-switch from one point to the
other, often being only vaguely aware of the inconsistency. The
coexistence of all these views is partly related to the rapidity of social
change in Hong Kong, and the mixture of codes within individuals is
different between generations who for obvious reasons have experienced
different aspects of this rapid social change - we return to the
complexities of cultural change below.
The idea of Westernization as an explanation for social and cultural
change is perhaps much stronger in Hong Kong than elsewhere in Asia
because of the continuation of colonial rule, the predominance of a
foreign language in the education and governmental system, and
initially the high profile of rich foreign hohng (business houses). The
process of modernization of Hong Kong society was, therefore,
inevitably conceptualised as alien. People everywhere feel powerless
in the face ofrapid social change and they feel disoriented. Europe itself
('the West') during the massive transformation from feudalism to
capitalism experienced similar disquiet, with massive traditionalist
messianic movements (unsuccessfully) mobilised against the change. In
6
INTRODUCTION
Hong Kong this feeling could be partly managed by conceptualising this
as a force from the outside - colonialism, Westernisation, and so on, and
indeed all the problems which come with industrialisation can in this
way also be blamed on 'the West'. Rapid social change also produces a
certain nostalgia for an idealised stable past and the idea of
'Chineseness' is important here. Yet attempts to articulate a
'traditional Chinese' way, or a 'Confucian' way, in a modern
industrial society encounters fundamental obstacles - which, of
course, does not mean that people will not continue to try.
Barbara Ward in her studies of the 'boat people' here in Hong Kong
developed a theory of 'conscious models' in order to understand
'Tanka' ideas of Chineseness. Often when she asked the people in the
village of Kau Sai why they follow a particular custom they answered:
'Because we are Chinese'. This she says was their conscious model of
the social system which they carried in their minds in order to explain,
predict or justify their behaviour as 'Chinese'. The problem begins,
however, upon the investigator's realization that people in different
locations of China have different ideas about what it means to be
'Chinese'. There are, therefore, a variety of conscious models 'a
number of different Chinese ideal patterns varying in time and space
with varying historical development and the demands of particular
occupations and environments' (1985:42). The overarching model is a
rather idealised version of Chineseness promoted by the traditional
literati. This ideal, always incompletely known by ordinary Chinese,
was what they aspired to but fell short of. Yet each group believed that
the way they lived more closely approximated the ideal than any other
neighbouring group which they observed. They constructed an
observer's model of these other groups as distinct from the model
they had of their own way of doing things which Ward called their
immediate model. Thus they carried in their minds an ideal or
ideological model of Chineseness, their observer models of other
Chinese groups, and their immediate model of themselves which may
vary considerably from other groups and from the ideal model.
'Strictly speaking,' writes Ward, 'the only people who can observe
differences between immediate models are outsiders (or social
scientists); what a Chinese layman compares is his own immediate
model of his own social arrangements with his own "observer's"
model of the other fellow's' (1985:51).
Following from these ideas ofWard what we are suggesting is that the
framework elaborated earlier constitutes some of the elements of the
conscious model held by people living in modern Hong Kong. It allows
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them too to construe some people as more Chinese than others, or less
(as with 'ABC's', American Born Chinese, as explored in Greg Guldin's
chapter below). The important thing to bear in mind about conscious
models is that, as Levi-Strauss who stimulated Ward's work remarks:
'conscious models are ... by definition very poor ones, since they are
not intended to explain the phenomena but to perpetuate them'
(1968:281).
The coherence of Ward's model hinged on the reality of an ideal
Chineseness, one modelled on the literati of the Ching Dynasty. The
collapse of the old structure left a hole at the centre of the Chinese
system, and so throughout the Twentieth Century Chinese intellectuals
and others have endlessly debated what it means to be 'Chinese'.
Nationalism has been the main overarching ideology to step into the
vacuum, although different nationalists have disagreed on what is
'essentially' Chinese. For example, the victorious communist
nationalists for a long time attacked Chinese 'feudal' beliefs and
practices, as had the Guomindang in its early days. The latter however
became a defender of Chinese tradition from its base in Taiwan after
1949, and only recently has Beijing supported a re-exploration of
Confucianism. In other words, the cultural content of Chinese
nationalism has been under continuous renegotiation.
In a recent essay on culture and identity in Hong Kong by Chan Hoi-
man a recurring theme is Hong Kong's lack of 'a unifying cultural
foundation' (1994:447). Thus Hong Kong would appear to epitomise the
century long crisis of Chinese identity. He writes, Hong Kong 'identity
can only be defined in relation to its vacuous centre' (1994:460). This
'vacuous centre' in Hong Kong is filled by popular culture, which
however can only paint over the fragmentary nature of the colony's
culture. Nevertheless, it acts as 'the key dynamic' because 'popular
culture is decidedly also the primary sphere of consciousness and
sentiment where the concerns, anxieties, and foreboding of society as a
whole fmd their expression. In the absence ofany hegemonic framework
of high culture, national culture, and so forth, popular culture in Hong
Kong must play the role - set the agenda - of 'culture' per se'
(1994:449). While he goes on to give a stimulating discussion ofaspects
of this popular culture in Hong Kong it is, in the end, for him an ersatz
culture. Without a state and its attendant high culture to anchor it in the
strong winds of the modem world Hong Kong identity can only be
ephemeral. An unacknowledged consequence of this, of course, is the
fragility of Hong Kong culture in the face of reintegration into the
Chinese state.
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Others are more sanguine, and interestingly their observations come
from areas usually associated with 'high culture' - painting, literature
and architecture. Writing of the evolution of painting in modem Hong
Kong David Clarke points to the difficulty painters have always had of
elaborating a positive identity. Young artists, therefore, have begun to
assert a negative identity, one which breaks with 'the grand narratives of
both Modernization and Chinese nationalism.' Earlier artists in Hong
Kong had tried to link these two powerful terms, 'their juniors seem to be
able to live more easily with their rootlessness, and to produce, within a
western modernist formal vocabulary, an art which is in many respects
deeply post-modem, and primarily local in its interests' (1994:86). If
indeed Hong Kong art epitomises the post-modem then Chan Hoi-man's
anxieties about the 'vacuous centre' of the territory's culture would
seem misplaced, unless of course he wishes to fill it with the grand
narrative of Beijing's version of nationalism. Otherwise, Hong Kong
high culture in fact could place itself with the avant garde which has no
need to fill the centre. This is certainly one implication of the argument
advanced by Rozanna Lilley in her chapter in this book on the
performance group, Zuni Icosahedron.
Perhaps this peculiar feature of Hong Kong culture is epitomised by
the people's self-description as HPung Gong Yahn, a term so redolent
with local meaning we toyed with it as a title for this book but found it
ultimately untranslatable into English. It not only signifies a life-style,
but also something more than a resident yet less than a people. And
perhaps it is this atmosphere which produced the magical realism of, for
example, Xi Xi's My City: A Hong Kong Story (1989;1993) with its
irreverent literary use of the vernacular.
Much ofthe debate around Hong Kong identity and culture is dogged
by either implicit conceptions ofculture, or unclearly defined ones. The
most deceptive category is, of course, 'traditional Chinese culture'. To
their credit Lau and Kuan acknowledge the problems of deploying such
a concept: 'there is always a risk that what is considered traditional in
this discourse might turn out to be largely a straw-man, assembled
through subjective judgements and with dubious scattered pieces of
evidence' (1988:3). They lament the absence of 'systematic empirical
data ofthe traditional values of the common Chinese people in the past'
(1988:3), but is the substitution of an ideal, fantasy past an adequate
substitute? And why is it needed for an analysis of contemporary Hong
Kong culture? There are no answers given by the authors. A concomitant
of the construction of a 'traditional Chinese culture' is the construction
of an ideal type of a modem 'western' society against which the values
9
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in Hong Kong are compared. In this case, however, the authors cannot
argue that there is no 'systematic empirical data' available on various
'Western' societies and there is no excuse for constructing a 'straw man'.
But this is what the authors in fact do, following a long line of other
authors. Thus, in the end Hong Kong is discussed in relation to two ideal
types - an ideal West and an ideal East (China) - and the theoretical
discussion proceeds by way of listing presences or absences of ideal
features, using a framework in which tradition and modernity function
as inert causes. Ofcourse, in this way, Hong Kong can never be an ideal
typical 'Western' society, nor an ideal 'Chinese' one either, but then no
society ever can be. In this way the sociology of Hong Kong has
succumbed to a form of idealism in which analysis of the real world is
spirited away.
CULTURE: THE CONCEPT
Culture, however, in modern anthropology is not inert but actively
negotiated and argued about through time. It is in a continual process of
construction, and attention has to be paid to process if we are to really
develop adequate cultural analyses of modern Hong Kong.
The word culture and the concept attached to it has had a long and
complicated history, and its meaning is still changing in response to
broader social changes. Anthropologists have been more inclined to
research and write about culture than sociologists. For purposes of
clarification we can distinguish two main contemporary ideas ofculture:
1. ideological and 2. analytical. By ideological is meant a conception
which is only partial and therefore distorting, and often serves to obscure
power relations. By analytical we mean an attempt to construct an open
scientific discourse on the idea of culture.
1. Ideological
This includes the idea of so-called high culture and low-culture or
popular culture. So-called high culture refers to the 'arts', classical
music and so on. Low culture refers to the festivals and songs etc. ofthe
masses. The former is usually considered more refined, the latter crude.
The important point to note about this concept ofculture is: who defines
what is high or low? In other words who has the power to make such a
definition? Most often this power has been exercised by intellectual
10
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elites closely allied to state power, and the differentiation has been one
way oflegitimating power. For example: The traditional Chinese state's
claim to represent a superior high culture legitimised its assertion of
dominance over various minority cultures on its periphery. States in
most modem societies patronise 'the arts'.
A second ideological idea is one which overlaps with some analytical
ideas of culture. This is the idea that a culture is homogenous, and that
the world is made up of clearly demarcated, unified cultures. In the
modem world this idea is often conflated with, or identified with, a
nation. In this regard nationalism and debates associated with it have had
an important impact on our attempts to conceptualise culture. There is a
strong and widely held belief in the idea of unitary cultures.
2. Analytical
The analytical idea of culture which most easily overlaps with the
ideological idea of cultures as homogenous is functionalism. This
concept of society argues that societies are held together because the
individuals and groups within them hold a common set of values and
beliefs - i.e. a common culture. This culture, it is argued, is transferred
from one generation to the next by the process ofsocialization, and this
ensures cultural and social continuity. Beliefs which hold the society
together were therefore 'functional', and it is argued that the particular
values or beliefs of any culture exist because they contribute towards
cultural stability, Le. they make the society 'function'. It is easy to see
that this reasoning is circular: certain beliefs are found in a culture
because they are functional, and by definition they must be functional
if they exist. Consequently, this theory is, firstly, unable to explain
cultural change over time - Le. why beliefs and values change over
time - and, secondly, it is unable to offer an explanation for the obvious
disagreements, different beliefs and views held, and practices followed
by different individuals and groups within a society. One consequence
is that outside forces (e.g. 'Westernization') are invoked to explain
change.
The modem anthropological view of culture tries to conceptualise
empirical diversity within a culture, and tries to explain why a culture
changes over time.
The idea of 'culture' as a unity, they argue, has been largely a product
of the ideology of modem nationalism, and modem states tend to
propagate this idea along with their educational apparatuses and mass
media.
11
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Anthropologists now argue that the idea of culture is a convenient
framework for expressing the ongoing dialogue, debate and negotiation
that takes place between different individuals, groups, institutions,
genders, ethnicities, and so on which make up a society, concerning the
content or meaning ofthe culture they are in. For example, what it means
to be 'Chinese', what it means to be a Chinese woman or a Chinese man,
about marriage, divorce, aesthetics, and etiquette, and so on. In their
homes, at work, in schools, in the mass media, in speeches by politicians
and public figures, people discuss these issues, argue about them, and
negotiate them. In short, they construct their culture.
They do this, however, often in terms of culturally identifiable
parameters. For example, Chinese people differ greatly among
themselves about the significance and importance and interpretation
of 'Confucianism' - most in fact know little of the formal philosophy.
But almost everyone agrees that its ideas (however they are identified)
are important to discuss and debate. Whereas, for example, Confucius is
not central to French cultural debates, but the French philosopher
Rousseau is. In other words, different cultures do have distinct symbolic
reference points in their discourses about culture. So, here we are
suggesting that the idea of Confucius (as distinct from his actual
philosophical writings) functions as a cultural symbol. The
'globalisation' of culture means that cultural debates and the
parameters of these debates are increasingly shared along with certain
global symbols.
Culture is not an identifiable 'thing', it is an ongoing social process
of debate, dialogue and negotiation, primarily conducted among
people who place themselves within the broad parameters of that
culture, recognise its symbols, and use its language. But it can also
include outsiders who choose to participate in that 'internal' cultural
debate.
Culture is the ongoing, never-endingprocess ofconstruction ofhuman
meaning, it is the ongoing process of trying to say who we are and
what our lives mean - which includes the many rituals and symbols
within a culture. It includes trying to decide what it means to be
'Chinese', 'Japanese', 'Thai' or 'Australian', 'man' or 'woman', etc.
These meanings are always changing - sometimes slowly, sometimes
fast.
The anthropological analysis of culture is concerned both with these
changing meanings within a culture, and with the broader processes
12
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which may have stimulated those changes, such as industrialisation,
globalisation, war, revolution, and so on.
So, one of the consequences of nationalism in the modern world is
that while we all like to think that we live in stable, unified cultures, in
fact internal and external forces are changing culture all the time. And
perhaps it is in the nature of modernity, with its rapid social changes, to
have fantasies ofcultural unity - an imaginary stable point in a changing
world.
THE STUDY OF HONG KONG CULTURE
This approach to culture gives us a different way of thinking about
culture in Hong Kong compared with past studies. IfHong Kong culture
is in fact constructed through a process of social argument, a discussion
about what is relevant from the Chinese past for the present, about what
is relevant from the rest of the world for the constitution of meaningful
lives within Hong Kong, then analysis should try to trace the participants
in these cultural arguments, to try to understand their reasons for
selecting one aspect of culture and discarding another, and for choosing
one set of symbols while disregarding others. So the question would
become not how an inert tradition continues to affect the present but how
people in the present 'choose' or do not 'choose', to keep alive certain
cultural beliefs and practices from the past. Or even why they may revive
them after having discarded them for some years or decades. Similarly,
rather than some blanket concept of 'Westernization' anthropologists of
contemporary Hong Kong need to focus their attention on the processes
by which ideas and cultural artifacts are borrowed from the global
corpus ofculture; what things are incorporated into modem Hong Kong
culture from among the many possibilities and why - from Japanese
comics to white bridal gowns. The social and cultural logics which
infonn this process ofselection and rejection is what defines Hong Kong
culture and its uniqueness.
In the following pages we begin this task, but before we introduce
our authors we wish to draw the reader's attention to a more political
argument around Hong Kong identity and culture which has been
made by Mathew Turner in an essay 60 's /90 's - Dissolving the People
produced for an exhibition on 1960s popular culture. He writes: 'If, as
we are constantly told, Hong Kong's history, economy and society are
all 'unique', then so too are its people.' But, he says, despite Britain's
attempts to get people to identify with Hong Kong through launching
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various cultural programmes after the riots of 1967, both the UK
government and China have been wary ofacknowledging a distinctive
Hong Kong culture. He writes: 'in formal documents the People's
Republic assumes that there is no such thing as a "people" of Hong
Kong, and indeed the Joint Declaration describes the population in
neutral, neutralizing terms such as "inhabitants" or "residents", while
local culture is rendered merely as "life-style"'. What, he asks, does
'life-style' mean in this context, especially when it is guaranteed to
remain 'unchanged for 50 years'? He goes on: 'Since no society could
"remain unchanged for 50 years", how will social change be
legitimized? At the heart of agreements on Hong Kong's future lies
a slippery neologism which may be interpreted to mean almost
anything.' Most importantly, he suggests that the denial of a
distinctive culture is also part of a strategy to deny Hong Kong a
distinctive political status. But historian John Young points out, 'there
is no historical precedent for the Hong Kong-Chinese to rely on ...
Exactly how much of the Hong Kong identity as we know it will
remain after the transfer ofsovereignity is an unknown .. .'. Although
pessimistic, he concludes, 'one thing is certain, the Hong Kong
experience has been a unique one in the history ofModem China, and
perhaps in the history of the world, and it deserves, and needs to be,
recorded' (Young 1996).
Hong Kong's unique place within a wider Chinese cultural universe
further complicate the 'cultural/political' manoeuvres swirling around
it. Through films, magazines and Canto-pop, Hong Kong reaches out to
the large overseas Chinese population. As Lynn Pan puts it: 'Hong Kong
is the world capital of overseas Chinese popular culture, the heart of a
whole climate and ambience of thinking' (1991:370). And, part of what
it projects is a regionally conscious 'Cantonese' culture. In a special
issue of Daedalus on Chinese identity, Helen Siu (1993) has attempted
to locate Hong Kong within the broader context of the long-standing
tension between southern China and the central Chinese state. She draws
attention to how the development ofHong Kong, and especially its new
middle classes, has added a dynamic new element to the creation of a
modem Chinese culture, one which defies 'a standardizing cultural
narrative' emanating from Beijing. But perhaps that precisely is the
'threat' felt by Beijing, for a distinctive Hong Kong (or Taiwanese)
culture, underlines the possibility, or the fact, that 'Chineseness' is not
homologous with the nation-state of China. Indeed it raises the spectre
ofdistinct nation-states which are predominantly Chinese culturally, but
not part of a unified China.
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Greg Guldin in his chapter takes up the question of Chinese ethnic
identity in Hong Kong and attempts to elaborate a model of the different
levels and modalities of Han identity in Hong Kong and briefly
speculates on the emergence of 'a new Hong Kong ethnicity model'
after 1997 as Hong Kong people adjust themselves to being part of a
larger China (daaih luhk). But in line with current anthropological
thinking on ethnicity Guldin emphasises that the category 'Han'
contains no invariant content. Inevitably, Guldin also points to the
position of foreigners in this ethnic (some still call it racial) schema, in
particular gwail6u, a term reserved for Europeans. Uses of gwail6u
(literally, ghost person) in everyday life in Hong Kong reflects much of
the ambivalence in the ongoing, but fading, colonial reality of Hong
Kong. Indeed, the letters columns ofthe English press occasionally burst
to life with disputes over the use ofthis term, some foreigners seeing its
use as 'racist', others not. In fact, sometimes it is spoken with bitterness
by Chinese, and sometimes it is used playfully, and indeed some
foreigners themselves join the play and use it self-referentially. The
ambivalence of this word reflects a deeper social and cultural issue. In
surveying the sociology and anthropology of Hong Kong what is truly.
surprising is how little study has been done of this fundamental cross-
cultural relationship in Hong Kong society, both historically and in the
present. Such a blindspot in the intellectual optic of Hong Kong is
perhaps revealing of something more profound about cross-cultural
relations here. Earlier we pointed to the need for a social history of the
Anglophile elite in Hong Kong who are intriguing precisely because
they straddle this divide. Authors working on Macau also signal an
important difference between the two colonies when they point to the
significance of the 'mestizo' Macanese group there, which only serves
to highlight the low profile of the equivalent group of 'mixed-race'
people in Hong Kong. In this twilight of the colonial era we can only
stress the importance of studying this question if we wish to understand
the evolution of Hong Kong's culture and society.
Anthropologists in recent years have, with gusto, turned their
attention to food and have demonstrated the many cultural messages
communicated by the way we eat and what we eat. Food is an important
ethnic marker for Chinese people and therefore it is not surprising that
Hong Kong peoples' quest for identity should be partly articulated
through the medium of food. The new middle class life-styles here play
an important role in this process. In the bright, new, sanitised, herbal tea
shops of Hong Kong with their tasteful 'traditional' Chinese decor
Cheng Sea-ling sees 'a kind of fantasy world in which Hong Kong
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people can find an affinnation of their Chinese identity'. But like much
else in Hong Kong today the nature of this fantasy is partly dictated by
the impending re-unification with China, for it appeals to a fantasy of
China rather than the stark reality of the Beijing regime.
In the following chapter Philip Robertson takes the Hong Kong Film
unit as a case study in colonial documentary rhetoric. His essay engages
with 'post-modernist' and 'post-colonial' theories, which have entered
into an intense dialogue with anthropology in recent years, causing some
questioning and re-evaluation of ethnographic film. A recent book
which reflects this dialogue draws attention to the problematic 'realist'
assumptions of documentary. Anthropologist Leslie Devereaux writes:
documentary film cannot help participating in the codes and
conventions of fictional cinema, even as it signals its genre
difference.... By the devices of narrativity in documentary or
ethnographic film, the social reality of others is rendered into an
ideal of transparency through which we imagine we understand
them. The laws of naturalism in film and the techniques of
invisible assemblage work to produce a fullness of meaning that
obscures what is left out.
(1995:330)
As Robertson shows, this was also true of the productions of the Film
Unit in Hong Kong. From its founding in the early 1960s, he suggests,
the Unit was an anachronism and this caused revealing, sometimes
almost surreal, slippages in its imperial rhetoric. Ironically, the images
left behind by the Unit are now an important part of the memory archive
for those seeking to construct a contemporary Hong Kong identity.
Depending on how they are used, he suggests, they can continue as
sources of mystification or alternatively, of critical awareness in Hong
Kong's cultural debate.
The following chapter by Rozanna Lilley on the perfonnance group
Zuni Icosahedron provides another case study and continues the debate
on the fonns ofrepresentation around Hong Kong's identity and future.
Also drawing on 'post-modem' theorists she sets out to demonstrate how
Zuni opens up an alternative 'imaginary' space within which the future
can be thought - a space free from the stifling polarities of Capitalism
Vs. Communism; West vs. East; Chineseness vs. non-Chineseness, and
so on. Hong Kong's 'bi-cultural' reality, the words of one of Zuni's
producers, means it is uniquely placed to provide a critique of these
meta-categories. It is extremely difficult to estimate in any quantitative
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sense the impact of a group like Zuni. But within Hong Kong's culture
and society it undoubtedly plays the role of a collective intellectual
whose 'business', says Ulf Hannerz, is 'to carry on traffic between
different levels and fields of meaning within a culture, to translate
between abstract and concrete, to make the implicit explicit and the
certain questionable, to move ideas between levels of consciousness, to
connect ideas which superficially have little in common, to juxtapose
ideas which usually thrive on separateness, to seize on inconsistency,
and to establish channels between different modes of giving meanings
external shape .. .' (1992:139).
In the next chapter Christina Cheng Mui-bing reads Hong Kong's
spectacular architecture as a cultural 'text'. Through an intriguing
comparison of the controversial receptions of the Bank of China
buildings in both Macau and Hong Kong she finds traces oftheir distinct
colonial histories and elaborates on how our built environment, no
matter how 'postmodem' the design, provides raw material for cultural
and political arguments in these last two fragments of empire on the
southern coast of China. These debates demonstrate, she says, the
unique and paradoxical nature ofde-colonisation in Hong Kong because
'the colonised subaltern citizens do not welcome decolonization and
liberation, but they much prefer foreign rule.'
As we saw earlier, when anthropologists started coming to Hong
Kong they headed off into the still rural New Territories to study the
'traditional' male-dominated lineages there. But today lineage land
which once grew rice now supports massive high rise buildings and
many people have grown fat on the proceeds of the sale of this land.
Lineages continue to hold real estate in the New Territories, but in
conditions radically different from 'traditional China'. Two young
women anthropologists, Selina Chan and Eliza Chan, report on their
fmdings in these radically changed conditions, and in the context of a
dispute over female rights to inheritance in the New Territories. One of
the many paradoxes ofcolonialism in Hong Kong is that it preserved the
rights oflineages in the New Territories long after they were suppressed
on the mainland, and indeed, as Selina Chan reports, many people now
see what is encoded in colonial law as 'tradition'. Ironically, one ofEliza
Chan's female claimants looks forward to the situation after 1997 when
'Qing Law' will finally be abolished by the communists. Both of these
articles provide clear examples of the historically contingent and
negotiated nature of Chinese culture and kinship in Hong Kong, against
a political and ideological backdrop of 'tradition'. Selina Chan writes of
how the changing status ofwomen in the wider society and the changing
17
ANTHROPOLOGY OF HONG KONG
role ofland in family and kinship solidarity, in the context ofa fossilized
legal system, has led to practical modifications of female inheritance
while appearing outwardly to conform to 'tradition'. Her chapter is an
important warning to those (anthropologists, or others) who reify
'traditional' Chinese kinship. This is also true of Eliza Chan's chapter
which provides a fascinating account of how women who are the only
surviving members of their natal families try to manipulate sentiments
of affection to surmount the formal rules of patrilineality in order to
make a claim on their fathers' property.
The following essay by Diana Martin also looks at the position of
women in modem Hong Kong, but here the focus is on the entry ofthese
women in massive numbers into the workforce and the consequences of
this for childcare. Her contention is 'that the Hong Kong mother's
identity as a worker is stronger than her identity as a mother'. Martin
claims that these modem choices by Hong Kong women are buttressed
by appeals to 'traditional' attitudes towards children and childcare. She
is struck by the absence ofdebate around the status ofchildren in Hong
Kong. But as the later chapter by Grant Evans indicates, debates around
the place of children in a rapidly changing Hong Kong are to be found
not necessarily in the more formal discourses of say, nurses or social
workers, but in panics about ghosts which reveal an intense anxiety
about children. It is clear that complex changes in attitudes towards
children are taking place in Hong Kong as the family structure changes
and as the cultural definitions ofadulthood and childhood are modified.
Hong Kong's transformation into a modem metropolis has seen the
restructuring of its sacred map. Graeme Lang charts the emergence of
new nodes of sacred power in the city's high-rise landscape, such as the
extraordinarily popular Wong Tai Sin Temple, a 'God Palace'. At the
same time older temples have fallen into disuse. Far from seeing a
collapse ofreligious beliefs and practices in the glittering modem white-
collar financial world of Hong Kong one in fact sees a religious search
for alternative sources ofpower. Lang writes: 'scattered among the great
concrete warrens of the city, and in the surrounding hills, are a large
number of shrines and temples where such invisible powers can be
tapped.' There may be, he says, some evidence that young people are
losing interest in Chinese religious practices, but even if this is true
temples and the sacred landscape can also be seen as nodes of 'cultural
memory as well as nodes ofsacred power'. Janet Scott then explores the
ubiquitous world ofpaper offerings in Hong Kong, so central to funeral
rituals. In her detailed examination of paper offerings she finds an area
of 'tradition' which is expanding and transforming in accordance with
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the demands of wider cultural changes, while simultaneously providing
a sense ofcultural continuity. Grant Evans provides a detailed account of
a rumour that swept through Hong Kong based on the assumption that
ghosts were part of a TV commercial. Not only does he show how this
rumour contained cultural, social and political messages, but he also
illustrates how, contrary to the expectations of some streams of
sociology, the mysterious and the irrational are not likely to be
banished forever from industrial societies.
Finally, the chapter by Kingsley Bolton and Christopher Hutton looks
to youth and their 'bad language' as a source of linguistic innovation in
Hong Kong Cantonese. The 'official' or proper attitude to chou hilU as
somehow not part of Hong Kong culture in some respects parallels the
general attitude to Cantonese as a language, i.e. that it is some kind of
inferior form of Chinese - 'real' Chinese being represented by
Mandarin. Some people will even tell the unsuspecting foreigner that
Cantonese cannot be written, just as it is also suggested that chOu hau
cannot be written. But, of course, it can be and thousands and thousands
of young Hong Kong males and females consume this vernacular
through the medium of comics everyday. The attitude to Cantonese and
to comics reflects very clearly the ideological idea of high culture and
low culture referred to earlier in this introduction, buttressed in this case
by the claims of the central Chinese state's language policy. Xi Xi's
novel My City was strongly criticised by 'literary policemen' (Xi Xi's
words) for its liberal use of Cantonese vocabulary and syntax, but she
rejected these criticisms saying that to have written otherwise would
have been to tum the novel into 'someone else's city' or 'some other
city'. Increasingly, local Chinese newspapers, in particular the new and
spectacularly successful Apple Daily, make unprecedented use of
Cantonese language, sharpening a sense of linguistic identity at a time
when more and more Mandarin can be heard in the streets of Hong
Kong, and in the shadow of the almost certain onslaught of 'official'
Chinese after 1997. In this book we have chosen to transliterate
Cantonese using the Yale system, rather than converting Cantonese into
Mandarin Pinyin as is commonly done. Bolton and Hutton's foray into
the forbidden territory ofbad boys and bad language brings to light (for
rarified academics, at least) a vital and vibrant side of Hong Kong's
culture which literary and other cultural 'policemen' would like to see
ignored or suppressed.
These essays are simply the beginning of an anthropology of urban
Hong Kong. The takeover of Hong Kong by China in 1997 which looms
so large in the minds of Hong Kong people at present and haunts
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contemporary cultural debates, will be the next dramatic chapter in the
rapid and bewildering transformation of this society. Hopefully this
book will stimulate future studies of this modem Chinese metropolis.
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2HONG KONG ETHNICITY
OF FOLK MODELS AND CHANGE*
Gregory Eliyu Guldin
Ethnicity as a concept has been much maligned as a conceptual
organizing frame over the last decade or so, but it still can serve us
adequately if we are clear about its contingent nature and its shifting
referents. In the arena of Chinese identities, there has long been a
recognition of the prima facie ethnicity of the Overseas Chinese of
Southeast Asia and elsewhere, l and the rage of the 1980s and early
1990s among foreign researchers has been to focus on the oft-
contentious ethnicity of the non-Han 'minority nationalities' which
comprise about 7% of China's billion-plus population.2
This non-Han focus, however, has obscured the often-problematical
ethnicity of the Han majority. In the past, even those studies that
concentrated on this aspect of Chinese social organization spoke in
conflicting terms of speech-groups (Cohen 1968; Skinner 1957),
regional or provincial groups (Eberhard 1965; Huang 1982), ethnic
groups (Anderson 1967; Blake 1981; Wang 1975), or even 'sub-ethnic
regional groups' (Hamilton 1977). Although these and other studies3
have begun the task of unmasking the various peoples and cultures that
lie behind the common label 'Chinese', (or more precisely, Han
Chinese) the subject unfortunately remains enshrouded in a confusing
welter of inconsistent labels and inadequate definitions.
Yet conceptual clarity is needed and attainable and researchers like
Crissman (1967) and Huang (1980) early on pointed the way with their
Evans-Pritchard-like focus on the nesting segmentation of Chinese
communities, both those overseas and at home. What is required are
"This article first appeared in the Journal a/Chinese Studies, Vol. I, June 1984. It has since
been revised and updated.
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models of Chinese ethnicity which incorporate the many levels of
identity that Chinese ethnicity is both actively and potentially organized
on and which are sensitive to changes over time. Only by an
ethnosemantic mapping out of the multiple levels of Chinese ethnic
identities can we follow John Galaty's (1982) admonition to avoid
'finding' ethnic categories and instead discover whether folk
ethnosociology itself makes use of the categories which appear
relevant to outsiders. In the case of Hong Kong, this model-building
process led, in the early 1980s, to the discovery ofa level of identity and
a complexity of ethnic conceptual organization that had escaped
anthropological focus. A return to the process a decade and a half later
revealed changes in the ethnic landscape which necessitated a
remapping of the ethnicity model.
ONE FOLK MODEL AMONG MANY
Pursuing such a strategy, however, requires persistence and comparison,
because the model that emerges from the study ofany particular Chinese
ethnic locale will not be a 'universal' Chinese ethnic identity levels
model but one firmly ensconced in the realities and folk perceptions of
that time and place. Just as each Chinese ethnic group has its own
'conscious model' of what it means to be Chinese (Ward 1965), so too
will each ethnic group have its own folk model ofChinese ethnicity and
will the dynamics ofethnicity vary for each Chinese locale. Each model
must be mapped out as faithfully to the local reality as possible; only
after several such models have been presented can we envision a more
encompassing Chinese ethnic identity model.
The first folk model of Chinese ethnicity presented hereafter is a
Hong Kong version. It is a folk view of Chinese ethnicity as seen by the
majority Gw6ngdung yilhn (Guangdongren, Cantonese)4 population of
the colony during the mid-1970s and as such is bound to reflect the
uneven quality of popular knowledge of Chinese ethnicity as well as
conditions in Hong Kong at that time. Ambiguous, a-historical, and
sometimes even (objectively) 'incorrect' in its judgments or
classifications, this folk model conforms not to the preconceptions
and scholarly insights of sinologists but to its own logic.s By purposely
keeping such outside (non-native) insights to a minimum, this paper
attempts to come as close as possible to presenting the reader with a
Hong Kong native's view ofthe often complex and bewildering (even to
Chinese) world of Chinese ethnic identity.
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Before mapping out this complex world of multiple ethnic levels,
however, let us fIrst familiarize ourselves with the contours of Hong
Kong's ethnic universe. SeuhnghOi ydhn, Chiu Jdu ydhn, and Haakgd
ydhn (Shanghairen , Chaozhouren, and Hakka), as well as other groups
make their home in the colony, but without doubt Hong Kong is,
ethnically and demographically speaking, a 'Cantonese world'. A brief
introduction to the mid-1970s ethnic world-view of Hong Kong's
GwongdUng y3hn is thus imperative.
CANTONESE "CHAUVINISM"
GwongdUng y3hn have always had quite a strong sense of their own
ethnicity and peoplehood. They have felt proud of the role of their
province (and they do consider it theirs, no matter that minorities also live
there) as a progressive force in Chinese history and ofthe achievements of
GwongdUng people at home and abroad. Broad agreement exists among
GwongdUng y3hn that they are, if not perhaps the originators of Chinese
culture, at least its best executors. Other Chinese also feel this to some
extent, but perhaps not as strongly as the GwongdUng y3hn. Whatever the
results of such a cross-ethnic or cross-provincial comparison, it is
certainly true that GwongdUng y3hn judge non-GwongdUng y3hn by
GwongdUng y3hn standards and as the overwhelming majority in Hong
Kong they have no trouble in putting forth the idea that to be GwongdUng
y3hn is to be the best kind of Chinese one could possibly be.
Gwongjdu (Guangzhou, Canton), the provincial capital, is also seen
as the acme of ethnic Cantonese sophistication and culture. The district
in which it is located, Panyu, speaks a dialect that is alleged to be the
purest form of Gwongfuwa (Cantonese);6 it is this tongue that is widely
used and understood in the 3/4 of Guangdong and the southern half of
Guangxi Province that comprise the breadth of ethnic Cantonese
settlement (Lau 1969:3). Knowledge ofthis Gwongfiiwli, furthermore, is
essential for all groups in Hong Kong. Alone amongst all Chinese
places, Hong Kong is the only area where Poutiingwa (Mandarin,
Putonghua) as the national language is not taught as a matter ofcourse;7
indeed, GwongdUng y3hn will only countenance Mandarin from
foreigners - all Chinese must speak to GwongdUng yahn in 'Chinese,'
and to Hong Kong's Gwongdung yahn this definitely means
Gwongfilwli. Speaking Mandarin or Chiu Jdu Wa (Chaozhou) or
Haakga (Hakka) will usually not get you very far ifyou're speaking to a
Cantonese vendor. Even when non-GwongdUng yahn make the attempt
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to speak Gw6ngdungwa and do get served, many Cantonese find it more
an occasion for amusement than communication or trade.
Gw6ngdimg yahn view themselves as, first and foremost, fond of
good food; secondly, hard-working; and lastly, a friendly and polite
people given to the active pursuit ofa good life for their family. In Hong
Kong during the 1970s those perceived as furthest removed from
'Cantoneseness' were, not surprisingly, the 'gwail6u' - the 'white' non-
Chinese foreigners8• The primarily British colonials were ambivalently
viewed both as models of 'progress' and 'Modernity' as well as
'barbarians' who lack the subtleties of Chinese civilization and culture.
The small but visible overseas Indian/Pakistani (the 'Ah Cha')9
community was looked down on with near-universal contempt for
their alien ways, although a grudging respect for their hard work and
language competencies was also often accorded them.
All Chinese, by contrast, are considered related groups, or a least on
the same side of the Chinese/'gwaiI6u' boundary line. Their degrees of
closeness vary though; oftentimes Gw6ngdimg yahn will not even
define the Haakga or the fishing peoples (tehnggil yilhn; the Tanka; the
Hohk16u) as real Chinese (cf. Ward 1965). Yet even those acknowledged
as real Chinese do not find immediate acceptance if they are not
Gw6ngdimg yahn. One Shanghai immigrant complained that when
people from other areas of China lived in Shanghai they were quickly
absorbed, especially when they had learned to speak fluent
Shanghainese and had lived there for a number of years,
But things aren't so pleasant with the Cantonese. A friend ofmine
speaks perfect or near-perfect Gw6ngdimgwa since he came here
to Hong Kong when he was very small - and still people
constantly point him out as a Seuhngh6i yahn. I myselfhave lived
here for twelve years, have a Cantonese wife and am still viewed
as an outsider, a ngoi saang yilhn, (waishengren; 'outside-
province' person). The Gw6ngdimg yahn will always treat us
non-Cantonese as ngoi deih yilhn (outsiders).
The Gw6ngdimg yahn do indeed view Northerners (BiikjOng yilhn) and
Seuhngh6i yahn as 'barbarians' to some extent because: I) they talk
loudly and are known to quarrel often because of their bad tempers, 2)
they put up a false front and like to show off even when poor, e.g. wear
good clothes even when they can't afford it, and 3) in general, just aren't
friendly. Furthermore, one should bear in mind that these categories of
'Northerners' or 'Seuhngh6i yahn' themselves have a very Cantonese
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Hong Kong referent. As we can see in Figure 2.5, the categories
encompass a regional grouping, 'Seuhngh6i yabn', which for most of the
postwar period has served as a catchall category to include all ngoi saang
yabn from north of Gw6ngdimg, regardless of their provenance north or
south of the Yangzi, the traditional Chinese north-south dividing line.
Other groups of 'barbarians' are lumped by Gw6ngdung yabn into the
'Chill Jdu lou' (Chaozhou Guys) category which comprises Fllkgin
ydhn, Chiu Jau yahn, and Hohk16u (Fujianese, Chaozhou and Hoklo).
The characteristics of this group include: 1) Also talking loudly, 2)
having bad tempers which cause them to fight and bully people ofother
groups, 3) 'clannishness', 4) having little good taste, being rough types
who work in the lowest status, manual labor jobs, and who, even when
they are well-to-do, cannot help mixing themselves in illegal and
demeaning activities such as Hong Kong's lucrative drug traffic.
In sum, then, we get a division by Gw6ngdoog yahn of people in
Hong Kong into seven separate categories (see Figure 2.1);
(1) Gw6ngdoog yahn, wherein separate counties oforigin are acknowl-
edged but the primacy of Gw6ngjau is unassailable,
(2) Haakga yahn (Hakka), seen as a predominately rural and
unsophisticated population,
(3) 'Chiu Jau l6u', including Flikgin yabn, the H6i1uhkfung (Hai-Lu
Feng) Hohkl6u and Chiu Jau yahn,
(4) the Fisher People, the tehngga yabn and the Hohkl6u,
(5) SeuhnghOi yahn and the Northerners, distinguishable as non-
Southern Chinese,
(6) Gwai16u and foreigners of every ilk, and
(7) overseas Chinese, betwixt and between gwai16u, barbarians and a
whole slew of Chinese identities.
LANGUAGE GROUPS OR ETHNIC GROUPS?
With our Hong Kong ethnic baptism behind us, let us now step-by-step
analyze the various ethnic identity levels that cognitively underlie such a
complex ethnic map. Some caution, however, is in order since Chinese
group identities are not single-stranded 'ethnic' ones. Shared Chinese
social identities can be based on surname, occupation, political faction,
language/dialect, or place or origin (Blake 1981; Cohen 1968; Crissman
1967; Hong 1976; Weiss 1974). As Crissman has pointed out
(1967:190), the social identity characterized as 'ethnic' is often based
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on a combination of the above identities, and it is through the
combination and re-combination of these principles of identity that a
Chinese community achieves its segmented status. Most students of the
Overseas Chinese have seen these segments derived primarily from
language differences (e.g. Crissman 1967:186,190; Kwong 1958:44;
Skinner 1958:4-5) but this emphasis is misplaced if we are seeking to
understand ethnic communities rather than simply attempting to denote
the boundaries of language communities. Language differences do not
make inviolate ethnic boundaries; as in the USA and elsewhere, ethnic
groups can persist without retaining their linguistic idiosyncracies
(Cohen 1969, 1974; Gordon 1964; Greeley 1977).
Is there something special then about Chinese ethnic groups which
requires linguistic distinctiveness for boundary maintenance? Logic
argues against such a conclusion for although language differences are
now helping to maintain ethnic boundaries, there is no need to insist that
the boundaries are dependent on them. Blake, for one, has pointed out that
linguistic boundaries are not solely linguistic constructs, that they tend to
be arbitrary, that is, sociological. 'There are gradients and lines rather than
language boundaries; and factors influencing mutual intelligibility... are
not purely linguistic but are also sociological in nature' (Blake 1981:17).
This de-emphasis on linguistic distinctiveness, furthermore, squares
well with much anthropological thinking on ethnicity. Ethnicity can be
seen as a status ascribed to a group ofpeople who regard themselves and
are regarded by others as descended from common ancestors. Common
cultural patterns are a prevalent but by no means necessary concomitant
element of this status (Charsely 1974:350; Barth 1969:12). Ethnic
boundaries can therefore both be drawn to separate groups speaking the
same language (e.g. Irish and English in Great Britain), as well as to
include groups speaking differing languages (witness 'Chinese'
ethnicity in Southeast Asia or the emergence of a Native American
'Indian' identity in the USA). Thus freed of the traditional requirement
to view Chinese ethnicity solely in terms of language groups, we can
immediately embark on an unrestrained exploration of the varying
Chinese ethnic identity levels which characterize Hong Kong ethnicity.
PROVINCIAL ETHNICS OR SPEECH-GROUP
ETHNICS?
During my mid-1970s fieldwork in Hong Kong, while undertaking a
study of the Fiikgin yahn (Fujianese) community resident there,tO I was
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in the habit of asking all infonnants 'neih haih miityeh yahn?' ('What
type of person are you?') and usually got the conventional 'ngoh haih
Gwongdung yahn' (I am a Gwongdimg yahn, or Fiikgin yahn, or Chiu
Jim yahn, etc.) in return. One day, while visiting the clerks of a large
department store, the usual question was asked ofa new clerk, Chen, and
the usual response, 'I am a Gwongdimg yahn', was generated. Yet this
time many of the other clerks snickered and smiled as this researcher
persisted in asking Chen about his 'Gwongdimg-ness.' These clerks did
not consider Chen really a Gwongdimg yahn because, they explained,
'he's not a Gwongdimg yahn at all, but a Haakga yilin!' Chen,
unperturbed, insisted on his Gwongdimg yilin identity.
Puzzling at first, this was not merely a case of mistaken identity, but
instead reflected two sharply varying applications of the label
'Gwongdimg yilin'. In Gwongdimg Province itself three major ethnic
peoples are recognized both by the people there and by outsiders: (1)
Chiu Jau yahn (concentrated along Gwongdimg's eastern coast), (2)
Haakga yilin (eastern inland Gwongdimg), and (3) the rest ofthe people,
the majority, who live in central, northern and western Gwongdimg.
What to call this last group is something of a problem, a problem
which in ethnoscientific tenns can be seen as one of overlapping
linguistic domains. The people of this last group have traditionally
called themselves 'Gwongdimg yilin' ('Gwongdimg People'), although
'Gwongjau yahn' (derived from the centrally located provincial capital
of Gwongjau) has also been used to designate this group and the
language they speak. The problem with the fonner referent is simple: if
we call this group 'Gwongdimg yahn', how are we to distinguish them
from the other people who, because they live in Gwongdimg Province,
are also 'Gwongdimg yahn' (as the Haakga clerk Chen stoutly
maintained)? Calling the provincial majority 'Gwongjau yahn' solves
the problem only in so far as Gwongjau is allowed to symbolically
represent all the ethnically similar people of the province who speak
Gwongdimgwa (i.e. Gwongjauwa) or a closely related dialect. I I However,
a new problem then arises from the reverse perspective when we wish to
refer to the residents of Gwongjau City: how to distinguish this narrow
meaning of 'Gwongjau yahn' from its broader ethno-linguistic referent?
Such a solution merely transfers the locus of ambiguity. 12
Such ambiguity, of course, is what enabled Chen's co-workers to
tease him about his identity; they preferred the narrow interpretation of
'Gwongdung yilin', and Chen the broader. More important, however, is
the introduction here of a distinctly separate level of identity: the
provincial. Figure 2.2 maps out the position that this new level of
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identity occupies vis-a-vis the other levels of identity we have so far
discussed, and helps clarify the above discussion. 13 We can clearly see
how 'Gw6ngdung yahn' is a tenn with both provincial and ethno-
linguistic referents and, likewise, how the use of a county-level tenn,
Gw6ngjau yahn, to take on these wider meanings of inclusiveness
merely shifts our labeling problem.
These tiers of identity - that of ethno-linguism and of province - do
not necessarily contradict or work against each other, nor are most
Chinese confused by them. Moreover, depending of the circumstances,
either membership category may give rise to an identity which
circumscribes an ethnic group. Once we acknowledge the potential
existence of both speech-group-based ethnicity and province-based
ethnicity as well, much of the confusion surrounding the variable
meanings of 'Gw6ngdiIng yahn' ethnicity is cleared up.
NATION, NATIONALITY, AND RELIGION
'Chinese' identity, of course, also exists on the more inclusive levels of
nation-state/society and nationality.14 On the national level Chinese
identity is accorded to all citizens of the Chinese nation-state while at
the same time there has long been a recognition of nationality
differences between China's Han majority and non-Han minority
groups. This nationality level, traditionally, also served as an outer
boundary of Chinese identity with 'Chineseness' associated almost
exclusively with Han Chinese and their culture. Although the problem of
'Han Chauvinism' is not as acute in today's China as it was in the recent
past, this potential level of Chinese identity is still very much an
important one, although in Hong Kong an equivalence of 'Chinese' and
'Han' identities is assumed.
Still another level has traditionally been recognized above the
provincial plane - the so-called 'regionalism' of Southerners versus
Northerners. Although Eberhard (1965:602) does indeed propose just
such a North/South dichotomy for China and even though Gw6ngdiIng
yahn do make a distinction between Southerners and Northerners, we
must be leery ofassuming, therefore, that ipsofacto this is a major factor
of Chinese ethnicity in all cases. It seems not to be in Hong Kong;
people do not discriminate along such lines. The key identity question is
not whether or not you are a 'fellow-Southerner' (as against 'those
Northerners') but whether or not you are a Gw6ngdiIng yahn. 1S Non-
Cantonese intuitively sense this basic fact oflife in Hong Kong and often
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feel a sympathy with 'other-province' groups, regardless of the location
of their homeland North or South of the Yangzi River.16
Regionalism therefore exists only as an abstract conceptual label and
does not serve as a basis for formation of 'Southern' or 'Northern'
Chinese ethnic groups in Hong Kong. 17 Although these broad regional
divisions of North and South China can be used to order one's
conceptual framework and data, such an exercise would be largely an
academic one. Our Hong Kong Chinese Ethnic Identity Levels Chart
(Fig. 2.3) thus retains Regionalism merely in a state ofbroken-line semi-
reality.
FUJIANESE IDENTITY
The concept of regionalism or regional groupings among China's many
ethno-linguistic groups is nonetheless still a valid concept since some
intermediate level is indeed necessary between nationality and ethno-
linguistic group. The provincial is one such level but not all identity
structures are mediated through a provincial identity; such is the case,
for example, for Hong Kong's Fujianese (Fiikgin yahn) community, as
will be seen below.
We have already seen the difficulties incurred in the use of the label
'Gwongdimg yahn', sometimes referring to an ethnolinguistic group,
sometimes to all the people in the province. The problem is even greater
with Fujian Province, for there no one ethnic group dominates the area as
do the ethnic Gwongdimg yahn in the province that bears their name. In
Fujian, three distinct group areas are recognized - Southern, Northern,
and Middle (or Western) - but none of these is acknowledged by the
others as the most typical or dominant Fujianese group. Two groups do,
however, claim preeminence and it is these two groups that are best
represented in Hong Kong's Fujianese community: Southern Fujianese
('Hahmuhn yahn') and Northern Fujianese ('Fiikjau yahn').18
This rivalry between the two groups reflects the fact that while wide
agreement exists among Gwongdung yihn that things as they are done in
Gwongjau are the most typically Cantonese - in language, customs, and
food - these is no such unanimity among Fujianese. Some Fujianese
point to their province's more rugged geography and the resultant
isolation of many districts as an explanation for the lack of strong
persistence of 'feudal' (Le. traditional or pre-modem) ways and local
attachments. This strong sense ofcounty or locality is unusual when one
considers that Gwongdimg yahn in Hong Kong cannot always identify
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what district or area of Gw6ngd-ung Province other ethnic Gw6ngd-ung
y:llm are from or even if the Gw6ngd-ung y:llm in question is a 'tuhng
Mung', i.e. someone who is also from or traces his descent from one's
home county.
Yet at the same time, Fujianese also recognize close links between
southern Fujianese and Northern Fujianese (due to similar customs and
a common provincial origin), and between Southern Fujianese and the
Chiu Jau population of eastern Gw6ngdimg (similar language, some
customs the same). At once more parochial (with greater emphasis on
the sub-provincial levels of identity), and more universalistic (with
feelings of ethnic kinship that cut across provincial boundaries),
Fujianese identity (in Hong Kong at least) obviously operates in a
manner significantly different from what a province-oriented Identity
Levels Chart (such as Fig. 2.3) would lead us to suspect.
THE REGIONAL GROUPING
The folk and anthropological recognition of broad cultural, linguistic
and historical similarities among some ofChina's many ethno-linguistic
groups introduces an important new element into our understanding of
Chinese ethnicity and identity. Such similarities among the Haakga of
Fujian, Guangdong and Jiangxi (Kiangsi) provinces and among the
southern Fujianese, Northern Fujianese and Chaozhou warrant our
clustering of these populations into two 'Regional Groupings', labeled
the Haakga and the 'Mahn'19 respectively.20
This new level of identity, however, does not fit neatly into our old
Hong Kong Ethnic Identity Levels Chart. The borders between these
regional groupings are not coterminous with provincial borders, so we
are forced to view Chinese identity from a different perspective - that of
the regional Grouping (see Fig. 2.4). This new domain immediately
helps us understand why Southern Fujianese were more adept at ethnic
identifications on the ethno-linguistic level while Gw6ngdimg y:llm
seemed to identify best at the provincial. In reality both are dealing with
the same level of identity, the ethno-linguistic. Since Gw6ngd-ung y:llm
comprise a dominant majority of Gw6ngd-ung Province, there is a close
correlation for them between provincial and ethno-linguistic
identification. For Fujianese, by contrast, no such ethnic people-
provincial equation could possibly exist; the Mahn regional grouping
extends over the borders of Fujian Province and Fujian itself is
populated by at least three component ethno-linguistic groups.
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This new perspective can perhaps also help us to deal with another
one ofHong Kong's many ethnic groups, the so-called 'Seunghoiyan'.21
Had we only the Provincial Domain ofFig. 2.3 to work with we would be
forced to place 'SeuhnghOi y3.hn' in our 'Northerners' box on the
Regional level. This would be misleading, as we have seen, because non-
Northerners, non-' SeuhnghOi y3.hn', do not identify or relate in any way
as 'Southerners'. Nor would arranging the 'Seuhngh6i yahn' according
to province of origin be any more accurate in describing these peoples'
Hong Kong ethnic identity. A far better solution would be to place the
'Seuhngh6i y3.hn' on the regional grouping level since in Hong Kong all
Central or Northern Chinese do indeed from a regional grouping similar
to that of the Malm, Gw6ngdling y3.hn and Haakga.
This tendency to discriminate at the regional grouping level is quite
strong in Hong Kong. A general homogenizing process has been in
operation in Hong Kong during the past few decades whereby county-
level differences among the Gw6ngdling y3.hn and others and even
ethno-linguistic barriers among those from Fujian Province are
gradually being overcome. The repeated insistence of Gw6ngdling
y3.hn on lumping all 'Mahn' together - over the vociferous objections of
the Fujianese ethno-linguistic groups22 - will perhaps even lead one day
to the emergence of a common 'Mahn' identity in Hong Kong. This
blithe violation of the supposed sacro-sancticity of Chinese 'speech
groups' should give pause once again to those who insist on viewing all
Chinese ethnic groups as language groups.
The regional grouping domain thus adds an important dimension to
our understanding of Chinese ethnicity. Existing on a conceptual plane
parallel to the provincial, the regional grouping domain offers both an
alternative classificatory scheme to social scientists and an increased
degree of identity choice to Chinese. Figure 2.5 sums up the potential
identity levels as they appeared in the 1970s and includes reference to
the cross-cutting non-ethnic identities ofoccupation, ideology, surname,
and specific locality.
HONG KONG MODEL OF ETHNICITY: TAKE TWO
Appearances of such charts and models to the contrary, however,
ethnicity is not a static phenomenon. Ethnicity, both as a dimension of
human life and as an intellectual construct, changes over time as it
reflects changes in society and in intellectual currents. Thus the first
model of Chinese ethnicity charted above (and its explication), while a
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useful guide to the Hong Kong realities of the mid and late 1970s, has
become outdated and needs revision. During the intervening two
decades since then, Hong Kong has begun to operate in a new macro-
reality and this has changed both ethnicity in Hong Kong and our
thinking about ethnicity. The 'opening' of China after the death ofMao
Zedong and the inauguration of the 'reform era' have combined with the
1984 Sino-British agreement on the return of Hong Kong to Chinese
sovereignty to change Hong Kong's ethnic equations and the way we
should think about Chinese ethnicity.
One change that seems called for is in our conceptualization of the
'national' level. In an era of three vigorous Chinese entities in the guise
of Taiwan and Hong Kong as well as the People's Republic, it seems
prudent to make recognition of an even greater level of connectedness
between all three legs of this triangle. This new conceptualization has
been dubbed 'Greater China' and seeks to focus us on the most inclusive
level yet, that of 'Chineseness' as a people. This category has strong
cultural referents and, in its most expansive definition, includes
Overseas Chinese as well.
There is an ambiguity surrounding this term, however. On the one
hand, it supersedes the three political entities that inhabit the Chinese
territorial universe. Yet on the other, if it is a culturally-based identity,
then the sense of commonality is more accurately described as a Han
Chinese ethnic identity, exclusive of the non-Han (or non-Chinese)
population elements in the three societies' populations. Figure 2.6 charts
the former sense of the term, while Figure 2.7, by inverting Levels One
and Two, attempts to indicate the term's narrower referents. Given the
emergence of new ethnically-based states such as Kazakhstan and
Kirgizstan on China's westernmost borders, it behooves us to ponder the
possibility that for the non-Han nationalities as well, nationality
identification might cross or encompass different societal boundaries.
The previous greater salience of the ethnolinguistic level in Hong
Kong also seems to have faded somewhat, with a complementary
increase at the societal level. Homogenizing factors at work in Hong
Kong include a higher percentage of the population being Hong Kong-
born, the continuing acculturative influence of Cantonese both
linguistically and socially, and the continuing prosperity of the society
as a whole. A richer, more influential, and world-class city has emerged
from the refugee entrepot of the 1940s and the second-class
manufacturing base of the 1960s, and with it the self-confidence of
the Hong Kong population has risen tremendously. The June 4th incident,
and the speculation, prospects, and problems surrounding '1997' have
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all joined to reinforce the feeling ofa separate Hong Kong identity, and
this has served to decrease the stress on other levels of identity.23
1997's creation of the new Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region means that Hong Kong will once again revise its sense of self
and its constituent identities. Without a doubt, a more integral role in
both the Chinese nation and in the Cantonese world of the Pearl River
Delta will recast old loyalties, boundaries, and identities. Will, for
example, we see a continuation ofHong Kong's ongoing integration into
Guangdong, with identity coherence following on the economic,
communications, and social linkages already in place? Perhaps the
decolonization process will mean that Hong Kong's high profile sense of
identity will begin to fade in the next generation as its citizens live their
lives as Chinese subjects in a south Chinese province and region.
Portuguese Goa followed just such a process or identity reintegration
after its sudden absorption by India over thirty years ago; perhaps Hong
Kong will too. Or will Hong Kong's ethnicity pattern follow that of the
Shenzhen Special Economic Zone, as large numbers of both high and
low prestige daaih luhk yahn (mainlanders) converge on the former
Crown Colony? In the nearby SEZ, these waishengren are undergoing a
rapid process of acculturation to Cantonese culture, all the while
reinvigorating the local economy, society and culture.
Given such possibilities, it is safe to say that a new Hong Kong
ethnicity model will emerge. Yet even so, it is likely that our seven levels
will endure as intertwining guidelines to the possibilities inherent in
Hong Kong Chinese identities (see Figure 2.8). Migrant populations
have inundated Hong Kong before; if the past is any guide to the future,
levels four and five should reassert themselves as continuing axes of
Hong Kong ethnicity.
CHINESE ETHNICITY
AND THE SEVEN LEVELS OF IDENTITY
Since ethnic group formation consists of the transformations of a
potential category of identification into the actual basis of group
interaction in a society (Charsely 1974:359; Cohen 1974:ix),24 Chinese
ethnic groups may emerge at any of these seven identity levels. Which
particular level becomes an ethnically significant one will depend on the
peculiar circumstances of a given location. Thus in the Overseas
Chinese communities of Southeast Asia levels one and six are often
invoked, in Hong Kong first level five and then level two, and in Xiamen
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City level seven. Ethnicity is not only a variably used resource (Cohen
1974: XV),25 it is fundamentally a variable and situational concept itself.
To the lasting vexation of anthropologists and students of Chinese
groups, there is no simple and ever-lasting 'Chinese ethnicity.' For every
Chinese place a different Chinese ethnic identity levels chart may very
well be required. Yet it will only be after many such ethnic mappings
have been carried out that we will get a clearer understanding of the
totality of Chinese ethnicities in all their subtleties.
NOTES
1 Among the many volumes dealing with Overseas Chinese, see especially
Purcell (1965), Skinner (1957), T'ien (1953) and Wickberg (1965) for
discussions of Chinese/Southeast Asian ethnic relations.
2 Ethnic differences between the Han majority and the non-Han minority
populations of China, like those differences between Overseas Chinese and
the natives of Southeast Asia, have long been noted and commented on
(Gladney 1991, Harrell 1990, Jankowiak 1993, Mosely 1966, Rin 1975,
Wiens 1953; see also Guldin 1991).
3 Such as Ward's (1965) delineation of the 'varieties of the conscious
(Chinese) model' and Crissman's (1967) analysis of the 'structural
principles' of Overseas Chinese community segmentation.
4 The Yale Cantonese romanization will be used for most Cantonese place names
and Hong Kong-based terms; where I feel the Pinyin Mandarin or another
rendering may aid identification, I will enclose that word in parentheses the
first time the new word is used. Thus Gw6ngdUng yahn (Cantonese); Fiikgin
yahn (Fujianese, Fukienese); and Chiu Jim yahn (Chaozhouren, Chiu Jim,
Teochiew). When referring to places or peoples outside of Gw6ngdUng
Province, however, the Pinyin Mandarin form will be used.
5 Those specifically interested in these very social science and historical
insights should consult Eberhard (1965) and Wiens (1953), among
others.
6 The term Gw6ngffiwa derives from the imperial era's Gw6ngffijim (Guangfu
Zhou, Guangfu Prefecture) centered around Gw6ngjim, here it designates
the 'Cantonese' language.
7 Since the late 1980s, this has begun to change, as schools and the media
have introduced Putonghua in preparation for the post-1997 reintegration of
Hong Kong with China.
8 Gwail6u, lit. Ghost fellow, has continued to carry derogatory valuation in
contrast to the more neutral 'sai yahn' or Westerner.
9 The terms 'Ah Cha' or 'Moluo Cha' are said to be derived from the Indian
migrant population's frequent use of 'bohut acha' which means very good
in 'Indian'.
10 See Guldin (1977a, 1977b, 1982, 1985) for a description of Hong Kong's
Fujianese community.
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11 The language tie though can not be pursued too strongly; Toisaanwa
(Taishan speech) and some other dialects are often unintelligible to the
standard Gw6ngdimgwa-speaker. And many Gw6ngjau yahn (the city
variety) vociferously object to including their non- Gw6ngjau City country
cousins in any category labeled 'Gw6ngjau yahn'.
12 Huang Shuping of Zhongshan University suggests we refer to this
ethnolinguistic Gw6ngdimg group as 'Gw6ngfu yahn'.
13 The reader should be aware that Figures 2.2, 2.3, and 2.4 are simplified. Full
mapping would require the addition of boxes on the provincial, ethno-
linguistic and county levels.
14 'Nationality' as used here follows current Chinese usage to distinguish
among the Han and the 50-odd 'minority nationalities' (sfu sok mahn juhk)
of the People's Republic. As such it does not carry precisely the same
meaning when used by political scientists to denote a people among whom
there exists a significant movement toward political, economic or cultural
autonomy (K. Deutsch 1966).
15 Crissman reports a parallel discrimination in other Chinese cities between
locals and other Chinese who are more or less 'foreign' (1967:201).
16 The Yangzi (Yang Tze) River is the traditional dividing line between North
and South China.
17 The case ofthe 'Northern Chinese' of Hong Kong, the so-called 'Seuhngho
i yahn', will be discussed below.
18 With the cities of HahmUhn (Xiamen; Amoy) and Fiikjau (Fuzhou; Foo
Chow), symbolically representing the two regions.
19 The word' Mahn' derives from the largest river in Fujian Province, the
Mahn, is also the one-character abbreviation for the province, and thus
seems appropriate as a title for this regional grouping (cf. Blake [1981] and
his term 'Hokkien').
20 Actually these groupings are even more composite entities than I explain
here. The Gw6ngdimgwa Hakka, for instance, are composed of distinct
populations, of Baoan Hakka, East River Hakka, Southwest Gw6ngdimg
Hakka, etc. The Mahn grouping, furthermore, should also include a group
that although it is not significant in Hong Kong, certainly belongs in any
comprehensive Mahn grouping: the ethnolinguistically-related Taiwanese.
21 'Seuhngh6i yahn' is actually a catch-all term in Hong Kong for all Central
and sometimes even Northern Chinese.
22 Those from Fujian Province resent being classified with the Chiu !au for
fear the lower social prestige of the Chiu Jau will adhere to all the Mahn
grouping. A similar process is at work in the USA, where dark-skinned
Caribbean migrant populations endeavor to establish identities distinct from
that of African-Americans.
23 The non-Chinese population has also changed significantly. Substantially
diminished in both numbers and influence, the British in their declining
days have seen the Americans and Japanese replace them as the key foreign
groups in business and society. Yet even these groups are dwarfed by the far
more numerous though lower prestige Filipino population, comprised
mostly of female domestic workers.
24 Arnold Strickon (personal communication) postulated just such a develop-
ment from the abstract/potential 'national population' category to both
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'collectivities' and 'ethnic groups'. For Chinese ethnicity such a
transformation is theoretically possibly on seven different identity levels.
25 Bailey (1969), Barth (1967) and others have spoken of how people
constantly evaluate the benefits gained by a reallocation of their time and
resources into newer or slightly different patterns. Ethnic decisions are
likewise often based on the shifting benefits of being 'Chinese' today,
'Fujianese' tomorrow, and 'from Xiamen' the next day (cf. Huang
1982:260).
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3BACK TO THE FUTURE
HERBAL TEA SHOPS IN HONG KONG
Cheng Sea Ling
My childhood memories of drinking herbal tea are associated with tears
and fierce fights with my grandmother. These ended in a bitter defeat
every time. Grandma, generally tolerant, would not have me leave a
drop of the herbal tea on the pretext that it was 'good for me'. Yet the
concoction - the epitome of bitterness in a matching colour of dark
brown - that has been brewing in the earthen clay pot for several hours
was in no way appealing to a child who had a sweet tooth. The old
saying, 'Bitter medicine is good medicine' never worked for me! Herbal
tea shops at that time were places where only the aged and the 'old-
fashioned' visited. However, herbal tea shops have emerged in the late
1980's as an arena for both 'traditional' and 'modern' health-conscious
people. Nowadays, even I occasionally pick up a bowl of the once-
horrifying 'twenty-four herbs' concoction to 'curb' my 'heat'.
This article seeks to portray the development of herbal tea shops in
Hong Kong in a period of rapid social and economic changes. Herbal tea
is an important part of Cantonese folk medicine. Its survival despite the
onslaught of scientism and modernism in the 1970's and 1980's is
evidence of the strong hold Chinese folk medicine has on peoples' lives
in Hong Kong. Now, in the 1990's, it has made a triumphant revival.
Consumption of herbal tea and visits to herbal tea shop have become a
culturally loaded act, a sign of one's social status, cultural and health
beliefs. Herbal tea shops in Hong Kong society have played many a role
that contributes to its people's health conditions, social cohesion, and
cultural identity. A brief social history of herbal tea shops, their image
and functions, reveals a most interesting process of identity negotiation
and construction among Hong Kong Chinese. It is my argument that the
revival of herbal tea shops, that reached a peak in the 1990's, is part of
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a nostalgic movement among Hong Kong Chinese. This nostalgia is a
reaction to the identity crisis that arises from the prospect of returning to
the 'motherland', after 150 years of British rule. To affirm their
Chinese identity, a romantic past has emerged to appeal to the
population. Herbal tea shops, reconstructed and re-identified, have
become part of this nostalgia, a yearning for a secure yesterday to
counter-balance an uncertain tomorrow.
HERBAL TEA THAT COOLS
'Herbal tea' is in fact not a literal translation - in Cantonese, it is called
leuhng chiih - 'cooling tea'. The name denotes its perceived effects of
eliminating too much heat in the body according to the Chinese medical
system. Balance is important in the cosmology of Chinese medicine and
should be maintained, according to the folk version, between
dichotomies of 'hot/cold' and 'wet/dry'. Imbalances would lead to
bodily discomforts or illnesses. Consumption of herbal tea is common
in the Southern parts of China where hot and humid weather
predisposes its inhabitants to 'overheating'.
The multiple uses of herbal tea makes this system easy to use and good
to think. Herbal tea is consumed to 'curb heat' - ching yiht when signs of
overheating like sore throats, indigestion, and pimples arise, or to
prevent imbalances of hei (such as after eating large quantities of 'hot'
food). Different effects are associated with the various herbal teas -
chrysanthemum tea and five-flower tea are assumed to be mildly
cooling, while sesame drink, sugarcane juice and sour plum juice are
good for promoting digestion, and since their effects are mild they can
also be taken simply as a drink. Twenty-four-herb tea is generally
perceived as strongly cooling and good for curing 'hot' diseases like flu
and fevers. Herbal tea is medicinal as well as thirst-quenching.
Herbal tea shops provide people who have not the time or resources to
attend long hours of boiling with a convenient means of self-medication
as well as a drink to quench thirst. The shops also operate as a public
venue. Set against these basic functions, the social history of herbal tea
shops is also closely interwoven with the development of Hong Kong
society.
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BEGINNINGS (1897-1945): THE LEGEND OF
WONG LO KAT
The importance of herbal tea shops during this period can be attributed
to the inaccessibility of other medicines for most inhabitants in the
colony, especially the Chinese population who were poor. Traditional
Chinese medicines like herbal tea and other herbal medicine, like those
distributed by the Taoist temple of Wong Tai Sin in its early days, which
were either very cheap or free, were welcomed by the needy masses.
During these early years, Hong Kong suffered various attacks of the
plague which caused thousands of deaths.
The name 'Wong La Kat' to Hong Kong people is synonymous with
herbal tea. Few know (myself included, before this study) that it is
actually a specific concoction of herbal tea. According to Ms. Wong,
director of Wong La Kat (International) Ltd., Wong La Kat was the first
herbal tea shop in Hong Kong registered in 1897 with the Hong Kong
government. Wong La Kat was the man who 'discovered' the
prescription for a herbal tea that cured all diseases and won so much
acclaim that he was summoned by the Qing Emperor Man Chung OJlf
3t*) who gave him the title of Imperial Doctor. His first shop was set
up in Guangzhou in 1853 under his own name. The first shop in Hong
Kong was located in Man Mo Temple in Chik Street.
Packaged tea was sold as 'Wong La Kat Medical Tea locally and
overseas to Europe, England, American, Holland and various ports of
the South Pacific' (Wong 1987:44). In 1915 the shop was moved to
Aberdeen Street. Both locations were in the area now called Central,
just a few streets away from the main road where most people lived and
where a lot of tea shops and restaurants could be found.
During the Japanese occupation, the shop's business increased as
'ordinary hospitals, both private and public, were fully occupied, and
most people could not afford the costs of private doctors, naturally they
come for a glass or two and bought some packaged tea home in case of
sudden needs'. Wong La Kat herbal tea was also used by the'Japanese
soldiers and their families who relied on Wong La Kat herbal tea to cure
diseases'(Wong 1987: 120).
Both before and during the war, health conditions were poor and
infectious diseases were rife and epidemics frequent and often fatal.
Those who managed to get themselves a space in the common two or
three-storey tenements had to put up with increasing overcrowding and
pollution. The Hong Kong Annual Report in 1938 describes how the
extension of the Sino-Japanese hostilities to South China during the
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year resulted in a still greater influx of refugees and led to further
'aggravation of the various public health problems such as
overcrowding, malnutrition and epidemic disease'(1938:23). The
number of residents per floor in the tenements went from twenty to
sixty. Overcrowding itself is considered a cause of heat, and coupled
with the poor health conditions, the accessibility of herbal tea made it
the natural guardian for all who believed in its effects.
It has been suggested by T. W. Chan (personal communication, 1995)
that the use of herbal tea was spread among the early migrants through
their kinship networks. The early settlers who had benefited from the
distribution and effects of herbal medicine introduced their newly
arrived kin into these practices and beliefs. The pattern of migration via
kinship networks thus facilitated the spread of herbal tea use.
It may be of interest to note that the rise of Wong Tai Sin, the 'Refugee
God' (Lang & Ragvald 1988,1993) began in a similar situation: the
provision of herbal medicine to the masses of poor people. Lang &
Ragvald (1988) found Wong Tai Sin a 'natural, if obscure, choice as a
patron god for a Taoist herbal medicine business' (1988:62) as he was
said to have successfully created a drug for immortality with cinnabar -
immortality being the major preoccupation of Taoists. Wong Tai Sin
thus started attracting his first local worshippers in one of the oldest
areas on the island - Wanchai. The number of his followers continued to
grow when the temple was moved to its present location in Kowloon in
1921. The practice of 'offering herbal medicine prescriptions from the
god, along with a limited supply of free medicine, brought a steady
growth in visitors, especially among the newer immigrants' during the
1929's and 1930's, thereby adding to the great appeal of Wong Tai Sin
(1993:44). The survival of the temple and its herbal medicine business
through the Japanese war was explained in terms of the god's
intervention. It has been interpreted by the temple historians, as well as
those who witnessed how the temple emerged from the destructions of
war relatively unscathed, that the god's protective might and blessings
have ensured the well-being of the temple and its neighbourhood.
The survival of Wong Tai Sin and Wong La Kat are both perceived as
miraculous, though the former has a much greater religious aura than
the latter. Herbal medicine has been important for these two institutions
in gaining popularity both before and after the war, when health
conditions were poor and health care facilities lacking. The herbal tea of
Wong La Kat, a secular establishment with no religious strings
attached, must have enjoyed a general appeal, including the followers of
Wong Tai Sin.
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THE GATHERING PLACES (1946-68)
This was a period of rapid population growth and intensified
urbanisation during which herbal tea became a 'social beverage'.
Herbal tea shops turned into popular settings for consorting with ones's
fellow patrons, similar to the rise of coffeehouses in the 16th-century
Near East studied by Hattox (1986).
Wong Lo Kat was quick to seize on the opportunity and expanded its
chain of shops in the most densely populated areas - four other branches
came into being between 1946-47 in Wanchai, Sai Ying Pun and
Queen's Road West on Hong Kong Island, and one in Shanghai Street
on Kowloon Peninsula. They also produced a new packaged herbal tea
which were convenient to carry, facilitating the spread of herbal tea.
Though official statistics are lacking before 1950, the first batch of
permits issued by the Urban Services Department in 1951 suggests that
many were already in operation before government regulation of these
establishments (Fig 1).
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FIGURE 1. Number of Permits in Force for Chinese Herb Tea Issued
by the Urban Services Department (Information obtained from the
Urban Council and Urban Services Statistical Reports).
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The number of herbal tea shops grew throughout the period - their
healthy growth being the result of strategic adaptations. To attract
business, herbal tea shops diversified their range of drinks and equipped
themselves with the newest inventions in the electronic media - the
radio in the 1940's, jukeboxes in the 1950's and television sets in the
1960's. These were all beyond most people's reach at the time. By
turning themselves into social and entertainment centres, herbal tea
shops attracted patrons from different generations and became popular
amongst the young. Higher income groups had their own exclusive
places.
The well being of the majority of people during the earlier part of the
period did not improve significantly - the population of 600,000 during
the Japanese occupation suddenly rose to 1,600,000 in 1946, and
another wave of refugee influx from the mainland in the early 1950's
continued to create tremendous pressure on local resources.
Overcrowding and health problems remained prominent issues the
Government had to deal with. Housing conditions in the 1950's-1960's
described by L. F. Goodstadt (1969) suggest that in spite of increased
government control and resettlement, housing standards for most were
still unsatisfactory on the tenement floors. Many occupants in the
cubicles had 'neither light nor ventilation'; ordinary daily routines like
cooking or washing became major problems. 'The cramped space in
which most families live restricts the activities of their members...The
poor conditions make the home very unattractive, and it is a place in
which members of the family spend as little time as possible - especially
in the summer'. The lack of reasonable housing drove people out of
their 'homes' but recreational facilities were also inadequate. So, for
these economically less advantaged people, herbal tea shops provided a
channel of escape from their humdrum lives by creating an easily
accessible and physically comfortable public place that connected them
with each other and the world at large. In this way herbal tea shops
played a socially integrating role.
By the 1950's, besides medicinal teas, a variety of health drinks
became available at herbal tea shops; five-flower tea, chrysanthemum
tea, almond drink, sesame drink were among the more well-known
ones. The popular turtle jelly (gwai lihng goU)1 was first introduced at
this time in the Shanghai Street Wong Lo Kat. People visited herbal tea
shops not only for the herbal tea, but also for the space, a seat, the
electric fan, and the radio. Ms Wong, the Director of Wong Lo Kat
(International) Ltd., recalls that journalists would sit in the shop for a
whole day with just one drink.
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Installations of radios since the late 1940's made herbal tea shops the
place to be for the common people for whom overcrowding was a
problem and for whom few other entertainments were available. The
Rediffusion (Hong Kong) Limited, franchised by the Government in
1948, operated a wired broadcasting system in the Colony. The Chinese
radio programmes offered plays, stories, concerts and Cantonese operas.
These broadcast programmes were immensely popular and available
through the tea shops at a low cost - 10 cents per drink. It was said by
one informant that football matches then were a major event, and people
at work might get permission to gather at herbal tea shops to listen to
live broadcasts of the matches. It was also a popular gathering place
everyday at 12 noon for the unemployed, the retired and housewives
who were loyal fans of the popular broadcast stories hosted by the
famous broadcaster Lee Ngo.
In the 1950's, jukeboxes in some herbal tea shops were a major
attraction for the younger generations. Many local Cantonese films
produced in this period featured trendy young people (men with a
slick-back hairstyle, folded-up shirt collars and women typically in
mini-skirts) socialising and dancing to western music from the
jukeboxes in herbal tea shops. Two of my informants recalled the herbal
tea shops with jukeboxes. One of them remembers, as a kid, following
her elder brother to the shop. She would have a drink of sugarcane
juice, chrysanthemum tea or almond drink, and insert a 10 cent coin
into the jukebox and select her choice. The other informant was unable
to spare the money to visit these shops but she vividly remembers these
scenes.
Television programmes were pioneered by Rediffusion in 1957, and
Wong La Kat shops were among the first to install television sets in their
shops in 1958-9.1 Programmes include presentations such as Cantonese
operas, dance orchestras, night-club acts, children's features, and
interviews'. There were also outside broadcasts of sports and special
events, and a local and international newsreels each evening. The rental
fee of $55 per month for both service and maintenance of the set was too
great for most people2• Therefore, herbal tea shops became the natural
choice for those who yearned for a glimpse of their own society and the
outside world transmitted through television. Ng Ho, lecturer at the
Department of Journalism and Communications in Hong Kong Baptist
University, recalled his own youthful days in the 1960's, as one of many
who were still living in tenement housing: 'We loved watching
television. Very few people have their own TV sets, I remember
standing outside the room of our landlady's and peeped through the
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door gap to watch television. She was the only one in the house to have
a TV set. Otherwise, I would run to the herbal tea shops and pay 10 cents
for a drink of almond tea and watch television there.'
According to Matthew Turner, Hong Kong people in the late 1960's
had developed 'an identity of life-style, a shared recognition of similar
self-images, real or desired, of existential choices, from food to
education, that had to be made now that Hong Kong people could no
longer be guided either by Chinese tradition, or Chinese
modernity'(1994:4). Hong Kong before the 1960's was a transit lounge
for goods as well as of people, not the ultimate place to settle in or to be
identified with. Yet the development of a local manufacturing and
export economy, the Chinese Manufacturers' Exhibition of Hong Kong
Products that was only second in scale to the Chinese New Year, the
gradual improvements of both private and public housing, the media
productions that increasingly drew on the local way of life, the exposure
through trade and media to the international world and western ways of
life as models of modernity, all stimulated a complex discourse on Hong
Kong identity that people in the Colony began to negotiate. These
struggles over a Chinese identity culminated after 1967 in a painful
rejection of China when communist virulence was exposed during the
Cultural Revolution. For those who could afford to among the first
generation of local born, their search for a modern identity thus took off
in the 1970's. However, with the gradual realisation of this goal, the
popularity of herbal tea shops fell to its lowest ebb as Hong Kong took
off in its search for modernity.
A MODERN METROPOLIS WITHOUT
HERBAL TEA SHOPS (1969-84)
In 1969, Hong Kong's first satellite earth station enabled direct telecasts
between Hong Kong, the United States and other countries (1969 Hong
Kong Report). It was a fitting symbol of Hong Kong's entry into the
global market. This was a period which saw Hong Kong's rise as an
international city and its people were making every effort to be modern.
In this context, it is interesting to note how the number of herbal tea
shops took a downward turn in 1969 from 306 to 295, not a significant
decrease but the beginning of a continuous decline which continued
right into the late 1980's. The social functions of herbal tea shops that
had been so prominent in the past decades were progressively taken over
by the family and other entertainment establishments. More
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importantly, its 'traditional roots' led to its marginalization in the
march towards a metropolitan identity.
The Government committed itself to large scale projects for the
improvement of social conditions. Town planning and urban renewal
were vigorously carried out. A ten-year housing programme which
pledged to provide public housing to half of the population was
declared in 1972. The living environment as well as economic
conditions rapidly improved for most people.
Television sets evolved from a luxury into a necessity for the
household in the burgeoning economy of the 1970's. The first wireless
television broadcast station - Hong Kong Television Broadcasts Ltd
(HK-TVB) began regular broadcasts in November, 1967. By 1969,
'nine out of ten Hong Kong homes are reached by broadcasting services
and approximately one in three has a television set' (Hong Kong Report
1969:240-241). Television gradually became part of everyday life. The
times when one had to go to herbal tea shops to watch TV had gone.
Entertainment establishments increased in number and variety -
bowling centres and dancing parties were more common, discotheques
were the 'hippest' place to be after the mid-1970's.
Icons of modernity like McDonald's arrived in 1974, followed by
other similar fast food chains like Kentucky Fried Chicken and Burger
King. The modern, American decor and immaculately clean
environment of these eateries were symbols of the modern world. Those
who had benefited from the economic boom were willing to spend more
for the better - epitomised by having 'western meals' like steaks on hot
grills served at the table.3 Other eateries found success by resorting to
ostentatious decor, and expensive and exotic tastes - the Jumbo Floating
Restaurant is a clear illustration, while hotel grill rooms were the place
for the 'westernised' and, certainly, well-off. Cuisines from other Asian
countries, in particular Vietnam, Thailand and Japan, also found their
own niche in the local market in the 1980's. This culinary expansion of
the local palate demonstrated the growth of Hong Kong as a
metropolitan city.
There was a tendency to believe that 'All that is modern is good',
which became the driving force of Hong Kong society during this
dramatic period. The good things were increasingly within the reach of
those who had attained or believed in the prospects of upward mobility.
The eating out culture of HK people embarked on a vigorous path of
diversification. The significance of food consumption as a
demonstration of wealth, knowledge and status is increasingly seized by
those who have benefited from the economic boom. The decline of
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herbal tea shops was a result of changing perceptions - in this context of
immense diversification and modernisation - and its products were
something from the past which had not caught up with the times and
thus were relegated to the sidelines.
In the 1970's, the formation of a modern Hong Kong identity as
distinct from mainland Chinese or Taiwanese, could be discerned in the
media. Cantonese pop songs (pioneered by Sam Hui) triumphed over
mandarin pop songs and gained popularity with lyrics that marked a
local identity and a common aspiration. Television series represented
Hong Kong's success as a result of its hardworking, intelligent and
virtuous people. AHong Kong identity distinct from mainland Chinese
was clearly visible by 1979 when the television character of a mainland
immigrant 'A Can' was ridiculed as a dumb and greedy country-
pumpkin. The sense of identification with the mainland before the late
1960's had vanished. It was 'a historical movement between genuine
attempts to accommodate political refugees from China following 1949
and later resentment of economic migrants from the Mainland who
became objects of mirth.' The pejorative stereotyping of Mainlanders
evident in the'A Can syndrome' arose out of a new local consciousness
(Cheng Yu 1985 & 1990 in Lilley 1993:278).
The period was a time of rationality and scienticism, of economic
expansion and the accumulation of wealth, of conspicuous consumption
and consumerism - these were the dominant discourses on modern life
that were fundamentally opposed to the folk traditions as represented by
herbal tea shops. It was also a time when the boundary between the
public and the private was strengthened - increased self-sufficiency of
the household in terms of space and resources made public space less
necessary and attractive. Herbal tea shops as public spaces and herbal
tea as a symbol of the traditional suffered serious setbacks in the course
of Hong Kong's search for a modern identity.
IN SEARCH OF CHINESENESS: 1985-PRESENT
In this period, we can see a return of herbal tea shops in a conspicuously
'Chinese' image, particularly strong in the 1990's. Their revival could
be seen in the light of rising health consciousness, a yearning for
enchantment in the metropolis, the rise of an eating-out culture that
interacts with a changing family meal pattern, and surrounding all of
these, a search for Chinese cultural identity.
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Revival and reformation of herbal tea shops
Concerns for health have been swarming into the local scene from
various directions and cumulated in a call for the return to the natural
from 1980's onwards, increasing in scale and influence ever since. A
denunciation of MSG gave rise to some restaurants and products
marketing themselves as 'MSG-free'. Calls for a diet with more fibre,
less sugar and less fat were found in all kinds of media and daily talk
about food. Healthy eating has become part of the modern Hong Kong
lifestyle.
Clever entrepreneurs have made use of these new concerns for the
body and created a whole new image for herbal tea shops. A modern,
hygienic image was designed for Wong La Kat's first shop in the
1980's. In 1987, Wong La Kat (Ltd) Co. aimed at building an image
'like an ordinary place serving drinks', explains its current director, Ms
Wong. It deliberately de-emphasized the medicinal effects of herbal tea.
Ms Wong points out, 'People might think, 'why should I drink herbal
tea, I'm not sick!' When I first started the shop business, I was not so
sure about the market. Even though people accept Chinese medicine,
maybe they are very specific about the prescription, they might not just
come in for a drink.' It may be for the same reason that the term
'medical tea' has been replaced by 'herbal tea' on the package of Wong
La Kat's products. Moreover, Ms Wong also admits that since their
brand is very well-known, it is not necessary to be emphatic about the
medicinal qualities of the drink. To retain its 'traditional' image, Wong
La Kat continues with its old practice of giving sweet preserved plums
to those who have had the bitter taste twenty-four herb tea.
Popularisation of herbal tea started in 1985 with Wong La Kat herbal
tea ching leuhng chiih as ready-to-drink box drinks, available in
supermarkets and convenience stores. This further buttressed the role of
herbal tea as soft drinks, originally composed only of chrysanthemum
tea in the packaged drinks business, bringing in a Chinese element onto
the shelves filled with carbonated beverages. Furthermore, Wong La
Kat, followed by others such as Sung Mau Tai (~[Jt:*), produced a
variety of instant herbal tea with different medicinal effects, often
specified on the packages or elaborated with a separate sheet, the latter
frequently emphasising the historical pedigree of the prescription.
Honey herbal () Ilffi[tl:IJ~!I:), Cane and Carrot Juice Ct:tj(tt~rr) etc.
are some of the versions available, as a modern counterpart to those
from the mainland with quality packaging as guarantee of hygiene and
modernity, thus more appealing to the urban middle class who pay for
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both the effects and image.
Contrary to the older brand, the new wave of herbal tea shops in the
1990's has tried in various ways - naming, decor and product
diversification - to establish themselves as part of Chinese cultural
heritage while maximising business. These new players in the game do
not have the long-established reputation of Wong Lo Kat or Kung Wo
Tong to guarantee success, and it is necessary to make their name by
accommodating the changing health, cultural and social needs of the
people.
Naming
Names reminiscent of a traditional world are used - 'Hui Lau Shan',
which was a famous herbal tea shop in Yuen Long before the 1970's, or
Hung Fook Tong (~ijji1it), Tung Chi Tong (['i'l)W:i1it)4 , or a famous
charitable Chinese clinic Po Chi Lam (Wz>tf) situated in Fo Shan (1~
U-!).
Curiously, the last is a chain started by a famous film star Kwan Tak
Hing (gtf,~)well known for his role as Wong Fei Hung (Wm~), the
Chinese kung-fu expert as well as medical practitioner who ran the
clinic Po Chi Lam. The character is well-known for his expertise in
martial arts as much as his virtues as a righteous, disciplined, humble
master of charity. Ms Lee, one of the directors of Po Chi Lam, says that
the shops are intended to carryon the charitable nature of the original
Po Chi Lam by providing Chinese medicine to people. Suffice to note
that the names of herbal tea shops are designed to remind us of their
Chinese origins.
Decor
There are chiefly two styles which herbal tea shops adopt: the dominant
one assumes the look of a family main hall. Motifs of Chineseness, like
golden dragons, are frequently used. The names of the shops are often
golden-plated on a wooden tablet and hung high at the centre of the
shop's front. Agolden bell-shaped Taoist urn is found in many of them.
The Taoist concerns of longevity and alchemy are evoked with these
urns known for brewing medicine. This motif, though present in some
old herbal tea shops like Kung Wo Tong, has not been a prominent
feature in the past.5 Wood features strongly in the whole makeup of the
shop furniture, the walls and the arches. Two rhyming couplets in
Chinese calligraphy articulating the 'spirit' of the shop can be seen in a
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number of shops. Chinese paintings may also be seen in the shop.
The other style foregrounds Nature, suggesting a rustic life of peace
and simplicity. The Best Herbal Tea Shop chain displays medicinal
herbs in various ways - in glass cabinets or large glass tubes, depending
on individual shop size - but the message is that they are faithful to the
original use of Chinese medicinal herbs. There is also a running
waterwheel at every shop's front, constantly on the move, suggesting a
life of harmony with Nature. Together with the dominant green shade,
as well as the use of fake tree trunks as seats, a sense of tranquillity and
Nature is created as one consumes the drink among the herbs displayed.
It is a place where enchantment in a 'disenchanted world' (Weber) can
be found.
We should also note that these herbal tea shops have adopted an open
design - no doors to push open as people enter. This is so in spite of the
fact that air-conditioning is provided in all of them. Unlike the new
restaurants of the 1970's with their conspicuous stickers on their doors
that read 'Air conditioning -Please close doors!'. This openness is
suggestive of a communal life in a friendly neighbourhood. The
removal of the physical barrier of doors attempts to symbolise a world
without suspicion and few social barriers. It is an attempt to create the
old tea-shop kind of atmosphere whereby the customers could sit and
watch as life went buzzing by out on the streets. In the actual operation
of the shop, however, customers are not as welcome as in the pre-
modern era to linger on in the shop. The manager of Po Chi Lam says,
'It's not so good for a customer to sit for half an hour with only one
drink, we need more business.' The atmosphere is, thus, an illusion
rather than a genuine attempt to induce communality.
Such decor tries to stimulate a leisurely pace of life for its customers
by making reference to the lives of the old literati, to a traditional and
sophisticated way of life, and to a harmonic coexistence with Nature. It
is an appeal to modern urban dwellers who desire a break from the
hubbub of everyday life.
Products
Diversity is a must for those who want to survive fierce competition.
Diversity and syncretisation govern the expansion of herbal tea shops.
Besides the basic types of herbal tea, all new herbal tea shops have
added new drinks or snacks to their list - items that would have
surprised people who frequented herbal tea shops in the 1950's. Some
feature fruit juices and desserts - Hui Lau Shan being the most
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successful, along with their famous sago fruit mix. They managed to
expand between 1992-94, on a franchise basis, to almost 40 branches.
Others also try to enhance their repertoire of traditional items with fruit
desserts. Variations on a theme can be seen as new drinks and new
desserts made with different herbs can be found in every shop. Po Chi
Lam introduced a drink of Papaya Milk with gei ji. American ginseng
with turtle jelly is currently the main marketing item for a number of
chains.
Health is the dominant theme in this diversification, and so herbal tea
shops are clearly a case of the localisation of the global health trend.
Alongside aerobic dance, the bestseller book Fit for Life, diet and
slimming programmes, MSG-free cuisine and vegetarianism, herbal tea
shops have found their niche in the rising health consciousness by
drawing on traditional Chinese medicine and health concepts and
. placing them side by side with items perceived as 'western foods': in
this case, the fresh fruit desserts.6 Epitomised in the advertising slogan
of Tung Chi Tong, 'Chinese medicine of Han formula, Fresh Fruit
Delicacies', the new herbal tea shops' survival need to cater for the
syncretic beliefs and needs of the consumers. The interest in and
recognition of Chinese medicine in modem Hong Kong are rapidly on
the rise in the run-up to 1997.
Herbal tea shops? The case of Hui Lau Shan
Hui Lau Shan has been the most prominent of all among Chinese herb
tea permit holders. Its first shop was founded in Yuen Long before the
1970's, most famous for its turtle jelly. In the 1990's, its arrival in
Causeway Bay, one of the busiest business districts on Hong Kong
island, as a herbal tea shop was accompanied by the introduction of
fresh fruit desserts with sago. The fresh fruit sago business has become
synonymous with Hui Lau Shan,which has claimed to be the creator of
'fresh fruit sago mix Ci§EU~*[9*ii),. Their business has also
expanded into selling 'handmade beef balls'. The diversification of its
products from turtle jelly and herbal tea to fresh fruit sago mix and
related desserts, and now to beefballs, has led to an 'identity crisis' in
1994.
It has established itself more as a fruit and dessert shop than a herbal
tea shop. The display of fresh fruits and the counter with blenders filled
with different fruit juices in every shop is a far cry from herbal tea shops.
Many of those who have visited Hui Lau Shan are not even aware of the
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availability of twenty-four herb tea and turtle jelly. Others said they
would go to other shops for these traditional items for Hui is only good
for desserts. Few recognise it as a herbal tea shop and as one of my
informants pointed out that the Taoist urn is not present anymore.? Hui
Lau Shan has marginalized herbal tea to a self-service counter which is
obviously designed to discourage people from consuming drinks
(HK$5-10) inside the shop, saving seats for those who are paying much
more for the fruit desserts (HK$20-35).
Shops like Hui Lau Shan and Po Chi Lam are no longer just places for
herbal tea. They have turned into health food halls that combine the
provisions of a herbal tea shop, a fruit stall and a dessert shop
- businesses that were previously distinct. They are places to visit in
between shopping trips, after the movies or after a meal. The peak of
business is often after lunch and dinner for most herbal tea shops in
business districts, plus afternoon tea time in the shopping districts. The
popularity of these new 'snack' shops reflect changes in the meal
patterns of Hong Kong people. Between-meal eating activities have
become much more popular in Hong Kong, particularly desserts. The
spread is also a reflection of changing trends of consumerism. The new
herbal tea shops have in fact grown on the fertile grounds laid by chain
dessert specialty shops like Daniel (1fx.frJj-ft) with simple, practical
design and small shop size that serve a mixture of traditional Chinese
desserts (almond paste, sesame paste, and other sweet soups) and fresh
fruit desserts (mainly sago with fruits, fresh fruit and milk drinks). Hui
Lau Shan and others have incorporated these snacks in addition to
herbal tea to cater for the consumers' palate, eating patterns (increased
consumption of snacks), modern health concerns, as well as demand for
stylish decor. The final triumph of these desserts by overshadowing the
sale of herbal tea illustrates their greater popularity as well as
profitability. This further encourages the shopowners to develop their
products in the direction of snacks rather than drinks.
At the same time, Hui Lau Shan is facing a 'crisis of identity' because
it has violated the Urban Services Department's regulations on herbal
tea shops.8 However, diversification is, as explained by the director of
Po Chi Lam, a necessary survival strategy in view of the high rents.
They have to risk breaking regulations in order to sustain business.9 On
the other hand, this 'identity crisis' compels us to look into the revival
of herbal tea shops as such. There is more to it than the resilience of
beliefs in Chinese folk medicine. People obviously go there for things
other than just herbal tea. The statistical growth of herbal tea shops
would look very different without Hui Lau Shan, which has deviated
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from official as well as popular conceptions of herbal tea shops. The
case of Hui Lau Shan makes it necessary to look at the popularity of
these shops in another light.
NOSTALGIA AND CULTURAL IDENTITY
Herbal tea shops may signify a modern sentimental yearning for the
past. We should note that these ethnic 'establishments are designed for
local Chinese rather than tourists: the English language and
non-Chinese visitors are conspicuous by their absence from these shops.
The boundary between Chinese and foreigners in popular eateries is
probably strongest in these outlets. Are they part of a 'romantically
sanitised version of Chinese history' (Lilley 1993:267) which does not
have to be authentic as long as it shows us what a Chinese herbal tea
shop should be and what this Chineseness is idealised as? Echoes may
be found in Lilley's analysis of television in Hong Kong (1993) about
the 'defence of "Chinese culture'" through production of old costume
films or serialisation of Chinese novels and stories,
an idealist preoccupation with authentic origins, stereotypes which
endow present reality with, to borrow a phrase from Jameson, 'the
spell and distance of a glossy mirage.
(Lilley 1993:267)
Similarly, herbal tea shops are no longer 'old-fashioned' or backward
- they have been renewed and transformed through our embracing of
nostalgia. And as Robert Nisbet writes: 'Nostalgia tells us more about
present moods than about past realities' (cited in Davis 1979: 10).
As television productions indicate, herbal tea shops are not alone in
this move 'back to the future'. Nostalgic eating has been found in other
parts of our food culture since the late 1980's and has become more
prominent in the past few years. 'Ah Yee Leng Tong' is one of the first
popular Chinese restaurants to have a traditional decor and a detailed
account of the medicinal effects of soups in their menus. The upmarket
congee restaurant 'Big Bowl' and the dessert and snack shop 'Sweet
Dynasty' have decor and advertisements with a distinctively Chinese
flavour - shop logos using Chinese calligraphy or in the form of a
sculpted name chop, posters with Chinese woman dressed in cheuhng
saam complemented by waitresses in similar dress code, not to mention
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wooden tablets and furniture - that appeal to our nostalgia for
'something Chinese'. Quotations from Chinese classics in their
publicity material are used to illustrate their virtues. 'Yat Chau Health
Restaurant' - with its own restaurant, its own Chinese herbalist
stationed there to consult and prescribe, and its own herbal medicine
shop - is an institutionalization of the Chinese concepts of health and
diet, proclaiming a legitimate status for Chinese medicine not available
at the governmental level. Nostalgic decor is not only found in eateries,
a high class department store has adopted the look of an old Shanghai
tailor shop and the name of 'Shanghai Tang', using simplified Chinese
characters as another means to convey its 'Chineseness'. This in itself is
ironic since simplified characters were not in use in those pre-
communist days. Furthermore, age-old brands like Two Girls perfume
have been revived and are building up their own market in the fierce
competition with international labels. Though equipped with a modern
logo, the old posters with two Chinese girls in cheuhng saam are the
chief marketing tools. Pulling itself out of obsolescence, Two Girls
Brand has found acceptance in modern Hong Kong by bringing in a
diversity of new products under its traditional image, selling them in
super-mallS like the Times Square. The new herbal tea shops are
definitely not alone in this return to the 'past'. Significantly, director of
Po Chi Lam insists that the decor of their shops is not a return to the
past, but part of the 'new trend'.
The 'Chinese' image is more important than the content for these
enterprises. In this context, it seems that food has become secondary -
whether the tea or dessert in herbal tea shops does have its proclaimed
effects are not a matter of central concern; it is the 'Chineseness' of the
consumption experience that is cherished. Similarly, the authenticity of
the reference to elites drinking tea or having desserts in such a way
needs no validation. The important thing is that we are having a taste of
an idyllic past and of the 'roots' of our culture, that we are finally
coming to terms with our Chinese identity. The full page advertisement
of Shanghai Tang, the newly opened department store, succinctly
articulates this in their captions:
Grab Hold of The Image-nation of Sino-Centrism,
With a Clear Direction To Have an Auspicious opening.
~~*$~~~~~~~~~'~M~~~~~*~o
(Ming Pao 4/3/1995)
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Hundred Flowers Bloom, Hundred Fabrics Together,
Hundred Goods and Gifts, Hundred Colour Revolt.
B~~~'B~X$oB~m~'B~m~o
(Ming Pao 5/3/1995)
Juxtaposing Chinese folk ideas of suspiciousness and nationalism, the
consumerist ideal and revolutionary slogans, against a background with
marching young revolutionaries in a flowery frame is a clever mixture
of the competing discourses in contemporary Hong Kong. The appeal is
designed specifically to the Chinese population in Hong Kong (and
maybe, the relevant authorities), for the English copy has little of this
mixture with the caption, Joyful Shop Now Swollen to Great Size, Put
Your Foot in It (South China Morning Post 4/3/1995) and Please View
Our Honest and Sophistication Products from Very Long Range (South
China Morning Post 5/411995). What the press says about Shanghai
Tang also applies to herbal tea shops, and other 'nostalgic' enterprises,
traditional Chinese products served up with a modern, funky spin and
set in an atmosphere of Old World Chinese elegance.
(South China Morning Post 25/2/1995)
I find in this 'new trend' an active reconstruction of the 'past', a kind of
fantasy world in which Hong Kong people could find an affirmation of
their Chinese identity.
Why has this nostalgic movement emerged at such a time? What does
this nostalgia tell us about 'present moods'? Interestingly, the revival of
herbal tea shops started slowly in 1985, a year after the signing of the
Joint Declaration, and has been gathering much momentum in the past
few years -in the run-up to 1997 and in a time of extreme uncertainty
under strained relations between the Chinese and British governments.
In the words of Davis (1979), the Hong Kong people are experiencing
an 'identity discontinuity'. Chineseness which was identified as an
obstacle to modernisation is now being re-evaluated and appreciated in
the light of the handover. Hong Kong people are to become Chinese
people and not British subjects after more than 150 years of British rule.
A Hong Kong metropolitan identity has to be negotiated with its
Chinese 'roots'. It is a collective identity crisis and a collective search
for identity. Chinese systems of knowledge about the cosmos like
geomancy, astrology, tung seui, have sprung up from the depths of
popular culture to become dominant discourses in our search for
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meaning in the present - such as in the ghost train advertisement
discussed by Grant Evans in the pages below.
That there is no active discovery of what contemporary China has to
offer is a sign of reservation about the impending identity. What is being
retrieved from the archives of Chinese culture is the apparently familiar
and the folkloric, an indefinable past that all Chinese is expected to
recognise because of its apparent familiarity and strong Chinese
essence. It is not a nostalgia of a specific past, like that in the United
States in the 70'SIO that found the world of the 50's a comforting realm,
and an affirmation of their identities. Those who are most affected by
the uncertainty of the transition, namely the younger generations whose
futures are closely bound up with the political future of Hong Kong, are
also the most active participants in the nostalgia. They are also the
generations who have been brought up to recognise the 'Chineseness' as
represented by herbal tea, the wooden arches, the furniture and Taoist
urns. It is a collective nostalgia removed of any political or nationalistic
sentiments or content. Decolonisation in Hong Kong has failed to bring
about the usual joys in the prospects of rediscovering a national identity.
There is little to rejoice over for Hong Kong people who are uncertain
and worried about the future. It is an exceptional case in the history of
decolonisation in which even the hope of autonomy and self-rule after
the colonialists departed is never seriously entertained. When reality
has little to offer, it seems, Hong Kong people take the active step to
search for the folkloric and idyllic.
I agree with Davis (1979) that 'nostalgic evocation of some past state
of affairs occurs in the context of present fears, discontents, anxieties, or
uncertainties', and that nostalgia is an attempt 'to abort or, at the very
least, deflect' the threat of identity discontinuity (Davis 1979: 108). In
the attempt to minimise havoc in the transition of sovereignty, the
return to Chinese roots is not one without its doubts or suspicion.
CONCLUSION
One can picture the little Wong Lo Kat herbal tea shop, situated near the
Man Mo Temple a century ago, standing as the guardian of the masses
who had few other means to manage their lives besides the shop's
miraculous concoction of herbs. The ecology of the colony made herbal
tea a much needed means of self-medication when institutional
provisions were seriously inadequate and living conditions deplorable.
Bodily balance of 'hot', 'cold', 'wet' and 'dry' were practically the only
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guidelines along which the Chinese could govern their lives by, and
herbal tea was the most convenient and accessible means for
maintenance of health.
Having survived the war side by side with their patrons, herbal tea
shops pioneered by Wong Lo Kat spread vigorously by opening more
shops and producing packaged teas for sale. In order to attract business,
herbal tea shops established themselves as social and entertainment
centres for the majority who lacked a private space. By bringing people
of different origins into the same venue, herbal tea shops contributed to
the integration of community who shared a common plight of poor
living and working conditions. Yet by exposing them to the modern
world through the electronic media, herbal tea shops participated in
their own downfall and they were abandoned during the colony's search
for modernity in the 1970's to search for modernity, pioneered by the
first generation of local born people.
In the construction of a metropolitan Hong Kong identity, traditional
Chineseness had to be abandoned in favour of the international and the
modern. It was not until the mid-1980's that a revival of herbal tea
shops began as part of the search for identity at a time of intense
uncertainties. The representation of herbal tea shops as part of
traditional Chinese culture explains their popularity among a
population eager to mark themselves as Hong Kong Chinese before the
handover to the Communist Chinese government.
Representations of a past before Communism collapse the problem of
national identification and objections to the present regime. It is an
aesthetic mode which mesmerises with the comfort of continuity,
which demands little engagement with the dilemmas of current
experience.
(Lilley 1993:267)
Maybe it is a kind of escapism, but one with good cause at a time of
significant transition. Chinese medicine and its related practices like
geomancy have re-emerged as 'positive, desirable cultural symbols'
(Wu 1979:29) in the decade before 1997 for the Chinese nationals-to-
be who have found in a romantic past an ideal to which their identity
can lay claim.
Herbal tea is a symbol of the Chinese folk system of beliefs and
practices. The uses of herbal tea shops have been engaged in a
continuous process of construction, maintenance and negotiation of
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Hong Kong identity. Herbal tea shops are a reflection of the increasing
prominence traditional Chinese medicine has gained in the few years
before the return to China, where Chinese medicine enjoys legitimacy
within the state. More importantly, herbal tea shops 'dramatised' for us
the vigorous processes of a cultural identity construction at a time of
rapid social and political changes, when the impending national
identity is regarded with suspicion and uncertainty. Hopes and fantasies
about the future are thus displaced to the cultural realm. Nostalgia as
manifested in the new herbal tea shops, among other businesses, is a
perfect illustration of Davis's argument that: 'nostalgia is a distinctive
way...of relating our past to our present and future...nostalgia is deeply
implicated in the sense of who we are, what we are about, and...whither
we go' (Davis 1979:31).
NOTES
Information from the Hong Kong Report 1958 shows that there were 2,500
subscribers at the end of 1958. Information from the Cost of Living Survey
1958-63/4 conducted and published by the Hong Kong Commerce and
Industry Department Statistics Branch shows that there were 10,834
television subscribers among 680,000 households in 1961.
2 Asemi-skilled worker earned $4-$8 a day in 1958 (Hong Kong Report 1958).
3 In the 1970's, going to a western-style restaurant was an event in itself and
children (like myself) regarded it as a treat, and were usually taken there as
some sort of reward.
4 The word tong means hall, as used in chi tong - ancestral hall.
S These Taoist urns could not be found in pictures of Wong La Kat in the
1940's and 1950's.
6 Health and fitness advice, chiefly from the American nutritionists and
publishers, emphasize the need to gain vitamins and fibre in their most
natural forms, as in fresh fruits.
7 Actually, I managed to locate the 'original' Hui Lau Shan in Causeway Bay.
It has the Taoist urn, but it is obscurely placed behind a rubbish bin of about
the same height, next to the side door rather than the shop's front.
8 The Urban Services Department has regulations that specify twelve items
that can be sold in licensed Chinese herbal tea shops. Hui Lau Shan and
similar shops have violated this regulation by selling things beyond the list,
thus turning themselves into a 'restaurant' which would require a range of
renovations and expansions in order to comply with the minimum
requirements for restaurant size and availability of washrooms.
9 During the interview, the director of Po Chi Lam told me that the two
desserts cabinet would be removed the following day to prepare for an Urban
Services Department inspection. However, the menus which have a long list
of desserts and other non-herbal-tea items would not be removed because,
'they won't be that strict'. So, one can observe that the regulations are not
readily invoked to penalise illegitimate businesses of herbal tea shops.
IOThe nostalgia in the US in the 1970's takes place when the country is
engaged in a period of rapid changes and a crisis of identity.
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4OF MIMICRY AND MERMAIDS
HONG KONG AND THE
DOCUMENTARY FILM LEGACY
Philip Robertson
I feel I am a broker conducting the biggest deal between history
and the future. Among those who live in Hong Kong at this time,
who doesn't?
Popular songwriter Luo Dayou!
'Plover Cove Reservoir' (1962) is a typical black and white newsreel
from the Hong Kong Today series produced on a monthly basis during
the 1960s by the film-making arm of colonial Government, the Hong
Kong Film Unit. In keeping with the magazine item's prosaic title, for
most of its five minute duration the commentary matter-of-factly
describes the engineering processes involved in reclaiming a small inlet
from the sea to create a freshwater lake, then the film draws to a close
with a nightsequence ofmen on board a small fishing trawler hauling in
nets. 'After the seawall is built and as the salt water is being pumped
out,' the Cantonese voice-over explains, 'Government workers prepare
to clean the basin by trawling for small fish and other marine life,
working day and night.' Suddenly, out of the darkness, a young woman
rises unnoticed from-the black water and climbs aboard; she is naked
from the waist up, her long hair covering her breasts, and from the waist
down she wears a scaly fishtail costume. In the reverse angle shot which
follows, a worker turns from handling the nets and catches sight of the
mermaid, now reclining on the net-strewn deck; in medium close shot,
he registers astonishment and delight. As ifunsure whether the worker's
amateur acting has made the point of the scene strongly enough, the
commentary spells it out: 'Is it a dream or the real thing?' The film then
cuts back to a wide shot of the mermaid, who smiles coyly and extends
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her arms in invitation. As if in response to the question, and affIrming an
answer in favour of reality, the fIsherman jumps into the frame to
embrace the mermaid. On this note the sequence and with it the news
item itself fades to black.
The audience - Chinese and expatriate, young and old - laugh and
applaud. It is November 1994, and this screening takes place at the Hong
Kong Arts Centre as part of an exhibition entitled Hong Kong Sixties:
Designing Identity. A documentary filmmaker by trade, I am presenting
a talk on the Hong Kong Film Unit's work which places it within a
specific film tradition and reads it in terms of current documentary
theory? In this cross-cultural setting, with its own ambiguities of power
and knowledge, the mermaid in the newsreel raises a set of related
questions about documentary film itself. These are questions about the
form's negotiation of power and knowledge at a specific cultural site,
and they have to do with the interaction of memory, history and the
documentary tradition. This essay is concerned with a particular
conjunction of post-colonial subjectivity and its archive. It seeks to
theorise the construction, through documentary film, ofan earlier Hong
Kong as a way into understanding aspects of contemporary cultural
production. To my mind, and on many levels, the mermaid is
spectacularly out of time, and out of place. As she clambers from the
dark South China Sea on board the Hong Kong Government fishing boat,
the mermaid rises out of myth into history, surfaces from dreaming into
representation and crosses time-honoured borders between fiction and
documentary. It is at these blurred boundaries that this essay is situated,
a place of dislocation and transition which resonates with to that of the
people of Hong Kong.
PROJECTING HONG KONG
The first official public reference to the Hong Kong Film Unit invokes a
term with a history: 'there is no doubt that the short film is both an
invaluable medium for reaching large sections of Hong Kong's
population and an excellent vehicle for 'projecting' Hong Kong
overseas' (HKGAR 1960:243). This felicitous metaphor for the
promotion of official policies through the screening of films comes
from a specific institutional and formal tradition, that of the
documentary movement founded by John Grierson, the 'father of
British documentary' (Barsam 1973:7). In his history of Australia's
Commonwealth Film Unit, Moran notes:
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Projection was the preferred tenn in [the Commonwealth Film
Unit] for the generation of national awareness ... It has been
used by Canadians about their documentary films, and indeed it
was a favourite tenn ofGrierson's, both in Canada and in Britain.
In particular it was the tenn used in a seminal pampWet by
Grierson's patron, Sir Stephen Tallents at the Empire Marketing
Board, for the idea of national ideology, The Projection of
England (1932).
(Moran 1991:135)
As well as defining both an ideology and an aesthetic which was to
dominate documentary for a generation (Barnouw 1993), this movement
also created an institutional structure which was readily reproduceable
throughout the British Empire, under the guidance of Grierson himself
in Canada (1939), New Zealand (1941) and Australia (1945) (Moran
1991). In 1958 it was extended to Hong Kong, when the Public Relations
Officer submitted a confidential report to Government on his return
from a London conference for British Foreign Service infonnation
officers. The Report argued for a greatly expanded and 'modernised'
publicity apparatus and for the establishment of a Government film-
making capability:
Apart from prestige documentary films in colour, running time 15
to 20 minutes, of which we could with profit use at least one a
year, the field for short news and magazine items to be used both
in cinema newsreels and television programmes is practically
unlimited .... [Television's] consumption is so voracious that
almost any competently made news "short" with reasonable story
value is likely to secure acceptance.
(Murray 1958:7-8)
Behind the Report's argument lay a fear that Hong Kong was falling
behind other 'colonial territories' in tenns of expenditure on publicity:
in fact, lying third from the bottom in a list of24 that included numerous
African, Mediterranean and Carribean possessions as well as others
closer to home such as 'Singapore, Malaya, Fiji and Brunei' (Murray
1958:2, and Appendix 'D'). 'Comparisons are notoriously odious and
can be misleading, but most colonies are spending much more on their
infonnation services' (Murray 1958:2). By late 1959 a film unit
comprising four people - an expatriate writer/director/producer, known
as the Unit Head or Films Officer, and three locals who managed the
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photographic and organisational work - was officially in place (HKGAR
1960:242-243) (see Figure 1).
The output of this small film-making team fell into three distinct
forms or genres: half-hour documentaries aimed at overseas audiences,
monthly newsreels and magazine items for both local and international
consumption, and educational material produced on behalf of other
Government Departments for purely local use. It is significant that only
two of these categories are present in the Report which led to the Unit's
founding:
Suitable subjects for films are -like those for illustrated booklets
- abundant. We need initially a good general film dealing with the
Colony as a whole, and this should probably be brought up to date
and re-angled at least every three years. Our industrial expansion,
specific aspects of that expansion, our tourist attractions, our
achievements in resettlement and rehousing, the port of Hong
Kong, educational programmes and so on, can all be considered
either for full length prestige films or as magazine items.
(Murray 1958:8)
The category that has been elided here is informational film intended
solely for local audiences. Taken together with its invocation of
television, which would not arrive in Hong Kong for another decade, this
exclusion suggests that the Report had its eyes fixed firmly overseas.
Colonialism structures its audience into a hierarchy ofvalue, placing its
metropolitan masters above the demands of local audiences, then maps
this hierarchy on to the production process. For the Hong Kong Film
Unit, this meant that their flagship, prestige documentaries of the 1960s
(and well into the 1970s), were produced by either London corporate
film production houses or their local expatriate-staffed off-shoots
(HKGAR 1960-70).3 The Film Unit production schedule became a
question of selecting appropriate 'writers' and 'voices' for different
audiences. In this regard the Report represents a classic locus ofcolonial
discourse (see Spurr 1993), where the brute realities of media and
economic power wielded locally is displaced into an 'international'
language ofmarkets and outlets deriving from the commercial television
and film distribution industries, a jargon of 'story-value' and 'angles'
drawn from Western media (Murray was a journalist), and common-
sense models of audience and communication theory.4
The Unit's first effort at 'projecting Hong Kong overseas' - the
'prestige documentary in colour' of the 1958 Report - was sub-
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contracted out to Cathay Films of Singapore, a European-staffed
production house which set up a local arm on the strength of this one
job.s After final vetting by London, This is Hong Kong was 'approved,
subject to certain minor modifications' in late 1960 (HKGAR
1960:243). In the same year the expatriate Films Officer and his local
team also produced their first films intended for Hong Kong people
themselves, 'four short films explaining the aims of the 1961 Census to
the community at large' (HKGAR 1960:242). Shot in black and white
on silent 35mm cameras, combining actuality shots ofHong Kong street
scenes with awkwardly dramatised 'typical family' scenes, featuring
standard library music and a patronising Cantonese voice-over
translated from an English original, these were low-budget local
versions of Grierson's 'educationals' (Grierson 1946:78-80). Like
colonialism, the Griersonian aesthetic erects its own scale ofproduction
value which runs from 'bread and butter' work at the bottom to more
'prestige' production at the top. In Hong Kong, ofcourse, this hierarchy
is coloured by ideas of race.
Fine formal distinctions within this work of the Unit between
documentary, propaganda and film journalism are not important for my
argument, though they are of course a matter of on-going debate in
documentary theory (paget 1990; Winston 1995), as they were in
Grierson's day (Adamson 1993). Grierson himself entered this debate in
oft-quoted terms: 'I look on the cinema as a pulpit', and 'it is as a
hammer rather than a mirror that I have sought to use the medium'
(Grierson 1946:12, 24). Nevertheless, he has difficulty pinning his
project down:
The documentary idea, after all, demands no more than that the
affairs of our time shall be brought to the screen in any fashion
which strikes the imagination and makes observation a little richer
than it was. At one level, the vision may be journalistic; at another,
it may rise to poetry and drama. At another level again, its
aesthetic quality may lie in the mere lucidity of its exposition.
(Grierson 1946:19)
And elsewhere:
Beyond the newsmen and the magazine men and the lecturers
(comic or interesting or exciting or only rhetorical) one begins to
wander into the world ofdocumentary proper, into the only world
in which documentary can hope to achieve the ordinary virtues of
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an art. Here we pass from the plain (or fancy) descriptions of
natural material, to arrangements, re-arrangements, and creative
shapings of it.
(Grierson 1946:79)
The film syntax that the British documentary movement developed over
the whole body of its work is consistent, however, and readily
characterised. Arising as a solution to the limitations of contemporary
film technology - unblimped 35mm cameras which made synchronised
sound recording impossible, heavy and cumbersome equipment, and
slow film speeds - the classic Griersonian documentary typically
constructs its argument through a highly-crafted 'montage' set to music
of silent, staged actuality material. Its narrative is driven by the aptly-
named 'voice-of-God' commentary (see Winston 1995; Nichols 1991;
Barnouw 1993). This particular 'jargon of authenticity' in turn
authorises meaning and truth (Arthur 1993); the formal conventions
become naturalised as transparent reproduction of reality. This specific
representational style with its characteristic epistemological under-
pinnings is shared by all the work of the movement, including both
documentary aspiring to the 'ordinary virtues of art' and their more
humble cousins, the 'educationals'. The style becomes 'the classic
documentary' (Barnouw 1993).
But somewhere between Government informational film and
'prestige documentary' lies that more ambiguous category of Hong
Kong Film Unit production: the 'monthly newsreel or magazine item'. It
is here that the mermaid surfaced in 1962. In this 'hybrid' film form the
twin hierarchies of colonialism and Griersonian documentary do not
appear as stable as theory might wish.
RHETORIC OF EMPIRE
What is startling about the mermaid's appearance is her irruption
without warning into a film discourse that operates by other rules
entirely. 'Plover Cove Reservoir' is constructed like all the Film Unit's
work according to the aesthetics of Griersonian documentary. Indeed,
the night fishing sequence may be read as direct homage to one of the
tradition's masterpieces, Drifters (1929) (Barnouw 1993:87-88).6
Mermaids do not normally surface in these 'realist documentary' texts,
at least not without being marked off in some way from the actuality
footage that surrounds them, clearly coded as dream sequence or poetic
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interlude (Winston 1995). Yet, as the shot by shot description at the
beginning of this essay signals, none of the classic conventions for
representing ghosts or dreams - for example, double exposure, soft
focus, effect lighting, signature music - are brought to bear here: the
mermaid exists on the same plane of reality as the fisherman who
embraces her. What I want to suggest is that the mermaid sequence hints
at the kind of tensions and slippages that may occur when a film form
invented to service a metropolitan, national project at a particular
moment in history is deployed thirty years later in colonial space. Both
the Hong Kong Film Unit and its body ofdocumentary work is -like the
figure of the mermaid - out of time, out of place.
Writing in 1988, Teresa Ma characterises Film Unit production
during the 60s as follows:
The documentaries of the day [were] apolitical, devoid of
ideology, flavourless. Even then what remained was not exactly
objective. For the colonial bureaucrats, events worth chronicling
were royal visits, trade fairs, new roads, power plants, dams,
housing projects, schools and police crackdowns on drug
smugglers and bootlegging rings. The footage is a homage to
civil service achievements.
(Ma 1988:77)
This is fair description but an unsatisfactory reading, which overlooks
the films' formal manoeuvres and under-estimates the particular force
ofthe Griersonian aesthetic. Far from being devoid of ideology, the work
of the Film Unit reads at the level of documentary rhetoric as a
sustained, skilfully-crafted argument about progress, modernity and
history. Whether as half-hour 'prestige documentary' or newsreel
'magazine item', this rhetoric argues for the maintenance ofa particular
political system and advances a specific ideology. Viewed in this way,
the Hong Kong Film Unit becomes a case-study in the discourse of
colonialism. Drawing on thematic structures, tropes and metaphors
which are fundamental to this particular Western project of appropria-
tion and control, the Hong Kong Film Unit speaks and writes the
argument in a classic 'rhetoric of empire', to borrow the title of Spurr's
analysis (Spurr 1993). Edward Said characterises imperialism as a
'structure ofattitude and reference' whereby the Western powers looked
at 'Others' in terms of a limited and recurring representational
repertoire: images, symbols, figures, metaphors. He argues that this
cultural production was deployed in turn to justifY the actual work of
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invasion, occupation and exploitation (Said 1978, 1994). The Film Unit
was an anachronistic player in this colonial project which shaped Hong
Kong in the 60s, and classic Griersonian documentary provided a film
form and syntax completely appropriate to it.
Trumpeting new civil engineering projects, home and workplace
visits by Governors and Minor Royalty and the wonders of modem
technology, the films of the Hong Kong Film Unit claim to 'document'
an irresistible movement forward in history and a modernity that is
exclusively Western. Chinese culture is rarely part of this dynamic, but
functions rather as a kind ofexotic curiosity with some potential for the
tourism industry. When portrayed, it is an unchanging 'Oriental'
backdrop against which the drama of progress takes place. The work of
the Film Unit routinely structures itself through this dialectic: thus
'Plover Cove Reservoir' is preceded in its edition of Hong Kong Today
by an item on the 'up-to-date' nature of the local feature film industry,
and followed by a report on the traditional 'bun festival' at Cheung
Chau. Real events of public life have been selected, translated from
contingency into history and narrative, and the whole then set to an
imperial tune.
'Hong Kong Village Lights Up', about the installation of a small
diesel electric generator on the island ofPeng Chau, is a clearer example
from the same monthly newsreel series of how this rhetoric of empire
works. The chosen story-line reduces the meaning of electricity for this
isolated island - its potential for refrigeration, water pumping, and
communication, for example - to a single trope, electric lighting. This
manoeuvre enables the structuring of the whole film in terms of an
imagery of light and dark. An opening impressionistic paean to the
lights of Hong Kong at night, edited to a fast city rhythm, is followed by
slow-paced, day-time, bucolic scenes on the island: old people in
traditional costume meander through fields and unpaved lanes, living
icons of a culture that has remained 'unchanged for centuries', as the
commentary notes. Into this archetypically static Orient storms the gift-
bearing technology of the West and with it the Twentieth Century in a
whirlwind ofnoise and excitement: an army helicopter carrying the new
generator. As it descends out of the sun into a welcoming party of
curious old people and children, the scene is instantly familiar from
travel and exotica film genres going back to missionary lantern slide
shows (see Stephen 1993). This cliched dialectic of light and dark,
modem and traditional, recurs throughout the film: inside a gloomy tea
house early in the film a 'village elder' demonstrates his old oil lamp for
the (expatriate) District Officer; the logic of this earlier scene becomes
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clear when the elder later places his hand on an electric lightshade in a
similarly awkward gesture: in a 'school-room' scene which has been
staged at night to emphasise the film's central imagery. Intercut with this
sequence which ends the film is a shot of a sign illumined by electric
light, with the name of the island painted in Chinese characters. An
ironic reference to the traditional practice of carving a rural village's
name in stone, this image also provides narrative closure by returning us
to the city lights of the film's opening sequence. Bringing light where
before there was only darkness is, ofcourse, a classic, indeed Conradian
trope of the rhetoric of empire.
For those familiar with the work of the Grierson era these relics from
the Hong Kong documentary archive produce what can only be
described as a 'shock of recognition'. It is not just that the underlying
rhetoric revels in classic 'orientalist' tropes, but that it is embedded in an
earlier, historically specific style of representation. The topics, formats,
production values, images, sounds, structures, and narratives of a
documentary project from the 1930s seem to have been revived or
rather, resurrected into a kind ofhalf-life in the 1960s. At the time of the
Hong Kong Film Unit's founding the Griersonian documentary was
under challenge within its metropolitan heartlands. Deployed in an
oppositional rhetoric, 16 mm sync sound was revolutionising the
documentary form: Primary (1960) in the U.S. and 'direct cinema';
Lonely Boy (1961) in Canada and 'challenge for change'; Chronique
D'un Ete (1960) in France, and 'cinema verite'. What united these
diverse new formal approaches was a common desire to question the
classic documentary's authority and authenticity; to empower on the one
hand the individual voice of the film-maker, and on the other hand the
film subject, permitted for the first time to speak; and finally, to view
with distrust the twin projects of nationalism and imperialism
(O'Connell 1992; Loizos 1993; Winston 1995). Elsewhere among the
'Units' seeded by Grierson around the British Empire, film-makers were
seeking and experimenting with a 'native voice' for documentary
(Evans, Gary 1984; Moran 1991). In Australia, for example, From the
Tropics to the Snow (1964) - the Commonwealth Film Unit's annual
omnibus film directly comparable to the 'prestige documentaries' of the
Hong Kong Film Unit - is an irreverent, self-relexive look at the whole
genre of sponsored documentary (Moran 1991:18). It is against these
developments in documentary theory and practice that the Hong Kong
Film Unit's revival of the Griersonian tradition must finally be
measured. More to the point, if the Film Unit is a paradigm case in
both institutional structure and rhetorical style of the discourse of
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colonialism, then its work is fundamentally about identity and power. As
such, it returns to haunt us in the present as archive and living legacy for
contemporary documentary film-makers.
QUESTIONS OF IDENTITY
In both Chinese and Western mythology the anomalous mermaid partly
represents ideas and anxieties about identity. She is a hybrid figure,
formed in discrete parts half from one world and half from another.
'Hybridity' as a metaphor for the post-colonial experience, ofbeing both
one and other at the same time, is the subject of an extensive debate in
cultural studies which there is no need to rehearse here (see Lee 1996).
However, it is clear that the mermaid retains a presence in the popular
consciousness and culture ofHong Kong. She re-appeared most recently
in late 1993, when 'fears and fascination came bubbling to the surface
last week with reports that a mermaid had been caught in Hong Kong',
as the Sunday Morning Post sub-head put it (SCSMP 17/10/93).
Anthropologist Grant Evans attempted to unravel the meanings behind
this mystery appearance, and among other things, saw shades of
contemporary intra- and inter-ethnic debates (Evans 1993). But it is not
a question here of tracing the figure back through Chinese myth, local
folklore or even her history in Hong Kong's popular imagination. Nor
does it matter whether the idea for staging the mermaid sequence in
'Plover Cove Reservoir' came from expatriate or local scriptwriters.
Indeed, it is likely that she represents nothing more than a felicitous,
sexy high-note on which to end a particularly dull newsreel. My
argument is rather, that the idea of the mermaid is made possible by a
specific conjunction of history and documentary that obtained in Hong
Kong then and continues to act today on cultural production.
Griersonian documentary is staged like fiction, and a scene involving
an actress posing semi-nude must have crossed many budgetary and
other hurdles within the Film Unit before finally reaching the screen in
1962. The mermaid sequence thus says something about institutional
thinking with regard to audience. Particularly in the 'hybrid' newsreel,
audience and filmic address posed a problem for the Unit's film-makers:
it was always at least a double or split negotiation between domestic and
international markets. The newsreels played simultaneously in London
and Hong Kong ('shown in some 40 cinemas throughout the Colony')
and were also caravanned around community halls and villages in the
New Territories by portable projection teams (HKGA 1960:242). In fact,
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in its first few years the Unit devoted the bulk of its local resources to the
production of 'newsreel shorts', and claimed them as its most successful
venture in 'projecting' itself both overseas and within the community
(HKGAR 1962:272). The uncertain cultural circumstances of the
mermaid's origin, then, is matched by ambiguities in her spectatorship.
Her usefulness lay in the way she exoticised the Other for metropolitan
audiences, while at the same time playing to the local house on different
terms.
This kind of doubly-coded, ambiguous textual voice which speaks
through Chinese Gods and Goddesses, or magical and mythical figures
and other heroes and heroines played by local actors and actresses,
becomes a familiar device in Film Unit production as the decade wears
on. Report to the Gods (1967), for example, structures its diegesis
through the character ofTso Kwan, the Chinese Kitchen God, who in the
words of the Film Unit catalogue 'comes to life and appears in many
guises and reports to the gods on what his family have achieved in the
previous year in the fields of education, housing, medicine, science and
industry' (GIS Catalogue 1991:97). One approach to exploring this
characteristic construction of a protagonist with an 'ambiguous', multi-
layered identity is through the idea ofcopying or imitation, which seems
to resonate well with aspects of Hong Kong's economic history and her
entrepreneurial reputation. Mathew Turner coins the term 'ersatz design',
for example, to characterise what he calls 'an enduring and very
successful strategy of Chinese capitalism [which resulted from] the
interactions between Chinese and Western design' in Hong Kong: 'Ersatz
design is cheap, derivative, opportunistic and culturally defused; yet at
the same time it is flexible, creatively adaptive and highly commercial'
(Turner 1993:3). If this kind of imitative yet creative process is
understood in terms of performance - as in dance, theatre or film - it
calls up a range of suggestive tropes: miming the Other, acting a part,
playing a role. Ifnot the mermaid-as-hybrid metaphor, then, perhaps that
of the mimic provides a more helpful way into understanding Hong
Kong's specific coloniality and its construction of identity.
Theorising from an Indian coloniality that is historically both more
distant and more brutal than Hong Kong's, Homi Bhabha explores
mimicry and mockery as responses to the colonial condition. He views
them in a negative light: central to colonial subjectivity, they act as
mechanisms for social control which attack the integrity ofboth coloniser
and colonised. Yet he notes: 'The epic intention of the civilising mission
... often produces a text rich in trompe-l'oeil, irony, mimicry and
repetition' (Bhabha 1994:85). If, however, the same effects are regarded
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as a positive response to colonial power, then they provide a suggestive
reading for this essay, in terms ofwhat I have playfully alluded to with the
question ofthe mermaid. Bhabha's analysis can be applied, for example,
to the Film Unit's 1967 flagship film, Report to the Gods:
The "unthought" across which colonial man is articulated ...
results in the splitting of colonial discourse so that two attitudes
persist; one takes reality into consideration while the other
disavows it and replaces it by a product of desire that repeats, re-
articulates "reality" as mimicry.
(Bhabha 1994:91 original emphasis)
REPORTING TO THE GODS
On one level, Report to the Gods writes Hong Kong for an overseas
audience in the Film Unit's familiar rhetoric of empire. A dialectic is
constructed between old and new, Eastern and Western, disordered and
ordered space: the 'ugly disease' of hillside squatter huts housing
refugees versus the more pleasing 'natural' environment of a Western
aesthetic, a 'landscape' disfigured by a 'rash'; dark, dirty temporary
settlements and inner city slums versus the high-rise clarity of modem
housing blocks; the disorder of hawker-infested pedestrian ways versus
the ordered car traffic of the wide boulevards of Central District; old
people working with their hands versus modem machine-dominated
factories; the crowded living space of an extended family versus the
cosy new flat of a happy, fictional nuclear family. Set up as a model for
Hong Kong's aspiring middle-classes, the Kitchen God's host family is
portrayed by visiting London filmmaker Brian Salt as well on its way
into the ranks of the bourgeois, working happily into the night, children
as well, making plastic flowers. Another set of comparisons positions
our 'star' family on a global imperial grid: poised somewhere between
peasant farmers and 'native' villages in India and Africa on the one
hand, and on the other set against an unattainable Western dream world
ofleisured life-style and carpeted homes where plastic flowers provide a
tasteful decorative touch. By this racist sleight-of-hand the family
becomes necessarily a second-rate, oriental bourgeoisie, and by
extension so too does Hong Kong's. The logic is not subtle: the Kitchen
God drinks tea in a dark, dirty, traditional tea-house, makes a face and
examines his cup, then is seen three shots later sipping beer on a sunlit
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western-style patio. This is Griersonian documentary at its most scripted
and staged.
There are more sophisticated strategies at work as well, one ofwhich
might be termed the construction of absence. For example, long
sequences dedicated to hospital laundries, personal hygiene and
vocational training imply their lack or impossibility before the
intervention of colonial Government. Another significant absence is
the Chinese voice and its Cantonese language. The local actor who plays
the character of the Kitchen God has been dubbed into an aristocratic
British voice. As in the vast majority of the Film Unit's work, no other
Chinese speak throughout the film; the language has been
'disappeared'.7 Working class males are also curiously absent, while
old people populate the streets or do craftwork and schoolchildren crowd
the camera to applaud modernity. By contrast and reinforcing this
absence, young women are well-represented: they are especially suited
to work in assembly lines because they have uniquely 'deft' fingers, the
commentary informs us. As either symbols of modernity (fashion
shows) or alternatively ancient arts (embroidery), they also make an
appearance to sing and dance, dress and undress (like the mermaid).8 As
recent post-colonial and feminist critique suggests, one consequence of
imperial ownership is the figurative emasculation of the colonial male,
engineered here as disappearance or absence from representation
(Alloula 1986; Martin 1992).
However, the main structuring element of Report to the Gods is the
conceit ofthe Kitchen God, who comes to life in the home ofthis model
Chinese family and becomes the film's narrator. Each year, he says, 'I
have to report to heaven on how the people are behaving themselves. For
many years now I have been able to give a good report.' Uttered in the
context of civil unrest in 1966-1967, this statement is disingenuous to
say the least, but it accurately describes the film's rhetorical purpose. In
the Chinese pantheon, the higher authority to whom the Kitchen God
reports is the Emperor. The film's conceit is that this hierarchy exactly
replicates the administrative structure of colonial government; the
Kitchen God represents the Governor reporting on the people of Hong
Kong to London. Indeed, Report to the Gods is precisely an annual
report in film form from the colonial administration in Hong Kong to its
imperial capital. Through this conceit, then, government assumes a
mantle of divine authority for the current order; obedience to colonial
power shades into an ethic. 'Reading against the grain' like this, as Said
puts it, reveals the real project of the Hong Kong Film Unit: these short
films and newsreels represent the colonial government talking to itself,
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and to its sources of authority in the metropolitan centres of the West.
They are arguments for a continuing British imperial role in Asia, pleas
for understanding and boasts of being needed (Said 1994).
However, this kind of over-determined reading while persuasive does
not exclude others, nor address how the film may be viewed locally.
Moreover, it tends to discount whatever may be specific to Hong Kong in
the text; it totalises both the apparatus ofrepresentation and its audience.
Leung Sing Bor, the actor playing the Kitchen God in Report to the Gods,
was a famous comedian of the 60s, well-known to local audiences. His
characterisation - as a friendly, chubby fellow, with the all-too-human
defects of a liking for good food, strong drink and pretty women - may
well work to mask with self-deprecating humour the colonial authority's
power, but it also mocks it at the same time. He plays the role oftrickster,
popping up in unlikely places, gesturing with a nod and a wink to the
audience, conducting himself with a knowing pomposity. The dubbed
upper-class British voice merely adds to this range of distancing effects:
the transformation into caricature ofthe British civil servant is complete.
In fact, the notion of mimicry may be taken a step further: in details of
dress and gesture his performance also imitates local businessmen and
minor civil servants, those with yellow faces and white masks, to
paraphrase Fanon (Fanon 1968). The role becomes a caricature of
colonial mimicry, in Bhabha's sense of the term. Viewed through local
eyes, then, his performance is always playing against another order of
knowledge that the audience brings to it. As they 'know', Leung Sing Bor
is merely performing a role drafted for him by expatriate scriptwriters, in
the service of a false portrayal of contemporary Hong Kong,
impersonating a Chinese God for his usual fee; it's all in day's work.
Setting the text in this context begins to bring home the full force of the
insight into colonial subjectivity that Bhabha's ideas of 'mimicry',
'mockery', and 'sly civility' provide (Bhabha 1994:85):
It is from this area between mimicry and mockery, where the
reforming, civilizing mission is threatened by the displacing gaze
of its disciplinary double, that my instances of colonial imitation
come. What they all share is a discursive process by which excess
or slippage produced by the ambivalence of mimicry (almost the
same, but not quite) does not merely rupture the discourse, but
becomes transformed into an uncertainty which fixes the colonial
subject as a "partial" presence. By "partial" I mean both
incomplete and virtual.
(Bhabha 1994:86)
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Bhabha is exploring moments when the text falters: genre rules are
broken; the rhetoric shows signs of hesitation or self-doubt; there is a
lapse that interrupts the smoothness of the performance. I want to
suggest that the mermaid represents one such moment, and the Kitchen
God another. The descriptive passages above give no feel for the sheer
sophistication of Report to the Gods: the quality of its mise-en-scene,
montage, production values, rhetorical skills. This is fmely-crafted
work, but the surface gloss does not square with its dialectical
simplicities. There is an ambivalence in the film: form and content do
not quite mesh or gel. Indeed, the film often reads as a caricature ofthe
classic documentary project, with Grierson's 'First Principles of
Documentary' become empty circus tricks, the formulae deployed
without purpose, integrity or commitment (Grierson 1946:78). Bhabha's
'slippage or excess' lies in this gap between seriousness and playfulness
in the film. It is as if the film itself wore a poker-faced attitude of self-
mockery. Flaunting its rhetorical flourishes and cleverness, the film
exhibits a kind of self-awareness that calls into question its own project.
In the same way, I suggest, the mermaid when she surfaces in 'Plover
Cove Reservoir', 'playing a role' like Leung Sing Bor as the Kitchen
God, points to a knowing complicity between image and spectator, and
to a sense of playfulness in negotiating messages within messages: a
kind of 'I know that you know that I know that'.
DOCUMENTARY AS ARCHIVE
The Hong Kong Sixties: Designing Identity exhibition where my screening
takes place is merely the most recent example of an increasingly urgent
archaeology of the past that has been underway since the return of Hong
Kong to Chinese sovereignty was decided in 1984. The films were last
screened publicly a few years earlier, at the 12th Annual Hong Kong
Festival, in 1988. Entitled Changes in Hong Kong Society through Cinema,
the Hong Kong Cinema Retrospective section of the festival for the first
time since its founding in 1976 featured 'documentaries, newsreels, [and]
home movies', making it 'markedly different from past retrospectives
which have, all along, focused on fictional films and genre cinema' (Li
Cheuk-to 1988:9). 'There is a need to understand our history because Hong
Kong is a city commonly thought of as having no history,' remarks Li
Cheuk-to in the Festival catalogue (Li Cheuk-to 1988:9). The establishment
of the Hong Kong Film Archive (from which documentary, however, is
currently excluded) (Fonoroff 1993), the revival of the Urban Council's
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Hong Kong Independent Short Film and Video Awards (1992), the storm of
protest in the popular press attending the removal of the Government
archives to an outlying district are all indices of the current archiving
impulse. The politics of this retrieval of the material past is clear enough: it
is a double-movement looking both backwards and forwards, an effort to
trace what has been forgotten, repressed or lost over time, and at the same
time a working out of current desires and needs in terms of the material
culture that survives. In this politics of selection, re-valuation and re-
interpretation, the concept ofauthenticity becomes a central site or trope of
the debate, as Chow emphasises (Chow 1991). In the climate of a 'city at
the end of time' (Leung 1992), documentary film and photographs occupy
an unstable place in this process ofnegotiating the future in light ofthe past.
The Designing Identity exhibition theorises the birth of a unique
Hong Kong culture - an identity that is neither that of other sites in the
Chinese diaspora nor reduceable to the metropolitan cultures of either
Beijing or London - as it traces the 'competing, contradictory
representations of Hong Kong life-style' at play during 'one, turbulent
decade', as Guest Curator Mathew Turner puts it:
An harmonious blend of East and West was presented in school
textbooks and trade promotions, public information campaigns
and tourist publicity. Yet these "made for export" images survived
domestic crises and political conflict, and came to articulate local
reflections of identity. By the end of the decade it was plain that a
modern Hong Kong people and a Hong Kong life-style were here
to stay.
(Turner 1995:xvi)
As the exhibition demonstrates, this identity is being constructed
retrospectively across thirty years of history, and out of memory, relic
and archive. The Film Unit's importance lies in the fact that it is the
primary source of documentary images of the 60s housed in Hong
Kong.9 The survival of the work of the Government's propaganda
apparatus is a consequence on the one hand of the propensity within a
governing bureaucracy for the archiving of its work, and on the other
hand of official indifference to other sources of local film and cultural
history. However, what is at stake when official history becomes
naturalised through this process is the notion of documentary truth.
Under the heading 'Warning: Eating Bitter Chocolates', Mathew Turner
writes in the Preface to the Exhibition Catalogue:
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This is a chocolate box exhibition with a bitter centre. For the
sixties was also an era of harsh working conditions and grim
housing; a raw decade of poverty, exploitation, sacrifice and
instability. But ifHong Kong people had to "eat bitterness"during
the Sixties, they also chose to consume sugar-coated images of
freedom, westernization and affluence, laying the foundations for
an ambiguous cultural identity.
(Turner 1995:xv)
This is not the place to argue current theory about documentary's
epistemological status (see Nichols 1991,1994; Renov 1993; Winston
1995; Rabinowitz 1994; Solomon-Godeau 1991). Commonsense
notions of the photographic process's value as evidence and of its
power to witness retain a strong grip on us, although Hong Kong has yet
to have them tested in court as they were in the United States during the
Rodney King case. These claims to truth mean that the past as
constructed by documentary film becomes a key player in the economy
of dream, memory, and fact that is contemporary Hong Kong culture's
on-going work of self-representation. But it is not enough to simply
point out the economic realities of colonialism that are masked in Film
Unit films. Turner's notions of 'ambiguous cultural identity' and his
chocolate box image with its 'either-or' of appearance versus reality
does not take us far in exploring the construction ofcolonial subjectivity.
The documentary gaze in coloniality is not so simple. As this essay
suggests, it becomes rather a kind ofnegotiated 'space between' subject
and object where their two gazes cross, along the lines of Bhabha's
'displacing gaze'.
In this 'dislocated' gaze we look somewhere between the mermaid and
her filmic representation, we see the game being played, we get the joke.
In Report to the Gods, for example, the spectator is positioned through
sophisticated editing of point-of-view shots to look through the eyes of
the Kitchen God. The tensions and finally, untenability ofthis position in
turn force the spectator into a kind of indeterminate third place, a site that
is neither that of the Kitchen God nor that of his puppeteer. Thus
displaced, the spectator's gaze becomes an imaginative construction, a
'pretend' gaze. lO Even in its own time, I suggest, the anachronistic work
of the Hong Kong Film Unit engaged in a performance or unconscious
game with its audience, working through a kind of self-mockery which
both drew on and played against local knowledges.
Today the aura ofauthenticity and dignity that documentary acquires
over time complicates the game. On the one hand, the Film Unit archive
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is widely sourced by mainstream productions to 'illustrate' Hong Kong's
past, yet as this essay makes clear, there are real dangers in direct
quotation. l1 On the other hand however, these images also sometimes
play a more knowing, self-aware, ironic role in Hong Kong today. In
early 1995, for example, a popular promotional clip for Star TV's
Channel V, the music video channel which targets teenagers, inserted
Film Unit footage into its own discourse. Fast-cut contemporary images
and digital video effects are contrasted with these static black and white
images which now stand for a nostalgically remembered past: two young
women dressed in the styles ofthe 60s - significantly, one Asian and the
other European - enter a changing room to re-emerge immediately, by
way of a jump-cut edit, in old-fashioned, one-piece bathing suits; a
student formally recites for the teacher in a primitive, roof-top
classroom; an elderly woman works on a foot-pedaled sewing
machine, in what looks like a home-factory situation. The voice-over
urges: 'It's not too late to change! Tune into Channel V! Your grades
won't go down and your grandmother won't mind too much! Just make
sure you find out what's in it before she does! Keep up or be left out!'
The message is clear: Hongkong's lifestyle has changed radically -like
a jump-cut edit - since the way of life portrayed in these archaic,
ironically-deployed, and faintly ridiculous 'documentary' images.
Today's teenagers are the 'now' generation, accustomed to rapid
change, looking forward to an exciting, high-tech future, courtesy of .
satellite television and MTY. These Hong Kong Film Unit fantasies from
the 60s, then, have another life in the 90s, deployed by the current
generation of film-makers in a new rhetoric of modernity and progress.
For some contemporary Hong Kong documentary film-makers, the
need to negotiate their post-coloniality vis a vis the Griersonian tradition
is expressed more directly. Cultural Identity of the 60s? (1994) is
described by filmmaker Bacon Cheung as 'combining footage of rare
documentaries and popular film of Hong Kong in the 60s, however, the
line between these two elements [is] blurred. [There is a] self-reflexive
quality as video'(Cheung 1994: programme notes). His film intercuts
scenes from popular commercial features of the time with sequences
from the Hong Kong Film Unit archive featuring the same actors and
actresses performing as 'workers' or 'typical family' members. Poised
somewhere between the documentary and experimental film, Cultural
Identity ofthe 60s? mounts an attack on both the classic documentary's
imperial ideology and the formal aesthetic that is complicit with it. At
the same time, Cheung issues a warning about both the photographic
archive's and the documentary's claims to truth. We know from Barthes
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that the truth of photography, and by extension documentary, is truth to
presence rather than truth to appearance: 'Every photograph is a
certificate of presence' (Barthes 1993:87). What post-colonial film-
makers question is, finally, whose presence?
DOCUMENTARY - DREAM OR REALITY?
One of the reason's for declaring my writing position in this essay is to
signal the on-going nature of these complicities in Hong Kong
documentary. Griersonian documentary, for example, lives on in two
places: as corporate and sponsored video within an expatriate-
dominated filmmaking community, and in the form of social issue
films at Radio Television Hong Kong, the institution that eclipsed the
Hong Kong Film Unit as the film-making arm of Government in the
early 70s. The first group comprises both some of the 'old China hands'
from the 60s and also a new wave of 'blow-ins' from the European
diaspora, including myself. The rhetoric ofcorporate video may be more
naked than that of the Film Unit as it makes its argument on behalf of
international capital, but it makes identical choices regarding audience
and form. RTHK is arguably similarly strait-jacketed by the underlying
needs and aesthetics of its own historical project, the invention of a
middle-class for Hong Kong.12
If documentary is understood in Foucault's terms, as a discourse of
knowledge and power, for which the Hong Kong Film Unit provides a
case-study, then its centrality to cultural studies becomes clearer. It
remains surprising that critical work on Hong Kong cinema virtually
ignores documentary. For example, anthropologist Rozanna Lilley's
recent survey of 'local critical discourses about television and film'
throws up only one documentary, Shu Kei's Sunless Days (1990),13 and
is blind not only to the long and influential documentary tradition within
say, RTHK, but also to the vast amount ofactuality material and locally-
produced documentary that does somehow make its way on to Hong
Kong television (Lilley 1993).
In its own way, Hong Kong is a vital site of much experimentation
and dynamic 'creative treatment of actuality', even and perhaps
especially within commercial television: news, current affairs, tabloid
journalism, and yes, even documentary. Hong Kong crews travel the
world in pursuit of their own exotic places and Others; sex and ghost
documentaries find ready markets internationally; and 'root searching'
is not confined to intellectuals in exile. There is also an active
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independent film and video underground, comprising political and
experimental video art groups such as Video Power and Videotage. Even
in a media environment governed by oligopoly, as The Other Hong Kong
Report puts it, advances in camera, editing, sound and computing
technology provide some room for manoeuvre. A dozen small
production houses produce karaoke video backgrounders: arguably a
new, semi-drama, semi-documentary genre. What all this suggests is
that the notion of documentary itself, conceived as a privileged way of
knowing to be practised by a professional elite, needs closer
interrogation. 'Documentary is a clumsy description, but let it stand',
Grierson notoriously remarks (Grierson 1946:78). In post-colonial
space, let's not.
NOTES
1 Production Notes, cited in Chow:1991:169, her translation.
2 An early draft of this chapter based on the talk is published in the Hong
Kong Sixties: Designing Identity catalogue, ed. Mathew Turner and Irene
Ngan, under the title 'From the Rhetoric ofEmpire to the Discreet Charm of
the Bourgeois: The Hong Kong Film Unit 1959-1969', Hong Kong Arts
Centre, 1995.
3 The GIS archive is extremely disorganised. However, the evidence of the
credits on major productions and personal reminiscences by filmmakers
active during the Sixties - Michael Gascoyne, Jack Bygraves, Charles
Wang, and Elaine Forsgate-Myers - support my argument. However, the
point is not crucial to the main thrust of the essay.
4 I mean to suggest here that not only is cross-cultural communication not
theorised, but local conditions are not even researched. It is simply assumed
that what works in England will work in the Colony; a discourse - in
Foucault's sense comprising both texts and their means of delivery -
designed for a citizenry in a democracy is mapped on to a very different
politics and demographics: a poor, refugee populace in an undemocratic
colony.
5 Personal communication, Michael Gascoyne; this manoeuvre also enabled
the Government to report that the film was produced by 'Cathay Film
Services (Hong Kong) Limited' (HKGAR:1960:243).
6 Drifters was one of the few films that Grierson himself made; thereafter he
became more of a figurehead, gathering a team of young film-makers
around him who came to constitute what history calls the British
Documentary Movement. This essay uses 'Grierson' and 'Griersonian' to
stand for the formal aesthetics of this movement, and all three terms are
interchangeable with that other common description, 'the classic documen-
tary' (Barnouw: 1993).
. 7 The production format of the film - like all the Unit's in-house work, shot
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on an unblimped 35mm Arri ST - does not sufficiently explain such radical
absence. When the post-1967 political climate demanded are-invigorated
effort at community relations, Hong Kong Today began featuring sync
sequences such as performances by Teddy Robbins and his band and
speeches by, for example, Miss Hong Kong.
8 As the Hong Kong Sixties: Designing Identity Exhibition demonstrates, the
twin urges to forge both an industry (fashion) and a certain modernity (read
'Western society') resulted in a whole new imagery ofwomen, promulgated
in film as in other media at the time.
9 More extensive archives exist in the capitals of the Colony's past and future
imperial masters: Beijing, London, Tokyo and Washington.
10 Rey Chow's notion ofthe 'simulated gaze' strikes a similar chord: 'Contrary
to the model of western hegemony in which the coloniser is seen as a
primary, active 'gaze' subjugating the native as passive 'object', I want to
argue that it is actually the coloniser who feels looked at by the native's
gaze. This gaze, which is neither a threat nor a retaliation, makes the
coloniser 'conscious' ofhimself, leading to his need to turn this gaze around
and look at himself, henceforth 'reflected' in the native-object ... In the
silence of the native-as-object ... this simulated gaze is between the image
and the gaze of the coloniser' (1993:51-52).
11 The GIS archive is regularly sourced these days by overseas television
companies preparing their '1997' documentaries.
12 In time history caught up with the contradictions of the Hong Kong Film
Unit's project. The 'disturbances' of 196~7 are widely regarded as
marking fundamental changes in Hong Kong society, a major turning point
in the process of forging a distinct identity and inventing the modern
'belonger' of today. They marked the end of 'the unreformed colonial state',
provoking a radical change in the Government's thinking about ways of
legitimising its presence (Scott:1989). Blaming a failure in communication
as the cause of the civil unrest, Government found a new base of political
legitimacy in the idea of a bourgeois that would have a stake in society and
would assent to government by technocracy. This new strategy demanded a
whole new apparatus of representation. The Hong Kong Film Unit was an
early casualty as attention and resources shifted to Radio Television Hong
Kong in the 1970s.
13 Lilley names Sunless Days in the context of a discussion about political
censorship, noting that it faced difficulties finding a screen in Hong Kong. It
was, however, financed and broadcast by Japanese Television (NHK). Shu
Kei struck a 16mm print at his own expense in order to pursue local
screenings, but apart from the Arts Centre, where as Lilley notes it was
screened, there are few cinemas in Hong Kong equipped for 16mm
(personal communication).This is not to deny the presence of censorship in
Hong Kong nor Sunless Days' status and importance as a locally-conceived
documentary about local issues. My point rather is to question its status as
sole representative of documentary in Lilley's overview of the Hong Kong
scene.
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5RESURGENT CHINESE POWER
IN POSTMODERN DISGUISE
THE NEW BANK OF CHINA BUILDINGS
IN HONG KONG AND MACAU
Cheng Miu Bing, Christina
INTRODUCTION
Architecture is the science ofbuilding raised to a fine art. Like any work
of art, it can also be considered 'textual' for broader cultural exegesis.
Mikhail Bakhtin says a text is 'any coherent complex of signs' (Bakhtin
1986:103), a definition which encompasses everything from literature to
visual and aural works of art, as well as everyday action and
communication. Given this pantextual idea, we can approach
architecture as a commonplace of contemporary discourse embracing
a wide semiotic range and exhibiting the entire spectrum of artistic
practices, cultural manifestations and political implications. By
engaging with architecture as text in a kind of 'threshold encounter'
with the vogue of the 'postmodern', this paper attempts to examine the
new Bank of China Buildings in Hong Kong and Macau.· These two
buildings are not merely skyscrapers using high technology and the
rhetoric of postmodern design, they also exhibit cultural connotations
and political overtones and are expressions of a vicarious ideology of
resurgent power in the two colonies. The questions to raise are: what
features are considered 'postmodern' in these two buildings? Are there
any problems in the creation and interpretation of architectural
metaphors between the architect's intention and the general public's
reaction? How is political power 'textualized' in architecture and how do
these two Bank buildings represent the political power of the Chinese
government well in advance of the destined decolonization of Hong
Kong and Macau? Through a 'reading' ofthese two Bank buildings, it is
hoped to provide some insights into the relationship between culture and
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politics, predicated on architecture, in the crucial years leading up to the
handover of British Hong Kong and Portuguese Macau to China on
1 July 1997 and 20 December 1999 respectively.
THE POSTMODERN IN ARCHITECTURE
The two new Bank of China Buildings in Hong Kong and Macau have
both been described as examples of postmodem architecture. The term
'postmodem' was first used in architecture in 1945 by Joseph Hudnut,2
and the rubric of 'postmodemism' then emerged in America and Europe
in the 1970's as a cultural phenomenon, (or rather, a cultural dominant as
Fredric Jameson has called it), which soon manifested itself in other
aspects ofcultural production - art, literature, photography, film, dance,
music, etc. Its deconstructive impulse constitutes a liberative force in the
re-definition of cultural endeavours, and a critique of the monotony of
universal Modernism's vision ofthe world. Postmodem architecture has
in a sense stood in opposition to the established authority of the Modem
Movement (1910-45), but it is not a repudiation of the past.3 It is also
inappropriate to describe postmodern architecture as 'anti-Modern' and
'ultra-Modern' as the former connotes a rejection and the latter refers to
an extremism. In postmodern architecture, the past is neither ignored nor
completely denied, but previous styles and designs are warmly digested,
assimilated and embraced as vital sources for architectural expression; it
is a playful eclecticism ofarchitectural gestures. Charles Jencks, one of
the best known popularizers of postmodernism, contends that 'the
primary dualism concerned elitism and populism, the undeniable
conflicting pressures which any good architect must face' (Jencks
1977:6). In his opinion, the major objective ofpostmodem architecture
is to overcome the disjunction between elites (e.g. professional
architects) and various publics, in its attempt to communicate with
both. In aword, Jencks sees postmodern architecture as a kind ofdouble-
coding, pluralistic and hybrid. In addition, Jencks and other postmodem
theorists have tended to refer to 'semantic' and 'syntactic' dimensions of
architecture in order to focus on aspects of signification and meaning.
They endorse a referential notion ofmeaning, in the hope that forms can
be read as words; buildings, they say, can convey messages (McLeod
1985:31-33).
However, it is worth remembering Ferdinard de Saussure's aphorism
- in language there can be differences without positive terms (Saussure
1974:120), that is, there is no inherent relationship between the signifier
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and the signified in the semiotic systems. Perhaps, therefore,
architectural meaning can also be interpreted arbitrarily; there is no
necessary one-to-one relationship between the professional architect's
intention and the public's reception. Architecture, as an expressive
medium, is often ambiguous to the general populace. As Robert Venturi
aptly points out, 'An architectural element is perceived as form and
structure, texture and material. These oscillating relationships, complex
and contradictory, are the source of the ambiguity and tension
characteristic to the medium of architecture' (Venturi 1977:20). In
Learning from Las Vegas (1989) Venturi et al insist that architects
should abstain from pursuing some abstract, theoretical, and doctrinaire
ideals but rather they had better learn from the study of popular and
vernacular landscapes, and learn from the rejection ofpurity in forms, in
order to communicate with the general public. Seen in this light,
postmodernism in architecture stages itself as a kind of aesthetic
populism, as the very title of Venturi's influential manifesto, Learning
from Las fegas, suggests.
In a similar vein, Heinrich Klotz argues, 'Whenever present-day
architecture observes other laws in addition to functional aptness and
maximum simplicity of basic forms, whenever it moves away from
abstraction and tends toward representational objectivization, I call it
postmodern' (Klotz 1988:4). For Klotz, only after architecture is
liberated from the abstraction ofpure utility, that is, its functionalism, is
there a possibility for the emergence ofbeauty and for the transcendence
of its subservience to mere practical usage. His forthright declaration is
that postmodern architecture is not just functional but fictional. In a
sense, the artistic fiction can take us beyond reality to a world offantasy
and imagination. Contrary to the univalency of Modern architecture, the
multivalency of postmodern architecture seems to invoke what Charles
Jencks and Fredric Jameson have characterised as 'schizophrenia' (a
sense of dislocation) induced by fragmentation, which is a common
feature ofthe postmodern 'mind-set'. Such a breakdown ofthe temporal
order of things also gives rise to an eclectic treatment of the past. Like
postmodern . art, postmodern architecture also abandons historical
continuity and memory but tries to 'plunder' history and to take bits
and pieces from the past for present use. The bricolage of historical
elements is reminiscent of the collage paintings of Georges Braque and
Pablo Picasso in the 1920's.
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Figure 5.1 Bank of China Building in Hong Kong
Figure 5.2 Chinese-style gardens at the base of the Bank
Figure 5.3 The Hongkong Bank
Building
Figure 5.4 Two bronze lions outside the Hongkong Bank in Central
Figure 5.5 Governor's residence in the foreground with the China Bank 'blades' in the
background
Figure 5.6 Citibank Tower
Figure 5.7 Bank of China Building in Macau
Figure 5.8 (above) Hong Kong's Post-modern
skyline: I. The Entertainment Building; 2. Nine
Queens Road central; 3. Ritz-Carlton Hotel
Figure 5.9 (left) The Amaral Equestrian
Monument
Figure 5.10 The Amaral statue being removed
Figure 5.11 The Bank of China building without the Amaral statue
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I.M. PEPS BANK OF CHINA BUILDING
Among the monotonous, rigid, and graceless high-rise buildings in
Hong Kong, the new Bank of China Building4 (see Figure 5.1)
commands unrivalled attention partly because of its unusual prismatic
shape and partly because of its monumentalism. Completed in 1989 and
officially opened in May, 1990, the shining grey-green faceted building
was designed by the renowned Chinese American architect, I.M. Pei and
Partners, winning for it the Grand Award for Engineering Excellence in
1989 from the American Consulting Engineers Council (Chung
1989:96). Pei, who is well-known to the world for his contributions to
major museums, often maximises the use of geometric forms of
triangles and cubes to produce an aggregation of angular masses. In
Washington, D.C., Pei's East Building of the National Gallery of Art
(completed in 1978) is a success in creating diamond-shaped towers over
a large triangular building on the irregular trapezoidal site.
Again, Pei manipulates the same angular structure in the Louvre,
Paris with a steel and glass pyramid in the main courtyard ofthe Louvre
serving as the principal entrance to the museum and welcoming hall for
the general public. This transparent, crystal pyramid (completed in
1989) was once a controversial issue because there appeared to be an
irreconcilable hiatus between the triumph of high technology and the
delicacy of the baroque Palace. Like the National Gallery in
Washington and the crystal pyramid in the Louvre in Paris, the Bank
building in Hong Kong equally received unfavourable comments
although it had won a prestigious prize. The Bank is yet another
stunning exercise ofPei's favourite modernist device, the manipulation
of abstract geometry.
The 70-storey edifice with a height of 1,209 feet was once the tallest
building not only in Hong Kong but in Asia, and ranked the fourth tallest
building in the world. However, it was superseded by the Central PlazaS
(1,228 ft. high), which was completed in 1992. The Bank building is at
the same time functional and fictional, and transcends purity of form.
Moreover, the architect's peculiar treatment of space and the rebellious
motive to create theatrical rigour and fanciful imagination seem to
embrace postmodern rhetoric, but the overall design is more like a
modernist building. While it is a high-tech edifice, being predominantly
based on the expressive qualities of technological procedures and
construction, it is also an eclectic mixture of historicising forms and
tends to go beyond functionality. In a postmodern attempt to localize
with familiar features, the lower part of the building is flanked by two
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traditional Chinese style gardens (see Figure 5.2), consisting of 'natural'
scenes of mountains, flowers, trees and streaming cascades.
These 'scenes' are also typical of traditional Chinese landscape
paintings, which immediately add a sense ofdouble-coding to pander to
the populace. In view of the ultra-modem top storeys, Pei reserves at
least some allegiance to vernacular favour by incorporating, in a less
abstract way, a sense of traditional Chinese styles in its base and
entrance hall. However, unlike the old Bank of China Building which is
guarded by a pair of stone lions for warding off evils spirits, the new
headquarters is iconoclastic and discards the Chinese inclination for
placing the motif of lions at the entrance. By and large, the Bank
building straddles high technology, modernist ideas and postmodern
rhetoric, but eschews the Chinese tradition of having guarding lions.
A SYMBOL OF RESURGENT POWER
The Bank's prismatic tower dominates almost every view ofHong Kong
harbour and is symbolic of the power of the People's Republic ofChina,
the Bank's owner (Davey 1990:4). It can also be interpreted as a
wrestling match with the British, the latter represented by the new
Hongkong Bank Building6 (see Figure 5.3) which was hailed by Michael
Sandberg, the Chairman of the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking
Corporation, as the most ambitious and innovative of all its previous
bank buildings (Lambot & Chambers 1986:Foreword). Completed in
1985 and inaugurated in April, 1986, the 52-level steel-framed high-tech
Hongkong Bank Building was designed by the British architect Norman
Forster and Associates and is owned by British tycoons. The project
costs HK.$5.3 billion and was the world's most expensive piece of real
estate. Its machine age structure and its massive steel frame are
reminiscent of Richard Rogers and Renzo Piano's Georges Pompidou
National Centre of Art and Culture, also known as the Beaubourg,
opened in 1977 in Paris. Like the Georges Pompidou National Centre,
the Hongkong Bank Building's 'transparency' is a central feature of the
overall design. Both the Bank of China Building and the Hongkong
Bank Building are basically manifestations of high technology in the
machine age.
However, Norman Forster is more fung seui-conscious7 and 'a
Chinese geomancer has been consulted on all matters sensitive to local
tradition, particularly fUng seui issues' (Architecture and Urbanism
1986:67). The 'up' and 'down' escalators were also carefully positioned
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on the ground floor in order to maximise the'dragon's vein' ofbeneficial
hei (or flux of energy) to flow in and (presumably) to remain, bringing
good fortune. Moreover, a pair of 1930's bronze lions was geomantically
and ritually re-positioned at the entrance of the building in order to be
'harmonious with the contour of the hill behind' (Mimar Architecture in
Development 1988:40). These two bronze lions (see Figure 5.4) were
formerly used to guard the entrance of the Bank's 1935 predecessor.
The postrnodern pastiche of the nostalgic motif and the high-tech
new building at once forms a continuity in discontinuity, in which the
bronze lions assume a renewed aura by resuming their guard duties. In
short, the Hongkong Bank Building can be considered postmodern
because of its loopback effect which links the historical bronze lions
with the new structure, whereas the Bank of China Building is more
modernist in conception than postmodern.
The locations of these two bank buildings are not without
significance in the power struggle between the two governments. The
Hongkong Bank Building is located in the heart of the financial-
commercial arena, One Queen's Road Central, whereas the Bank of
China Building is marginalized at the far end of Central District at One
Garden Road. Moreover, unlike the Hongkong Bank Building which
faces the Statue Square and an MTR station, the Bank ofChina Building
is isolated and entwined by flyovers. It is located at what Fredric
Jameson would call a 'hyperspace' in postrnodernity. A postrnodern
hyperspace is a problematic space in which the human body is incapable
of locating itself, or unable to organise its immediate surroundings
perceptually, nor cognitively map its position in a mappable external
world (Jameson 1984:83). If one wants to go to the Bank of China
Building, one may experience something like a mutation in built space
and may also encounter difficulty in physical trajectories, since the
building is surrounded by flyovers and is not easily accessible by
pedestrian walkway. It could be surmised that the owners ofthe Bank of
China were unable to enjoy the same privilege in Hong Kong for
choosing a prime location for its new headquarters as the Chinese
authorities in Macau did. In this spirit, power is apparently exercised in
the very structure of location and space.
If the new Hongkong Bank Building is seen as a last parade of British
power in Hong Kong since the first establishment of the Hongkong Bank
in 1864 in Wardley House at One Queen's Road Central, the new Bank of
China Building certainly represents the resurgent power of the Chinese
government. As Wang Deyan, Chairman and President of the Bank of
China, said at the opening ceremony of the new headquarters, 'The
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construction of this Tower is, in itself, not only an evidence of our
confidence in the future ofHong Kong, but also an indication ofBank of
China Group's entering into a new historical stage' (Pictorial Album:
Bank ofChina Tower Hong Kong 1991:13). No doubt, under the banner of
dubious postrnodern fad, the Bank of China Building is an exhibition of
power through its spectacular visual dominance and its record-breaking
height, even though it is physically marginalized from Central District.
The emergence of these two high-tech bank buildings readily speaks
for apparent competition and conflict. As Charles F. Emmons writes:
When the new 47-storey Hongkong and Shanghai Bank was to be
constructed in the early 1980s in Central District on the site of the
previous structure, a geomancer was engaged whose advice to
alter the proposed structural design resulted in the inversion of
triangular elements on the outside. For a couple of years the new
bank towered over its competitor from the People's Republic of
China, the Bank of China, but in the late 1980s a new Bank of
China was built close by up the hill. Over 70 storeys tall, it
dwarfed nearby structures and was covered in triangles (some-
times considered unlucky) that might cast evil reflections on the
Hongkong and Shanghai Bank. All in all, a bad omen for those
worried about China taking over in 1997.
(Emmons 1992:44)
The tallest bank building vying for the lead with the most expensive
bank building, in a sense, symbolically disguises political and economic
rivalry in f1mg seui between the departing British colonial regime and
the coming Chinese government.
THE SCHIZOPHRENIC UNDERSTANDING AND THE
ISSUE OF FUNG SEUI
The Bank of China Building offers an unusual opportunity to examine
the correlation between the architect's intention and the populace's
reaction to architectural gestures. The design principles at work in this
building are modernist. It is conceived as a cube, rising out of the
ground, and divided diagonally into quadrants. As the structure moves
upward, the mass is diminished one quadrant at a time until it is reduced
to a single, triangular prism, and is accentuated further by two 208-feet
high twin mast at the apex. It is Pei's intention to create a crystalline
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Euclidean vision in reflective glass and aluminium (Architectural
Record 1985: 137) and the prismatic design is meant to convey goodwill
and to add 'new brilliance to the prosperity of Hong Kong' (Pictorial
Album: Bank of China Tower Hong Kong 1991:13). Furthermore, the
rising quadrants of the structure attempt to incorporate the Chinese
traditional symbol of bamboo as an auspicious sign. Bamboo is a
popular motif in Chinese culture and often signifies modesty, constancy,
refinement and protection from defilement (Olderr 1986:9). According
to the Bank's General Fact Sheet:
The building comprises four triangular glass shafts rising to different
heights, the inspiration for this design being derived from a Chinese
proverb, using bamboo as a symbol: its sectioned trunk propelled
ever higher by each new growth, denoting growth and prosperity.
(Bank ofChina Building, Hong Kong: General Fact Sheet 1987: 1)
Using bamboo as a metaphor, the inspiration of the design came from
the successive and steady growth ofbamboo which symbolises liveliness
and prosperity. In addition, the four triangular shafts terminating at
different levels symbolise the enterprising spirit and future growth ofthe
Bank of China as it shoots skywards section by section, and the mirror
glass of the building reflects the lights after nightfall and is made
analogous to a diamond embedded in Hong Kong (Profile ofthe Bank of
China Tower). However, contrary to the architect's intention, the angular
Bank has been received as an ominous structure by many Hong Kong
Chinese. It is believed that the Bank's four triangular prisms are negative
symbols in Chinese architectural iconography owing to the fact that they
are the opposite of circles which traditionally symbolise money,
perfection and prosperity. Moreover, the 'big crosses' on the surface
of the Bank building are signs of 'no' and the 'X' motif is perceived as
another source in creating disharmonious effects.
Despite the Bank building's beautiful crystalline structure and its
auspicious architectural intention, Peter Davey reiterates what local
geomancers have put forward that the Bank building is strangely sinister
and is bad rung seui to the public:
In fact, from a distance, the Bank ofChina resembles not so much
a crystal as a praying mantis, with two aerials at the apex
resembling the antennae of the insect and the horizontal slot in the
skin below them emphasising the likeness to a sinister mask.
(Davey 1990:4)
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Through different interpretations, 'the growing bamboo' is displaced as
'a harmful praying mantis' and the twin masts are seen as the antennae
of the insect. According to a local geomancer, Lee Giii Ming, the two
poles at the top, like two menacing needles, cast bad effects on the 8ino-
British-Hong Kong relationship (Keih Man 1992:11). In addition, the
triangular prisms are also likened to numerous daggers which disrupt the
fimg seui of the surrounding skyscrapers because those shining blades
seem to be in the process of hacking into the Bank's neighbours. In
particular, one 'sharp blade' is said to cut across the colonial governor's
mansion (see Figure 5.5) and some have even speculated that the Bank's
owners have attempted to disturb British rule through a vicarious use of
architectural fimg seui. Completed in 1855, Government House was
designed by Charles 8t George Cleverly and was situated in an once
imposingly elevated location in Upper Albert Road looking out over the
Victoria Harbour.s Many local people believe that when it was built the
designer and architect must have been experts in geomancy because
around the site there were tall trees at the back and a curving road. The
curves are perceived as a fimg seui strategy to keep out bad luck which
travels only in straight lines (Emmons 1992:41 & Waring 1993:133). At
that time, the colonial governor's mansion was believed to have enjoyed
tremendous geomantic prosperity. Over the years, as the city grew
around it, its location was gradually undermined. According to a local
geomancer, Ah Lohk (pen name), Government House now fails to
command good fimg seui, owing to the fact that it is surrounded by
skyscrapers, and above all, it is severely disrupted by the Bank of China
Building's prismatic shape. Moreover, the ominous geomantic influence
of the Bank building was already in force when construction began in
April 1985, because later in 1986 Governor Edward Youde (1982-1986)
suddenly died of an heart attack during an official visit to Beijing (The
Metropolitan Weekly, 23 December 1995). When his successor, David
Wilson (1987-1992), came, he was advised by sinologists to modify the
rectangular fountain, which was said to resemble a western-style coffin,
to a round shape9 and some willow trees were also planted in the garden
in order to counter the malignant hei. However, the juggernaut force of
the sharp edges was so strong that the 'dwarfed' Government House
could not possibly avert the impact. Consequently, not only was David
Wilson 'called back' to Britain, but Chris Patten, the twenty-eighth
Governor of Hong Kong, was hospitalised and was personally attacked
by the populace ofHong Kong and the Chinese officials in the wake ofa
number of political quarrels and economic failures (The Metropolitan
Weekly, 23 December 1995).10
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Given the Bank building's sinister image, Peter Wesley-Smith also
reveals the unease felt by many Hong Kong citizens:
It is said that the sharp edges ofthe new Bank ofChina building in
Hong Kong bring bad luck to those at whom they point unless the
malevolent influences they project are deflected by the judicious
placement of a mirror or eight-sided diagram.
(Wesley-Smith 1992:1)
The Bank building thus has been considered a kind of demonic
architecture which arouses great anxiety among its neighbours and the
general public concerning the imminent reunification with China. 11
In this spirit, the Bank building best illustrates that the creation and
interpretation ofmetaphor is not a one-to-one relationship but there may
exist a gap in perception. The mode ofreception by the general populace
in relation to the interpretation of architectural semantics is more
dependent on local codes and vernacular characteristics than on the
architect's conception and intention. This discrepancy in interpretation
leads to a 'schizophrenic' understanding of the auspicious bamboo
metaphor. As David Harvey points out, urban design should be
'sensitive to vernacular traditions, local histories, particular wants,
needs, and fancies, thus generating specialised, even highly customised
architectural forms that may range from intimate, personalised spaces,
through traditional monumentality, to the gaiety of spectacle' (Harvey
1989:66). However, Pei seems to be indifferent to vernacular traditions
which do not favour angular forms in architecture. Although he is a
Chinese American, Pei fails to incorporate circular architectural motifs
that traditionally symbolise harmony and prosperity, and instead
indulges in a game of geometry. The result is indeed a classic
modernist failure.
The arrangement ofbuildings often involves competition and conflict
over the issue of fimg seui. In this respect, Maurice Freedman writes:
It is very important to grasp the idea that in the Chinese view a
building is not simply something that sits upon the ground to serve
as a convenient site for human activity. It is an intervention in the
universe; and that universe is composed of the physical
environment and men and the relationships among men. Men
are bonded to the physical environment, working good or ill upon
it and being done good or ill to by it ... In principle, every act of
construction disturbs a complex balance offorces within a system
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made up of nature and society, and it must be made to produce a
new balance of forces lest evil follow.
(Freedman 1979:318)
The Chinese popular system of fimg seui is not merely concerned with
the subtlety of cosmic conformity between architecture and social
relations, it also suggests possible alterations in order to redress an
undesirable environment. Charles F. Emmons considers fimg seui to be a
rather broad, eclectic type ofmagical system whose major function is to
help people relieve anxieties about the physical and social environment
(Emmons 1992:49). The bad fimg seui of the Bank building, in this
particular context, reflects tension, anxiety, challenge and competition
and the disharmonious ordering of social relations in space. As a
remedial reaction to the eerily 'evil' Bank and its 'malevolent'
influence, its immediate neighbour, the Citibank Tower (see Figure
5.6), completed in 1992, located at 3 Garden Road, cannily employs four
arch-like parallelograms in its architectural structure as 'shields' to
offset the harmful pointed edges, and the Central Plaza also emerges in
the form of 'a triangular file' to blunt its sharpened blades (Keih Man
1992:13 & Ming Pao Daily News 26 March 1995). As such, the
development of these edifices in a Chinese metropolis is willy-nilly
caught in the game of fimg seui and objectifies men's relationship by
means ofconstructions. Fimg seui, after all, is still an active belief in this
high-tech era, and is not yet overborne by architectural technology.
Rather, it goes hand in hand with (post)modern capitalism as a means of
competition and redress.
THE "SISTER" IN MACAU
While the towering Bank ofChina Building in Hong Kong has received
an extra-ordinary amount of attention, the new Bank of China Building
in Macau12 (see Figure 5.7), is no less a spectacle than its 'sister'. But
unlike its marginalized 'sister' in Hong Kong, the Bank building,
completed in 1991, occupies the most prominent spot in the tiny enclave.
Its location at once reveals the different political relationships between
British-ruled Hong Kong and Portuguese-administered Macau and
China. The Bank's owners perhaps were able to have this prime site due
to the amicable Sino-Portuguese relationship after the 1987 Joint
Declaration. But the excellent location also points to different colonial
histories of the two places: Portugal acquired Macau on sufferance from
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China,13 but Britain took Hong Kong by conquest and the imposition of
unequal treaties on China. These different histories are now reflected in
the events surrounding the return of the two places to China. While
Hong Kong is caught in a frustrating tug-of-war between London and
Beijing over transition issues, Macau is marching much more smoothly
towards its reunification with China, and Portugal is more accommodat-
ing to China than Britain. The prominent site of the Bank building in
Macau can thus be considered a political statement.
Standing in its unchallenging monumentalism, the 37-storey Bank of
China Building in Macau was designed by Remo Riva,14 and was
completed in 1991 by P & T Architects and Engineers. It is said to be
'like its sister in Hong Kong, a statement of corporate success and
confidence in the future' (prescott 1993:75). Moreover, much in the
same way as its sister, the Bank ofChina in Macau is laden with political
implications as manifested in its imposing height. The building is
approximately 166 metres above the road level and is the tallest structure
ever in Macau. ls It embraces a classical tripartite division ofbase, shaft,
and capital, but is still close to the grave monumental structures among
the skyscrapers in Hong Kong. The central octagonal tower is flanked by
attached wings on either side and capped by a prismatic triangular
capital, a trendy architectural feature considered a 'trademark' in
postmodem fad by Patrick Lau Sau Shing, professor of architecture in
the University of Hong Kong (Ming Pao Daily News 10 December
1993). However, the penchant for crowning the top of a building with a
prismatic triangle is merely a postmodem mannerism and is nowadays
perceived as a postmodem cliche by Ho Tao, a renowned Chinese
architect and designer. This kitschy feature was often adopted by
designers in the so-called postmodem buildings in Hong Kong, such as
the Entertainment Building (also designed by Remo Riva), the Nine
Queen's Road Central (the name ofthe building), the Ritz-Carlton Hotel
(see Figure 5.8), and the Central Plaza. While the octagonal main tower
is expressed by the use ofcurtain walling, the wings by structural glazing
strip windows and Portuguese pink granite, small strips in Barrocal white
are employed to modulate the elevation. Unlike its 'sister' in Hong
Kong, the Bank building in Macau is flanked by the familiar guarding
lions at the entrance. The whole building is a celebration of modem
technology, with its glittering silver glass, with the indispensable motif
of lions. Like the Entertainment Building, Riva employs the same
pastiche idea by capping the top with a triangular prism in order to
embellish the building and to have a pretext to call it postmodem
architecture. It is in fact a postmodem simulacrum in Macau.
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Similar to fashion promotion, architects and developers borrow
fashionable names and add trendy elements. Being crowned with an
'imported' foreign label - postmodem, the postmodem buildings in
Hong Kong and Macau readily sound different and can meet the
consumers' insatiable desire for ever-changing fashion. But most of
these buildings' 'postmodemess' is unconvincing when compared with
the postmodem tenets in architecture as discussed earlier. They in fact
resemble modernist slab blocks rather than postmodemist playful
eclecticism.
ANACHRONISTIC DECOLONIZATION AND
A "PRE-POSTCOLONIAL" ERA
The Bank of China building in Macau is not merely a skyscraper office
building owned by the Chinese government, it is a political landmark in
disguise signifying Chinese authority and influence. The architectural
gesture reeks with political overtones and is a metonymic representation
of the resurgent power after some four hundred years of foreign
administration. Let us first turn to examine the relationship between
Macau and Portugal since the 1960's.
The 1974 political upheaval in Portugal had a certain impact on
Macau. The 'Carnation Revolution' of 25 April 1974 successfully
ousted the 46-year totalitarian rule of Antonio de Oliveira Salazar and
Portugal eventually evolved into a democratic state. The liberation from
fascist dictatorship also led to a belated wave of decolonization and the
new government advocated 'a policy of good relations and friendship
with all peoples on the basis of mutual interests, non-interference,
independence and equality among nations' (Cremer 1991:131-2).
However, even before this process of decolonization in other
Portuguese colonies, Portugal had already relinquished much of its
power in Macau during the climax of China's Cultural Revolution
(1966-67). At that time, Macau was in a state of anarchy and the
administration was paralysed. The Portuguese settlers would have
readily 'evacuated' from Macau had China simply requested them to do
so, but Lisbon was informed that China wished Macau to remain as it
was, largely because the change in Macau's status might shock the
people of Hong Kong. The Portuguese, therefore, retained a militarily
and politically indefensible little colonial anachronism in Asia (Hanna
1969:4). It was indeed a uniquely ironic historic inversion ofthe colonial
relationship. In addition, it was an anomaly par excellence because it
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was the radical Cultural Revolution in China which allowed the colonial
era in Macau to continue. Frantz Fanon remarks that 'Decolonization,
which sets out to change the order of the world, is, obviously, a
programme ofcomplete disorder' (Fanon 1971 :27). He is of the opinion
that decolonization is always a violent phenomenon, because it is the
meeting of two opposed forces. However, China's decision not to put an
end to Portuguese colonisation confounds Fanon's paradigm of
Manichean enmity between native and coloniser. Fanon's argument
fails to apply to Macau's ambiguous historical situation where questions
of nationality, sovereignty and government have never been clearly
defined.
The new Bank of China Building plays an important, if not peculiar,
role in the actualisation ofMacau's anachronistic decolonization. It was
the pretext for the removal of a colonial icon, the bronze statue of the
former colonial governor Amaral, from in front of the Bank building.
Joao Maria Ferreira do Amaral was a wayward governor of Macau
(1846-1849). After taking office, he implemented a series of high-
handed reforms aimed at lessening Chinese influence in Macau. His
strong policies eventually led to his assassination by the Chinese. The
Amaral equestrian monument (see Figure 5.9) was inaugurated in 1940
as a celebration of Portugal's 8th centenary as an independent nation in
the Iberian Peninsula and as a belated commemoration of his prowess.
The bronze sculpture is a representation of a fierce authority depicting
the brute strength and overwhelming rage of the commander who is
engaged in the climax of the battle to suppress his Chinese attackers.
The Amaral statue can be considered a masterpiece of Portuguese
artwork. It breaks the solidity offorms and is charged with an exaggerated
tautness and a kind of Baroque theatricality of dramatic, vigorous
movement. The human psyche ofAmaral's infuriated agony and dauntless
resolution to combat the Chinese, the prancing stride and the bulging
muscles of the horse are portrayed in a frozen action - a moment being
arrested in a snapshot effect. But this monument was seen as the extant
icon of Portuguese colonisation in Macau after the destruction of the
Mesquita statue.16 While Amaral was hailed by the Portuguese as one of
the most outstanding governors ofMacau as well as a hero/martyr, he was
regarded as an invader/oppressor by the Chinese. As such, Lu Ping,
Director of China's State Council's Hongkong and Macau Affairs Office,
said in 1990 that the statue was 'a symbol of colonialism' and must be
removed before 1999 (Lee; SCMP 29 Oct 1992).
The newly completed Bank of China Building perhaps hastened the
removal of the statue on 28 October 1992 (see Figures 5.1 0 and 5.11).
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The fmal fate of the five-tonne bronze statue was to be shipped back to
Portugal from where it had come. The reasons for elimination of the
equestrian monument provide a revealing comparison with the Bank of
China's reception in Hong Kong. It was believed that the monument
created bad fUng seui for the Bank's new headquarters. When looking at
the entrance of the Bank building, it seemed that Amaral's whip was
flogging the whole building; while from the opposite direction, when
looking from the statue, it looked as if the horse was treading and
stamping on the Bank. The statue, therefore, interfered with the
harmonious geomancy of the new Bank building. Logically one could
argue, however, that the statue was put up well before the construction of
the building and if it was bad fUng seui for the Bank to face the statue, the
designer could well have avoided dishannony by re-positioning the Bank.
But as we have seen, fUng seui can be a political force in disguise, in this
case expediting the erasure ofa colonial symbol before the 1999 takeover.
The pulling down of the monument marked the process of
'decolonization within a colonial context'. This action can aptly be
called an 'anachronistic decolonization' because it renders problematic
ideas of a linear progress to postcoloniality - a topic in vogue in some
Western academies. The removal ofthe equestrian monument before the
demise of colonialism seems to underline a passage into a new era and
the closure ofa prickly historical age. However, it created an ambivalent
scenario partly because it contradicts linear chronologies ofcolonialism
- decolonization - postcolonialism. Macau is now strangely situated in a
historically and theoretically problematic context which I would call a
'Pre-postcolonial' era from October 1992 until 1999. Although the
oxymoronic rubric appears to be awkward and somewhat eccentric, it
nevertheless precisely portrays the unique pre-postcolonial ambience in
Macau, where the Chinese have already displayed in advance its
'legitimate' influence as symbolised by the Bank building. Ifthe Amaral
equestrian monument manifested the colonial power, the Bank building
certainly represents China's overwhelming authority in Macau, which is
also 'anachronistic' in the colonial milieu.
CONCLUSION
Architecture, as a cultural discourse, does not just exhibit the artistic
expression of a certain epoch, but is also power-laden. The Bank of
China Building in Hong Kong seems to use postrnodern rhetoric, but it is
in fact a modernist design and functions like a modernist building,
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lacking any kind of aesthetic populism and humanism. Although its
'sister' in Macau is kitschily topped by a prismatic triangular capital, it
still resembles the modernist slab block model and is a postmodern
simulacrum without novelty. Under the veneer of dubious postmodern
architectural gestures, the two Banks' owners intriguingly display their
resurgent ruling power in disguise. In fact, at least, the resurrected
political power may also be symbolically suggested by the two Banks'
monumental height-the tallest bank buildings in these two places. On a
realistic level, however, the growing significance of the Bank of China
in Hong Kong and Macau is suggested by the fact that it became a note-
issuing bank in these two places in May 1994 and October 1995
respectively. By and large, the two buildings now stand as symbols ofthe
importance of the Bank of China in international trade and finance, and
also represent China's commitment to playing a key role in the
economic integration of the two places after the resumption of full
sovereignty.
In Hong Kong, the Bank of China Building's auspicious bamboo
metaphor has been conversely interpreted by the local people as sinister
omens, precisely because there is an obvious discrepancy between the
architect's intention and the general public's perception ofChina. There
is, therefore, a profound schizophrenic in the process ofreunification of
Hong Kong and Macau with China. During the 1980's, China exerted
strenuous efforts to regain the sovereignty of these two places. The 1984
Sino-British Joint Declaration and the 1987 Sino-Portuguese Joint
Declaration are wrapped in good intentions, to 'liberate' the colonial
subjects from the grip of foreign usurpers/aggressors. It should have
been a moment for celebration of territorial integrity and national
solidarity since the shameful Opium Wars. But coming reunification
instead unleashes unprecedented misgivings and stress about the future.
Some Chinese show an unwillingness, if not phobia, of returning to the
mother country. The Chinese state's efforts to resume the exercise of
sovereignty and to oust the two colonial powers have not been met with
applause and joy, but have triggered an emigration-mania, which
reached its climax soon after the Tiananmen Square suppression ofpro-
democracy demonstrations in June 1989.17 It is extremely ironical in
colonial histories that the colonised subaltern citizens do not welcome
decolonization and liberation, and much prefer foreign rule. The
grandiloquent mission of historical recuperation from Western
colonialism and imperialism is strangely displaced, becoming instead
a possible threat to political stability and economic prosperity in these
two places.
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In Macau, through the cultural statement of fimg seui, the Chinese
authorities successfully pressed for the early removal of the Portuguese
colonial icon: the Amaral statue. This action at once complicates
contemporary theories which see cultural phenomena delineated as
linear epochal successions, and contradicts theories of postcoloniality.
As Simon During argues, 'the notion of 'postcoloniality' carries with it a
theory of history. It segments world history into three eras: the pre-
colonial, the colonial and the postcolonial itself. The will to use the term
'postcolonial' is not simply driven by a need for narrative order and
global harmony, but contains a political promise of liberation' (During,
1992:339). The 'post' does not signal an 'after' but rather mark spaces of
ongoing contestation enabled by the process of decolonization.
'Postcoloniality' obviously connotes a condition that is evenly
developed rather than internally disparate, disarrayed or contradictory.
The term 'postcolonial' therefore embraces a temporal connotation
which implies a progression of events marking history as a series of
stages along an epochal road from the 'pre-colonial' to 'colonialism',
'postcolonialism' and 'neo-colonialism'. However, the removal of the
Amaral statue does not signal a phase of immediate 'liberation'. These
cultural theories cannot be neatly mapped onto Macau.
By examining the two Bank of China Buildings in Hong Kong and
Macau, we can see that political power can be 'textualized' in
architecture. In the main, these two towering Bank buildings suggest a
complicity between power politics and culture, and evince a symbiotic
relationship through artistic creation and architectural expression. The
two Bank buildings are fashioned by professional views as well as
political ideologies, and the different histories ofHong Kong and Macau
are also willy-nilly articulated by the Banks' fimg seui disputes. They
are not just high-tech towering edifices but are also ideological
constructs which metonymically represent the resurrection of the
repressed power, and reveal political wrestling in the disguise of
postmodern fad, in the crucial years leading up to the return of Hong
Kong and Macau to China before the end of the twentieth century.
NOTES
1 The Bank of China was fonnally established in 1912 by the new Republic of
China and was a branch of the 'Central Treasury' possessing semi-
government status. After the establishment of the People's Republic of
China in 1949, the Bank assumed its role as the state's international bank in
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1953 and gained a monopoly over all foreign financial transactions. In 1980,
the Bank received its new statues through the State Council; it was
described as a state-owned socialist enterprise. It is now one of the largest
and the most important banks in China. See David Strohm, 'The Bank of
China: A Review of its Role and Function in the People's Republic of China
and the Hong KonglMacau Region', Discussion Paper, (Macau: The
University of East Asia, China Economic Research Centre, 1989).
2 The phrase 'postmodern architecture' first appeared in Hudnut's essay, 'The
Post-Modem House', which was reprinted in Joseph Hudnut (ed.),
Architecture and the Spirit of Man, (Mass.: Harvard University Press,
1949), p. 109-19.
3 In particular, the International Style, which took shape in America and
Europe during the 1930's, developed a kind of formalistic rigidity in
architectural features and showed a close relationship to Cubist and
formalist developments in painting. Its advocacy of purism was partly a
reaction against nineteenth-century eclecticism.
4 The Bank ofChina (BOC) was established in Hong Kong in 1917. The BOC
Group in Hong Kong comprises 13-member banks, operated under the
supervision of the Bank of China, Hong Kong & Macau Regional Office.
On the role ofBOC in Hong Kong, see David Ho Tai Wai, 'A Study on the
Corporate Strategy of the Bank ofChina Group in Hong Kong in the Run-up
to the twenty-first century', unpublished M.B.A. Dissertation, the
University of Hong Kong, 1993.
5 Not true to the name, the 78-storey Central Plaza is not located at Central
District, but at Wanchai. It now ranks the fourth tallest building in the world
after the Sears Tower (Chicago 1974), the World Trade Centre (New York
1973) and the Empire State (New York 1931).
6 The Bank of China group is second only to the Hongkong and Shanghai
Banking Corporation in Hong Kong.
7 Fung seui (literally, wind [and] water) is the Chinese art and science of
placement that uses design, ecology, intuition and common sense in order to
create harmony and to bring health, wealth and happiness, but also embraces
competition and conflict resulting in strain. Maurice Freedman contends
that it is a sort of 'science' which should be exempt from the description
'superstitious', and it must be part of Chinese religion. See Maurice
Freedman, 'Chinese Geomancy: Some Observations in Hong Kong' and
'Geomancy', in G. William Skinner, The Study of Chinese Society: Essays
by Maurice Freedman, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1979). It is,
however, considered a popular Chinese magical system, serving the function
of relieving anxiety and tension. See Charles F. Emmons, 'Hong Kong's
Feng Shui: Popular Magic in a Modem Urban Setting', Journal of Popular
Culture, Vol. 26:1, Summer 1992, p. 39-49. Although fung seui is
considered a type of geomancy, a way of divining based on the earth,
Stephen Feuchtwang points out that it might be called 'topomancy', as it
involves reading the significance of landscape (topography) and of
architecture rather than the earth or dirt itself. See Stephen D.R.
Feuchtwang, Anthropological Analysis of Chinese Geomancy, (Vientiane,
Laos: Editions Vithagna, 1974), p. 224.
8 Government House was declared 'historical building' by the Antiquities and
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Monuments (Decoration of Historical Building) (No.6) Notice 1995,
published in the Hong Kong Government Gazette on 29 September 1995.
On the history and transformation of Hong Kong governor's residence, see
Katherine Mattock and Jill Cheshire, The Story of Government House,
(Hong Kong: Studio Publications Ltd 1994).
9 During a personal interview in January 1996 with Dr Ho Tao (who was
entrusted with the renovation of Government House for Governor Chris
Patten in 1993), he reiterated that the changing of the shape of the fountain
during David Wilson's tenure was mainly a fimg seui issue. Ho co-initiated
and designed the Hong Kong Arts Centre (completed in 1977) and won the
territory's highest architectural honour, the silver medal, from the Hong
Kong Institute of Architects in 1978. Adopting the city flower of Hong
Kong - the Bauhinia - as a central theme, he designed the flag and emblem
for Hong Kong Special Administrative Region which will be officially used
on 1 July 1997.
10 For example, Chris Patten has been dubbed by his opponents as 'a
prostitute' and 'a man condemned in history'.
11 In a telephone interview with two staff members of the Public Relations
Office of the Bank of China, they unanimously said that the Bank building
was not involved in the game of feng seui as widely speculated, rather they
emphasised the 'official' information given in the Profile of the Bank of
China Tower.
12 The Bank of China was established in Macau in 1950.
13 With regard to the problematic issue on the sovereignty of Macau, see
Camoes C.K. Tam, Disputes concerning Macau's Sovereignty between
China and Portugal (1553-1993), (Taipei: Yung Yeh Publishes Ltd 1994),
and Robert W. Usellis, The Origin of Macao, (Macau: Museu Maritimo de
Macau, 1995).
14 Remo Riva, director of Hong Kong architects P & T Group, is one of Hong
Kong's leading architects. He won the highest architectural honour, the
silver medal, from the Hong Kong Institute of Architects in 1993 for
designing the postmodern Entertainment Building.
15 The second tallest building, Luso Building, completed in 1983 with 26
floors, was at that time considered by the planners to have exceeded a
desirable height.
16 Vicente Nicolau de Mesquita was the governor of Macau after the
assassination of Amaral in 1849. He successfully invaded Baishaling, near
Macau, and consolidated the Portuguese ambition to exercise sovereignty
over Macau de facto. His statue, put up in 1940 in the square facing the Leal
Senado, or the Royal Senate, was considered the very emblem ofPortuguese
imperialism and suppression, and was destroyed by the local Chinese during
the anti-Portuguese outcry on 3 December 1966, known as the '123
Incident' in Macau.
17 On the impact of the return of Hong Kong and Macau to China, see Albert
H. Vee, A People Misruled, (Singapore: Heinemann Asia 1992), and Jay
Branegan, 'Perils of 1997', Time, 13 May 1991.
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6TREADING THE MARGINS
PERFORMING HONG KONG
Rozanna Lilley
REPETITIVE HISTORIES
The prophets of doom and the seers of success have lately been busily
making predictions about Hong Kong. A process ofreification has been at
work wherein the present is construed not simply as the here and now but
a moment that must be dated and called the 'late-transitional' phase, a
moment pregnant with potential meanings. When British colonisation
ends in 1997 Hong Kong will become a Special Administrative Region of
China, governed by a vision ofreunification which is guided by the dream
of an essential difference between Western capitalisms and the People's
Republic. This dream is called 'One Country, Two Systems'. Initially
conceived by Deng Xiaoping to settle the question of Taiwan (Sum
1995:96), the fantasy has become a formula which states that for fifty
years following the transfer ofsovereignty China will continue to practice
socialism while Hong Kong will keep its capitalist systems and lifestyle.
What I want to draw attention to here is the way in which the potential
meanings of this late-transitional phase tend to have been reduced to an
oppositional discourse pitting, for example, Chinese accusations ofneo-
imperialism against United States grandstanding about human rights
abuses. This opposition involves a repetitive history which, unwilling or
incapable of imagining new political forms, takes its participants along
the well-trodden paths ofthe past, paths sign-posted 'liberal-democratic'
discourse for some, 'post-Maoist' discourse for others. The various
positions which can be taken on China's resumption of sovereignty over
Hong Kong, whichever terms they are couched in, can always be shown
to articulate visions of history which deepen this repetition through an
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essentially political affirmation or repudiation. The acrimonious
polemicising of the Cold War may be over but the essential core of
the old positions remain. Both socialism and capitalism remain
profoundly dependent upon each other for their self-definition. If you
follow the other path you will step towards irrationality and
malevolence. So many fears and desires are invested in this doubling,
and in the particular ways in which this mirroring is played out in
debates about 1997, that each time these roads predictably open in front
of us, we must assume that other destinations and other modes of travel
have been closed off. What I want to ask is, given the tenacity of this
discursive dichotomy, how is it possible to intervene in such an
'overdetermined circuit' (Chow 1993:15)?
If you bear in mind Governor Patten's democratisation rhetoric l
which, I should add, has operated entirely within the confines of an
executive-led government (Sum 1995:71), and China's stress on the role
of Hong Kong in bringing to partial fruition its nationalist dreams of
reunification and of replaying the glories of a splendid past, you will
begin to sense the extraordinary tenacity of the restrictions on
imagination activated here. The consequences of walking these well-
worn roads is to obscure plurality, fragmentation and heterogeneity and,
no less importantly, to stifle thoughts that might give rise to differently
envisioned modes of life.
That these thoughts have been stifled rather than suffocated, is
evident from the work of a handful of theorists commentating on and
formulating the issue of Hong Kong identity in ways which resist
dominant conceptualisations. Lee (1994), for example, argues the case
for a 'hybridised cultural register' in the territory which consciously
displaces idealist demarcations between the East and the West in the
interests of forging a strategic political identity. Chow makes a stronger
plea for this type of strategy. She writes:
it is the tactics of dealing with and dealing in dominant cultures
that are so characteristic of living in Hong Kong. These are the
tactics of those who do not have claims to territorial propriety or
cultural centrality. Perhaps more than anyone else, those who live
in Hong Kong realize the opportunistic role they need to play in
order, not to "preserve", but to negotiate their "cultural identity".
(Chow 1993:25)
For Chow (1993:92,97,140), this identity is strategic because of its
instability. The utopia of opposition and the possibilities for difference
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can be located in the perpetual modification of 'being Chinese' beyond
the confmes of national boundaries.
In this paper I would like to extend the direction of Lee and Chow's
work through a consideration of Hong Kong performance group, Zuni
Icosahedron. More specifically, I link the problems raised by their
reception, on the part of both theatre critics and audiences, to questions
of language and to some of the issues raised by Castoriadis in his
provocative analyses of 'the imaginary'. When Castoriadis writes of a
'radical imaginary', he refers to the 'elementary and irreducible
capacity of evoking images', to the 'originary faculty of positing or
presenting oneself with things and relations that do not exist'
(Castoriadis 1987:127). He also employs a more common usage ofthe
term as a way of considering shifts in meaning and slippages which
allow a movement away from the repetition of canonical significations.
It is this interest in slippages, and especially in the ways in which 'the
effect of the imaginary outstrips its function' (Castoriadis 1987:131),
that I wish to pursue here.
In the course of this pursuit, Zuni Icosahedron has been chosen for
investigation because, I believe, they provide instances of a form of
representation which resists closing itself into a system, which is not
dogmatic but problematic. Their repeated privileging of questioning
speaks usefully to the late-transitional phase and suggests the necessity
for new modes of thought and representation which cut across the
certainties ofboth totalitarianism and liberal democracy. While we need
to be aware ofthe limitations ofZuni's disjunctive work, we also need to
acknowledge that within the hegemonic parameters in which the
company operates they provide audiences with other points from which
to start, conjuring hazy outlines for new conceptions of 'Hong Kong
identity'. What is perhaps most pertinent for anthropologists here is the
indigenous argument that Hong Kong people are in a privileged position
to examine Chinese and Western culture in a critical way; that the very
lack of an established identity is an asset.
In Hong Kong, the situation of being between cultures, identities,
countries is producing its own mode ofexpression - unresolved tensions
between continuity and disruption, between fragmentation and
homogeneity characterise these articulations. These are the fractal
patterns which anthropologists try to specify through terms like
'syncretism', 'creolization' (see Gilroy 1992:192), 'hybridity' or,
more recently, 'discrepant cosmopolitanisms' (Clifford 1992:108). In
this sense, Zuni Icosahedron's work is an invitation, and sometimes a
demand, to reconceive familiar notions of nationalism and ethnicity.
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REVOLUTIONISING HONG KONG THEATRE
Currently in Hong Kong there is a very self-conscious attempt on the
part of some cultural workers to create and encourage specifically local
forms in the performing arts. This call for indigenous modes of
representation occurs within a context wherein the gravity and
civilizational value of Western and Chinese performing arts are
continually mobilised. Government funding is predicated on supplying
the imputed need for this civilization and cultural policy has largely
attempted to enforce these reference points. Groups which are engaged
in the search for indigenous modes ofrepresentation strive to undermine
assumptions about the aesthetic superiority ofcanonical versions ofboth
Western and Chinese high culture and to produce work which decenters
these received categories and is of immediate relevance to local people
(see Lilley 1991, 1995). Zuni Icosahedron is the most extravagantly
controversial group in the territory committed to this task.
Zuni Icosahedron was founded in 1982 and, since that time, the
company has presented more than fifty productions and over two
hundred performances. Zuni have become something of a legendary
fringe institution within the territory's performing arts scene but have
received their greatest critical accolades performing overseas - in
Taiwan, Britain, the United States and Japan. Financially they rely on
support from the Urban Council and from the Council for Performing
Arts in the form of small project grants but the prospect of dissolution
always looms. Indeed, for members, it forms part of the very horizon of
commitment.
Zuni began to gain greater audience popularity in 1987 with
Romance of the Rock, a production which drew its title from Cao
Xueqin's classic Chinese text The Story ofthe Stone. During that year
over 22,000 people bought tickets to Zuni shows. Since then, audience
numbers have fluctuated but, as artistic director Danny Yung points out,
the company is, at times, more popular than either the Hong Kong Dance
Company or City Contemporary Dance Company.
Many, though not all, members ofZuni are persons we might loosely
call 'intellectuals,.2 In Hong Kong, this intellectual stance is generated
from a strong sense of 'in-betweenness', of being interstitially placed
between China and Britain, and is partially a response to state and quasi-
state cultural apparati through which both of these powers propagate
Oriental and Occidental cultural forms. It is also driven by
cosmopolitanism, by the double vision and aesthetic stance of
openness to divergent cultural perspectives which this 'in-
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betweenness' fosters. This cosmopolitanism is not fortuitous. Hong
Kong owes its existence to its positioning at an economic and political
crossroad and, nowadays, is an important channel between centres and
peripheries within wider international and regional systems (see
Hannerz 1992:201). It is, quite literally, Hong Kong's business to be
open. Furthermore, thousands ofHong Kong's families have strong links
abroad, not only with mainland China but with diaspora China, made up
ofabout thirty six million people scattered throughout the world (Kim &
Dittmer 1993:277). The heightened awareness of cosmopolitanism
within Zuni Icosahedron, and the metacultural position that this
encourages, is derived from the above factors and from the
internationalisation of art and culture generally. It is also intensified
by the biographical histories of many senior members as people who
have, at times, sojourned in various parts of diasporic China and
returned home to find that the easy sense of the taken-for-grantedness of
one's own milieu is no longer available to them, that encounters with
contrasting perspectives have rendered them permanently sceptical.
In their application for a seeding grant to the Council for Performing
Arts in 1991 the company suggested:
Performing arts in Hong Kong, until the beginning of the nineties,
sadly, can by and large be described as "traditional" - either
inheriting directly from Chinese culture or taking its roots in
Western civilisation, lacking its own identity.
Zuni Icosahedron, now in its tenth year, has always aimed at
bringing to Hong Kong an original force in creativity ... It is with
this idea in mind that Zuni performs as a "laboratory" ...
ultimately striking a unique language.
(ASG(D) 1991:1)
This defence of Hong Kong's self-image, in the form of a reaction
against cultural domination from the West and China, is combined with
an avowed concern to publicise 'minority interests' in the territory.
Edward Lam3, a company founder, put it to me like this:
Due to the existence of Zuni at least more people, especially
people in the cultural scene, are more aware of the words
"alternative" and "minority" and I think it is Zuni - absolutely, it
is Zuni - who bring out these concepts. There is no other company
that has been so persistent in promoting an alternative culture, in
raising the voice of minorities, in reminding society that
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minorities should not be neglected. So the performing arts and the
publicity and promotions around all these pieces have become a
very important tool by which people understand the significance
of minority interests in Hong Kong. That is a very big step that
Zuni has achieved although not much credit has been given to us.
It is with these twin notions in mind - creating a unique local identity
and defending minority interests - that Zuni claims to have achieved a
'revolution' of Hong Kong theatre (ASG(D) 1991:3). In the following
section I will investigate this rather bold claim through a consideration
of some of the stylistic hallmarks of the company.
ZUNI STYLE
In conversation, artistic director Danny Yung refuses to associate the
company with any particular style but, if pressed, stresses that he is
interested 'in basics more than particulars . . . in form more than
contents', that he wants to explore the "impressionistic" and the
"emotional"' (Program Notes Decameron 88). This exploration involves
the creation ofperformance pieces stretched between theatre and dance,
between Chinese and Western imagery. Zuni's desire to create a
uniquely Hong Kong performance style has thus led to an excavation of
disparate images and sounds deriving from foreign and Chinese sources.
This layering effect, an uncovering ofcolonial history, is bound together
by the use of ordinary, everyday movements, gestures and props.
Critics have responded differently to these performances. Reviewing
Decameron 88, Andrew Kwong of the Hong Kong Standard (22/6/88)
writes that the production:
carried all the hallmarks of Zuni: a bare stage, costume in black,
white or some other neutral colours, characters aimlessly walking
up and down the stage or running perimetrically and diagonally,
hysterical cries which are irritating rather than enlightening. In
this production the unconventional was crowned with a total
absence of the spoken word (apart from some fragments of a live
recording ofthe Legislative Council in session). Movements ofthe
players occurred in a highly aleatory manner, and neither reason
nor imagination would provide the key to what was happening on
stage.
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While some critics deny that Zuni productions have a 'subject',
constraining themselves to 'implications' (e.g. Winterton South China
Morning Post (SCMP) 21/9/1988), the following examples will give the
reader some idea ofhow the company manages to relate the meaning of
diverse texts to the social, political and cultural circumstances of Hong
Kong. Decameron was said to be about the Black Death and about public
fears and expectations in the homestretch to 1997, with voiceovers about
ensuring stability and prosperity filling the auditorium and a bed at the
side of the stage symbolising Taiwan (China Post 23/8/1988:9; Hong
Kong Standard (HKS) 18/6/1988; SCMP 21/9/1988). Romance of the
Rock linked the plight ofBlack Jade, the neglected granddaughter ofthe
literary saga, with the sufferings of Mainland writers and artists during
the Cultural Revolution (SCMP 27/2/1987:20). The political implications
of Sunrise became increasingly explicit, with a mixture of oral and
written dialogue referring to the Legislative Council's controversial
Powers and Privileges Bill (1985).4 Conjunctions of past and present are
proclaimed, fictional histories form analogies with contemporary hopes
and tribulations and the power of theatrical experience, imagery and
mood to construct political consciousness is asserted.
However Zuni productions do not embrace any functional calls for
specific political actions. They are intended as a space for questioning,
an arena in which people are encouraged to construct their own
interpretations from minimal forms. Yung's own attitude to audiences is
related to his concept of 'sincerity'. Convinced that conventional works
domineer and bombard, he tries to develop:
a relationship of trust between audience and performers, of faith.
You have to believe in whatever you see. Otherwise you would not
be sitting there. And you have to believe in what you do.
Otherwise you would not be standing there. Anything else is just a
superficial interaction or transaction.
As critics never tire ofpointing out, many of these characteristics are
not new within the context of international performing arts. Zuni's work
could, for instance, be linked to the detachment called for in epic stage-
craft, the gestic theatre developed by Brecht in which the audience,
instead of identifying with the characters, is educated to be astonished
by the representation of conditions (see Benjamin 1968:150-154) until
the familiar becomes strange, until inattention is jolted towards an
historicising of the everyday (Blau 1982:18). More frequently, though,
Zuni is linked to Western Experimental or Alternative Theatre,
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Happenings and the whole flurry of radical performance activity during
the rebellious 1960s. Some suggest that Zuni's immediate mentors come
from more recent innovators, artists like Robert Wilson from the United
States or Germany's Pina Bausch (South China Sunday Morning Post
(SCSMP) 7/1/1990). The possibilities of a stylistic connection with
Japanese theatre are rarely explored. Remarkably, the correlations with
classical Chinese aesthetics are also little mentioned - the presentation
of discontinuous images not unlike a Chinese poem, the importance of
empty space and silence in bringing a performance to life, and the
consequent stress on minimalism which attributes great weight to the
active role of audiences in constructing their own interpretations are all
relevant here (Leys 1988:21,23,36-37).
It is not my intention to enter into this debate about potential origins.
What I do want to point to is the way in which such histories are used to
suggest that there is something inauthentic about Zuni, something
outmoded or plain suspicious. Rosamund Yu, writing for Bazaar (Dec
1990) put the case rather mildly: 'It's food for thought that Lam and Zuni
have used seemingly Western forms to question Western colonial
hegemony in Hong Kong'. Local critic, Winterton, reviewing Sisters of
the World United in 1987, was more patronizingly virulent about the matter:
It all seemed very worthy. But repeated stage images of
involuntary self-denial, and symbolic gestures expressing emo-
tional impotence plucked out from any narrative context, have
ceased to be "progressive" decades ago practically everywhere
else in the world . . . I have sat in a cellar while the actors
shovelled earth on to the skylight in Poland, been locked into a lift
with a ghost in Holland, seen Hamlet done as vaudeville, Macbeth
played by three actors fixed together like Siamese twins, watched
hom-players descend from a cathedral roof in pink overalls, been
fed blue cake by a man with a live rat peeping out from his sleeve
... seen Scott's expedition to the South Pole done on an ice-rink
and watched fake decapitations. Whether I've loved them or
loathed them, one thing is certain - I've never forgotten them. I
won't say I can remember nothing ofZuni's meanderings on a too-
large stage on Wednesday night ... [but] Sisters of the World
United was paler than life.
(SCSMP 11/10/1987)
An essay by Zhang (1992) might help to solidify the company that well-
travelled Winterton has here almost evaporated into the realms of
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insignificance. Writing about the series of campaigns against Western
'spiritual pollution' and 'bourgeois liberalisation' that have marked
Chinese political affairs since the end of the Cultural Revolution, Zhang
proposes that the travelling of Western theory to China is part of an
active opposition, an act of antagonism in the face of institutionalised
officialdom. Calling on the work of satirical author Lu Xun, the term
'grabism' is deployed to suggest the entirely different situations and
purposes which Western theory speaks to in the Mainland. According to
this analysis, the grabbing of Western theory through translation is a
'liberating' influence in a China mired in 'a completely threadbare and
ossified theory of class and class struggle that reduces all literature and
criticism to a number of rigid formulas' (Zhang 1992:109).
Zhang's argument can be applied with equal force to Zuni
Icosahedron's 'grabbing' of foreign performing arts theory and
practice. This application acquires an oppositional status in the midst
of Hong Kong's mainstream performing arts scene which draws its
strengths from the master narratives of Chinese and European tradition
(see Lilley 1991 & Lilley 1995). Put more prosaically, this is an
observation that while art forms may originate in a specific social
context, they are not tied to that context - they make take on different
functions in different places and times (Burger 1984:69).
During an interview which appeared in AsiaWeek (20/4/1984:94)
Yung was asked whether he felt that Asian performers are too influenced
by the West. He replied: 'In a bicultural environment we have a
bicultural product - and there's nothing wrong with that ... There are
many avant-garde creators in New York who have digested Asian
thought and art forms'. Or as Lu Xun pithily put it, 'the fact that we eat
beef and mutton does not mean that we are turning ourselves into cows
and sheep' (cited in Zhang 1992:120).
In fact, Zuni encompasses a variety of performance styles depending
on the director involved. Most of the work I have been discussing is
attributable to Danny Yung. Yung has the highest profile and is the
strongest guiding hand of the company. It is his works that have toured
overseas. I hope it has become clear by now that Yung's performance
pieces are marked by a contemplative resonance, sometimes labelled
sterile formalism by his detractors, a cool yet impassioned visual
seduction. The astringent grandeur of these compressions can be
contrasted with Edward Lam's proliferating expansions.
Lam was originally involved with more conventional theatre plays
and had a kind of conversion after seeing Yung's work. He became
Yung's most able protege but gradually went on to develop a very
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different approach. While there is a concern within the company to
preserve the formal appearance of mutual good feelings, the two
directors have become increasingly antagonistic. We are not only
dealing with differences in style here, with the ways in which Yung's
obsessive work solidifies against interpretation while Lam's is more
accessible.
Both directors embrace forms of emancipatory politics, but Yung's
concerns are more to do with the fixities of Chinese tradition, the
conditions that enable hierarchical domination and the possibilities of
Hong Kong identity, of a particular ethnicity, within these constraints.
Lam, in his major pieces How To Love A Man Who Doesn't Love Me
(1989) and Scenes From A Man's Changing Room (1991), is more
overtly interested in sexual politics and gender differentiation,
particularly in exploring gay issues in Hong Kong. His is a politics of
self-identity that has an almost social documentary edge, aimed at
constructing a self-defining history against the institutional and cultural
stereotypes which afflict homosexual men in Hong Kong. These
somewhat different approaches currently sit uneasily together within the
company's repertoire. More generally, a determination to explore the
conditions of perception and reception combined with an interest in
more specific critiques are the axes around which Zuni turns,
revolutions which are as frequently strained as they are smooth.
The breach between Lam and Yung is indicative of a broader split in
the current political strategies adopted by concerned locals. In one
definition of emancipatory politics, typified by Lam, the focus for
critiques of illegitimate domination centres on a valorisation of
differences, of 'minorities'; in this case, sexual difference and the
need to overcome discriminatory attitudes towards homosexuals. On the
other hand, there is a broader political agenda which seeks to examine
the bindings of tradition, of the past, thereby preparing the new or
allowing a transformative approach to an as yet undetermined future
(see Giddens 1991:210,211). This is the approach taken by Yung in his
stage journeys. This is the China Hongkongese must return to but by
another route; the China of politicised memories and desire.
For Yung, minority politics smacks of tokenism. The familiar mantra
of women, students, artists, workers, greenies and gays cannot address
the big picture.s Although he takes an intense interest in elections and
lobby groups and encourages, sometimes unsuccessfully, other Zuni
members to do the same, he locates the site for 'real' politics beyond the
governmental sphere. While Yung's productions seek to politicise any
and all of the actions of the British administration or the Chinese
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Communist Party (CCP), he treats these as symptoms of contradictions
located at a deeper level. It is this use of the governmental as a reflexive
target of self-problematisation (see Hunter 1992:367) that allows some
members a disenchanted withdrawal from formal politics and others a
fervent pledge to engage in political activities without any appearance of
overt discord.
ENGAGING THE AUDIENCE
Zuni's placement of themselves as practising an autonomous 'high' art
in opposition to companies given over to the ideological reproduction of
society, their pursuit oforiginality and denigration ofconformism, have
resulted in accusations of having an 'insulting disregard for the
audience' (SCMP 27/12/1985), of staging a 'confrontation' between
performers and spectators (Tsin Pao 28/6/1988). Many company
members take the elitist view that the masses seek distraction whereas
true art demands concentration from the viewer. In their 1991
application for a seeding grant Zuni listed as one of its objectives
'serving' the audience in a more positive manner in contrast to merely
'entertaining' the community (ASG(D) 1991:1).
Zuni members express this viewpoint in a variety of ways. One
woman said to me that Hong Kong Repertory Company was 'not no
good, just traditional'; that 'most of their performances are just the
same', 'just to make you laugh'. Yung is more balanced in his public
statements:
There are two kinds of performing arts. One kind belongs to the
museum which we can all go to and appreciate. It is like looking at
porcelain: a summary of our history, our background. The other
kind is actually moving, going on, expanding, relating, develop-
ing. I think I am more interested in the second, although I can see
that the first is important.
(Hackett 1990:33)
IfYung tactfully suggests ossification in Chinese and Western tradition,
placing himself as part of a movement towards innovation, Lam, with
typical confidence, at one time suggested that the response ofaudiences
was, to a certain extent, irrelevant. In a newspaper interview he had the
following statement attributed to him: 'Unlike other commercial groups
which have to pander to the audience's tastes in order to secure a good
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also has some currency in the West but seems to be more readily
accepted by Zuni audiences than might be expected elsewhere. The
genuineness of people's desire to understand and to be taught is part of
an acceptance of a marked pedagogical strain in contemporary Chinese
artistic policy. And, in the Chinese language press, the circulation of
these ideas, affects reviewers whether they write for Taiwanese,
Mainland or independent publications. Ceasing to be a particular
theory professed only in mainland China, the value of a distinctly
pedagogical artistic practice has so affected language and ideas that it
has become a constitutive part of the Hong Kong cultural landscape.
However, another critic of the same production, while indicating the
same genuine quest for comprehension, believes he fails precisely
because the form is too Western, too modem:
This is the second time I have gone to a Zuni performance. The
first time I watched October at the Shatin Town Hall. After the
performance, several ladies asked me about my impressions. I
simply said, "I don't understand". An old hand of the drama circle
said: "You will understand more ifyou watch Zuni's performances
more often".
Yesterday, I went again to Zuni's performance. Still I failed to
understand. Fortunately I met a very famous figure in the field of
performing arts. He told me: "This type ofdrama has become very
popular in the United States. It is the avant-garde type". I am still
very perplexed. Maybe I am too old-fashioned.
I did not want to give up. I must be able to find someone among
the audience who could understand. While I was looking around,
Mr Xu Guanglin came along with several young men. I dragged
him out, asking: "What does this drama mean?" "Oh, we are just
discussing that. Let's have something to drink first", said Mr Xu.
We sat in a restaurant for two hours. We raised many questions.
Several times we thought we could not continue the discussion.
(Zhu Ke The Mirror 1984)
If Zuni aim to imbue an attitude of questioning, in this instance they
certainly succeeded. One might note, though, that what is being
questioned is the methodology of Zuni rather than current social
circumstances in Hong Kong. In this sense, the company could be
described as creating a disposition towards doubt which partially rests
on the instability of attraction/repulsion to critiques addressed to Hong
Kong Chinese couched in what is perceived to be a Western form.
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Ofcourse, critics are a particular case and most tend to admire Zuni,
particularly after their overseas touring. Many are in awe. One dance
critic I was attending Cantonese language classes with was too terrified
to review a Zuni production. The mythos had grown around the company
that they were not interpretable, particularly to foreigners. Some react
negatively to this 'off-limits' quality - the most vicious attacks I have
read were published in English language newspapers. I have already
given some examples of these vilifications but the following will serve
to jolt the reader's memory - 'boring, cold, authoritarian ... rich kid's
aloof play' (Winterton, SCMP 21/9/1988) or, rather more absurdly,
'Zuni performers were like characters out of Roger Corman's movie
Night oj the Living Dead . . . Everything was below a threshold of
discernible stimuli' (Borek, HKS 1/5/1991). A number of issues and
neuroses are played out in these critical commentaries. IfChinese critics
sometimes feel they do not understand Zuni's productions because they
are too Western, Western critics fear they lack understanding because
they are too Chinese. There is an element of resentment here, common
to many expatriate discourses in Hong Kong. But there is also a counter
strategy of claiming superior knowledge of 'avant-garde' performing
arts, of suggesting that Zuni have appropriated something which is not
rightfully theirs and which, being Chinese, they do badly anyway.6
Critics everywhere have a fundamental role in producing legitimate
classifications of artistic value. In Hong Kong, however, this role is
somewhat attenuated. Critics cannot make or break a show because
productions simply do not run for long enough. Even six performances
would be a lengthy season. Reviews do not generally appear until a few
days after opening night and audiences thus must decide whether to buy a
ticket prior to the publication ofa review. In the long term, though, critics
do form the basis for the recognition of performing groups and for the
further accumulation of their cultural authority (see Verdery 1991:189).
Zuni have managed to sidestep this process to some extent through their
'political' reputation and their handling of specific controversies. This
gives them an advantage over other local performing arts companies
because they have largely managed to create and control their own media
profile based on specific interventions that are deemed newsworthy.
PREPARING THE NEW
On occasion, Zuni members express a feeling of inadequacy about their
own productions, a fear of the social ineffectiveness of their medium.
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Mathias Woo suggested to me that art as an institution in Hong Kong
neutralises the political content of individual works, saying that
sometimes he thinks, 'Oh, God. There are so many problems in the
world, in Hong Kong, should I put in an effort to do a performance?'
Yung has also expressed this uncertainty:
Worrying about the limitation, asking questions, circling around day
in day out doesn't help a bit as it's not going to lead us anywhere. And
the stage becomes a cage. With only worry and questions.
(Program Notes Days and Nights ofAbstinence (DNA) 1990)
In answering these concerns it would be possible to argue that Zuni's
style is emancipatory in itself, that its nonorganicity permits the
breaking up of ideologies. But we do not have to refer only to structural
. principles and formal characteristics. Content is equally at issue. Zuni
frequently use the stage as a source ofcounter-information about events
in the territory, exposing repression and bureaucratic high-handedness.
Most importantly, though, the value ofZuni Icosahedron lies in their
advocacy of a perpetual state of questioning within a polity which
encourages passivity and paralysis through a combination of
conventional Chinese formal constraints on behaviour which endorse
the maintenance ofsocial order and British colonial policies which, until
recently, have allowed locals little say in the running of their own city.
Zuni member David Yeung gave me an insightful description of the
company's rupturing practices:
We are not a political group trying to put propaganda on stage but
we do have a political consciousness that we try to express in a
creative way on stage. We try to introduce an open-minded point
ofview, both for the audience and for ourselves. Also we try to talk
about history, we try to talk about the environment affecting
people and that environment can be Hong Kong or China. We are
not trying to propose propaganda but we are trying to open
people's minds so that they can see. We talk about chauvinisms,
we talk about the passiveness of people towards the environment,
their country, history.
The form is a kind ofrevolution for Hong Kong audiences. It is
very important for everyone to see their life, the standard of
tradition and the history ofHong Kong and China. We are trying to
break rules in the theatre and also in normal life, to show that we
are not passive. We are trying to do something.
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Yung is more succinct in his discussion of the same issue: 'The local
education system forces everything upon you, making you memorise,
and lays down a value system for you so that you won't challenge it at
all. People say 'I don't understand' as if everything they watch has to be
understood' (HKS 31/10/1989).
Zuni's remorseless destabilisation of canons is about creating an
alternative form of representation, a new place from which to speak.
Other performing groups like Sand & Bricks or City Contemporary
Dance Company (see Lilley 1991) are also engaged in this quest. But it
is Zuni's project ofreclaiming, reinflecting and questioning history and
tradition for the conditional present that has attracted the greatest
publicity and the most polarised responses. Their pillaging of tradition,
their parodies and their allegories construct a hybrid ChinesefWestern
theatre/dance form. Tracing the original sources from which this
hybridity emerges is a challenging intellectual exercise. But the essential
point to consider is not these originating moments. Rather, we should
recall that it is Zuni Icosahedron which has effectively publicised an
interrogative space which allows other positions to emerge and made
visible the hegemonic parameters of Chinese and Western tradition.
Although the defining characteristics ofZuni's work remain difficult
to capture, all of their performances are bound together by dramatic
analyses of oppression and subjectivity, the intertwining of culture and
power at the level of emotion and bodily expression - the loci where
forms of domination become entrenched through being interiorised.
What I remember most clearly from their shows is the incessant turning
things over, knowing there will be no last word or easy solution. Their
depictions of unspeakable closures almost return the viewer to silence,
but not quite. And here, the sparse use of dialogue is necessary.
Confronted by dominant cultures which repress the articulation of a
specifically Hong Kong experience, their struggle is, as Williams has
described the emerging identities ofnew social groups, 'at the very edge
ofsemantic availability' (cited in Rutherford 1990:22). Thus they opt for
the imagistic, recreating everyday movements and gestures occurring in
daily practice. They are concerned with what cannot be put into words
and this silence is eloquent.
The eloquence of silence is also, I suggest, intimately tied to the
problematic status of Cantonese (see Bolton & Hutton's chapter in this
volume). In Hong Kong Cantonese, not Mandarin, is the language
primarily used by over 98 per cent of the population (Chen 1993:521).
Stigmatisation of this language has been standard practice. In post-war
years commentators, for example, suggested that local plays could not
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box office, we are a sponsored group and therefore we can stage our
performances in any way we feel like regardless of whether people
understand them or not' (SCMP 4/9/1986).
Obviously there is a tension operating here between Zuni's belief that
they are respecting and caring for audiences and the perception ofothers
that this elitism is alienating. Frequently audiences do dislike Zuni
productions. Some find an almost masochistic pleasure in their own
bewilderment. Witness these meanderings from Zheng Jingming in the
Weekend Herald (3/7/1988):
If you are not perplexed after you watch Zuni's performance, I
would feel worried. The feeling of being perplexed proves that you
have tried, though failed, to find the answer. This is the normal
reaction ofnormal people. That you feel you know the answer could
mean that either you are above worldly considerations or you are
dreaming during the performance. It is, in fact, a self-persecution to
watch Zuni's performances. You have to enter a state ofdepression,
constantly wrestling with your own thinking, trying to interpret the
successive symbols ... Faced by Zuni's obscure ideas it is natural
that we are perplexed, or even angry, feeling that we have bought
two difficult hours with our own money.
A few days ago after I finished watching Zuni's The
Decameron, my ears were filled with the audience's complaints
... Zuni's performance appeared to bring a nightmare to the
audience. Relief came only after the show. What the hell does
Zuni's performance want to say? There would be no answer ifyou
insisted on asking Zuni ... Therefore quite a number of drama
critics are of the opinion that Zuni's attitude has distanced itself
from the folk. It is destructive, rather than constructive.
This kind of criticism reflects only the critics mentality. They
regard the audience as being three years old. To be honest, those
soap-opera-type of dramas can only dull the audience. An
approach like "this story teaches us that ..." can only raise up
a lazy audience.
Though the account is ambivalent, it demonstrates a willingness to
accept Zuni's elusive pedagogy, an admiration for the discipline of their
abstractions. Ironically, I think that this appreciation of Zuni's
instruction is much greater in the Chinese language press because,
while the content may be vague, the attitude has affinities with socialist
philosophies of art and performance as educational tools. This notion
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be written in Cantonese because there were 'limitations' to the language;
it was 'slovenly' and an inadequate vehicle for the expression of
emotional depths (Tsim 1968:23). With hindsight this notion appears
extraordinary. Today more new works than translations are performed
and the appropriateness ofCantonese as a medium oflocal expression is
no longer at issue.?
Nevertheless, we need to bear in mind that the 1982 Constitution of
the People's Republic stipulates for the first time that Mandarin is to be
promoted across the country (Chen 1993:508) and detractors now argue
that the common use of Cantonese in Guangdong public life is
'inhibiting socialist construction' (Erbaugh 1995:91). The Basic Law,
which is a framework for the governance of the territory after 1997,
allows for the official use of English and Chinese language 'by the
executive authorities, legislative and judicial organs' (1990 Article 9).
The ambiguous use of Chinese language or jungmahn in this document
would seem to tacitly tolerate Cantonese. However, locals are frantically
attending Mandarin classes in anticipation of a marked shift in this
direction.8
Compounding these complications, is the fact that, until the early
1970s, English was the sole written language for virtually all formal
occasions in Hong Kong and is embedded in administrative practice.
Despite the promulgation of an Official Languages Ordinance in 1974,
which gave parity to the use ofChinese and English, the civil service is
stilI criticised for being slow in the promotion of the former (Chen
1993:532-533; SCMPIW22/4/1995:11). An overwhelming majority of
secondary schools continue to use English as the primary medium of
instruction. This results in what Lee (1994:14) has termed a
'schizophrenic educational environment' where, within the classroom,
students and teachers make frequent use of code shifting from English
into Cantonese (Scollon 1995:9) and, outside the classroom, speak only
Cantonese. While commentators predict an increasingly trilingual
society in the territory, it is evident that language use has become
both politically charged and highly demanding.
Chow (1993:147,160) has pointed out that inarticulateness is a way of
resisting the talking function of the state, of refusing to participate in
patriotic rhetoric. In Hong Kong, silence can also mark a refusal to be
coopted into the monotonous affirmation of the dominant values of
socialism and capitalism, a desire to disengage with the mutually
defining relationship of these categories and the disparate visions of the
irreversibility of historical processes that both categories promote.
Instead of making predetermined speeches, instead of accepting the
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domination of the Hong Kong imaginary by inexorable conclusions
which promise utopia or tragedy, instead of reciting the school texts
laboriously learnt by heart, people may choose not to say anything.
This abandonment of words bespeaks vulnerability. It is as if, every
coordinate buckling around them as 1997 draws closer, living in Hong
Kong has become a constant navigation over the fault lines of tradition.
The felt experience of Zuni performances depend on this quickening
incertitude in which only a promise of problematisation is held out for
the audience to grasp. Indeed, Zuni members take the fact that there is no
finished edifice, that what is encouraged is the work of potentially
endless reflection, as a sign of their own aesthetic and ethical superiority
amongst other local cultural producers.
What makes Zuni's work a valid confrontation of the problems posed
by the frontiers of the history Hong Kong people are living through is
not any particular message that they convey to audiences but the
interrogation which it is and to which it gives rise. Their performances
do not unveil some occulted truth. They are a continual process of
interrogation, destined to ambiguity in their desire to eliminate closure
and completion, prohibited from absolutising their results. The most
important 'message' that this process can convey is that there is no one
good regime, that history is indeterminate and, as Castoriadis
(1987: 190) has so cogently expressed it, 'not the actualisation of pre-
determined possibilities'.
Zuni Icosahedron's work is intimately related to changes currently
taking place in Hong Kong. When local legislators voice their criticisms
or issue their demands, they are not only calling for specific policy
changes on the part of the administration. They are implicitly
demanding the right to criticise and to make demands, a right which
disrupts the logic of both colonialism and totalitarianism. Zuni's
performances do not necessarily express these values as such. Rather,
their work emerges in a space opened by them, and their formal values of
questioning and interrogation, along with their utopian sense of future
possibilities, are resonances of the optimisms and fears of the late
transitional phase. Their attempts to represent Hong Kong experience in
its often contradictory multiplicity, to convey the translations between
and across cultures which are constitutive of the daily lives of Hong
Kong people, tends to reveal the presence of social power in places
where it had been practically invisible and inaudible. Zuni's vigorous
defence oftheir right to perform involves the right ofothers to watch and
intends a future in which expression is multiplied instead offrozen in the
wastelands of politically useful art.
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THE INDETERMINATE FUTURE
Concerned with shoring up a social space separated from state power
and with nourishing a variously defined autonomy, Zuni Icosahedron are
proposing a reformation of Hong Kong performing arts at every level,
aesthetically and politically. The dimensions of the problems they are
dealing with are enormous. Zuni are attempting to construct a unique
Hong Kong identity, come to terms with history, keep a divided
company together, avoid the use ofhighly trained professionals, develop
a new audience, educate the public and alter the economic structure of
performing arts in Hong Kong.
The group is too unknown to achieve all this; their performances will
never be manna for the masses and they will inevitably fail from
overextension. However, while I, as an academic analyst, may suspect
. that I am treading the slippery terrain of fantasies of radical
consciousness, Zuni members and supporters believe that they are
treading the margins of the possible and that the whole point of the
exercise is the expenditure of effort.
The question here is to what extent a disposition towards doubt, an
encouragement of questioning and hence of greater individual
autonomy can cancel the effects on people's lives of the oppressive
structures ofthe society in which they live. Yung admits to a cynicism
about the political system and a consequent desire to use the freedom
of the stage as a kind of last resort. His attitudes about the
relationship between the wider polity and his own cultural products
are difficult to pin-point because he wisely refuses to separate the
two, relying on the old metaphor of the world as a stage to articulate
his position:
What's on stage is just as important as what's offstage. Tiny stages
and enormous stages, political stages and historical stages, they're
all waiting alike for us to acquaint, to stroll about, and to explore.
Waiting for us to participate and experience ... What a stage
offers is space - with less function/mission/significance in mind,
maybe we'll dig up more unknowns.
(program Notes DNA 1990)
If Yung believes in anything, he believes that Zuni Icosahedron speaks
for the future. In conversation once on the Star Ferry, he spoke to me
about the unique cultural position of Hong Kong, arguing that the
impending horizon of 1997 now provides a source of continual ferment
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in the territory, an experience which is not a revolution but a 'condensed
evolution'. He compared Zuni's performances to the types of cultural
events that occurred in Russia during the October Revolution and in
China just prior to and after 1949. Later he added:
The most valuable thing is not only that you have the drive to
express and articulate your experience and to analyse and then edit
your ways ofpresentation but also it is that you can always step out
again and this is what makes an artist. Being a bicultural person is
really a plus. Because you can switch from one language to
another language in order to relate in a new way. Through that
whole social process we learn faster, we are more sensitive and
have more acute vision.
Zuni provide a very concise picture of the acknowledgement of the
bindings of Chinese tradition, a recognition of the relevance of their
British history and a rejection of nationalism in favour of an unstable
and fragile notion of 'Hong Kong identity' that has some roots in an
ethnic idea, in that it primarily speaks to Hong Kong Chinese, but is
utterly disassociated from any overt discourse of ethnicity. There is
nothing apologetic about this stance and the following comment from
Edward Lam may help to capture the sense of freedom, of
entrepreneurial adventure, that this process entails:
We are entitled to borrow so many things from the outside because
we don't have this burden about being Chinese. Whatever we see
we can borrow and turn it into something in a very Hong Kong
style. Like the way they make clam spaghetti.
(TV & Entertainment Times 12-18/8/1991:17)
In their excavation of disparate source materials, their presentation of
bits and pieces of history, scraps ofculture, in their silent gestures, Zuni
diligently dismantle the authority of the master narratives of Chinese
and Western tradition.
The condensations and displacements which Zuni offer their
audiences are designed to alter perception. But we obviously cannot
predict how and to what extent for whom. Indeed, in the absence ofany
genuine party politics in Hong Kong, in the lack of institutional foci
with much independence from Britain or China, no dissenting voices in
the territory stand much chance of becoming a chorus (see Verdery
1991:365).
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However, groups like Zuni Icosahedron might be said to have a
properly revolutionary significance because their work presupposes -
over and above the individuals performing on the stage, speaking
pompously about the virtues of the CCp' cursing propaganda and
thought control, advocating democracy and greater citizen participation,
making decisions without consultation - a rupture with the dominant
regimes of the imaginary and a movement towards an unknowable
future. It is the effective presence of this future in anticipation, the
subtext of the ineluctable and uncertain prospect of 1997, which forms
the base line for drawing new maps and Zuni inhabit this borderland
culture area populated by Hong Kong Chinese unevenly assimilated to
dominant nation states (see Clifford 1992: 110), slipping between nation,
ethnicity and identity in their repeated efforts to question the politics of
tradition, of historical memory, of location, of the new.
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NOTES
1 Patten has articulated a change in Britain's decolonisation rhetoric away
from 'convergence' to a promotion ofcitizen participation in the interests of
defending and creating 'democracy and rights' (Sum 1995:77). In, for
example, a speech broadcast on Radio Television Hong Kong, Patten
replayed a familiar liberalism which has very effectively forged the fiction
ofa society spontaneously organised as a result of free competition in which
the state played the minimal role ofensuring that the rules of the game were
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respected. The innovative element here is a move away from much touted
generalisations about the apathy of Hong Kong people. For Patten, the
economic success of the colony can only be preserved if the creative
participation of the population is recognised and encouraged. Moral
protection in the guise of a stimulation of active participation has become
the exit-in-glory motif (Sum 1995:72). Scorning the notion that Hong Kong
people are 'consumers of goods, but never of ideas', by remarking 'You
don't need to be a Marxist to know that that's twaddle', Patten argues that
the territory will not fundamentally alter 'if the men and women who live
here don't want it to change'. 'Be positive and act positive too' he enthuses.
In this way, listeners are reassured, Hong Kong will be 'a free, prosperous,
decent society, living with the rule of law under a Chinese flag' (South
China Morning Post International Weekly (SCMPIW) 8/4/1995:11).
2 Here I follow Hannerz's distinction between 'intellectuals' and 'intelligen-
tsia' wherein both terms refer to people who are preoccupied with ideas but
the latter tend to be more bound by paradigms and institutional constraints.
Indeed, Hannerz's description of intellectuals is a very apt account of the
type of theatrical work that Zuni are engaged in. He writes: 'It is the
business of intellectuals to carry on traffic between different levels and
fields of meaning within a culture, to translate between abstract and
concrete, to make the implicit explicit and the certain questionable, to move
ideas between levels of consciousness, to connect ideas which superficially
have little in common, to juxtapose ideas which usually thrive on
separateness, to seize on inconsistency, and to establish channels between
different modes of giving meanings external shape' (1992:139).
3 Lam now has his own dance/theatre company, called 'Edward Lam's D.T.',
in Hong Kong.
4 The original draft ofthis bill gave the legislature the right to deny the public
entry to council meetings, prohibited the publication of reports of
proceedings held in camera and created a set of defamation offences
including 'intentional disrespect' (Far Eastern Economic Review 27/6/
1985:36).
5 The vital issue ofaudience responses to Zuni productions is addressed in my
forthcoming book, Staging Hong Kong: Gender and Performance in
Transition, Curzon Press. There I argue that the generally appreciative
response of audiences to this company rests on their valuation of the
demand for thinking and for questioning and on their insistence on
heterogeneity and the refusal of precise meaning.
6 See Lilley 1994 for a sustained analysis of a Zuni production in which
feminist issues were repeatedly hijacked by supposedly larger concerns,
such as sovereignty transferral.
7 Erbaugh (1995) reports that the economic boom in southern China is rapidly
enhancing dialect prestige. Television commercials in the Mainland employ
Cantonese speaking actors to impart a sheen of sophistication to their
products and travellers fake Cantonese accents in the hope of better service
(Erbaugh 1995:89).
8 Currently, though, even among Hong Kong secondary and college students,
less than ten per cent report any competence in Mandarin (Erbaugh
1995:80,87).
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7NEGOTIATING TRADITION
CUSTOMARY SUCCESSION IN THE
NEW TERRITORIES OF HONG KONG1
Selina Ching Chan
INTRODUCTION
This paper examines the customary succession pattern in today's New
Territories. The investigation is based upon information collected
during one year of anthropological fieldwork conducted in a lineage
village of Fanling Wai in the New Territories of Hong Kong during
1991 and 1993. The Fanling Pang lineage is one ofthe five big lineages
in the New Territories (Baker 1968). According to the Pang's
genealogy, the lineage was originally from Chaozhou. In 1190 A.D.,
the Pangs moved into the northern part of the New Territories of Hong
Kong.
Based upon figures collected for 1992, there were approximately
three thousands Pangs in total. Around 640 households, half of the
population reside in Fanling Wai. The remainder are in Europe: in the
United Kingdom, Belgium, Holland, Germany and Sweden. These
people have sought work in Europe since the late 1950's. Many of them
worked in restaurants. The influence of these villagers has brought the
outside world to the village. Meanwhile, the New Territories have
undergone rapid economic development and urbanisation. Under such
circumstances, are lineages still 'traditional '? Are villagers still
practising customary succession as has been portrayed by
anthropologists and sinologists in the past?
In this paper, I will discuss first the traditional picture of customary
succession. Then, I will delineate the substantial content of the
inheritance pattern claimed as 'traditional' by villagers today. Through
analysing the ways in which traditions are interpreted differently by
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villagers in distinct contexts, I will examine villagers' attitudes to
inheritance issues. Interpretation of the legitimacy of granting
inheritance to daughters in the form of cash will be investigated, as
well as the reason why land and housing is strictly forbidden as a form of
inheritance on the part of daughters. My discussion will refer in
particular to the retention of idealised and over-structured aspects of
custom derived from the legal order - the New Territories Ordinance.2
TRADITIONAL PICTURE
Anthropologists and sinologists have claimed that Chinese practise
patrilineal inheritance pattern.3, According to Shiga, Chinese inheri-
tance, gaisi'hng has three modes ofexpression (1978:126). These are the
names of individuals, property and sacrifices. Only sons can carry on the
descent line, perform sacrifice, and continue the relationship between
themselves and fathers or ancestors. Property is divided equally among
all sons. Parents have no wish to favour anyone of their heirs. Indeed,
the Chinese inheritance pattern is structured by the principle ofdescent
ideology (Chen 1984, Chun 1990). Property served as a jou which
belonged to the family and provided funds for ancestral sacrifices. The
estate must also be retained within the clan through inheritance by male
heirs. The Chinese succession pattern and its relationship with descent
ideology can be defined within the context of two native terms: hei and
jOhng (Chen 1984, Chun 1990).
Hei in the present context refers to the 'shared and transmitted
substance' which passes from father to son (Chun 1990:20). Chun
pointed out that hei serves as the basis of a symbolically constituted
relationship between father and son, as well as between brothers (with
extension outward) through a common father. It points to the continuous
sharing of substance from father to son in every generation into the
indefinite future, which diachronically runs through the whole lineage,
and epitomises the descent ideology. Synchronically speaking, all sons
share the same quantity of hei derived from the father, whether or not
they have the same mother. Chun (1990) argues that the equal sharing of
hei by each son actually forms the basis ofequal inheritance. Or, in more
direct terms, the equal sharing in the inheritance of property is formed
on the basis of the holding of a fOhng status by each son, as claimed by
Chen (1984). Fohng is a native concept which relates closely to
patrilineal descent. Fohng denotes the descent status which a man holds
by virtue of his being a son. All brothers constitute separate fOhng, and
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they all share equal right to the father's property (Chen 1984). In other
words, it is the descent status which detennines the son's rights over his
father's property. In this way, it is understood that male offspring,
whether of the principal wife or the secondary wife, share the same right
of inheritance (Evans 1973:26, Jamieson 1970:16).
However, the pattern of equal division of inheritance among sons is
an ideal model. In practice, R. Watson (1985:107) has pointed out that
among the Ha Tsuen villagers in the New Territories neither the wealthy
landlords nor the landless poor necessarily practised equal inheritance.
She argues that a son is entitled to his inheritance only if his status is
validated in the eyes of the community through the celebration of
particular rituals (1985:109).
In the case of daughters, they are supposed to be 'married out'; as
such, they are not entitled to inherit the family property. Freedman
(1966:55) has claimed that daughters have no further economic claims
on their natal families, although they may receive gifts from their
families. Goody (1990:89) further pointed out that marriage defined
the limit of effective claims of daughters on family property.
Meanwhile, Goody (1990:79) also argued that daughters receive pre-
mortem inheritance at marriage in the fonn of a direct dowry. In the
1970s, the dowry in Ha Tsuen was composed mainly of furniture such
as cupboards and chairs, and clothes andjewellery; and earrings, rings,
bracelets and necklaces. Sometimes a young servant girl was given (R.
Watson 1985:131-2). Dowry in Fanling in the 1990s is mainly in the
fonn ofjewellery: gold and sometimes diamonds. Villagers claim that
a proper dowry is necessary to make their daughters 'look good and
decent' when entering their husbands' families. The meaning ofdowry
is however different from that of the inheritance. More significantly,
the amount of the dowry - jewellery or cash - given to daughters is not
comparable with the amount of the inheritance -land and cash - given
to sons. Indeed, neither the meaning, nor the amount, of the dowry in
Chinese society implies a fonn of pre-mortem inheritance to
daughters.
Goody (1990:89) further argued that an exception exists in cases
where daughters were needed to ensure the continuity of the family line.
He argued, 'where a women (sic) continue to have a substantial claim on
their parents after marriage, they "inherit" as well as take a dowry'
(1990:89). In fact, it is not the daughter who inherits her parents'
property and carries on the descent line in uxorilocal marriage. It is her
son who inherits the property by means of 'indirect adoption', taking the
surname of the natal family, and thus carrying on the descent line. In
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other words, uxorilocal marriage has no correlation with inheritance on
the part of a daughter.
Indeed, daughters do not hold descent status and therefore are
generally not entitled to have any share of the inheritance. R. Watson
(1985) pointed out that women in the Ha Tsuen Teng lineage in the 1970's
generally had no rights of inheritance.4 Nevertheless, my findings in the
New Territories in the 1990's show that, for daughters, marriage does not
entirely end the claims on the estate ofnatal families. By investigating the
following ethnographic case in detail, I will argue that there has been a
subtle change of the attitudes of villagers on the issue of inheritance.
INTERPRETING TRADITION - CASH FOR
DAUGHTERS
A. Ethnographic discussion
As shown in Diagram I, A died, leaving widow B and their only child,
daughter C, in the mid-1970's. Following Chinese custom, women
(wives and daughters) could not inherit A's property. A's property,
composed of land and houses was used to set up ajou, or trust. Thisjou,
was named after A. The income from the trust was mainly in the form of
rent collected from the house and land. Similar to other jou, on the one
hand, income derived from the jou went towards the maintenance costs
for widow B and daughter C; on the other hand, the income also made it
possible for widow B and daughter C to worship A and A's ancestors.
Following the conventional practice, widow B became the manager of
A'sjou.
A few years later, in 1978, widow B also passed away, leaving behind
the married daughter C. C had married a man from another village in the
New Territories and had moved to reside in England with her husband.
Since she was far away from Fanling, it was inconvenient for her to
manage and collect the income of A's jou properly and efficiently. She
therefore wanted to dissolve A's jou, so that she could inherit the
property which was in the name of A's jou.
I then asked the villagers if it was proper to request the dissolution of
a jou. The village representative explained that
she is now the only person of her family. It is practically
inconvenient for her to manage the jou in England, so why
shouldn't she dissolve the jou?
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Other villagers who were listening to the story agreed with him. They
told me that the continued existence of the j6u was not at all important.
They further explained to me that the dissolution of j6u does not
necessarily lead to an end ofthe worshipping ofancestors. Indeed, j6u is
not the end, it is only a means for venerating ancestors.
For the villagers in Fanling, however, the controversy arose over the
choice ofa legitimate person to inherit the land and property of the j6u.
C, as a married daughter laid a claim to the property. Her act however
was not in accordance with patrilineal 'theory' in which daughters after
marriage did not have any claim on family estate. The reason she gave
was that she was the most'chan', the person most closely related to her
father. In this context, chan was interpreted as a close relationship
defined in terms of blood ties and sentimental filiation. The villagers
seemed to support her claims entirely.
However, A's closest relative E, an aunt of daughter C, strongly
opposed C's claim to A's property (Diagram 1). Interestingly, aunt E's
petition was also based on an interpretation of the native concept of
chan. She said that a 'married-out daughter' - ngoi ga neuih - was 'spilt
water'. 'Married out daughters' are members oftheir husbands' families
and therefore they do not belong to their natal families. E therefore
claimed that 'married out women' were no longer chiin, that is, related
closely to their natal families. Her argument that a daughter after
marriage should not lay claim to the property ofher natal family accords
with the traditional picture summarised by Goody (1990:89). E further
pointed out that as a 'married in woman', she herself belonged to the
husband's lineage, that is, to the Pang. Thus, she was chiin, closely
related to the Pangs, and in fact, the closest person to A. Her
interpretation, followed the tradition ofyih chan kahp chan, 'succession
by the closest relative'. As a widow of the Pangs, she claimed that, in
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accordance with tradition, she should be the person who received the
family property if the zu was going to be dissolved. Meanwhile, she also
suggested that she should be the trustee of the family's property also in
accordance with 'tradition'.
Interestingly, the Village Council and the other members of the
lineage did not accept aunt E's interpretation. The Village Council
argued that, in accordance with tradition, only male descendants were
closely or directly related with A. The Village Council said that only ifE
had a son might she lay claim to property on behalf of her son, because
the son was a person who held descent status at the Pang lineage. A
woman, lacking any male descendant, was in no way chan, closely
related to A.5 The argument rested on the basis that a woman could never
be close to her husband's patrilineage without having an intermediate
bridge in the form of a son. Thus, the Village Council decided that aunt
E should not have any priority over daughter C to the claim, and in fact,
it simply dismissed her claim.
Although the aunt sought support for her claim by protesting to the
highest political organisation of the New Territories villagers, Heung
Yee Kuk, this organization simply recommended that the Village
Council re-examine the case in detail. At a later stage, aunt E
considerably modified her claim and simply wanted the house, but not
the land.
Nevertheless, both daughter C and the Village Council still disagreed
with aunt E's second proposal. The Village Council strongly supported
the claims of daughter C by agreeing with C's interpretation of the
sacred principle ofchan, and thought that the property of A's j6u should
in its entirely be given to her. This shows that daughter C's claim to the
property of her natal family was not related to her marital status. This
finding is, however, in contrast to past research indicating that marriage
ends a daughter's claim to the property of her natal family.
At the same time, villagers told me that the transfer of ownership of
the landed property and the house from the deceased father to the
daughter presented legal difficulties. This was because the pattern of
succession in the New Territories had to follow the 'customary way'.
According to section 13, Chapter 97 in the New Territories Ordinance, it
stated that,
In any proceedings in the High Court or the District Court in
relation to land in the New Territories, the court shall have power
to recognize and enforce any Chinese custom or customary right
affecting such land.
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Interestingly it was the villagers who told me this legal restriction. The
Village Council then created a delicate arrangement. On the one hand
the daughter did not become the real owner of the house and land ofNs
j6u, but on the other, nor was the j6u dissolved. Instead, the Village
Council appointed the daughter as the trustee so that she could receive
income from the house and the land. This arrangement guaranteed that
the returns from the property of Ns j6u would be given to daughter C,
yet, it did not violate the law. As explained by the villagers, after
obtaining the trusteeship, the daughter could sell the land of Ns j6u to
the private sector or to the government. Only in this way could daughter
C inherit all her father's property, but in the form of money.
A further consideration in this whole dispute is the arrangement of
old houses - j6u ngiiks - where ancestors have lived. The j6u ngiiks are
situated in the oldest part of the village and are special to the villagers.
The j6u ngiik has domestic shrines. and the names of patrilineal
ancestors from the last three to five generations are placed on a large
piece of red paper as a form of paper tablet facing the door. In other
words, the intimate connection between the newly-dead kinsmen and the
living is revealed in the old houses (Freedman 1958:85). Indeed, the j6u
ngiik is a medium connecting descendants and their ancestors. It is,
therefore, special, and should always be passed on to lineage members
only. Daughters are not members of the patrilineal descent group, and
thus they are not allowed to inherit these houses.
In this light, according to the villagers, daughter C is the most chan,
the closest person to A, and therefore should have the right to live in the
house, but she should not be the owner of the house. Daughter C, as
mentioned earlier, is actually living in England with her husband. Yet
she neither wanted to leave the house empty, nor rent it, nor sell the j6u
ngiik. Instead, she decided to give the house to a distant relative, H, as a
gift because C had a good relationship with H. Nevertheless, the reason
put forward in public by the Village Council was that 'he is a person
bearing the surname of the Pang; therefore, he is entitled to have the
house.'
B. The contested concept of chan - closeness
Daughter C and aunt E both claimed that they were the closest person to
A. Their arguments were both rooted in tradition. In different ways, they
are both active participants and interpreters of the tradition bearing the
native concept of chan. Chan, however, is interpreted of both
patrilineally ideology and bilaterally. It is this inherent ambiguity and
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flexibility that offers villagers the space to interpret and reinterpret the
tradition.
Although the above case is the one in which a daughter inherits her
father's property in the absence of sons, the absence ofa son or adopted
son is not the prime reason for granting the property to the daughter.
Today, the motivation for granting the property to a daughter is closeness
in terms ofsentimental filiation and blood relationship. This is a general
attitude which is not restricted to this particular case only. In my
conversations with the villagers, it was very common to hear villagers
saying:
both the daughter and the son are mine. They are chan, related to
me equally in terms of closeness. The daughter should obtain my
property too.
Apparently, in supporting daughter C, the Village Council ignored the
fact that she was somebody outside the patrilineal category, a 'married
out' daughter. In other words, the sentiment derived from the bilateral
relation is increasingly important relative to membership status in the
patrilineal descent group. It has become as powerful as, or more
powerful, than the descent status in entitling a person to receive a
substantial part of the inheritance. Similarly, the selection of the
particular distantly-related male member - H - was also due to
sentimental links between C and H although this act was publicly
justified by H's being an agnate of A.
In some other contexts, chan was interpreted as closeness in terms of
the descent ideology. In other words, having or being a male descendant
is an important basis for defining 'the relative closeness' to somebody.
This is true when daughter C decided to give the house to H. The reason
put forward to the public was that H was a male member of the Pang.
Similarly, when the Village Council argued against the claim of aunt E
over A's property, aunt E's not having a son excluded her from having
Ns property. Interestingly, a few years later, aunt E obtained an adopted
son, and then wanted to claim A's house on behalf of her adopted son.
The adopted son should have been the ideal person to succeed to A's
house ifdescent status was ofprime importance. The villagers, however,
ignored her claim and said that the file was closed and that no more
changes would be allowed.
What is most interesting about this whole case was that villagers
selectively interpreted and reinterpreted different interpretations ofchan
on different occasions in order to justify both parties' claims to
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closeness to father A. Manipulation and selective interpretations of the
concept led to different results. Significantly, none of the parties
condemned the validity of the other's interpretation of 'tradition'.
Indeed, what these contemporary attitudes of the villagers reveal is that
interpretation of chan as closeness in bilateral terms can serve as a
legitimate basis for the claiming of substantial inheritance.
c. The legitimacy of granting cash to daughters
As has been discussed earlier, in deciding that daughter C should inherit
all ofA's property, villagers did not give the land and house directly to C.
Instead, Ns property was ultimately given to C in the form of cash. Part
of the reason given by the villagers was that it was inconvenient from a
legal perspective to change the ownership of land. Cash is by nature
liquid in form, flowing from one hand to another among the villagers,
and can be given to anyone. Daughters are chan, closely related to the
father, and therefore could be entitled to have the property of the father
in the form of cash.
According to the villagers, the legitimacy of giving property in the
form of cash to daughters is related to the income division in the j6u
trust. Unmarried and married women are nowadays entitled to share in
the cash income from a trust in Fanling village, and there is strong
support for villagers' disposal ofcash to daughters at a domestic level. In
the following section, I intend to discuss in detail how the trust
distributes its income.
The j6u organization customarily held a large amount of land. The
income of the j6u was mainly in the form ofrent collected from fields. In
the past, the income was just enough for ancestor worship in spring and
autumn, and also for the distribution ofpork to villagers at the end of the
year (Baker 1968:62). Owing to the increase ofthe value ofland and the
large amount of land sales since the 1970's, these trust organisations
have become very rich. Today, the income left after deducting
expenditure for annual worship is huge. This large amount of income
is therefore divided among descendants.
Antony Dicks the legal expert on Chinese customary law, argued that
j6u property had its origin in family property, and therefore the only way
to divide the family property is per stirpes (Wong 1990:28). In practice,
it is common for the j6u properties to be divided on a per stirpes basis
and also on a per capita basis. Some ofthe income was used to buy roast
pork for ancestor worship, and some for education and the relief of
poverty on a per capita basis. Nevertheless, this per capita basis in the
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past referred only to men. Baker (Kan Fat-tat v Kan Yin-tat), as a lineage
expert, was summoned to court to give opinions regarding the customary
way of dividing money in trust. His opinion was,
the deliberate removal of such property from the main stream of
the family property and the fact that it was intended to be
perpetual and inalienable and certainly not meant to be divided,
show that if and when there should be division, the correct mode
of division of family property . . . should not apply or at least
would not necessarily apply.
(1987:542)
Thus, Deputy Judge Robert Tang QC (Kan Fat-tat versus Kan Yin-tat
1987:543) and Selby (1991 :63) concluded thatthere was no single correct
mode of distribution according to Chinese custom. Nevertheless, it was
widely agreed that, per capita basis means men only and not women.
Today the practice of the division oftrust income is still based on per
capita and/or per stirpes. Villagers in Fanling Wai told me that, today,
half of the income of the trust is distributed per stirpes, and half among
villagers per capita. Nevertheless, the content of the per capita structure
is different from that in the past. The per capita distribution includes not
only sons, but also unmarried daughters and married-in women. Thus,
these women obtain a share of cash equal to that received by men. The
villagers, male and female, were aware of this difference, and often told
me proudly that they were very 'democratic' and 'fair' to women.
Indeed, women's claims for money from the family or lineage property
is a new development. After years ofdisputes concerning the method of
dividing profit from the trust, the Sheung Shui Liao lineage had finally
come to a new conclusion, namely that 'married-in' women or
unmarried daughters were entitled to have half a share of the per
capita portion while men had a full share.
Interestingly, villagers neither did see the present practice of the
division of trust income as a change of tradition, nor did they point out
that the content ofper capita had changed. Instead, villagers implied that
the whole thing was 'traditional' by referring to the 'traditional'
structure ofper stirpes and per capita in the division ofthe income in the
'traditional setting' - the trust organization. The fact that women are
eligible to enjoy cash benefits from lineage property has become a very
important phenomenon for the villagers. It has become a strong basis for
villagers to claim that it is legitimate for daughters to obtain a cash
inheritance from their fathers.
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NEGOTIATING TRADITION: THE INFLUENCE OF
THE LEGAL ORDER
A. Fossilised custom vs. commoditization of land and housing
Since the New Territories is a leased territory; legally speaking, the
colonial government must respect the way of life of the villagers. Thus,
there is a persistence of customary law in the area, particularly
concerning inheritance. By the enactment of the New Territories
Ordinance, the British government codified Chinese succession with
reference to a particular historical point, the Qing dynasty in particular,
law and custom as it existed in 1843, with some parts having 'its own
Hong Kong flavour' (Lewis 1983:357). In practice, 'customary law' as
perceived and referred to by the colonial government has changed little
from the days before the British occupation.
According to Selby, the basic principle of customary succession as
interpreted in legal procedures is,
daughters could not succeed as owners of land, because, on
marriage, their land would become their husband's property (and
after his death, their sons'); thus land would be lost from the clan's
shared wealth. The same principle also applies to widows,
although less strongly if it was clear that they would never
remarry. In the Ching (Qing) dynasty, even when landowners
exceptionally made provision in a will for their wife or daughters
to succeed to their property, that was not considered enough to
override any claims by legitimate natural sons.
(1991:71-2)
In customary law, the widow may only be the manager of her late
husband's property, and she may claim for her maintenance and for that
ofher children. Daughters and widows were thus not fully entitled to lay
claim to the land and houses of the father or husband in the absence ofa
will. Ifthe daughter or the wife were to apply and successfully obtain the
Grant ofProbate or Letters ofAdministration within three months of the
death of the deceased, the daughter or the widow might, theoretically, be
entitled to have the inheritance. Nevertheless, according to the legal
experts, the Grant of Probate and the Letters of Administration are
practically impossible to obtain within three months of the death of the
deceased. In addition, even if a daughter to whom letters of
administration have been granted applies to have the estate of the
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deceased registered in her name, the Land Officer cannot approve the
application because it will be contrary to customary law (Selby
1991:47,76). Moreover, if male descendants or agnates opposed
inheritance by the daughter, they could certainly prevent it.
An interesting point is that the imposition ofa British administration
has resulted in a stricter adherence to 'Chinese law and custom' in the
New Territories (Nelson 1969:12). It upholds the 'norm' of 'tradition' in
the Qing days with few changes. Nevertheless, in areas other than the
New Territories in Hong Kong, after the enactments of the Marriage
Reform Ordinance 1970, the Deceased's Family Maintenance
Ordinance 1971, the Legitimacy Ordinance 1971, the Married Persons
Status Ordinance 1971, the Probate and Administration Ordinance 1971,
the Affiliation Proceedings Ordinance 1971, and the Intestates' Estates
Ordinance 1971, men and women have equal rights to the inheritance.
Similarly, mainland China had already abolished the Qing law of
customary succession by the enactment of the Civil Code of the
Republic of China in 1930, and the Marriage Laws of the People's
Republic of China in 1950. Ironically, the colonial government has
continued to enforce 'Chinese' customs and traditions in the New
Territories and has, through its legal apparatus, rigidified them to the
point where they are markedly different from the original customs which
were by nature flexible and diverse.
The legal order is based on the assumption that land is inalienable and
perpetual. This assumption was to a large extent true in the past. The
importance of not leaving land to non-lineage members may be
understood in the specific context of an agrarian society in the New
Territories. The agricultural economy was based upon highly fertile soil
for rice growing, with its comprehensive irrigation systems actually
predisposing local communities of agnates to arrange themselves into
large settlements (Freedman 1958:129). Villagers, as peasants, were
'tied' to the land and therefore had a strong attachment to native soil (Fei
1949, Potter 1978, Redfield 1959). Indeed, land ownership was one of
the important bases for competition between villagers. Land owned by
one lineage within the precincts of the village was therefore not easily
sold to other neighbouring lineages. Sale of land did occur, but only in
the case of an urgent need for a capital sum, for example, to build or
repair an ancestral hall (Selby 1991:63).
This underlying symbolic and practical value of land in customary
law, however, contrasts with modem life in today's New Territories. The
New Territories area has undergone tremendous transformation through
modernisation and town planning in the past thirty years. Occupations in
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the village have diversified and most of the villagers are working in the
city. Many of them even work abroad (the result ofemigration since the
1950s). In 1992, only one couple in the village, who had retired from
England, were farmers.
Not surprisingly, the symbolic value ofland has been changing owing
to this transformation from an agrarian community to a non-agrarian
one. In the 1960s, Potter (1968:101) reported that villagers of the Teng
lineage in Ping Shan, in the New Territories, planned to sell a large
quantity of landholdings. Other members of lineage, however, were
reluctant to approve the sales ofland. But their reluctance to sell the land
to non-Teng people was not due to the threat of violating tradition.
Rather, as pointed out by Potter (1968), it was because they were afraid
that other members of the group were secretly going to make more
money from the sale than they did. This shows that, already in the 1960s,
the symbolic meaning of the land was no longer the reason which led
villagers to disagree over the passing of land to outsiders. It had been
replaced by concern over individual profit.
Similarly, village life in the Fanling area has also witnessed
tremendous changes in recent decades. Since the late 1970s, the
villagers have started to sell large areas ofland surrounding the core area
of Fanling Wai. Thus, the land surrounding the village which was
originally kept for farming is now put to other uses. Consequently, the
'territory' of Fanling Wai is now quite small (Map 1). And today sales of
land near the village are no longer exclusively held by lineage members.
Villagers do not condemn themselves for not following the 'traditional'
norm or discouraging the sale ofland to non-Pang people. Indeed, land
has simply become a commodity with the villagers primarily being
concerned with searching for a better price in sales of land.
Similarly, the meaning of another kind of landholdings, houses, is
also changing. Villagers claimed that these should be kept in the hands
of the patrilineal Pang member for ever. Villagers explained that, if
daughters succeed to houses from their fathers, their children, bearing
the surname of another group of people, will succeed to their mothers'
houses. These non-Pang descendants will be living in the village in later
generations, and thus, Fanling Wai will no longer be a lineage. The
reality is however different from the theory.
To further understand this, we have to investigate two types ofhouses
as classified by villagers. The first type is j6u ngiik, literally meaning
'houses ofthe ancestors'. This is the oldest type of house in the village,
built when the Pangs first settled there. These have been repeatedly built
and rebuilt over succeeding generations. At first, they were just one
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storey high; later further storeys were added. Now they commonly have
four storeys, reaching the maximum height allowed by the government's
regulations. The second type is ding ngiik, literally meaning houses of
the dings, males. Ding-ngiiks, small houses, are a product ofgovernment
policy. The 'small house policy' started in the 1960's, and was
institutionalised in 1972. The policy laid down that only indigenous
male villagers who had reached the age of 18 years were eligible to apply
for a piece of land on which to build a house for their own usage. The
house area could not be bigger than 700 square feet and should not be
taller than 25 feet.
At fIrst glance, villagers told me that both j6u ngiik and ding ngiik
were not allowed to be passed on to non-Pangs, and were not allowed to
be sold as well. Upon further investigation, I discovered that ding ngiik
could be sold, whereas jou ngiik should not be sold. Villagers argued that
jou ngiiks were different from ding ngiiks. lou ngiiks are houses passed
down from ancestors and, therefore special.
Ding ngiiks, according to villagers, are new houses only. Today, it is
not unusual to observe villagers manipulating the traditional patrilineal
ideology in order to obtain a piece ofland from the government in order
to build a house, but not for their own use. Many of the houses are built
for renting to outsiders, or even for sale. All villagers build three storeys
in order to maximise the use of the height of 25 feet. Each floor is
usually built as an independent flat with bedrooms, dining room,
kitchen, and bathroom. In 1992, the rent ofa single floor ofa new small
house was 7,000 Hong Kong dollars per month. Or each flat could cost
about 2.7 million Hong Kong dollars if sold. I heard of several cases of
ding ngiik sales in the village. Advertisements by property agents
displayed in the village concentrate particularly on the sale and purchase
or renting ofthe ding ngiik. For the villagers, the sale ofthe ding ngiik is
perfectly acceptable. Not only this, but villagers also told me that some
of the villagers had sold houses to others before they were even built. In
other words, ding ngiik are not inalienable and do not necessarily pass
onto patrilineal members.
Regarding the jou ngiik, or old house, one further case of a Pang
widow and her only daughter is worth considering. The married
daughter, who lived in the city, decided she could no longer let her
mother live alone at the jou ngiik. There are three floors in this jou ngiik.
The widow used to live on the ground floor, and the second and third
floors were rented to others. The rent was collected for the maintenance
of the widow. The daughter wanted to move her mother to live with her
in the city, she therefore decided to sell the old house. The house was in
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fact not registered in the name of the married daughter but under the
name ofthe j6u ofher deceased father, with her mother as a trustee. The
daughter acted on behalfofher mother in deciding how to dispose ofthe
house. The house was finally sold to a distant relative in the Pang lineage
for 120,000 Hong Kong dollars.
The attitudes ofvillagers towards the sale of the j6u ngUk in this case
are illuminating. Villagers explained to me that it was 'necessary' for the
daughter to sell the house and seemed to view the sale as the only
available option. They told me that if the widow had not sold the house
and had not taken the cash, her daughter might not be able to afford to
support her living in the city. The villagers therefore thought that it was
perfectly reasonable and natural for a daughter to take money from the
sale of the house. The sale of the j6u ngUk, however, contradicted the
norm prohibiting such sales. Surprisingly, none ofthe villagers to whom
I chatted condemned or even attempted to condemn the action ofselling
the j6u ngUk.
More interestingly, villagers also told me that ifnobody in the village
wanted to buy the house, they also had no right to oppose her selling it
off to others. They explained to me that if they had stopped the daughter
from selling the house, the daughter would not be able to afford her
mother's living in the city. Then, those who had stopped the daughter
from being a filial person would be castigated. In reality, nobody wanted
to bear the responsibility ofpaying to support the old lady and thus they
kept quiet. It was imagined by the villagers that if they opposed the sale
of the house, the daughter could say, 'right, I will not sell the house, but
you will have to cover the cost of taking care of myoid mother.' Thus,
faced by conflict between observing tradition and avoiding the
economic burden, villagers chose a pragmatic solution rather than
strictly following tradition. Interestingly, they also cite tradition - filial
piety - as a justification for the daughter's sale of the house while at the
same time violating another tradition - selling the j6u ngUk.
To summarise, the symbolic meaning of land and housing is fading.
They are no longer strictly inalienable. Perhaps, the j6u ngUk to some
degree still occupies a symbolic place for villagers. Villagers were
concerned about whether the j6u ngUk was sold to a Pang or not. This
was however not the reason for which ding ngUk and land are no longer
passing on in perpetuity to lineage members.
Ironically, the New Territories Ordinance, Chapter 97 still assumes
the inalienable and perpetual nature of land ownership. Legal experts
argued that the passing on of property to outsiders and unmarried
women or widows who may subsequently remarry would threaten the
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social cohesion ofthe village community (Selby 1991 :76-77). In reality,
the inalienable and perpetual nature of land ownership no longer
conforms with today's demands. It represents the ideal expectation of a
former era. Reality shows that there is a marked discrepancy between
the assumption ofthe inalienable and perpetual nature ofland as implied
by the legal order in the New Territories Ordinance, and the real social
situation.
More interestingly, the respect of custom, as enforced by the legal
order, applies only to the issue of land (land and housing), and not to
other forms of property. Although landholdings are symbolically
important for the lineage organization in the Southeastern part of
China, the customary succession pattern in this area did not draw a sharp
distinction between landholdings and cash. The legal order of the
colonial government has, however, led to a stricter observation of
custom in relation to the disposal of land and housing. Meanwhile, the
disposal of cash is not under the control of law, and therefore enjoys a
greater degree offlexibility. In other words, it is the colonial government
which has drawn the distinction between land and housing and other
aspects of inheritance. .
B. The structural conformity
It is interesting that there is a parallel between villagers' attitudes and
the legal order. Ignoring the fact that tremendous amounts of land and
housing are sold to private sector and the government, villagers
claimed that land should be kept in the hands of the Pangs and should
only be given to male descendants. They claimed that daughters were
supposed to be married out. Daughters therefore should not hold any
lineage land, otherwise the land would finally pass on to hands of
outsiders.
More interestingly, the legal aspect - the New Territories Ordinance-
is in daily conversation widely invoked by villagers in support of their
interpretation of tradition. It is not uncommon to hear villagers saying,
'this is our tradition, not giving women a piece of land. The New
Territories Ordinance also stated it.' Indeed, the Ordinance was
highlighted by villagers as representing village tradition. This
awareness of legal restrictions by the villagers in the New Territories
contrasts sharply with what has been observed in some of the previous
research into villagers in Chinese society. C. K. Yang's (1959:92)
research in the village ofNanjing, and Myron Cohen's (1976:9) studies
in a Taiwanese village, revealed that these villagers were ignorant of the
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law of the state. In the New Territories, R. Watson (1986:109-110) also
showed that villagers in Ha Tsuen were ignorant of, and indifferent to,
laws concerning inheritance in the 1970's. In those areas and in those
days, it was the community and not the state which sanctioned
inheritance practice.
Today, the force of sanction however comes neither purely from
custom denoted in the law nor from the village. The form of tradition
implied in the legal order is verbally strictly followed by the villagers.
But the substantial content of the tradition may not be strictly followed.
As shown in the case of daughter C, although the clansmen and the
Village Council in the New Territories took the side of the daughter and
wanted to give all the property of father A to daughter C, the ownership
of the house and land offather A was not transferred technically to C. In
other words, villagers followed closely the provision of the New
Territories Ordinance, but at the same time, the substantial benefit ofthe
land was given to the daughter without hesitation.
The technical arrangement, to set up daughter C as a trustee, was
invented by villagers to ensure that daughter C was able to benefit from
father A's property. This process was an active interpretation of
villagers' customs and a reinterpretation of the government's legislation
concerning those customs. Nevertheless, having a daughter as a trustee
was not a 'traditional' practice. As past research shows, only wives,
widows who had not remarried were trustees (Selby 1991 :73). The right
of married-in women to act as trustees was derived from their being
members of their husband's patrilineage. Daughters, however, were
supposed to be married-out, and therefore did not belong to their natal
families. This distinction between the status ofdaughters and married-in
women as referred to in aunt E's interpretation of chan, has also been
noted by anthropologists. R. Watson (1985:135) claimed that in the
1970's daughters among the Ha Tsuen Teng were considered to be
transient members of their natal households. M. Wolf (1972:32) in
discussing the membership ofa lineage, with reference to the possession
of ancestor tablets, also claimed that a daughter who died before
marriage would not have a tablet on her father's altar because she was
not a member of the family. Therefore, only widows could be trustees,
and daughters were excluded. In this case, villagers are making use of
the traditional institution of the j6u but giving it new content by having
daughter C as a trustee.
Indeed, not giving land and housing to daughters conforms to
customary practice as codified by the legal order. Nevertheless,
conformity is now only formal, and not substantial, as the benefits can
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be passed on to the daughter in the form of cash. Today, it is not
uncommon to hear villagers in their mid-50s and younger saying that:
fathers could deliberately sell their land or house first. The
property is thereby converted into cash, and, thus, daughters may
legitimately receive the cash. So daughters are able to obtain a
considerable amount, equal or similar to that received by a son.
This is distinctively different from the 'traditional' practice. Some told
me that they would give a cash lump sum to their daughters while they
would only give houses or land to sons. There are, however, still some
villagers who give neither cash nor houses and land to daughters.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
To conclude, rural communities in the New Territories have undergone
tremendous changes since the last century. Today, land and housing are
no longer inalienable, even as an ideal. Housing and land are to a large
extent similar to cash. The perception ofland and housing implied in the
New Territories Ordinance now lags far behind practice. The
maintenance of the normative aspect of custom and tradition upheld
in the Qing dynasty has, in practice, not accommodated social change.
For administrative and technical purposes, the legal order has also
distorted and ossified the dynamic nature of 'custom'.
Today, with increased commoditization of housing and land in the
New Territories, there is a negotiation between the 'conservative' legal
order - the sacred representation of idealised custom - and a relative
'reformative' social reality. Daughters are increasingly favoured with
granting a share offamily property in the form ofcash. As my case study
reveals, the customary concept of chan is interpreted differently in
different contexts. Today, the concept of chan, signifying a close
relationship interpreted in terms ofdescent ideology, is not the dominant
force which structures the inheritance practice. The interpretation of
chan as closeness in terms ofsentimental filiation and blood relationship
can now be as powerful as that derived from descent ideology.
Consequently, the marriage of the daughter does not affect the degree
ofchan, closeness with her natal family, and thus, marriage does not end
the claim of the daughter to the property of the natal family. Such
attitudes mark a difference from customary practice in the past, and they
also contradict the procedures dictated by legal order which claims that
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daughters should be contradict inheritance. Indeed, willingness to grant
substantial inheritance to daughters implies a newly-emerging, subtle,
gradual, yet significant, change in concepts of kinship.
NOTES
1 Special thanks go to Carol Jones who has kindly given me her advice and
helped me to have access to a lot of useful legal documents. I also owe
thanks to Rubie Watson and Yunxiang Yan.
2 The legal order discussed here is the one before the reform initiated by the
Legislative Council in 1993. Outraged attitudes of the villagers toward the
amendment of the Ordinance will be discussed in tradition inherited,
tradition reinterpreted: A Chinese Linage in the 1990s, (Chan 1995).
3 Baker (1979:9); Cohen (1976:70); Gallin (1966:145); Jamieson (1970:25);
Shiga (1978); M. Yang (1945:83); C.K. Yang (1959:92); Lewis (1983:369),
R. Watson (1985:107).
4 According to Qing law, only when a son or adopted son could not be
selected from the clan, when all eligible lawful male relatives, including
agnatic relations were absent, and when the male line of the family had
become extinct, daughters of the intestate were entitled to divide the family
property between themselves (Jamieson 1970:25; Shiga 1968: 127; Van Der
Valk 1956:118). When it came to inheritance, daughters occupied a
subordinate rank compared with other male relatives in the father's
patrilineage. Van Der Valk (1956: 119) pointed out that in practice, in the
northern part of China, women's opportunities for inheritance were not
completely obstructed.
5 Aunt E adopted a son in 1983. But the whole controversy took place in
1978, and the Village Council refused to re-consider the case in 1983,
claiming that the case was already settled in 1978.
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NUHT FOHNG NEUIH
FEMALE INHERITANCE AND
AFFECTION
Eliza Chan
In December 1993 a Female Inheritance Movement began in Hong
Kong. It is a feminist Movement through which 'rural' 1 women are
struggling for their inheritance rights in terms of gender equality and
human rights. This demand for female inheritance rights is a bold claim,
since the patrilineal rule of inheritance is still a deeply entrenched
custom. Newspaper reports depicted these women as fighters against
'Chinese tradition', i.e., male inheritance. However, through an
examination of the women's narratives, we shall find out that the
women's claims for inheritance rights are not so easily characterized as
a denial of 'tradition'. By appealing to 'affection', the indigenous
women sought to justify their apparently 'unconventional' claim
through their manipulation of 'tradition'. The participants in the
Movement (known as jyuht fohng neuih) do not have any brothers who
can inherit family property. This paper aims at exploring the reasons
why 'affection' had been used by these jyuht fohng neuih to justify their
inheritance rights.
BACKGROUND OF THE MOVEMENT
In 1994, a group of indigenous women who had been legally banned
from inheritance rights (because ofChinese customary law) successfully
brought about a legal change which gave daughters and widows rights to
inherit their families' properties. The indigenous women's demand for
inheritance rights had been overlooked until it was articulated through
the Movement, which attracted an unanticipated spate of public
attention. A woman's demand for the right to manage family properties
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has been documented before, but it is only now after forty years, that
such a voice can be heard clearly (Hong Kong Law Reports 1967:367-
389). Previously labelled as a 'family-dispute-only', the women's
demands for inheritance rights could, for the first time, be expressed in
the language of universal justice, and therefore was able to mobilise
support from a vast range of social groups. Besides the indigenous
women themselves, a number of other social groups also participated in
the Movement, thereby greatly enhancing the range of resources able to
be tapped by the women. These groups included feminist activists,
reporters, legal practitioners and politicians. The Female Inheritance
Movement was able to elicit the support ofsuch an eclectic mix because,
on top offemale inheritance rights, the Movement was conceived ofas a
champion for gender equality and human rights as well.
'Indigenous residents' of the New Territories are barred from female
inheritance (following Chinese customary law), while residents living in
the rest of Hong Kong have never been subject to such a constraint. In
order to understand why the New Territories have been governed by
Chinese customary law, we need to take a look at Hong Kong's history at
the turn of this century.
In 1898, the Qing Dynasty 'ceded' the New Territories to the British, on
condition that the British respect Chinese customs in the New Territories
(Lockhart Report 1900), and therefore a New Territories Ordinance was
signed. Before 1994, there were two sets of inheritance rules prevailing in
Hong Kong: the 'British law' (applied in the urban areas) and the 'Chinese
customary law' (applied in the New Territories). Under Chinese customary
law, indigenous women in the New Territories could not inherit their
fathers' properties, even iftheir fathers only had female offspring, and were
willing to give the properties to their daughters.
There have always been complaints about female disinheritance in
the New Territories since the two sets of inheritance rules in Hong Kong
have been in force. Yet the government did not deal with the issue until
September 1993, when it was revealed that even the non-indigenous
residents in the New Territories (those who lived in government estates)
were subject to the New Territories Ordinance, meaning that they had to
comply with Chinese customary law as well (United Daily News, 11
September 1993). The New Territories were once predominantly
occupied by indigenous residents; but during the past two decades, the
New Territories have witnessed a huge influx of people from the urban
areas. Yet although they were not indigenous residents, they still had to
comply with the New Territories Ordinance, meaning that the fathers
could not pass their properties to their daughters.
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To resolve the problem, the government proposed to exempt the non-
indigenous residents from the New Territories Ordinance. Some
Legislative Councillors, who supported human rights and gender
equality, urged the government to expand the exemption to the
indigenous residents as well, so that urban and rural Hong Kong
would share the same rule of inheritance. In December 1993, an 'Anti-
Discrimination Female Residents' Committee' was organised by six
indigenous women (who were the most vocal among the indigenous
women) together with some social workers. Demonstrations and
seminars were held.
Those who opposed female inheritance stressed that female
inheritance would destroy the clan system, since the women were
going to marry 'outsiders'. Many of the indigenous residents come from
single-surname lineages, which are patrilineal, and characterised by
corporate landholding and ancestral worship. The group which objected
most forcefully to female inheritance was the Heung Yee Kuk (the Kuk),
an organisation formed predominantly by male indigenous residents,
which is responsible for informing the government on the matters
relating to indigenous residents. Some people in the Kuk feared that
female inheritance would lead to a disintegration of corporate
landholding, since the female lineage members would marry
'outsiders' bearing other surnames.
Despite vehement opposition from the Kuk, the New Territories
Ordinance was successfully amended in 22 June 1994. The amendment
stipulates that women, whose fathers pass away intestate after 22 June
1994, are legally entitled to their fathers' properties as well. Yet this did
not directly benefit the majority of the women participating in the
Movement whose fathers had passed away before that date.
THE MEANING OF JYUHT FOHNG
As mentioned earlier, most ofthe participants in the Movement are jyuht
fohng neuih. Jyuht fohng neuih refers to the daughters who do not have
any brothers in their immediate families, and therefore have no one in
the family to continue the male line. Jyuht fohng is literally a
genealogical term describing the situation when the male line cannot
be continued. According to Chen (1984), 'johng' literally means
'bedroom of the married sons'. 'Fohng' represents a conjugal unit with
unmarried sons, excluding the daughters. When sons get married, they
form separate 'fohng'. Daughters are supposed to be 'absorbed' into
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Diagram 1: Jyuht F6hng Neuih and Rule of Inheritance
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their husbands' fohng'. It represents a father-son affiliation that informs
the formal rule of inheritance. Jyuht means 'terminated' in Chinese.
When both words come together, they refer to the termination of that
father-son affiliation.
Referring to Diagram 1, B, C and D constitutes ajyuht fohng family.
A is the nearest male kin able to inherit B's properties, since D is a
daughter who cannot inherit her father's properties. Most of the
participants in the Movement resemble D's situation. It is not normally
acceptable for D to claim her inheritance rights through her ties with her
father, B, since such ties do not tally with the 'father-son' affiliation.
Female inheritance is impossible according to the structural principle of
'father-son' affiliation.
The participants in the Movement did not choose to defy the
patrilineal rule of inheritance (which followed a father-son pattern).
They opted for a daughterly identity - jyuht fohng neuih identity -
which responded to the women's need to fight for their rights, and at the
same time (the women hoped) would engage them in a dialogue with
their natal kin. Contrary to the mass media/activists' view, the jyuht
fohng neuih did not regard a complete denial ofthe lineages' customs as
favourable to their interests. By justifying their inheritance rights
through 'affection' they hoped to prevent a confrontation between
village kin and the women themselves.
AFFECTION
The women expressed a deep emotional attachment toward their natal
families, especially their fathers. A structural-functional view of the
lineages sees women as temporary residents whose membership and
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loyalty shifts as they 'marry out'; in fact daughters (even married ones)
have always maintained close ties with their natal families. If such ties
have always been regularly sustained, it is worth considering the
significance of 'affection' in justifying women's rights in their natal
families.
Jack Goody criticises the view that Chinese women have to cut all ties
with their natal families after getting married, and therefore give up all
claims to their inheritance rights in their natal families (1990:55).
According to Goody, both daughters and sons inherit, but at different
points in the life-cycle - daughters through their dowry at marriage, sons
at the time of their fathers' retirement or death. This Goody calls
'diverging devolution' of property (1990:2). While this cultural
principle affirms the validity of female inheritance it does not clearly
specify the nature ofthat inheritance as it does with sons. The size ofthe
dowry partly acts as a symbol of the family's social status and the desire
to demonstrate that status therefore ensures for most women a reasonable
dowry. But there also seems to be an 'arbitrary' component to female
inheritance which allows space for the expression of filial affection.
Thus, to prove their legitimacy as inheritors, women in their narratives
expressed their affection toward their fathers (the patriarch) rather than
the mothers, as a way of advancing their claims.
In the context ofthis Movement, 'affection' helps the women to 'bypass'
the restriction of 'formal kinship', while on the other hand 'adhering' to the
patrilineal principle of 'formal kinship' and 'tradition'. I would like to
discuss Ellen Judd's article on 'Niangjia' Qiterally natal family), and the
relevance of applying her theoretical framework in understanding the
relationship between 'affection' and 'tradition' (1989).
Judd's fieldwork was conducted in Shandong, North China, where
she discovered that married daughters did continue to maintain ties with
their natal families. Such ties with their natal family apparently upset the
'official kinship' ofthe patrilineal community, but the compromise was,
that the women usually stayed in their marital homes during the
calendrical rituals, while visiting their natal homes at other times.
According to Judd, there were two systems: the 'official model ' (the
believed-in model that inhibits married women from visiting their natal
homes) and 'practical kinship' (the practice of married women visiting
their natal homes). To this she adds the notion of 'customary practices'
which
allow a range of kinship practices to occur and have legitimacy.
The legitimacy acquired from observing custom is not of the same
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quality nor is it a substitute for observing the norms of the official
model. However, it is sufficient to raise certain strategies from
what would otherwise be a level of individual self-interest,
idiosyncrasy, or exception to a level of expected and legitimate
practice.
(1989:538)
It was precisely to the 'custom' of 'affection' that the women in the New
Territories appealed. Judd's article, therefore, gives us a better picture of
why indigenous women pursued their inheritance rights through
affection, while at the same time recognising the importance of male
inheritance. As mentioned earlier, the women admitted that they would
not fight for their rights if they had brothers in their immediate families
who could be legitimate inheritors. While the women affirmed the
importance of the 'official model' (male descent and inheritance), they
also sought to achieve their goals through strategies (i.e. affection) which
were not institutionalised and not integrated into the 'official model'.
I will discuss 'affection' with ethnographic examples in the sections
to come. Talking to the six indigenous women who actively participated
in the Movement, and listening to their narratives, I found out that these
women also used 'affection' to explain why they themselves should be
the legitimate inheritors.2
'Affection' is not simply an emotional attachment that should be
taken as 'natural' between the two generations. There are some groups
of people who are more socially able to justify their rights via
'affection'. We are going to compare the different consequences of
evoking an 'affectional bond' by daughters with brothers, and the jyuht
fohng neuih who do not have any brothers. What we are going to see is
that, it is socially acceptable for jyuht fohng neuih to justify inheritance
rights through 'affection'.
Daughters with brothers were generally not active in the Female
Inheritance Movement. This is because daughters competing with their
brothers for their inheritance rights would soon be the target ofcriticism,
and would attract less sympathy. The reason many people sympathised
with the jyuht fohng neuih, was that the male inheritors in their cases
were not the women's brothers, but their cousins and uncles who were
not fulfilling their duties to take care of the widows and the unmarried
daughters.
The only participant in the Movement with a brother is Wei-Ian, and
she was once acidly criticised by her fellow villagers and the Kuk
members for being 'money-minded': they believed that she should not
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eye the family property as long as she has a brother in her immediate
family. In a television program, Wei-Ian's brother apologised publicly to
the leader of the Kuk, swearing to cut off ties with his sister. A further
complication was that many women in the New Territories did not
welcome female inheritance because they were afraid that their
husbands' sisters would demand a share of their parents' properties.
The jyuht fohng neuih, daughters (without brothers), did not have to face
the pressure from their immediate families because many oftheir family
members had already passed away. Without voices of protest from the
natal families, the jyuht fOhng neuih were less likely to be discredited
when they justified their rights in terms ofaffection. In their own terms,
they were fighting for their family properties, so that these properties
would not flow into the hands ofanother family (the uncle's or cousin's
family). Affection is a natural psychological attachment of all people
engaged in social ties. However, 'affection' could also be deployed
strategically as a justification of rights.
The jyuht fohng neuih adduced different levels of understanding to
justify their inheritance rights. On one level, jyuht fohng neuih identity
was a chosen identity. But besides their jyuht fohng neuih identity, the
women also had the chance to learn about the feminist understanding of
their grievances, as set forth by the social workers and Legislative
Councillors who focused on the patrilineal setting. 'Affection' therefore,
has not been the only resource the women can deploy. On another level,
the jyuht fohng neuih's emphasis on affectional bonds reflects the
impact of the social institution of the lineage on their choice of an
identity.
The jyuht fohng neuih identity emphasises affection partly because,
within the lineage setting, women had no other means (socially and
legally) to validate their legitimacy as inheritors. Formal inheritance
rules recognise the father-son affiliation principle, which rules out
women as inheritors. Though customary law ideally states that
unmarried daughters (including jyuht fohng neuih) should be
maintained by the inheritors, the obligation has never been seriously
supervised by the government or the villagers. Ideally, the jyuht fohng
problem can be conveniently solved by adopting a boy who should be a
close relative bearing the same surname (Watson 1975). It is also
assumed that once the adopted son inherits the land, he will deploy
proceeds from the land to sustain the widow and her unmarried
daughters. Many people (including the village elders whom I
interviewed) had assumed that the elders might press the adopted sons
to fulfil their responsibility toward their adopted parents. In fact, the
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men's obligation toward the unpropertied female kin has never been
legally ensured. Without any reliable foothold from where they could
assert their rights, the women could only draw on notions of 'affection'
and 'loyalty', which were external to the formal inheritance rule and the
colonial government's legal requirement.
AFFECTION DENIED
'There is no one as unfortunate as I am, my father is poor and my mother
is poor.' A-tai's folksong started with these two lines.3 Being born into a
poor family and being brotherless are considered very unfortunate.
Besides explaining their misfortune in terms of 'fate', these women
believed that their misfortune has been inflicted upon them by specific
'culprits'. The most likely culprit is the closest male kin eligible to
inherit the family property. The women not only saw themselves as
victims of their wicked relatives, but also victims plagued by their
cohorts, in-laws and even neighbours.
One way of explaining to themselves why they were jyuht fohng
neuih was to blame relatives, especially those most eligible to inherit, for
all their misfortunes. Some women originally had brothers but they had
died at a tender age and some blamed relatives for this. Some of them
also thought that their fathers' deaths were caused by these relatives. A-
tai and Mei-yi were among those whose brothers had passed away at an
early age. A-tai said that her uncle (father's brother) and aunt had always
wanted to take away her family's properties, so they were always looking
for a chance to get rid of her little brother. One day while the little boy
was grazing the cattle, the cattle roamed into his aunt's field. The aunt
was furious and growled at the boy. She stamped her hoe several times,
while the little boy was standing next to her. The little boy then
contracted a high fever and passed away in a few days. A-tai thought that
her aunt intentionally scared off his soul, since a child's soul was very
vulnerable and could be easily scared off by vicious curses.
Mei-yi was one among three daughters in her family. Her parents'
only son died ofmeningitis. Soon after his death, they adopted a teenage
boy whose surname was the same as Mei-yi's, but that boy was just a
friend's son, and not a relative. When the adopted son got married, he
and his wife moved to Mei-yi's place. Mei-yi's 'sister-in-law' was
described by Mei-yi as a 'bad' woman. She suspected that her father's
death was caused by the 'sister-in-law', for there was no one around the
house except this woman when he died there.
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Oi-lee had a similar experience. Like A-tai, Oi-lee also came from a
terminated fohng or jyuht fohng. She said that when she was a little girl
of about 10, her elder sister was already married, so no one could take
her to the mountains to collect firewood. The responsibility then fell
upon the shoulders of her aunt (father's brother's wife). But this aunt
turned out to be a very mean person who also tried to murder Oi-lee, at
least in Oi-lee's opinion. Her aunt took Oi-lee to the riverside and
threatened to leave her there for the tigers. Another aunt heard what the
first aunt said and reprimanded her. Oi-lee also had a brother but he died
in a plague during the Japanese Occupation. At that time, malaria and
other types of epidemics were rife in the New Territories.
Aside from the would-be inheritors, the stigma ofjyuht fohng neuih
was used to explain the tension between the women and the significant
others at different stages of their lives. Aside from the patrilineal uncles
. and cousins, the significant others included 'sisters' who were the
women's female kin ofthe same generation. A-tai remembered how she
was ridiculed by one of the 'sisters' when they were small.
That woman was the most beautiful girl in the village, and there
were many girls following her. She was rich and pretty. Once she
asked me in front of other sisters, 'A-tai, why do you always wear
that old suit?'4 I felt so humiliated. Now when I met her again, I
asked her why she said that. She said she was just joking.
A-tai thought that the girl made that insulting remark because she was a
jyuht fohng neuih who did not have any natal kin to fall back on. A-tai
thought that the relatives looked down on her family, because there was
'nobody'5 in her natal family.
The women got married at an early age, usually around 15. For those
who did, the jyuht fohng neuih identity was used to explain why they did
not get along well with their husbands and in-laws. For those who
remained single, the jyuht fohng neuih identity justified their remaining
single. As I have said earlier, jyuht fohng neuih identity was redefined at
each stage to explain the undesirable situation each woman had to
confront.
Let me give two examples. A-tai's relationship with her parents-in-
law was very poor. Her mother-in-law always scolded A-tai; rather than
supporting A-tai, her husband ran away from home instead, leaving A-
tai and her children in the hostile home. Since her mother-in-law refused
to take care ofA-tai 's infants, A-tai asked her mother to babysit them. A-
tai's mother, in return, had to depend on her only daughter, for the
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nephew who inherited her properties did not take care of her. A-tai felt
extremely sorry for her mother who had to live with her. 'If she had a
son, my mother would not have to suffer,' A-tai mused. She then finally
decided to divorce her husband and left the village. I then asked A-tai the
immediate cause that agitated her to fight for her own independence.
She said, '[My mother-in-law] scolded me, "jyuht doihf".6 This phrase
is a Cantonese derogatory term which is used to curse people. When I
asked A-tai why her mother-in-law did so many horrible things to her
mother and children, A-tai said, 'Because I didn't have any relatives.'
Mei-yi remained single and is 42 years old. She was the only daughter
in the family who did not get married. She had been introduced to
several men but she rejected them all, because Mei-yi thought that they
were just trying to marry an obedient 'slave' who would serve them,
rather than marrying a wife out ofaffection for her. Her other reason for
choosing not to marry, was that her mother needed to go to the hospital
for regular checkup. Since she was the only girl at home she had to take
care of her mother. Her two elder sisters were already married, and her
youngest sister was, according to Mei-yi, an 'extrovert' whose heart was
'out there' rather than at home.
Instead ofmerely focusing on the situation of their own families, the
women talked at great length of their situation as victims who were
denied affection within both their natal and marital villages.7 The
victimisation as discussed in these women's narratives was not a
general sense of victimisation, but rather involved a specific victimiser
(usually the cousin or the uncle, and/or the uncle's wife). For example,
in the court case 'Li Tang-shi versus Li Wai-kong and the Attorney
General' (Action No. 1763 of 1967), the widow Li Tang-shi accused the
nearest male kin and the District Officer of removing her from
trusteeship of her dead husband's properties, without her approval. She
maintained that she should be the sole trustee of her husband's
properties. Since her husband's properties were held as 'Tso's
properties, the Court had to decipher the meaning of 'Tso' before the
hearing could proceed.
Expert evidence was solicited, and the judge finally decided that once
properties were subsumed under the category of 'Tso', they became
family land ('family' meaning 'clan', in contrast to 'private' and
'personal'). Based on that definition, the widow could not dispose of the
properties independently. There was pressure for the widow to
compromise with the village elders on the management of the
properties. In 1969, the widow appealed against the judge's refusal to
declare that the land was not 'Tso' properties. The judge said that there
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were only two alternative ways the properties could be handled: either
the properties should be devolved on to the nearest male kin, or a 'Tso'
should be set up. There was no way she could claim the properties for her
own use. Expert evidence supported the view that the properties of a
dead man without sons would tum into ancestral properties of the whole
clan. If properties were classified as 'clan' land, then the woman's
autonomy in managing the properties was lost, as seen in the above court
case. But it would be too simplistic to assume that the women were
completely vulnerable to pressure from village kin. The women could
protect their properties from encroachment by complying with the ideal
of corporate ownership. In the above court case, both the plaintiff (the
widow) and the defendant (the nearest male kin) wanted to monopolise
the management of the properties, hoping that these properties would
become personal properties. Being categorised as 'Tso', the properties
ceased to be the widow's personal properties; on the other hand, this also
prevented the nearest male kin from disposing of the land as if it was his
own, or managing the land as ifhe was the sole owner. The attachment to
the lineage was, therefore, a tactic for fending off encroaching male kin.
Village elders also deployed 'lineage tradition' strategically; failure to
observe ceremonial duties was adduced by the village elders to
invalidate the widow's legitimacy as trustee of her husband's
properties. Participation in lineage rituals and the principle of
corporate ownership became the vehicles through which women and
their male kin articulated claims for inheritance rights. To honour the
custom (be it genuine or lip service only) was a prerequisite to sustaining
their rights in the lineage.
By the same token, the jyuht fohng neuih's discontent could only be
wrapped in the language of personal relationships, dyadic and specific.
In this way, their complaints were directed towards particular people and
not the 'tradition' of the lineages. As far as their interests were
concerned, the women still wanted to be regarded as lineage members.
A-tai was once very upset by the fact that she was not invited to the
opening ceremony ofan ancestral hall in her natal village. She knew that
some other women (generally known as 'sisters') ofher generation were
invited; one ofthem, like A-tai herself, was also divorced. Divorce was a
disgrace to the conservative villagers. But A-tai thought that her divorce
could not be the real reason why they removed her from the invitation
list. Most probably, her natal kin (the village elders in charge of the
ancestral hall) rejected her because her relationship with the villagers
was not as strong as the other woman who was rich and always
maintained close contact with the villagers (playing mahjong with
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them). A-tai assumed that if she herselfhad been rich, and kept in touch
with her 'sisters' who still lived near their natal village, then perhaps she
too would have been invited.
The jyuht fohng neuih, like the widows, did not wish to abstain from
all ties with their male kin, especially the village elders. Sustaining a
congenial relationship between the village elders and the woman herself
was crucial if she wanted to protect her properties. Should the women
really be able to inherit their fathers' properties, they would consider the
ties with their natal kin important. One woman said, 'I don't want to live
next door to an enemy.' This woman arranged an out-of-court agreement
with her cousin (who inherited her father's properties), and her mother
complained that she was too lenient to her cousin because she did not
demand enough. The woman, however, thought that she could not push
her cousin's back against the wall. She foresaw that she and her mother
would be living in the village anyway, and her cousin would be her
neighbour, a potential enemy if she stretched the limits of their
relationship.
THE LOYAL 'PROTECTOR' OF FAMILY
PROPERTIES
It is noteworthy that at the beginning of our conversations, three out of
six women lamented the death of their little brothers. If these little
brothers had not passed away, then the women and their natal families
would not have to go through the humiliation of being jyuht fohng.
Nearly all the little brothers who died young were dearly remembered by
the women, for they were 'obedient and kind'. According to the women,
the key point is that, the boys were legitimate inheritors not only because
they belonged to the male sex, but also because they were 'obedient and
kind'. The present inheritors by contrast were described as 'ungrateful'
and 'malevolent'. Ifone criteria of inheritance rights was obedience and
affection, then the women themselves should be eligible too, they
seemed to claim.
Mei-yi's narrative is the best example of the jyuht fohng neuih
romanticising their little brothers. When I asked her to briefly describe
her family background, she said,
I originally had a little brother. My parents were superstitious.
Little brother was sick, so we took him to Pok Oi hospital. Before
that, he had had a temperature, and my parents just prayed to their
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gods. This time, prayers didn't work. I was, 8 or 9. I can only
vaguely remember. From dawn to dusk they were burning incense
and praying zealously. After 24 hours, they sent him to hospital
... he died ... it must have been meningitis. I loved him very
much. He was a very good child. I always put him on my back. I
treated him like precious jewellery. After his death, my parents'
temper changed drastically. They treated the girls even worse.
Compared with her little brother, her adopted brother (a non-relative)
was a greedy man whose presence in the household purely served the
purpose ofjustifying his inheritance rights, and Mei-yi had to protect her
family properties from him. Mei-yi thought that he only cared about
money because Mei-yi's sister had once asked him to give her a piece of
land to build a three-storey house, but he rejected the request. This man
also occupied the best room in her house, and her bedroom was on the
top floor which was hot in summer and cold in winter. Mei-yi seemed to
think that ifthe little brother had not died, then she and her sisters would
not have been treated so badly because he was 'obedient and kind'. Mei-
yi had all the characteristics of a filial child, in her terms, as she was
'attached to home' (chi ga). Mei-yi also thought that she had to chz'ga
since she had to protect her family properties from the greedy adopted
son. Indeed not only the jyuht fohng neuih thought that obedience was
one criterion of inheritance rights, but also those daughters who
contested with their brothers for inheritance rights also appealed to the
same criterion. Wei-Ian was the only participant who had brothers, but
she did not get on well with them. She complained of their 'rudeness'
and 'disobedience'. Customary rights required the brothers (or those
who inherited) to take care of the unpropertied, e.g. the unmarried
daughters and widows. The 'bad' brother did not provide for her
livelihood although she remained single. Wei-Ian said,
My elder brother was followed by my two sisters. Little brother
unfortunately died. My younger brother (i.e. the dead boy) was
very obedient. My elder brother is now very disobedient, because
he knows that it is up to him to give my mother face.
Wei-Ian said that daughters were more obedient and that their hearts
were with their parents. She said that she had to give up the opportunity
to marry when she was young, all for the sake ofmaking enough money
for the weddings ofher two brothers. She also gave up a well paid job in
Kowloon, because she wanted to use more time to take care of her
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mother who had had a heart attack. Her affection for her mother was
rewarded in 1980, when Wei-Ian had to attend a medical conference in
Japan, and her mother gave her $5000 for traveIIing expenses. 'It is very
extraordinary for a viIIage woman to give you all her money, because she
is very careful with her money.' This generosity was to Wei-Ian a token
of love and a recognition of her loyal affection toward her mother.
The story of Wei-Ian suggests that the notion 'daughters are more
loyal than sons' is a weB-organised idea. There are many traditional
stories extoIIing the obedience of daughters circulating in the South
China region. 1o Comparing themselves with the rebeBious brothers, the
jyuht fOhng neuih thought that they were more filial and, therefore,
were in a better position to protect the integrity of the family
properties. A-tai publicly accused her uncle (who inherited her father's
properties) of spending money on prostitution and gambling. The jyuht
fohng neuih, though married, argued that 'good daughters have to take
care of both families' (h6 neuih gu leuhng gil: the natal and marital
families).
AFFECTION BETWEEN FATHER AND DAUGHTER
'That woman didn't know who her father was. She was beaten up very
often, her mother and grandmother often beat her', Suk-fen described
the childhood ofa girl who was abused by her adopted family. Common
stereotypes of adopted daughters depicted them as starved, caned,
overworked, and worst of aB, fatherless. II The jyuht fohng neuih,
compared with the adopted daughters, were in a better position - at least
they knew who their fathers were, as one jyuht fOhng neuih put it. The
connection with fathers could eventuaBy justify their inheritance rights.
When the jyuht fohng neuih had to justify their claims for inheritance
rights, they would have to prove, in their narratives at least, their
eligibility as inheritors through their hard work and devotion to their
families, especiaBy to their fathers. The narratives of the women Suk-
fen, A-tai and Mei-yi best iIIustrate this point.
To prove her ties with her father, Suk-fen had to resort to the
documents about her father, and those documents bore her signature. In
1984, Suk-fen's father passed away. Suk-fen told me in great detail the
things she had done after her father's death. Not only was Suk-fen
responsible for arranging her father's funeral, she also had to take care of
the funeral of her paternal grandmother, though there were other male
kin around. Being an indigenous resident, her father was aBowed to be
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buried on the hillside nearby where other non-indigenous residents were
not pennitted access, for the hillsides were 'Crown Land' .12 Suk-fen
showed me the documents of her parents' burials - among them was a
map which bore her signature. 'My relatives said that I was the adopted
daughter, see, here's my name. What they said is garbage!' The burial
site was circled on the map, and next to it was her signature. Suk-fen told
me that the first time she went to the mortuary in the hospital to sign the
death certificate, she was appalled by the creepy atmosphere there. She
emphasised to me that she had to take a look at the corpse to ensure that
the dead body was her father.
Soon after her mother's death, her relatives (paternal cousins)
claimed that her mother had adopted them as sons, and successfully
transferred all properties, bypassing Suk-fen's approval. When Suk-fen
reproached them, they said that Suk-fen was just an adopted daughter.
Suk-fen did not have any birth certificate to prove her identity
(applying for a birth certificate fifty years ago was not a customary
practice). The only thing that Suk-fen could use to prove her identity
was the documents that she showed me. She tried to get two villagers to
serve as witnesses, one of them a non-indigenous resident. The other
witness was a native of that village but did not bear the lineage's
surname, and that witness' ancestors were considered the 'inferior
people'Y
In a patrilineal society, it is understandable that if a woman wants to
establish her rights, she needs to justify her rights with reference to a
male figure because many rights are only conferred through the male
line (the father-son affiliation). Though jyuht fohng neuih were
supposed to be cut off from the corporate kin group, it does not mean
that the women themselves would necessarily comply with such
genealogical principles. Instead, the women thought that they had to
sustain ties with natal kin if they wanted to protect their interests.
Affiliation with fathers was not only proved by documents, but was also
sought through expressions of the way father and daughter felt towards
each other. The fatherly figures were usually the 'good guys', while the
bad guys were usually the mothers. Fathers were the benevolent men
who protected the girls from mothers who drove the daughters to harsh
menial labour.
Suk-fen recalled one day that her mother beat her for stealing a piece
of brown sugar, and Suk-fen was so scared that she hid in the bushes
nearby. When her father returned at night, he looked for Suk-fen. When
he knew that his wife had scared offthe girl, he scolded his wife and then
went to fmd her. According to Suk-fen, her mother, was ungrateful. She
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was also old-fashioned and she did not allow her daughter to study in
school, despite the fact that the father consented to it.
A-tai called her mother a 'slave driver'. Like Suk-fen, A-tai also paid
a lot of attention to her father's funeral in her narrative. When A-tai
recollected her father's death, the details were so precise that it sounded
as ifthe whole incident had just happened days ago. Since A-tai's family
was very poor, they did not even have the money to prepare for the
Chinese New Year. Her father therefore asked her to borrow money from
her uncle. She told me the request was rejected. Finally, her other uncle
loaned her some money, and her father tried his best to cook the last
meal for himself. A-tai still remembers the ingredients of the dish her
father prepared 40 years ago. The day when her father died, A-tai
dragged him down from his bed and dressed him in his best clothes, for
they could not afford to buy the proper clothes worn by the dead. When
she kept vigil over the corpse, there were no other people except the
musicians in the band. 14 A-tai felt that her uncle should be there too. At
that time, A-tai was only 12.
According to Chinese customs, it is usually the eldest son who hosts
his parents' funemls. But A-tai insisted that even daughters could host
their fathers' funemls. The ritual, literally 'shouldering the flag and
buying water' (daam faan maaih seui), was commonly regarded as the
son's responsibility. In case the dead person did not have a male
successor, the closest male kin should host the rituals. To perform this
duty was to fulfil the responsibility of a successor who was entitled to
inherit the properties. No male kin was willing to perform this duty for
A-tai's father. A-tai, on the other hand, regarded the hosting ofthis ritual
as proof of her entitlement to inheritance rights.
Indeed daughters playing host at their fathers' death rituals was not
uncommon, at least this is what the indigenous women claim. According
to A-tai, there were particular procedures to follow when the daughter
had to perform this ritual. The daughter had to tie a red belt around her
waist, so as to keep off the 'killing air' (sei hei) of the corpse.
The jyuht fohng neuih had other ways ofdemonstrating ties with their
fathers other than documents and formal rituals. All these means were
used to solicit social recognition of their identity as their fathers'
daughters (contrary to the adopted daughters who did not know who
their fathers were). Some women would go back to their fathers' graves
or to their fathers' homes to cry to their hearts' content. A-tai usually
visited her father's grave during the Ching Ming Festival and the Chung
Yeung Festival, which traditionally were occasions for sweeping the
ancestml graves. However, A-tai would also go to cry in front of the
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grave apart from the above two festivals. She would also do so during
emotional crises.
When she fIrst participated in the Movement, her natal villagers saw
her appear on the T.v. screen, criticising the uncle and cousin for taking
away her properties without taking care of her mother. They were angry
with A-tai for taking such a high profile, and since her relatives regarded
inheritance dispute as a family matter, they thought that A-tai was
making a fuss about it in public. The New Territories villagers were also
afraid that female inheritance would be a prelude to government
attempts to scrap other privileges granted to the indigenous residents.
For these reasons, they rang up A-tai and scolded her for 'creating
troubles in the New Territories'.
When A-tai received these calls (usually made by her 'sisters' or
aunts), she was extremely upset. A-tai demanded that her cousin take
care of her mother, and be responsible for her mother's burial in the
future. All these demands were, according to A-tai, legitimate and
reasonable. She assumed that her villagers would support her, but on the
contrary, they did not sympathise with her. She then went to her father's
grave and cried, singing the folksongs which recounted her unhappy
childhood, hostile marital home, the cruelty of her fellow villagers and
the ingratitude of her cousin. As her father's grave was just 200 meters
from the nearest homestead in her natal village, her lament was more
than just a personal carthasis, it was also a public performance.
It would be far-fetched to suggest that all jyuht fohng neuih
rationalises their father-daughter connections in the same way. The
women interviewed came from different backgrounds, and this affected
their ways of expressing the affectional bond.
AFFECTION AND INDIVIDUALS
Each woman's age, religious beliefs and personality affected their
articulation of their affectional bond.
I started to pay attention to the women's religious beliefs when I was
invited by an indigenous woman to accompany her to visit a spirit
medium (mahn maih pO).15 Not all jyuht fohng neuih consulted the
spirit mediums, as some younger jyuht fohng neuih were Protestants.
Out of the six women, those who consulted spirit mediums were the
older ones. The two younger women in their early forties were
Christians; the youngest woman (34 years old) did not have any
religious beliefs. 16
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The older women who visited spirit mediums were in their fifties and
seventies. By consulting spirit mediums, they were looking for means to
support their claims for inheritance rights, claims which their fellow
villagers did not support.
In January 1994, when the Movement just took off, A-tai went to
spirit mediums; she wanted to ask her father some questions. As A-tai's
mother was gravely ill, she wondered if her father was going to 'take
away' her mother. A-tai also wanted to ask her father if her demand for
inheritance rights was 'too much', since A-tai's natal kin said she was
being 'ungrateful' by participating in the Movement. When spirit
mediums fell into a trance, she started speaking Cantonese and later
switched to Hakka (A-tai's father was a Hakka, and spirit mediums was
also a Hakka)Y Spirit mediums (speaking in Hakka, in the persona of
her father) reminded A-tai of the deaths of her seven siblings, as well as
her father's miserable burial. Her 'father' also encouraged A-tai to fight
for her own rights. A-tai became emotionally disturbed on being
reminded ofthis part ofher childhood. Listening to her own story from a
third person (who impersonated her father) reaffirmed her participation
in the Movement.
Sometimes spirit mediums were not needed to prove the ties between
daughters and their fathers. Ghost stories were used in some cases. Once
I and the indigenous women were talking about ghost stories. Suk-fen
said,
Myoid house is haunted. My cousin took away the house from me,
and rented the house to a couple. The couple soon moved away,
because they saw my parents' ghosts coming home hand in hand.
Now the house is still empty.
The ghosts were quiet, but to Suk-fen, they conveyed a message loudly
and clearly: the house belonged to Suk-fen's parents, and no one could
stay there except their daughter, Le. Suk-fen. Though the house was
renovated, the ghosts could still recognise the house and groped their
way back from the murky underworld. No matter what became of the
house, it was always her parents' home (and Suk-fen's home too, since it
was her natal home). Suk-fen told us that her daughter had stayed there
before, but that her daughter never met any ghosts. Suk-fen and her
daughter had the blessing of their ancestors' ghosts to be the legitimate
occupants.
Unlike Suk-fen and A-tai who were ten years older, Mei-yi and Wei-
Ian had more access to a variety of religions. Both Mei-yi and Wei-Ian
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believed in Christianity. Wei-Ian once quoted the Bible to prove that
female inheritance was 'correct'. The setting of the story was Exodus.
She did not give me the exact quotation, but stressed that the most
important point was that Moses did not object to female inheritance. She
also said that the Jewish synagogue 2000 years ago had forbidden
women to voice their opinions, but that the Christian Church now
allowed women to speak out. The biblical reference showed that
'tradition' could be amended. She said that she had times of self-doubt
during the course of the Movement, but in her prayers she received a
clear signal from God that she should carry on fighting for her rights.
Wei-Ian relied on the 'Father in Heaven' when she was in doubt, while
A-tai and other older women would seek spirit mediums to speak
directly with their 'fathers in Yellow Spring' (,yellow spring' is the
Chinese translation of the underworld).
Besides being a devout Christian, Wei-Ian is also very patriotic. She
addressed Dr. Sun Yat-sen as 'The Father of the Nation' and his wife
'The Mother of the Nation'. Inside her clinic hung a painting ofDr. Sun
Yat-sen's wife. Wei-Ian, sitting under the painting, rested her chin on her
hand, expressing surprise when I asked her who that person in the
painting was. China's history of turbulent revolutions had impressed
Wei-Ian deeply. 'When I was in primary five, my teacher told me that
Hong Kong would no longer be a colony in 1997. At that time, I thought
that 1997 would release me from my brother's threat,18 since there would
be no 'Qing Law' after 1997'.19 Her seniors, Oi-lee, Suk-fen and A-tai
did not have the chance to receive primary education, and would not
deploy 'objective' historical events (as well as nationalistic sentiments)
to justify their rights. But the older women, through spirit mediums,
could feel that they had their fathers' direct consent to their participation
in the Movement.
Siu-ling was the youngest indigenous woman in the Movement. She
said that the village she lived in was not far away from the urban areas,
and her fellow villagers were not as 'stubborn' as those villagers who
resided in remote areas. The proximity between her village and the
urban areas allowed her villagers to have better working and education
opportunities. Siu-ling herself was a good example: she went to a
Catholic college and then to a famous university, and eventually worked
as a news reporter.
As a jyuht fohng neuih, Siu-ling did not see the jyuht fohng neuih
problem only as a personal issue. One reason was that her father was
quite 'liberal'. She admitted that although her 'uncles' sometimes
would tease her father lightly for having no male offspring, her father
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did not exert any pressure on her mother and on his daughters. She
thought that her father's liberal attitude was due to his exposure to the
outside world; her father enjoyed travelling a lot. Siu-ling was grateful
for having had such a father. There were also no uncles or cousins who
claimed to be her father's legitimate inheritors. As a news reporter,
Siu-ling had a strong sense of social awareness, and for her the jyuht
fohng neuih problem was a social one as well as a personal one. Siu-
ling's perception of the Movement and her way of articulating the
father-daughter relationship was very different from other jyuht fohng
neuih. According to her, principles of gender equality and human
rights, on top of her father's approval, justified women's inheritance
rights.
From the above discussion we can see that individual differences -
age, education, religious beliefs and personality - shape the jyuht fohng
neuih's articulation of their affectional bond with their fathers, an
apparently 'natural' psychological response. From the mysterious and
hair-raising ghost stories to socialist ideals - the women's narratives
reflect the wide range of resources they can deploy. There was no
standardised way of expressing the affectional bond; there was also no
single best way to express it. Given the diverse way in which the
affectional bond was articulated, we can conclude that its expression is
not a carefully calculated formula to win sympathy.
CONCLUSION
The jyuht fohng neuih in the Movement were clearly not submissive
village females who accepted without doubt the 'customary rule' of
male inheritance; if they were, the Movement would never have come
into existence. However, they were not 'enlightened' women, inspired
only by feminist ideals and human rights. It would be untrue to claim
that the Movement marked a 'revolutionary' change in the lineage's
patrilineal outlook. Yet, even if the lineage's patrilineal organisation
persisted, the women could still strive for their interests by manipulating
the 'formal rule'. The assertion of inheritance rights through affectional
bonds obviously recognised the need to maintain ties with fellow
villagers. Although the women did not strictly comply with the father-
son affiliation principle, the strength of patrilineal influence still
dictated the women's strategies for realising their rights. Thus, women
could well be reinforcing the claims of a patrilineal system by asserting
their inheritance rights through affection.
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NOTES
1 The difference between the 'urban' and the 'rural' is a geographical
distinction, rather than a difference in lifestyles, since the populations in the
New Territories and urban Hong Kong both receive the same education,
watch the same T.Y., and enjoy equal job opportunities. Related to the term
'rural women' is 'indigenous women'. 'Indigenous residents' refers to the
population living in the New Territories since 1898, and their patrilineal
descendants. In 1898, the New Territories were leased to the British,
therefore the original population in the New Territories were branded
'indigenous residents', in contrast to the colonial rulers.
2 These interviews were conducted after the amendment was passed. It should
be noted that their views on 'affection' were expressed after their
inheritance rights were legally recognised.
3 Folksongs used to be sung among the female indigenous residents in the
New Territories. There were bridal songs and funeral laments. These songs
are not popular now, and only some old women know how to sing them. A-
tai learned the songs from her mother. A-tai also sang this folksong during
the demonstrations.
4 Girls at that time wore loose-fitting pants and tops.
5 'Nobody' (mduh yahn mOuh maht) here metaphorically refers to the fact that the
women did not have any male successors in the immediate families. The women
thought that families without male successors were considered to be vulnerable.
6 'Jyuht doih' (a Cantonese phrase) meaning the male line is terminated and
is similar to 'jyuht fohng'. This anathema is regarded as very vicious.
7 All women were married into other indigenous families in villages, instead
of marrying into non-indigenous families.
8 Expert evidence in the court proposed that the word 'Tso' was attached to
the name ofa dead man who died without a son, and the properties would be
registered under the man's name and the character 'Tso'. The properties
were used to finance ancestral worship, and managed by his widow, who
acted as the trustee.
9 Mei-yi's brother was adopted into her family in his teens. Normally, only
little boys are adopted to make sure they will have more attachment with the
adopted family.
10 Among these stories is one which tells the tale of an obedient and clever
daughter who saves her mother. Her mother was ordered by a god to cook
nine dishes. Her mother was extremely worried about it since she did not
have enough money to buy sufficient ingredients for the nine dishes. The
clever daughter then prepared the nine dishes with only one kind of
vegetable called 'gieu tsoi' (Hakka), together with other simple ingredients.
She used 'gieu tsoi', for 'gieu' rhymes with 'nine' in Hakka. This story was
supplied by Ms. Wong Yuk-yan, who lived in a village in South China. She
was already 82, and the first time she heard of this story was when she was
still a girl, living in Mei Xian (Mandarin), a region in North Guangdong.
Other popular stories about obedient girls are abundant, such as stories
about 'Hua Mu-Ian' (Hi Muhk Naahn) and Guan Yin (Gun Yam). Hua Mu-
Ian was the daughter of a man who was conscripted, but too old to join the
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army. Hua Mu-Ian replaced him and passed as a man for 20 years. She
finally became a general and at last disclosed her real identity. The story is
set in Yuan Dynasty (1276-1386 A.D.). Though this story did not originate
in South China, people in the South know this story very well. Guan Yin, a
goddess, is believed to be a filial daughter who saved her father's life.
II I checked up the synonyms of the word 'helpless', and discovered that one
of the synonyms was 'fatherless'(there was no 'motherless' on the list). The
stereotype of a 'fatherless' girl as 'helpless' is not particularly Chinese.
(Longman Synonym Dictionary, 1986).
12 Crown Land means the land owned by the government.
13 Inferior people (hoi Iii) are also known as little people (sai mahn). They
were the servants of the powerful lineages. For further information please
refer to James Watson's 'Chattel Slavery in Chinese Peasant Society: A
Comparative Analysis' in American Ethnologist, 15, 1976. Also see his
'Transactions in People: the Chinese Market in Slaves, Servants and Heirs'
in Asian and African Systems of Slavery, edited by James Watson,
University of California press, 1980.
14 During a traditional funeral, a band ofmusicians are present all through the
rituals.
IS A spirit medium is usually an old woman. She does not work in a temple but
offers services at home. Clients get in touch with her through friends and
relatives. People who want to talk to their deceased close relatives can seek
her consultation. After falling into a trance, she will impersonate the dead
relative. The charge of each service ranges from $200 to $700.
16 The correlation between age and religious belief is just specific to the six
women I interviewed, and should therefore not be" generalised to all
indigenous women.
17 The spirit medium spoke in Cantonese, perhaps because of my presence.
She might have assumed that I only understood Cantonese. The code-
switching between Cantonese and Hakka reflects how spirit mediums
'departmentalised' A-tai's experience: the present and the past. She used
Cantonese to talk about the present and the future, and Hakka when talking
about the past.
18 Wei-Ian was the only woman in the Movement who had brothers.
19 China and Taiwan repealed Qing Law long ago.
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THE WORKING MOTHER AND
CHILD-CARE IN THE PARENT-
CENTRED HONG KONG FAMILY
Diana Martini
At one time pregnancy and childbirth were women's unique and most
important contribution to the continuation of the family and to its
economy. Repeated pregnancies with their associated hazards occupied
a considerable period of a woman's life. Whereas childbirth remains a
woman's unique contribution to the continuation of the family, it no
longer dominates her existence in the developed countries, including
Hong Kong, where the desire to produce many children has given way to
the aim of producing one or two who will be upwardly mobile. The
decline of the pronatalist ethos of the Chinese, combined with the
availability of effective contraception has reduced the birthrate in Hong
Kong to one of the lowest in the world. From a figure of 35 births per
thousand population in the 1960s, it is currently 12 per thousand. This
means a total fertility rate per woman of 1.3. (Hong Kong Social and
Economic Trends 1982-1992, Census and Statistics Department 1993).
Despite a lingering preference for sons over daughters, this preference
does not seem to be strong enough for most parents of daughters to
continue to have children in order to try to have a son. Clearly there are
other priorities such as being able to give one's children a good
education, and a decent material standard of living. It is generally now
considered hard work to bring up children.
It is my contention in this paper that the Hong Kong mother's identity
as a worker is stronger than her identity as a mother; in other words her
commitment is primarily to her wage earning work rather than to the
nurture and raising ofher child or children. This primary commitment is
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demonstrated by the mother's rapid return to work, and by her emphasis
that this is what she would rather do even if she did not work for
financial reasons. Where this is a financial possibility, the work of
childcare is readily delegated to a paid childminder. In Chinese culture
the main thrust of childcare has been, and on the whole still is,
supervision and discipline with very little overt emphasis being placed
on affection or the closeness of the relationship between mother and
child. New mothers have said to me that looking after a baby is a 24 hour
a day shift involving hard and dull work. In their view it is ajob that is far
better done by someone who has experience and who will do it for 24
hours a day five or six days a week in her own home. Above all the task
of looking after a baby seems not to be perceived as primarily the
mother's duty. As another anthropologist of Chinese society, a Chinese-
American woman, remarked to me: 'Once the mother has had the baby
her job stops there' (Koo 1993). This attitude would certainly make it
possible for a mother to hand her baby over to the care of someone else
without feeling guilty or tom between the roles of worker and mother.
Moreover Hong Kong is a society with a very competitive lifestyle.
Accommodation for the aspiring middle-classes is expensive, as are
many of the goods and services targeted at them. Although it seems that
the generations keep in close touch, and that even after marriage the
younger generation honour their financial obligations to their parents,
the predominant family form is now nuclear.
There are two related themes to be looked at here. One is the practice
and perception ofwomen (and wives and mothers) in the labour force, and
the second is the readiness with which the baby is consigned to another
caretaker. Clearly the former cannot easily take place without the latter
although the reverse is less true. It would however appear that the traditional
Chinese pattern ofchildcare, which in a somewhat different form continues
in Hong Kong today, makes it very possible for large numbers ofwomen to
remain in the work force after they have had children.
WET-NURSES AND FOSTER PARENTS
It must be said that the care of babies by other than their mothers is not
particular to the Chinese. It seems to have been widespread among the
upper classes of England and France in the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries (Stone 1977; Badinter 1980; Fildes 1986) although there were
always those who condemned the practice, Rousseau, in France, being
one of the most adamant that women should nurse their own children
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(Aries 1960:362). Wiesner writes that, in Europe, although the wealthy
would hire a wet-nurse to come into their own homes, others would send
the baby to the wet-nurse's home for two to three years. Far from seeing
it as a sign oflack ofmaternal feeling, Wiesner considers that it 'actually
stemmed from the fact that nursing was incompatible with many of [her]
familial and social duties' (1993:71). Resident nannies were also
common until relatively recently in the English upper classes to allow
the mother to pursue her social life and her role as wife or companion to
her husband. In the West, possibly since Bowlby's writings in the 1950s
(arguing that babies need the constant care of their mothers in order to
thrive) and the ensuing reactions to his ideas, there is a continuing
debate about whether the mother should be the exclusive caretaker of
her child, what are the disadvantages or benefits to babies/small children
of unrelated childminders, or nurseries (Bowlby 1953; Birns and Ner
1988). It is a very emotional issue in the West, and the perceived needs
ofbabies will often depend on whether or not the writer/researcher has a
feminist standpoint (by which I mean whether or not she regards the
woman's interests and 'rights' as paramount). It is safe to say that there
is, for the most part, no such debate in Hong Kong. Neither feminist
issues nor issues to do with the rights of the child are in the forefront of
public consciousness in Hong Kong as they are in the West. There is no
law against sex discrimination in Hong Kong, for instance, although this
is being discussed at various levels.
In a study of West African parenthood and fostering, Esther Goody
discusses the prevalence in many parts of the world of delegating some
ofthe tasks ofparenthood, and the reasons for doing so (1982). It may be
to establish ties between adult kin and children, or between adults, as
among the Gonja of northern Ghana, or to create links based on
sponsorship as in the Balkans. When the child is fostered at a later age it
can be seen as an apprenticeship in specific skills or as a way of
socialising children by adults who will be less indulgent than the natural
parents. Goody also mentions the adoption of little daughters-in-law by
the Chinese of Taiwan, extensively studied by A. Wolf and Huang
(1980). The intention was that these girls would later marry the son of
the house, thereby avoiding both the expense of bringing an adult bride
into the house, and the conflicts endemic in the traditional mother-in-
law/daughter-in-Iaw relationship.
Carsten, in an article about fostering children in Pulau Langkawi,
discusses the different kinds of arrangements made and the reasons for
these (1991 :425-443). At the time of her study about a quarter of the
children in the village were not living with both their parents.
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The old European institution, mentioned above, ofbabies boarding at
the home of a wet nurse is also another instance of the delegation of
some of the parent's - here specifically the mother's - roles.
I should like to use Goody's framework to maintain that in Hong
Kong many families, in effect practise a partial form of what Goody
calls 'nurturant fostering' from when the baby is a few months old to the
age of between two and three years. That the child returns to its own
home at that age in order to go to kindergarten, may be because it will
anyway spend the major part of the day away from home, or it may be
because of the very great emphasis placed on education which will be
elaborated on later in this paper. The reason for the 'nurturant fostering'
seems to be largely pragmatic and primarily to enable the mother to
return to the workforce. It does not, as far as I know, create any lasting
ties or affection between the minder and the infant, or the minder and the
parents. The relationship is predominantly a financial one (even though
many child-minders will say that they are looking after a baby 'for a
friend', and she may even be a distant relative), and the child supposedly
returns home at weekends and on public holidays. This is an area which
could well be worth further study. Sixteen years ago, I lodged for a few
months with a young woman whose husband was away at sea. She had a
twenty-month old daughter, and to earn some extra money, she also took
on the care ofa one-month old baby boy during the week. I recall that on
more than one weekend the parents telephoned to say that they were too
busy to take their baby home.
That it is assumed that the ties between a child and an unrelated child-
minder can be cut without perceived problems or trauma on the child's
part was demonstrated to me by the following case. A social worker,
specialising in the placing of children for adoption, told me about an
eight year-old-boy for whom she was trying to find an adoptive family
overseas (the assumption being that no Hong Kong family would wish to
adopt a boy ofsuch an advanced age). He was the son ofa single mother
who had placed him as a baby in the care of an elderly lady. For a year
the mother had paid the baby-minder, but had then discontinued
payment and effectively disappeared. The baby-minder had continued
looking after the boy for eight years, out of affection, according to the
social worker. But she had eventually become too old and ill to continue
and the child had been handed over to the care of the Social Welfare
Department. I asked whether the boy was continuing to see the old lady
before he went overseas. The social worker told me that he was not
because they did not encourage it as it was better to cut all links and have
a clean break.
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Since the reason that babies are looked after by people other than their
parents is in order that their mother should return to paid employment, I
shall first look at women in the work-force in Hong Kong society.
WOMEN IN THE WORK FORCE
The entry of Chinese women into the industrial labour force in pre-
Communist China, post-Communist China, Hong Kong, Taiwan and
Singapore has been well documented. In spite of the traditional value
that women should not be seen outside the home (Pruitt 1945; Ba Jin
1931) it is now taken for granted that women work outside the home
before marriage, after marriage and, increasingly, in the growing white-
collar class, after they have children. In 1992 the overall percentage of
women (aged from 15 to 65 and over) in the labour force in Hong Kong
was 46.2% (compared to 78% for men), a figure which had been fairly
constant over the previous ten years. The highest percentages of
women's participation in the labour force are those ofwomen aged 20 to
24 (82.5%) and 25 to 29 (79.1 %). These figures presumably do not take
into account unofficial work, such as baby-minding, or self-employed
entrepreneurial type jobs (Hong Kong Census and Statistics Department
1993:14). Women's participation in the labour force equals that of
Japan, and is among the highest in Asia, with married women joining at
a faster rate than single women (Ho 1984).
In present-day Hong Kong where a dense population inhabiting a
small territory renders almost all resources scarce except for
opportunities for employment, and where children therefore continue
to be seen as resources (as it is assumed that they will study hard at
school and get a well-paying job), it seems to be nearly a cultural norm
for the mother to continue in paid employment. It is certainly the case,
for instance, that where a couple wish to adopt or foster a child the full-
time employment of the mother is no impediment in the eyes of the
Hong Kong Social Welfare Department. However, the scarcity of
government-operated child care centres2 and the expense of hiring a
childminder (from HK$3,000 to HK$4,000 per month) means that re-
entering the work force remains an ideal mostly pursued by the white-
collar employees who can earn enough to make paying for child-care a
feasible option. Manual workers who themselves earn about the same or
barely more than a baby-minder stay out of the workforce and look after
their children and express regret that they have to do so.
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THE RETURN TO WORK OF THE HONG KONG
MOTHER
At the end ofthe ch6h yuht (the month after childbirth during which the
mother's lifestyle is restricted) most mothers I talked to express great
relief and pleasure that they can once more live normally. Within about
six weeks ofthe birth most once more return to full-time work. This, as I
have already said, seems to be a matter ofpersonal preference as well as
financial necessity. Working has in nearly all cases certainly predated
marriage and motherhood, and has carried with it many implications
about women's role in the family. Exactly how young married couples
organise their finances is something that would be well worth studying
as is the power balance of the family. Journalistic reports suggest that
even in professional couples the husband is still regarded as the head of
the family and that the wives still expect them to be the major
breadwinners.
Well before the mother returns to work she has to make provision for
someone to look after the baby. Many had however not made any firm
arrangements up to the time when they were in hospital with their new-
born baby. The wealthy will take out a contract to employ a live-in
Filippina domestic helper (of whom there are about 125,000 working in
Hong Kong) who will take care of all the household chores. The
minimum salary for a foreign domestic helper is currently HK$3,500 per
month. Free food or a food allowance is also provided by the employer as
is a return flight home every two years and free medical care. The
majority will employ a baby-minder, which in terms of salary costs
nearly as much but accommodation and additional perks do not have to
be provided. As one might expect, the preferred baby-minder is a
member of the family: a paternal or maternal grandmother, a sister or
sister-in-law. Sometimes however relatives are not available because
they are themselves working outside the home, already looking after
children/grandchildren, too old, or living in China or even in some cases
have emigrated to the USA or Canada. These were all reasons given by
informants. In the case of a relative not being available, an unrelated
person will be sought as caretaker. As I have said, few women seemed to
consider using government creches or baby care centres, and the reasons
for this should be investigated. The unrelated caretaker will be found
either through friends or by advertising. Women I talked to did not have
any specific characteristics in mind that they required ofa baby-minder,
a few ofthem seeming satisfied to fmd someone who was clean and did
not smoke. The baby is nearly always looked after away from its own
203
ANTHROPOLOGY OF HONG KONG
home in the home of the baby-minder. One mother, married to a
professional man, told me she would not want a stranger coming to her
own home to look after the baby. There was a certain irony in trusting
someone with her baby whom she would not trust in her home.
Although some babies are cared for outside on a daily basis, and are
taken home in the evening by their parents, many will remain at the baby-
minder's flat for the whole week. This was the intention with a
substantial number of my informants. The parents will then collect the
baby on Saturday and return it on Sunday evening. The baby is likely to
continue to spend five or six days out ofseven at the baby-minder's house
until it is two or three years old and can go to kindergarten. Mothers say
that the baby suffers no ill effects, although mothers whose friends have
put their babies in care away from home say that their friends found that
their babies had difficulties settling back with their own parents. These
are obviously subjective opinions possibly to justify a course of action.
On the topic ofEuropean children remaining at the wet-nurse's home for
two years where affective ties may well have been created between nurse
and infant, Goody comments: 'In the context ofthe divisibility ofparent
roles it is striking to see that none of these studies describes the
integration of the returned two-year-old as a problem. While such
difficulties may well have occurred, but not been recorded for the
twentieth-century analyst, it would appear that this was not seen as a
problem at the time' (1982:25). Evidently the same is true ofpresent-day
Hong Kong families who place a child in some one else's home.
The cost for weekly baby-minding in Hong Kong is, as already stated
above, from about HK$3,000 to HK$4,000 a month plus the cost of
milk-powder and disposable nappies. If the median Hong Kong
household salary is currently about HK$II,OOO a month (1991
Census), this is clearly a substantial outlay. In all the cases that I have
come across a grandmother or sister is paid the same, the reasoning
being that she would otherwise be gainfully employed in some other
capacity. It should also be borne in mind that the older generation are
seen as having few obligations towards the younger one, especially after
its members have reached adulthood. Although the outlay is more or less
equivalent to the salary earned by a Filippina maid (Chinese maid or
'amah' are nowadays scarce and much more expensive), most flats do
not have the space to accommodate an extra person.
It seems to be, on the whole, those mothers who can only find low-
paid unskilled work who remain at home to look after their children.
They simply cannot afford to pay for outside baby-care, but often
express the preference for going out to work. The working mothers seem
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to regard the weekly separation with equanimity, although in fact those
whose baby is lodged with grandparents may well eat all together after
work ifthe location is convenient. They say 'Of course 1 will miss him!
her but 1 have no choice'. They maintain, in addition, that there is
nothing to be enjoyed about being with a baby, that it is very hard work
for 24 hours a day. 1have never heard a mother express the idea that she
did not want to miss anything of her child's development, or that it was
in any way the mother's duty, let alone pleasure, to be the primary
caretaker of the baby.
An administrator of my acquaintance who was the mother of a baby
girl sent the baby to be looked after by her mother in a housing estate
some way away. Her comments to me about the situation clearly
demonstrated her priorities. 'I would like to take care of my baby', she
told me, 'but 1have no time'. When some time later she and her husband
emigrated to Canada, the toddler was left in the care ofthe grandparents
until such time as the couple were settled. 'It doesn't matter now' a
mutual friend commented to about the separation of the 18-month-old
from her parents, 'but it won't be too good when she's older'.
THE ROLE OF THE MOTHER IN HONG KONG
CHINESE CULTURE
A Hong Kong Chinese obstetrician working in his own private practice
told me about a difference he had observed between his Chinese and
Western patients who came to his clinic for a scan or amniocentesis.
These are all women with professional husbands. On the form they are
required to fill in and sign is a slot for 'occupation'. Those Western
women who are currently not working outside the home write 'mother'.
Their Chinese counterparts leave the space blank. He said to me:
'Chinese women don't want to rear their children any more'. There is an
old Chinese saying that it is the duty ofa woman to support her husband
and teach her children. Certainly those women among my informants
who chose (either by default or because their husbands wanted them to)
to remain at home with their children, claimed that they were doing so to
supervise the children, and because a mother's care made the children
more obedient and less rebellious. Many said that it was the husband
who wanted the mother to stay with the baby.
Another concern that was expressed to me by the new mothers in the
various hospitals, is that they do not know how to take care ofa baby and
that it is therefore better if someone else with experience does the job.
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That this view is not a new one is evidenced in Flom Baber's and Elaine
Field's observations in the late 1960s in their survey of infant care in
Hong Kong. They write: 'There is a belief among the Chinese
community that an institution calling itself a nursery, or an individual
caring for a small number ofchildren in her home, is better equipped to
care for a young infant than is the child's own mother particularly if the
child is her first. This idea is prevalent throughout all social strata, rich
and poor alike, and there are innumerable 'nurseries' of varying
standards, from very good to appallingly bad, to cater for them' (Field
and Baber 1973:38).
There is still at least one private hospital in Hong Kong where parents
can leave a new-born baby for maybe one or two months so that it can
receive the expert and hygienic care of the nursing staff. The service is
less prevalent than it was about ten years ago. It currently costs about
HK$I,OOO per day.
It is interesting to note by way of comparison that Margery Wolf
found the same reliance on the 'expert' among women in China in the
1980s. She asked urban women how they felt about their children being
in a nursery all day or being looked after by the older generation. The
responses were that 'they said they didn't really know anything about
taking care of children and grandmother had a lot more experience'. A
surgical nurse whose child was in day care said, 'I was trained in
medicine, not child care. They are trained in child care'. When 1 asked
about the psychological effect on the infants, the majority of the women
seemed puzzled and some explained that 'at that age (until two or three)
children don't care who is around as long as they get fed' (M. Wolf
1985:120). This last observation is certainly echoed by what mothers
and others have said to me in Hong Kong.
In China the one-child policy is a factor that has affected the way
people wish to rear their children. Elisabeth Croll writes that 'parents
fear that the single child may be lonely, spoilt and selfish, or may suffer
ill-health, an accident or even death' (Croll 1985:231). She goes on to
say that the investment in a single child has led to a certain amount of
interest among urban families in child development and a demand for
'theoretical knowledge and practical aid in child-rearing'(1985:231).
Here too Croll observes the faith vested in the expert:
Because of their widespread fear that the child will be spoilt and
selfish, the demand for child-care outside the family unit has
increased in the past four years both because parents want
company for their child and because of greater trust in
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professional care. In the Evergreen Commune on the outskirts of
Beijing] the belief in the superiority ofprofessional care had risen
to such heights that many peasants there preferred to place their
children in the village kindergarten as weekly boarders than leave
them all day with a doting and untrained granny.
(1985:231)
Implicit in this preference is that the affection of the grandmother is of
far less value to the child than 'expert' care. It also appears that Chinese
women on the mainland, like their Hong Kong counterparts are not
disturbed by separation from their very young children. This does not
necessarily mean that individual mothers, or even the majority of
mothers, may not be deeply distressed by such separation, but it is
clearly not a value that is part of the cultural construction of mother-
infant relations. (See also Shih Ming Hu 1988).
It is ironic to note that the commitment of women to their work, and
the substantial reduction in the number of offspring, which have been
instilled in China by socialist ideology in the interests ofreconstructing
China, have come about in Hong Kong through laisser-faire market
forces. (See Gates [1994] for a similar situation in Taipei). A
comparative study of expectations of child-minders and child-care
facilities in China and in Hong Kong would perhaps reveal many
interesting differences and similarities that might be either caused by or
occur in spite of the very different political ideologies at play.
WHAT ARE CHILDREN FOR AND WHAT DO THEY
NEED?
In a recent survey carried out by a team ofTaiwan researchers on behalf
of the China Times Weekly on sexual attitudes and behaviour in China
and Taiwan, it was found that in Taiwan, 36.2% respondents agreed that
the purpose ofhaving children was to continue the lineage, and in China
25.5% said that it was to 'ensure someone to provide for parents when
they retire' (South China Morning Post 30/10/93). The Potters,
researching in rural Guangdong, state that 'In having children, the
villagers see a solution to their wish for care, rather than thinking of
themselves as assuming responsibility for another. The child is to care
for the parent in the future' (Potter and Potter 1990). Many Hong Kong
people would probably also agree with those ideas, although I do not
know ofany surveyor research which has been conducted on this issue.
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One could, therefore, characterise the Hong Kong family as 'parent-
centred', rather than as 'child- centred'.
Why people in any culture have children is obviously a very complex
matter, and even more so in modern times when births can be planned
and spaced often with a high degree of success. One of the themes that
arises out of this study is that of instrumentality in relation to having
children. By instrumentality I mean having children in order to have
specific and explicit goals. The age-old preference for sons over
daughters is one example of such instrumentality. The preference
transcends any personal preference ofthe mother, as, in many cases, she
knows she will be blamed for producing a daughter. Sons are preferred,
typically and in the traditional scheme of things, because, on the
ideological and religious level, it is they who continue the family line
and keep up the worship of the ancestors. On the practical level, it is the
sons, and especially the oldest one, who is responsible for the care ofhis
elderly parents, and for whom they will bring in a daughter-in-law who
will see to their daily physical needs as well as the more long-term aim
of producing grandchildren. The plight of old people who have no sons
has often been lamented and is still sympathetically viewed in China.
Margery Wolf (1985) gives the example of a couple in China who
tragically lose their son in an accident, and who, in spite of the fact that
they have a daughter, are given permission to have another child in the
hope that it will be a son.
However, although children are thought to be potentially very useful
to the family when they have reached adulthood, or at least the ability to
work, it would seem that their needs when they are small are regarded as
very basic. They need to be fed, kept warm, kept clean, and kept safe
from illness and danger.
Few writers have looked at the details ofchild care (mostly assuming
that this is carried out by the mother) or looked closely at how a child is
regarded in Chinese culture. Barbara Ward is one who has looked at
ideas about. children among the Hong Kong villagers with whom she
lived in the 1950s (Ward 1985).
M. Wolfhas also written about child training in a village in Taiwan in
the 1960s (1970:37-62). Her argument is that child training is training
for adaptation to the complex ofrelationships that make up adult family
and village life in Taiwan.
In present-day Hong Kong children are expected to attend
kindergarten at around 3 years of age, to learn and to do homework.
Mothers will say that even very small babies are 'naughty' ifthey cry or
will not sleep. In fact it is the most common response to the question
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'How is your baby?'. When adolescent children are enquired after, their
parents invariably pronounce them 'lazy' with a shake of the head. Both
epithets are a way ofbeing modest about one's children as it is not done
to boast about one's own, but it also reflects the high aspirations many
parents have of their children's' behaviour and performance.
A consideration of motherhood is inevitably intimately linked with
the social construction of the infant, its characteristics and needs and
how these change over time. How the infant and child is viewed leads on
to how parenting is regarded. As has already been suggested, the
Chinese family is parent-centred rather than child-centred. Hence babies
and small children adapt to the parents' routine, sometimes to the extent
that they are sent to a weekly babyminder, until they are old enough for a
kindergarten at two to three years ofage, so that they do not disturb it at
all. A mundane consequence of this adaptation to the adult lifestyle is
that small children routinely go to bed at the same time as their parents,
and are to be seen late at night in the streets and in restaurants. Many
Chinese parents express astonishment at what they regard as the very
early bedtime of English children in the territory.
In the long-term, the structure of the family is such that the child is
expected to please the parent, to fulfil certain expectations as it grows
up, and finally, to take responsibility for the care of the parents in their
old age. This last expectation is to some extent changing in Hong Kong
as ideas of economic independence are gaining ground and expressions
of intergenerational conflict are coming out into the open. The
allocation of government resources to contribute to adequate old age
pensions is currently much debated in the Hong Kong Legislative
Council.
Chinese writers stress that the emphasis within the family is on the
welfare of the group. Given the continuing lack of emphasis on the
individual, and especially the individuality of the child, the parenting of
infants and small children can be characterised in Hong Kong Chinese
culture as protective, and then later on, as the child grows bigger and is
expected to take more responsibility for its actions, as directive. In
Western culture, I would characterise the ideal style of parenthood as
interactive. These are, ofcourse, best thought ofas emphases rather than
as absolute categories. In Western parenting there is also, as there must
be, a certain amount ofprotection, and later on direction. An example of
directive behaviour in infancy is shown, however, in the common way of
toilet-training. Beatrice Kit-May Hung, in her research on early mother-
infant interaction, describes how the mother makes certain different
sounds (a hissing sound or a humming sound) when she wants the child
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to urinate or defecate. Hung comments that unlike the British or
American idea which is to help the toddler control hislher own bodily
functions, the Chinese idea is that the mother determines when these
should happen (Hung 1983).
In Hong Kong Chinese parenting, the lack ofemphasis on interaction
and communication is lamented in a forthcoming paper based on a
survey by Justina Leung, etc. (1994) and others, including Susanna Tsoi
who runs courses on parenting (for parents). Tsoi has also published two
books. The first is called A Mother's Personal Jottings (1991) which
sold 3,000 copies in its first edition and over 4000 in its second edition.
A second book on sex education That Which Bewilders A Child (1992)
has sold 6,000 copies and has just been approved for sale in China. Tsoi
stresses the need to spend time with children, the need to take a firm
stand over issues the parent considers important. She feels that currently
Hong Kong parents relate to their children 'on materialistic terms',
buying them things at weekends to compensate for the time spent away
from them during the week. I queried with her the notion that parenting
has taken a downturn in modem times, in view of the fact that modem
parents mostly shared their parents with several other siblings. Her
answer was that because many Hong Kong parents shared their parents
they themselves do not think that their children have the need of
intensive parenting. My interpretation is also that the younger parents
may not have the model of intensive parenting.
It is notable that there is a good deal of physical distance between
parents and children in a Hong Kong Chinese family. Although parents,
inevitably, have a good deal ofphysical contact with very small children,
inasmuch as they are carried around a good deal, this is discouraged
after the age of five or six, or when the child no longer needs to be
carried. Susanna Tsoi agreed with my observation, but had no
explanation. She did not disagree however, when I suggested family
hierarchy as one possibility, and the extended family with the need to
inhibit incest as another. It is an area which would be well worth
investigating fully.
EXPECTATIONS OF CHILD CARE
Unlike in the United Kingdom, there is no law in Hong Kong requiring
the registration of those who care for fewer than six children for
monetary reward. Nor is there a law against leaving small children
locked up alone at home, although this topic is the subject of a certain
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amount of debate in the newspapers and at official levels. As already
stated, most mothers did not have a very clear idea ofthe kind ofwoman
they wished to employ as their child-minder, perhaps preferring to trust
the recommendations of friends of relatives, or their own judgement
when meeting a potential child-minder.
The Family Welfare Society, a government-subvented body which
belongs to the Hong Kong Council ofSocial Service, has produced three
pages of guidelines both for parents and child-minders. The opening
recommendation is that parents and child-minder should be clear about
all the arrangements before they come to an agreement. This is followed
by recommendations about the kind of woman suitable to do the job and
her ideal circumstances. She should be healthy, mentally stable, should
not have bad habits such as smoking or playing mah-jong, should be
patient and enjoy being with children, should be loving and responsible,
have a suitable education (this is not defined), and enough time. The
second section deals with safety in the home. The emphasis is on a child
having a safe place in which to 'learn and rest'. Section three asks how
much the potential child-minder knows about children. Caring for the
child and teaching him or her are emphasised, as is communicating with
the parents about the child. The rest of the section is concerned with
giving the child balanced meals, dressing the child in clothing
appropriate to the weather, concern with hygiene and safety, talking to
the child and trying to understand him or her, administering suitable
rewards and punishments so as to maintain a balance between spoiling
and excessive severity, giving the child time for work and for play so as
encourage his or her own thinking. The fourth section deals with the
need for a child to get used to the strange environment in the absence of
the parents. Parents and child-minder should arrange that the child meets
the child-minder and sees the new environment before going there alone.
For her part the child-minder should make sure that she knows about the
child's needs and habits, likes and dislikes and fears. The final sections
returns to the relationship between the child-minder and the parents, re-
emphasising that all expectations and practical arrangements for normal
living and emergencies should be clearly understood by both parties.
The pamphlet ends by stating in quotation marks that the term for child-
minder do; mouh means replacing the mother or deputising for the
mother.
Much of this is relevant when the child is starting with a child-minder
at the age when he or she has already established ways and patterns.
Many of the babies of my informants however went to a child-minder
when they were from one to a few months old. The pamphlet expresses a
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common-sense approach to the matter and it would be interesting,
although difficult, to find out how much of its advice is adhered to.
The Family Welfare Society also sponsored a report on children who
were being looked after by child-minders (1986). The study was
motivated by the realisation that although it has been generally known
that children are being placed in the care of 'child caring agents e.g.
relatives, friends, or persons with whom they have no relationship . . .
little is known about the pattern of such care, the factors that determine
the parents'choice and the level of satisfaction they have regarding the
type of care rendered' (1986:5). The predominant reason for the
parents'of the 155 households interviewed placing the child with a
child-minder was so that they could both work. Parents interviewed, 57
per cent of whom had secondary education and 7 per cent post-
secondary education, were asked to choose among various priorities in
child care. The physical health of the child was given as first priority by
70 per cent of the respondents, intellectual development by 36.8 per
cent, and love and care by 34.1 per cent (1986:41). It is of course quite
possible that 'love and care' are considered as being properly given by
the parents and not the child-minder, but in that case the child is required
to do without it as an active ingredient in its life for a week at a time.
However, the co-ordinator of the research, Diana Mak, writes:
It is, however, a bit disappointing that so few respondents (53
respondents or 34%) identifY "love and care given to the child" as
among the first three priorities. One wonders to what extent this is
due to the way affection is expressed in the Chinese culture or
whether this is due to the unawareness of the respondents of this
element as an important attribute to child care. The latter point
seems to be supported because the respondents have generally
demonstrated a low attention index towards their children in the
minder's care.
(1986:120)
By this last comment is meant that many parents do not see the need to
visit their children or take them home at weekends. It tended to be
factory workers who had lower scores in this area, for which their' lower
education and knowledge in child care' is held responsible (1986:76).
Implicit in these observations is the idea that love for one's children is
connected to knowledge and educational level rather than being
something natural and spontaneous.
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TWO HONG KONG WORKING MOTHERS AND
THEIR CHOICE OF CHILD CARE
I shall illustrate the choices made by two Hong Kong mothers with the
stories that they told me.
The first one, Agnes, works in a skilled job as a garment pattern
cutter for a workshop which makes up samples. I was introduced to her
by her boss, an Englishwoman who knew ofmy research interests. I met
Agnes at her workbench during the lunch hour. She was happy to talk
and the conversation was in English. She is forty-two, and had twin girls
about twenty months old who had been born after their mother had had
treatment for fertility after seven years of marriage. When she knew she
was having twins she had hoped to have one ofeither sex. There was no
pressure on her to have sons, she said, because her husband was the
youngest of four sons and her mother-in-law already had 'lots of
grandsons'. She is the second child and eldest sister of two boys and five
girls. Her parents are both dead, her mother having died when the twins
were nine months old. She had given birth in a private hospital close to
where she lives, because of its proximity and because she had 'heard
nothing bad about it'. She had the babies by Caesarian section, because
of which she had not been able to see them for the first two days as she
had been in bed on a drip. But her sister had visited her and seen the
babies so that she knew they were normal and healthy and she was not
anxious about them. She had not tried to breastfeed them because by the
time she had got to see them they had already been given bottles.
Anyway she did not think she could manage to breastfeed twins. Her
mother-in-law was also against the idea saying that all her children had
had canned milk. Agnes had left hospital after seven days but the doctor
had suggested that the twins should remain for longer saying that she
would find it very tiring to look after them. In the end the babies had
stayed in hospital for an extra ten days (at a total cost ofover HK$6,OOO).
Agnes had not known why it was thought necessary to keep the babies in
hospital and suggested to me that maybe it was for the paediatrician's
own purposes (i.e. the fees). She had visited the babies daily and helped
to feed them. Once she had returned home she had employed a puih
yuhf for a month. She had postponed her return to work because she had
had difficulty finding good child-minders. The twins are cared for by
different people under different arrangements. Twin A comes home
every evening and Twin B stays with her minder all week (Agnes'
terms). I was interested to know how she had decided which one was to
sleep at home and which one to stay at her minder's house. Agnes
213
ANTHROPOLOGY OF HONG KONG
replied that her sister-in-law had told her that her fourteen year-old
daughter said she liked Twin B better because she looked more like her
father (i.e. the fourteen year-old's uncle and therefore perhaps more like
a member of her family). She then went on to tell me that Twin B was
better-looking, although Twin A was not bad looking, and that Twin A
had more understanding (tuhng sih). None ofthis added up to how the
decision had been made although the fourteen year-old niece's
comments seemed in some way to have been influential. Maybe
Agnes found it convenient to dissociate herself from the decision. In
fact, she told me that she had wanted both twins to board weekly but that
her husband had wanted to have one of them at home in the evenings.
Many women who are not returning to work give as one reason for this
course of action that the husband wants the mother to look after the
child.
The minder who looks after one twin all week is her brother-in-law's
wife. She is clean and experienced, but Agnes does not like her attitude,
and does not think she is very nice. 'Quite mean' she told me. 'She
should be content because I take back the baby every holiday' said
Agnes. But apparently if she collects the baby after 6 p.m. on Saturday
evening the baby-minder is not pleased. The arrangement was initiated
by Agnes's husband who is doing business with the baby-minder's
husband who is also his younger brother. This is perhaps a case where
family connections (and business interests) override the choice of
someone whom Agnes might find personally more acceptable. She pays
the minder HK$ 3,400 per month plus the cost of milk and nappies
which she estimates at about HK$540 per month.
The other twin, Twin A, is looked after close to home by an unrelated
minder. She is a woman Agnes knew as a machinist in a factory ten years
ago, and whom she ran into by chance again some time ago. She is in her
forties. Agnes takes the baby back in the evenings. She pays her
HK$2,000 per month.
Twin B will come back to live at home probably next autumn, when
she will be nearly three and about to start kindergarten. Agnes does not
want the twins to be separated in the long term, she says. They talk to
each other a lot and seem happy to see each other at week-ends. Agnes
has not decided whether at that point she will give up work, or employ a
Filippina maid, or entrust the children to an after school care centre.
Agnes said she was happy to have twins, and she was not planning to
have any more children. She also said she was quite happy to have
daughters because she thinks it is easier to get on with a son-in-law than
a daughter-in-law. She is ofthe opinion that because daughters will go to
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work and earn a salary they will be just as good at looking after their
mother in her old age as a son.
The other mother, Lai-ying, had just had her first child, a daughter,
when I met her. She is twenty-nine and works as a clerk. She gave birth
in a charity hospital where my first meeting with her took place. The
baby was not with her as she was having light treatment for jaundice.
Lai-ying was giving her bottles but said that when they got home she
wanted to breastfeed her as she had read that it is better for the baby. She
was intending to return to work at the end of her maternity leave. She
was planning to find a neighbour to look after the baby in the daytime
and anticipated that this would cost about HK$2,OOO a month.
Three weeks later, in May, my assistant and I went to visit her at her
privately-owned flat in a not very modem building in North Point in the
middle of a busy street market selling vegetables, fish and other fresh
and dried produce. The flat was very small and dark and the room where
we talked was piled high with files and bits of dismantled electronics.
The air-conditioner was on. Decomting the wall were large, poster size,
soft-focus photographs ofLai-ying in a white wedding dress. These were
lit up by spot-lights. Dressed in pyjamas, four years after her wedding,
the Lai-ying who greeted us provided quite a contrast to the implied
romance of the photographs. Her sister, who normally did part-time
domestic work, but who was currently without work was staying with
her for the month to look after her. The muhn yuht banquet (held one
month after a baby's birth) was to be the following Sunday and Lai-ying
was looking forward to it as after that she would be free, she told us,
from the restrictions of the chOh yuht. She would be able to drink soft
drinks and eat ice-cream again. Currently an experienced neighbour was
helping to bath the baby. Not for money, out of neighbourliness, I was
told. Lai-ying was due to return to work on 25 May, and at that time the
baby would go to friends in Kowloon for the week and return home at
week-ends. It was going to cost HK$3,200 per month plus the cost of
milk and nappies. In response to my asking how she felt about the
weekly absence, she replied that she had no choice because she had to
work in order to earn some money. She preferred to go back to work, she
said, as a baby is very troublesome. She added that she would mther have
found someone to look after the baby in the day-time but that she had
been unable to find anyone to do so. Having a baby is so much trouble
that she is not sure she wants another one.
Her sister joined in the conversation and told us that she had not
worked for two years after her own son had been born ten years ago. She
had looked after him herself and then at the age of two he had gone to a
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nursery to encourage him to get on with other children and to get
knowledge from books. She had not enjoyed looking after him, she said,
but she had had no choice as she had had no work at that time and
therefore no income with which to pay someone to do it for her.
CONCLUSIONS
It can be seen that the 'nurturant fostering' practised by some Hong
Kong families, bears little resemblance to the model put forward by E.
Goody or by Carsten. It seems to be resorted to purely as a practical
arrangement that benefits the parents' life-style. It could also be, as has
been suggested to me (Evans 1995 personal communication) that the
distancing of the parents in this way makes the child easier to control
because of a deep-seated fear of abandonment. On the whole, those
mothers I talked to who can afford paid baby-care would rather return to
work. This is not to say, as Tam has pointed out to me (personal
communication 1995) that there are not undoubtedly women whose
priority it is to spend a good deal oftime with their child for the first few
years of its life, and who feel tom and guilty ifthey do not do so. Further
research is needed to fmd out what ideas and values inform their
decision and influence their feelings in this direction.
At present in Hong Kong it is not difficult to find a middle-aged
housewife whose children are grown-up or at secondary school to take
on the job. For some reasons it seems to be harder to find a daily care-
taker. However it is possible that the mothers actually (secretly?) prefer
to have the baby away for the whole week. That way they do not have to
look after it in the evenings when they return home tired after work. Nor
is their sleep disturbed at night. In professional families where there is a
resident maid, it is commonly the maid who attends to the baby at night.
It is perhaps significant that it is fathers, who, although they play with
their babies and clearly enjoy being with them, playa minor part in the
fundamentals of child care, who seem to want the baby to spend more
time at home. It would be interesting to know more about what fathers
say about child-care arrangements and how much influence they have
over the decision. As I did not meet fathers I cannot comment on how
strongly the fathers may have wished to keep the baby at home, nor how
much the issue is one of gender politics. (See Gates (1994] on how
couples in Taipei negotiate the number of children born.
The relationship between the experiencing ofemotion and the ways in
which it is expressed and acted upon is complex. What the long-term
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consequences are of the baby-care arrangements discussed above and of
the mother's attitude to her own identity and ofthe mother's and society's
perception of the needs of the infant is undoubtedly also a very complex
matter and well beyond the scope of this study. It could also be asked to
what extent has many professional women's relative lack ofemotional (if
this is indeed the case) and practical involvement enabled them to do well
in their careers and to become more self-confident and satisfied
individuals. That these areas should be researched is without much doubt.
NOTES
1 This paper is based on a chapter from my doctoral thesis (1994) and forms
part of a wider study of pregnancy and childbirth in Hong Kong. For the
most part, my informants were about two hundred new mothers whom I
interviewed in person (from January 1991 to June 1992) with the help of a
Cantonese female assistant in the maternity wards of three hospitals (chosen
to represent intakes of low-income, middle-income and higher-income
women). We subsequently visited about fifty of these women in their own
homes for further discussions about a month after the birth of the baby.
2 A call to the Senior Information Officer of the Social Welfare Department
Public Relations Office ascertained that there are currently day places (8 a.m.
to 6 p.m.) for 34,000 children aged from 2-6 in government and government
subvented day care centers. These charge around HK$1 ,300 a month. They do
not cater for babies so would not therefore help the mothers who return to
work at that stage.
3 A woman employed especially to look after the mother and baby in the first
month after childbirth. They are paid a good deal more than a regular
domestic helper. They seem to be quite scarce in modern Hong Kong and
very few women in my study had recourse to one.
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TRADITIONAL VALUES AND
MODERN MEANINGS IN THE
PAPER OFFERING INDUSTRY
OF HONG KONG
Janet Lee Scott
Over the past few years, an increasing number of newspaper and
magazine articles, as well as television and radio programs concerned
with local affairs, have devoted much attention to the question of the
preservation of Hong Kong's cultural heritage. While much of this
attention is directed to the protection of antiquities (monuments and
archaeological sites), increasing concern has been expressed over the
survival of traditional arts, crafts, and lifeways. It would appear that an
ever-increasing number of citizens are convinced of the importance of
what they term traditional Chinese culture (in all its manifestations) to
modem Hong Kong life and are arguing strenuously for its preservation
or revival. As suggested elsewhere in this volume, this may be seen as
symptom of Hong Kong's modernity. However, we need to understand
the living context in which an item of material culture, an element of
belief, a set of actions, or a historical monument is set, and for this what
is required is an understanding of the meaning attributed to these things
by participants. Indeed, without such a context, the significance to
modem life of the entire complex referred to as 'traditional Chinese
culture' cannot be evaluated.
Some insights may be gained by a brief examination of one facet of
the most 'traditional' of areas - the realm of ritual and worship and the
repertoire of material culture that complements it. More specifically, it
would be helpful to focus attention on two familiar Hong Kong scenes,
two enduring realms of meaning - the world of death rituals and paper
offerings for the departed. In Hong Kong, offerings for the dead are
characterized by their abundance and· great variety in form and style.
Large amounts continue to be made and burned to the departed. Why
should this practice continue? One interpretation suggests that
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contemporary urban Chinese are motivated by a desire for reciprocal
enrichment; great giving to ancestors results in great receiving on the
part ofthe descendants. It is also said that the variety ofofferings reflects
the materialistic orientation believed to be characteristic of the society
as a whole. However, this paper will explore a parallel explanation that
connects this practice to another realm of motivation, one that may then
allow further reflection on the first concern - the place of traditional
thought and practice in the modern Chinese world. I
FUNERALS AND DEATH RITUALS
Recent scholarly efforts have re-examined and re-emphasized the
importance ofdeath ritual for the understanding ofthe design ofChinese
society. They have concluded that the underlying structure of funerary
rituals, with their accompanying elements associated with settling the
soul after death, were (and are) conducive to cultural unity across the
Chinese social landscape. With the acceptance ofa sequence ofculture-
wide funeral rituals, ethnic groups could practice a wide variety ofburial
customs, yet continue to identify what they did as 'Chinese' (Watson
and Rawski 1988). As Watson observes, 'The system allowed for a high
degree of variation within an overarching structure of unity' (1988:16).
For our purposes, gifts and materials offered to the dead seem to be a
most significant part of the the funeral ritual sequence and the rituals of
commemoration which follow. While food offerings may be both
abundant and various in form and complex in meaning (Thompson 1988,
Ahern 1973), there are other goods and offerings that are normally made
to the departed. It would seem from all this that funeral customs are not
only a most meaningful complex for the understanding of human
behavior, but that funeral offerings, an integral part of such customs, are
themselves ofgreat significance. To better comprehend the nature ofthe
funeral offerings and appreciate their significance to the discussion of
tradition and contemporary Chinese identity, a brief overview should be
made of the world of paper offerings currently available in Hong Kong.
THE WORLD OF PAPER OFFERING
Residents of Hong Kong and short-term visitors alike sometimes notice,
at the curbside or at street corners, tall metal containers full of ashes,
charred sticks, and the fluttering bits of colored paper - the remains of
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items recently burned. The visitor to Hong Kong may be puzzled and
wonder what the original objects were, how they appeared before being
consigned to the flames, and, even more likely, why such things were
being burned at all. Had the observer arrived earlier at the scene,
however, he or she would not only have observed small groups ofpeople
watching over the burning. By inquiring further, the observer would
quickly come to know what residents already understand - that the
individuals concerned with the proper burning of the materials are the
close relatives of someone recently deceased. They will also have
learned that the items piled on the street next to the ovens will be burned
as paper offerings, for use by the deceased in the world that they inhabit
after death.
These items, the large and diverse collection of items for the dead,
are but one part of an important and complex category of Chinese
material culture - the paper offerings purchased for offering to gods, to
ghosts, and to the ancestors (for the classic discussion on these
categories, see Wolfl974). These items can best be seen in context ofthe
religious observances characterizing the ritual cycle of the lunar year.
Overall, there are a great number ofoccasions for which paper offerings
of some form are appropriate. While individual worshippers understand
and conform to the general expectations of worship accompanying both
events of the ritual year and the more unusual events, each worshipper
may make offerings according to his or her level of devotion and
individual perceptions of the occasion and of what and how much is
appropriate to offer.
A visit to any of the urban retail shops selling paper offerings will
reveal a great and bewildering variety ofbeautiful items/ often elegantly
designed and crafted, always colorful. A typical paper shop is crammed
full with materials used in worship. From floor to ceiling, wall shelves
on all sides of these shops are stacked with the different varieties of
paper offerings arranged according to the festival or occasion in which
they are used, or by whether the item is one ofthose for everyday use, or
one needed for a more rarely occuring purpose. The floor space in front
of the shelves usually accomodates larger stacks of hand-assembled
worshipping packs, or open cardboard boxes or bins overflowing with
bulkier or pre-packed items. Even the ceiling space cannot be wasted
and is put to use for the hanging of paper clothing bundles, small items
modeled on bamboo frames, plastic bags filled with packages of gold or
silver money, circular lucky basins trimmed with gold paper money, and
other items. During the weeks preceding the New Year, the ceiling also
supports a dazzling, eye-catching array of the complex and beautiful
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golden flowers, or gam fa. In even the smallest paper shop, a
considerable amount of the full paper repertoire may be viewed, along
with stacks of the many varieties of incense, incense burners, lotus
lamps and old-style red candles, painted and three-dimensional images
of dieties, prayer beads, new style red household-sized burners for
offerings, and other worship-related items also for sale. Hong Kong
paper offering shops present a true feast ofcolor and design, and it is not
surprising that visitors and tourists are tempted to venture in to see what
is available.3
Most shops serve a regular clientele of local residents, providing
materials for their daily worshipping needs and for observing the special
celebrations which highlight the year-long ritual cycle. While not all
customers are equally knowledgable about the background and use of
these items,4 nor are they always fully conversant of all details of their
meaning and iconography, it is correct to say that most purchasers
understand their general use and their significance. Most also feel that,
as an integral part of worship, offerings should be made and used.
Samples of worshippers and shopkeepers all agreed that such offerings
were to be used regularly. 'Regularly' in this context means that the
'average' worshipper or customer purchases on a recurring basis, the
exact time (perhaps every two weeks) depending on the amount used.
The amount used depends, in tum, on the individual offering style and
personal habits of the worshipper. Regular worshippers purchase
proportionately more supplies during the periods immediately
preceding major events of the lunar calendar, such as the New Year,
Ching Mihng, and the YUh Nilahn Festival. For example, during the
Ching Mihng festival, customers purchase additional packages of
clothing and other personal items to send to the deceased.
THE VARIETIES OF PAPER OFFERINGS
The paper offerings for the dead are fabricated in workshops still
operating in Hong Kong as independent companies, or as an adjoining
sections of an established retail shop selling paper items for everyday
worship. Most of the offerings for the dead form part ofa larger division
- what informants refer to as 'pitched' items - within the full repertoire
ofpaper offerings. Pitched items are those built up on a frame ofbamboo
strips covered with paper.5 Each retail shop or workshop prepares and
has printed a list of their products from which the customer may choose.
If unclear about these offerings, customers can ask advice from the
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master or owner, may observe items in the process ofmanufacture in the
shop, or consult a photo album with pictures of items crafted in previous
orders. The current repertoire ofpaper offerings as grave goods, or gifts
for the dead, is both variable and complex, but may be divided into two
large categories.6
The first comprises what could be termed the 'basic set'. This
includes items made in a style reminiscent of an earlier period of
Chinese history-perhaps the middle to late Qing or early Republican-
when the design of furniture, clothing, and other everyday items was
markedly different from today's items. Other items in this set seem to be
created from beliefs about the soul, what it requires, and what it
encounters in its travels; again, it is difficult to determine from which
period such beliefs have been taken. While the actual number of items
listed therein varies somewhat from shop to shop, there is considerable
agreement on a list of approximately ten to thirteen items. For example,
one workshop listed the basic set as the following: A dragon tablet, a pair
of items consisting of the immortal crane and its accompanying catkin
fan, one set consisting of a red and a white fan, one bathing pan, a
package of bathing clothes, a pair of mountains in gold and silver, a
sedan chair, and the image ofthe hell-breaking spirit. Also included are:
the platform for looking back on one's home village, a pair of male and
female servants, a pair of bridges-one gold and one silver, a Chinese-
style safe to hold personal items for the deceased, a red cabinet for
storing clothing, a car, a Western-style multi-floored house with a
garden, a pair of storage chests for the gold and silver money , a
television set, and an additional set of a seven foot gold bridge and a
silver bridge. Many of these items are crafted to conform to old
fashioned images. For example, the male servants are often dressed in
Qing or Republican era costumes; often the grey or blue long jackets
with stand-up collars, worn with matching trousers, black cloth shoes
and a Western-style hat. Female servants are attired in the side-closing
jackets, trimmed with paper rickrack, trousers, with their hair done up in
chignons.
Other shops had more or less extensive product lists. In addition,
while informants never suggested that any of the items lacked
significance or importance, these owners of workshops and retail
outlets understood that not everyone could afford to purchase all the
items listed. While not excessively expensive, a full set of items might
be too much for very poor families to offer.? Accordingly, families need
not make a full purchase; only certain of the items available would be
considered to be of greatest importance. For example, refering to the
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preceding offerings list, only the first seven items were considered by the
shop master to be ofgreatest importance. It should also be noted that this
workshop placed the house and the car on the 'second' list of items to
secure; most place these on the first list of necessary items and most
customers do order at least one house and one car for the deceased.
Similarly, a number of shops would not list the television set as so
important, but some do. This indicates some variations of opinion
among the shops or workshops as to the arrangement of items which
appear on the list, and further, on the content ofthe item list itself. The
reasoning behind this is not completely clear and needs further study;
certainly, the items which are associated with the rituals held during the
funeral are of great significance. It is also clear that there is some
ambiguity about how 'old' things can be; cars are not usually thought of
as ancient artifacts. However, the car can be viewed as simply a modern
substitution for the sedan chair, which is itself an earlier representation
of an even older theme of providing transportation for the dead in the
other world.
In addition to the basic set just described, there is a second large
category of items which could be termed the 'items of everyday use'.
This category contains a number of sub-divisions. First, there are the
special items that are made up to accomodate the particular wishes ofthe
customers. These might include the life-sized, or nearly life-sized
replicas ofwhat the deceased possessed in life, what he or she desired to
possess in the otherworld, or what the family of the deceased wished to
provide. Most often, this category includes additional cars, houses and
other buildings or even, although more rarely, animals. All of the shops
were prepared as well to make up variations ofthe Street ofthe Dead, an
actual city street made up with all the shops and places necessary for
continuance ofordinary, everyday life. It is clear that families concerned
with the comfort of their deceased family members, and possessed of
suitable finances, can order anything that can be thought of - this
category of paper offerings being infinite in content.
A second sub-division, and a more common section of this second
category, is the cluster of what could be called 'daily necessities'. This
category is extremely popular, with many retail paper shops displaying
considerable numbers of prefabricated examples packed and ready for
purchase. Such items are to be burned at the end of the official funeral
observances or later, during other festivals such as Ching Mihng. It
includes three identifiable groupings. First, there are the various
electrical appliances and gadgets, including fans, rice cookers,
television sets, telephones, VCRs, irons, computers, calculators,
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refrigerators and so on. A second grouping consists ofpaper clothing (of
prefabricated or custom design), underwear, hats, shoes, handbags,
schoolbags, jewelry and all manner of items for personal use.8 A final
grouping takes up the items of personal finance - the check books,
savings books, ETC cards for the withdrawal of money from money
machines, and credit cards, all drawn on the Bank of Hell. The credit
cards, it should be noted, bear the image ofthe God ofHell, and in color
and design are very similar to the American Express card; providing an
otherworldly twist to their advertising slogan, 'Don't leave home
without it'.
This sub-division of daily necessities is the most elastic and ever-
expanding in its content; whenever a new item of technology, or a new
and improved version of an existing item, appears, it is made up and
ready to supplement, or even replace, the existing version of the same
item reflecting an earlier style or technology. The flexibility shown by
this sub-division is understandable as a process of adaptation within a
category, in which the general content is retained, but the specific item
or items within may be modified or even eliminated. This process
applies, for example, to some ofthe items in the classical category ofthe
basic set. The houses and cars, found in the basic set but of obviously
modern form, still reflect the general category of housing and
transportation, categories of grave offering with an ancient history,
and as such are appropriately placed within this sub-set. Nevertheless,
the introduction of new items and replacement of the old is definitely
more marked in the daily necessities sub-division, where technological
and stylistic change is more rapid. For example, while standard desk
telephones have been available for some time, retail shops have begun to
offer mobile phones. A similar situation· held for the replicas of the
battery-operated calculators, which were replaced in some shops by full-
sized replicas of computers, and for the old style stereophonic systems,
supplanted by working (Le., containing moving parts) examples of
compact disc players. Even clothing design, which in appearance is
somewhat more conservative, shows the effects of this change; shops
display high heeled shoes and the latest in sports shoes (complete with
real or string shoelaces) alongside traditional cloth (but made of paper)
slippers.
It should be clear from the preceding that paper offerings for the dead
consist of a large and complex sub-category of the total repertoire of
paper offerings. As a genre of material culture, it is a sub-category
characterized by great elasticity of its boundaries and a seemingly-
infinite capacity to absorb new elements of material culture, and their
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accompanying changes in technology. It encompasses the most up-to-
date items, yet also contains and preserves the more old-fashioned
elements embodying in their form and meaning allusions to times gone
by. Yet, with all this variety, there is little tension or contradiction among
. the objects, the combination of which apparently troubles none of the
purchasers, who consider the objects quite proper, both socially and
ritually. What are we to make ofthis combination - is this a reworking of
traditional culture into a new vehicle for the satisfaction ofcontemporary
needs? And, does this repertoire of paper offerings for the dead provide
any useful insights into what things are significant to the role of tradition
and the maintenance of 'Chineseness' in the Hong Kong context?
OFFERING CONTENT
Evaluating the design and content of the paper offerings for the dead
calls to mind two preliminary observations. The first is whether the
common contrast 'East' and 'West', an overarching feature ofdiscourses
on Hong Kong life - discussed in the Introduction to this volume - is of
any value in this context. It seems clear from purchasers' behavior that,
in this regard, there is no serious contradiction, because according to
shopkeepers, their customers purchase (for eventual burning) all new
items with little hesitation. They do not think of them as being divided
along an East-West axis, or even as 'Western' at all, for items adapted
from both sources are subsumed under the overriding category of
'proper offering', and are understood as such by the purchasers. As the
repertoire has for some time included items of clearly imported
technology, the allusions to westernization and modernization are there,
but do not seem to be ofspecial importance for understanding consumer
acceptance.
Secondly, in the world of paper offerings for the dead, traditional
patterns, while well represented, cannot be characterized as totally
conservative and resistent to new items. The old-fashioned paper
offerings for the dead, represented by the anciently-attired servants, the
silver and gold bridges, and the cranes, are in one sense never really at
risk. They can comfortably coexist with newer items because these
classical elements of the paper offerings for the dead are firstly, offered
as part of the funeral rituals performed at regular intervals after death,
and as such are set temporally and functionally within a somewhat
different frame than are the electrical appliances and other items in the
category ofeveryday goods. The classical items are part of the rituals to
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settle the spirit ofthe dead within the underworld, and thus, are still vital.
The items of everyday use are offered regularly thereafter for the
continued comfort ofand use by the dead (although it appears that some
purchasers burn some of them with the classical items burned at the
funeral rituals). Thus divided, the different categories of items satisfy
demands ofdifferent stages of the process ofthe funeral and are equally
necessary, but are not in conflict. It is also clear that, under the heading
of 'proper offerings', modem items of technology may be transformed
and provided with a new identity and meaning as grave goods. The
larger categories of items generally remain intact while what changes is
the form and variety of items within the category. Very old categories of
offerings may then be retained, with their specific contents altered, a
process which perhaps continues to echo Watson's insight into how the
system allowed for a 'high degree of variation within an overarching
structure of unity' (1988: 16).
It would seem that this transformation ofnew items into proper grave
offerings has been effective; even those long dead accept these items,
just as the living residents ofHong Kong are quick to adapt to, and use,
all manner ofnew technologies. In this sense, the continuity ofthe dead
and the living - long stressed by observers as an element of funeral
belief and one which stresses social continuity - is again maintained in
the attitude of those making these offerings to the dead.
SPIRITUAL MATERIALISM AND CONSPICUOUS
CONSUMPTION
However, is all this simply a reflection ofa 'culture ofaffiuence', as one
Hong Kong scholar describes it (Chan 1994), the predictable results ofa
form of spiritual materialism or a Hong Kong reformulation of the old
adage into, 'You can take it with you' (even ifyou never had it in the first
place)? This 'driven by consumerism' interpretation of the materials
requires some consideration. Many studies on Hong Kong life have
emphasized the importance ofmaterial values among the population (for
example, Hayes 1975; Mitchell 1969; Chaney 1971). Speaking of Lee,
Cheung and Cheung's 1979 study of life satisfaction, Lau Siu-kai
observed, 'Lee, Cheung and Cheung (1979), for example, found that the
degree of life satisfaction among their Chinese respondents was
positively associated with the level of material well-being enjoyed by
them. Furthermore, this relationship was independent of sex, age, and
educational status, thus attesting to its all-pervasive nature' (Lau
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1982:69). Lau himself devised the phrase 'the fetishism of material
wealth', explaining its rise in terms of the conditions of the original
immigrants, the commercialization of Gw6ngdung, the lack of moral
constraints in a migrant society, and the absence of other channels for
self advancement (Lau 1982:69-70).
Whether materialism is a key concept in understanding the dynamics
ofcontemporary Hong Kong society is highly debatable and outside the
scope of this paper, but for the purposes ofexamining the paper funeral
offerings it must be given some attention. It has long been understood
that Chinese funerals are complicated and expensive affairs; along with
marriage and birth, they are one of the critical rites of passage
demanding proper observance. This is true not only in Imperial China
but also in contemporary Chinese societies. While earlier accounts make
clear the financial burden funerals imposed on the family of the
deceased, a reference to the situation in the modem state of Singapore
may be instructive. 'One of the most striking features about Chinese
death rituals in Singapore is the astronomical sum of money spent to
ensure their performance. It is not uncommon for families to spend the
equivalent of $20,000 to $30,000 to enact these rituals. The average
family spends between $10,000 and $20,000. Even poorer Chinese
families desire and attempt to make the death rituals as elaborate as
possible' (Tong 1993:130). In Hong Kong, funerals can also be quite
expensive, with a custom-built Chinese style coffin costing as much as
HK$800,000. It is not inconceivable for the wealthy to spend in excess
of one million Hong Kong dollars.9 In short, funerals could be seen,
along with weddings, as amazing examples of conspicuous
consumption.
If for the moment it is accepted that Chinese funerals are, by their
nature, expensive, then paper offerings should also be affected. First, in
terms of sheer quantity and variety, it is clear that much is already
available, new items are being added, and the potential for more is there.
The price for a basic set has varied, from roughly HK$1 ,000-2,000 in
1989 to HK$4,000-5,000 in 1995. Ofcourse, the price for a single funeral
set is quite variable, and has no set upper limit due to the potential for
special orders and custom-made items. As said earlier, what limits there
may be would be subject only to the value placed on labor and the quality
of raw materials. Hong Kong residents, increasingly affiuent, are also
able to purchase more and finer items for the departed, to the extent that
the dead could theoretically live in the underworld even more
luxuriously than they did during their lives on earth. Noting again the
common practice among paper offerings workshops of refering
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customers to photo albums of previously ordered items, it is also
possible that this practice acts as a subtle impetus, not only to the
continuing introduction ofnew items into the repertoire, but also for the
influencing ofcustomers to have fabricated what others already have - a
spiritual form of 'keeping up with'.
Hence, the increasing elaboration of offerings may have much to do
with a general acceptance of social expectations of heavy spending and
conspicuous consumption - an influence from materialism and the
culture of consumption on the conduct of funerals and the choosing of
funeral offerings. For example, the purchasers may be motivated by the
desire for public display of family wealth or for praise from observers
noting the lavish displays of offerings to be burned. On the one hand,
while it is clear that purchasers of paper offerings do not do so for their
own use (no matter how elaborately offerings are made, or how much
they cost the purchaser, paper offerings absolutely cannot be worn or
used by the living), the objects are, nevertheless, on display for a period
of time before burning, and in rural areas may be moved in a procession
to the burning site (Hase 1984:158), giving observers ample time to note
the quality and quantity of the offerings, relative to the status of the
individual being buried. This practice has also been noted in Singapore:
'These items are put on display and burned in open spaces, in full view
ofthe public, demonstrating the virtue ofthe family in offering elaborate
sacrifices, and thereby enhancing their own social status' (Tong
1993:149). It has also been observed that individual family members
may wish to take photographs to remember what was offered, or to send
to relatives for their approval. 10 In the urban areas ofHong Kong, there is
less, ifany, practice ofparading items, but passers-by can, ifthey chance
upon the burning, observe the number and quality of items to be burned.
THE QUESTION OF CARE
Despite the persuasiveness ofthe preceding line of inquiry, an equally, if
not more promising parallel explanation for the persistence of paper
offerings lies in the deeply-rooted belief about the care due to ancestors.
'The Chinese believe in a future state somewhat similar to that existing
on earth, and therefore treat their dead with a view to preparing them for
the exigencies of the next world and supplying them with the various
articles ofluxury and necessity which they trust will be translated in the
spirit land for the use of the manes-or ghost of the deceased-by the
modem process of burning paper offerings of such articles' (Williams
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1976: 109-110). This conception implies a view of the underworld
wherein such articles have a place, not simply as objects, but as
necessary foundations for the comfort and succor of the departed. No
matter how small or how large the family fortune, how minimal or how
advanced the level of education, family members of the deceased will
endeavor to provide materials for the comfort of their departed loved
ones. As seen, retail paper shops sell a wide variety of materials
designed to ensure a comfortable life for the deceased. For example,
families can purchase full sets ofclothing in every style, from formal to
sports clothes, complete with paper underwear. Shops now have
available pre-pack sets of items for personal grooming (including
toothpaste, toothbrush, and glass), adornment (sets with watch, rings,
and earrings), and relaxation (including paper tea sets, and packets with
paper replicas of cognac, Coca Cola, and the glasses in which to drink
them). The sum of these items, when combined with the items already
described, suggests a high level of concern for the comfort of the
departed, as well as a desire to reproduce as carefully as possible their
original living environment. Providing for the dead, in short, still exerts
a powerful influence on Hong Kong residents. Informants have made
clear their beliefs that they would feel uneasy without giving paper
offerings. That the demand is still strong is also reflected in the
comments of many of my respondents, masters of the craft, who
believed that the trade in creating these objects were not in any
immediate danger. As one explained, 'A bit over ten years ago, I had the
thought that maybe we couldn't keep working any more after another ten
years because these items might not be so necessary. But now, ten years
after I wondered about that, I can't manage all the orders I get'.
Yet, a further question remains. Is it possible that family members are
burning great and variable amounts of paper offerings not only for the
care of the dead, but also for the care of the living-in short, are these
material benefits reappearing in another form? The giving of gifts, the
burning of grave goods to the departed, is generally portrayed as an
extension ofthe belief in the continuity ofthe ties between the living and
the dead, a belief already described as a key element ofChinese funeral
ideology. Not only has emphasis been placed on these ties, but even
more importantly, on their reciprocal nature. As Watson has observed:
Closely associated with these ideas of social continuity is the
final, and some might say the most important, feature of the
Chinese ideological domain: the idea of exchange between the
living and the dead. Death does not terminate relationships of
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reciprocity among Chinese, it simply transforms these ties and
often makes them stronger. A central feature of Chinese funerals
and postburial mortuary practices is the transfer of food, money,
and goods to the deceased . . . . In return the living espect to
receive certain material benefits, including luck, wealth, and
progeny.
(Watson 1988:9)
Similar observations have been made by scholars investigating the link
between the making of funeral offerings and the confirmation of legal
heirs and inheritance. The transfer ofgoods is critical, in that it not only
satisfies the obligation to provide for the deceased, but at the same time
ensures that the givers-the potential heirs of the deceased-are able to
claim their rights to inherit the property ofthe deceased (Johnston 1910,
Ahem 1973). Further, the giving of offerings may have a beneficial
effect on the status of the ancestor himself, for offerings proclaim the
ancestor to be a 'property-owning spirit, as a person without property
cannot conceivably bercome an ancestor' (Tong 1993:145).
However, the offering of goods is not only efficacious for the
claiming ofrights to inherit and for the ancestor to be deemed capable of
providing an inheritance, but may also affect the nature, content and
value of the inheritance itself, in both its material and nonmaterial
dimensions. An interesting depiction of this sentiment may be found in
Tong Chee Kiong's analysis of contemporary Singaporean funerals, in
which it is understood (at least privately) by the mourners that a number
of benefits may be obtained by correct management of death:
I suggest that what is important is not simply the inheritance ofthe
property ofthe deceased, but also the potential for greater benefits
that motivate the descendants to spend so much money. It is
believed that by converting the deceased into a rich ancestor, the
now well-offancestor will see fit, and is in fact expected, to return
the favour and reward descendants with even more wealth.
(1993:153)
This line of thought, emphasizing the (perhaps privately or uncon-
sciously-held) view that enriching the ancestors enriches the
descendants and that providing for the ancestors 'pays off', is most
persuasive and does allow for a clearer understanding of the amount of
paper offerings given to the dead. However, to fully comprehend the
Hong Kong experience, a parallel explanation, that of 'ethical
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imperatives superior to egocentric motivation' (Tong 1993:154) must be
explored.
The responses of my urban informants suggest that for them,
enriching the dead provides benefits, but not ones that only allow them
to gain materially or socially. What happens is that, by providing for the
departed through grave goods, the giver is satisfying the demands of
filial piety, one most important aspect of social virtue in Confucian
thought. There are ample indications that this thinking has far from
disappeared in modern Chinese contexts, including that ofHong Kong.
For example, in social surveys conducted in 1985 and 1986, Lau Siu-kai
and Kuan Hsin-chi discovered that a very high perc!lntage of the
population (87.6% in the 1985 sample) either strongly agreed or agreed
that the first thing necessary to ensure a good society was to have
everyone practicing filial piety. In both surveys, respondents were
adamant that care ofparents was ofprimary importance (Lau and Kuan
1988:59). While in the same surveys, repondents displayed more
ambiguity regarding their behavior and obligations towards other
relatives, such results suggest the continuing strength of the concept
of filial piety. Similar results were obtained in a later social survey of
1990, in which the majority ofrespondents (56.1 %) agreed that children
must support their parents (Lee 1992:22). Indeed, numerous authors
would affirm the concept of filial piety, and the resulting emphasis on
providing parental care and respect, to be of greatest importance, not
only for the continuation ofChinese social life, but for life in the modern
world overall.
Overwhelmingly, my respondents declared that burning paper
offerings to the ancestors was important. Most comments fell into five
categories: that providing such offerings was a long-standing Chinese
practice, that one needed to show respect to the ancestors, that providing
offerings expressed devotion and respect and reflected the sincerity of
the person making the offering, and that the practice allowed for
psychological comfort or the easing of one's heart. As one lady
expressed it, 'Offerings are necessary to show our sincerity and
devoutness and the ancestors need it. We must respect them and help
them to have a better life'. The emphasis on a better life is the key. The
primary motivation for burning so many items, and for continuing to
send new and up-to-date versions of items previously offered, is that
families want the dead to be comfortable in the other world, that they
want the dead to have the kind of life they enjoyed while living. Indeed,
the enriching of the departed, the efforts to enable them to live well
beyond the grave, is a manifestation offamily members wanting the best
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for their departed kin. Individuals take care of their relatives, especially
their parents, while they are living, and provide the latest in comforts for
them as they can. Why should they not do the same after these relatives
depart for the next world?
Further, no matter how important these offerings were considered to
be, the majority of respondents also declared that the ancestors would
not necessarily bless them more if they gave more offerings. That is,
they saw no automatic or necessary link between the amount ofofferings
rendered and the nature ofbenefits to be obtained, nor did they perceive
any relationship between the quality or the costliness of the offerings
and the level of benefits to be gained, if any. In fact, a number of
informants were perplexed that such an idea could be held; some
vaguely remembered hearing of such motivation, but did not believe it.
Even further, respondents saw no direct relationship between offering
gifts to the ancestors and obtaining any benefits whatsoever; their
explanations indicate that a majority had delinked the two issues. II This
de-emphasis on the potential for gain on the part of the one making the
offerings is also echoed in the responses of the minority of respondents
who felt it was not necessary to give paper offerings at all; their views
were that the state of mind was most important and only small, simple
items like flowers or incense were enough to reflect this. The giving of
offerings was seen as vitally important, unquestionably necessary, to the
majority of respondents, but not because so doing would influence the
ancestors to provide more benefits, or any benefits at all.
What emerges from respondents' comments is their sense of the
rightness of providing material support to the departed. While this is
done for the purpose of providing a comfortable existence for the
departed, the giver is also comforted when giving, the act ofgiving itself
springing from the intent, the state of mind of the giver. As informants
explain, this 'state ofone's heart' is most important and takes one into a
far different realm from that ofstatus seeking, or the expectation ofgain.
RETHINKING THE OFFERINGS
Given such sentiments, it seems clear that a useful perspective on the
continuing provision of paper offerings for the dead is one that sets the
sentiment of care for ancestors in a new form. These objects ofmaterial
culture are not simply one more example (albeit an otherwordly one) of
conspicuous consumption or the desire for gain, but reflect the love of
the departed and the deeply felt need to provide for them, to make them
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safe, secure and comfortable, even 'happy' ifthis is possible, in the next
world. Urban families who may no longer have a domestic altar in their
homes, nor regularly visit ancestral temples to participate in rites,
nevertheless purchase the larger items of the classical set at the time of
the funeral, to offer them at the appropriate time within the ritual
sequence. They then can add materials from the selection of everyday
items and continue to send items year after year. They may take comfort,
secure in the knowledge that they are performing what is not simply
correct or expected but right in both traditional and modem senses; love
for family members spans both past and present. Seen in this way, it may
be suggested that the repertoire of paper offerings persists, grows and
continues to be important, even in this ultra-modem example of
contemporary urban life, because it provides a framework for the
expression of one element still important to the understanding of
modem Hong Kong Chinese identity-the concern for family-which may
in other contexts appear to be obscured or questioned.
While existing discussions of the form and content of modem Hong
Kong identity (Baker 1983; Chan 1994; Lau and Kuan 1988; Chan 1986)
either set aside or do not fully address the place oftraditional thinking or
of traditional elements in the identity configuration, this discussion of
paper offerings suggests that more explorations in this area would be
worthwhile. Certainly, it would seem from the comments of my
respondents that our views of the mindsets of urban residents may also
need to be approached more carefully, lest observations in one realm
(general consumerism) unduly channel our thinking in another (the
motivations for providing for the dead). Returning to the observation on
cultural preservation which began this essay, the continued existence of
the paper offering industry attests to the strength of belief underlying it
and the importance of such belief to the complex termed modem
Chinese identity. Certainly, the realm ofpaper offerings can be seen as a
form of culture in process, in which an established area of traditional
culture can not only survive but can expand, playing a vital part in a
modem urban context, as an expression of an enduring and valued
complex of behavior.
NOTES
I Research in this paper was supported by an Earmarked Grant for Research
(HKBC 3/88, RSC/88-89/02) from the (then entitled) University and
Polytechnics Grants Committee. The author wishes to express her gratitude
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for such generous support. Thanks is also due to the research assistants: Ms
Florence Lui Yuk Lin, Ms Elizabeth Lai Ching Man, Ms Brenda Cheung Lai
Shan, and Mr. Timothy Tsang Ching Chuen. Special gratitude is due to all
the paper shop owners and workshop managers, who so generously gave of
their time and expertise. Data collected for the project was obtained using a
variety of research techniques: survey, interview, specimen collection,
observation, and photography. The data for this essay was taken from the
project data base which includes: in-depth interviews conducted at seventy-
five retail paper shops, ten paper offerings wholesalers, and eight workshops
for the dead; 282 in-depth surveys of users of paper offerings; a matching
sample investigating young people's knowledge; and nearly 1,000 indicative
surveys conducted at temples. A collection of nearly 1,500 specimens of
paper offerings has also been collected for the project. The author is grateful
for criticisms of previous versions of this paper provided by Prof. Gene
Blocker, Dr. Michael DeGolyer, Dr. Grant Evans, Dr. F. Lauren Pfister, Prof.
James L. Watson, Prof. Rubie S. Watson, and the anonymous reviewers.
2 Observations made in southern Taiwan would suggest that the paper
offering repertoire of the retail shops is less extensive than that on offer in
Hong Kong; on a visit in March of 1995, the author noted no more than
twelve varieties available for sale in shops in Tainan. This evaluation does
not hold for the paper replicas observed in use during temple rituals ,
however, which appear to be both extensive and elaborate. Nevertheless, this
observation is quite limited and it is clear that a fuller exploration of the
relationship between and the comparison of, materials used in Taiwan and
Hong Kong must be done.
3 Some shopkeepers, 'recognizing the sales potential of the visitor, have made
efforts to learn basic English terms and descriptions of many items. During
one interview in the Yau Ma Tei District in 1992, for example, the author
was asked by the shopkeeper to write down suitable English names of the
paper items tourists had asked about.
4 While most customers have a working knowledge of which paper offerings
to use for which purposes, most of those who have questions seek advice
from the shopkeeper on what to purchase. Generally, customers ask about
what to use for illness, accidents, or rarely-performed rituals, although
exactly what customers need to know would would vary from shop to shop.
Examples given from shopkeepers make clear that amount or accuracy of
knowledge cannot be easily correlated to age and experience alone; many
shopkeepers said that their younger customers were as knowledgable as the
elderly purchasers. The same can be said for gender, which in the opinions
of the shopkeepers is also not a deciding factor in either the knowledge
about, nor the purchase and use of, paper offerings.
5 Paper replicas to be burned for the dead are only one part of the category of
pitched paper items. Other categories include: the flower cannons (fa paau),
made for the worship of Tin Hau; golden flowers (gam fii), employed as
offerings and adornments for the gods; paper lanterns of all varieties, but
especially the lotus lanterns made at the New Year; and pinwheels (fung
che), purchased at the New Year as a sign of renewal and good luck.
6 There is no agreement among informants, whether from workshops or retail
paper shops, on a single overarching scheme for classifying the repertoire of
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paper offerings. The author has identified one large subdivision between
pitched and non-pitched (printed or painted) items. Referring to items for
the dead the former category would include the three-dimensional offerings
made up on frames-the cars, servants, cranes, and large household goods.
Within the latter category, there is even less agreement about how to divide
the items within, but items such as everyday and special offerings, charms,
paper clothing, and money are commonly found. For this paper, the author is
dividing the offerings for the dead into what may be termed the 'basic set'
and the 'items of everyday use', which itself is further subdivided into
special items and daily necessities (itself further divided into three
groupings).
7 The cost of a basic set varies according to the level of quality, the materials
used, and the amount oflabor and time spent on special designs. In 1989, a
basic set could be purchased for HK$I,OOo-2,OOO, with as much as
HK$IO,OOO or more for very elaborately-made sets. In 1992, the price of a
basic set of thirteen items had risen to 'a few thousand dollars' as one
master put it, meaning, HK$4,OOo-5,OOO. Prices for 1995 remain roughly
the same.
8 Some masters made wonderfully designed and crafted items. One lady
shopkeeper interviewed made paper clothing so fine and detailed that each
piece could be worn everyday by the living; she was justifiably proud of the
quality of her garments.
9 In the November 26, 1995, edition of the Sunday Morning Post Magazine,
(of the South China Morning Post) an article on modern Hong Kong
funerals lists one funeral parlor as selling custom-built Chinese-style
caskets for HK$800,OOO (approximately US$100,OOO at the exchange rate of
8:1). Most families, more often favoring cremation now, are content with
simple models retailing for somewhat less than HK$20,OOO (or US$2,500).
Either way, when added to the costs of other elements of the funeral
ceremonies, a large bill can be expected.
10 Dr. Lauren F. Pfister, personal communication, 1995.
11 It should be noted in this context that informants expressed similar views
towards the offerings made to the gods.
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SACRED POWER IN
THE METROPOLIS
SHRINES AND TEMPLES
IN HONG KONG
Graeme Lang
INTRODUCTION
Among the Chinese cities of Asia, Hong Kong has the most unfettered
economy, and offers the best access to the sources of economic power.
Hong Kong also has the most unfettered religious economy, and offers -
for believers - the best access to the sources of sacred power. This
chapter is about the temples and shrines which comprise Hong Kong's
nodes ofsacred power. It will also offer some comments on the future of
temples and folk religion in Hong Kong.
SHRINES AND TEMPLES AS POWER-NODES
The capitalist metropolis is a maze of economic opportunities, but
uncertainties and troubles afflict most residents (Mak and Lau 1992).
Urbanites cultivate personal relationships for protection and for
advantage, but social networks offer limited help in a crisis. Drawing
heavily on such help may cause a loss of further network support. The
city contains a scattering of secular power-nodes, but most are not
accessible to ordinary residents. The few accessible secular power-
centres provide little comfort for those who feel insecure, and offer little
help for citizens in trouble. Neither secular power-centres nor personal
networks, therefore, can cope with the volume of risks and troubles.
Anxiety is endemic. Thus, there is a market for alternative methods of
pursuing security and advantage. Gambling is one method. Religion is
another.
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Religion can be viewed as a system for getting access to alternative
sources of power. When people cannot rely on network resources or
secular power-nodes to help them with pressing problems, their needs
create a market for other kinds of helpers. Attracted by these needs,
religious entrepreneurs have created a world of invisible potencies, and
offer their expertise in dealing with them, for which they are suitably
rewarded by believers (Stark and Bainbridge 1987:90-104).
The cultures of many modem cities are still deeply rooted in earlier
cultures in which such potencies were almost the only sources of
accessible power outside ofclans and social networks. In the villages, in
the dark night when demons roamed spreading illness and misfortune,
when storms destroyed dams and dykes, when pestilence ruined crops
and killed animals, villagers turned to gods and spirits for protection.
They had learned from religious specialists that gods and spirits could
help them or afflict them, that they should be feared and must be
honoured. Some of these gods were carried to the cities by migrants and
religious entrepreneurs; some survived in local villages engulfed but not
destroyed by the expanding metropolis.
Thus, scattered among the great concrete warrens of the city, and in
the surrounding hills, are a large number of shrines and temples where
such invisible powers can be tapped. These sites are doorways to a realm
of spirits who may be induced to help and protect those who come
bearing gifts and showing deference. All such sites are places where
exchanges occur between humans, seeking benefit, and these invisible
agencies.
ANCESTRAL ALTARS
The most common shrines in the territory are ancestral altars. The
ancestors consume more incense each day than all of the other gods and
spirits combined. Although not as powerful as gods, they might help
their descendants in small ways if pleased and well-cared for, and may
be a source oftrouble ifneglected. Offerings oftea and incense are made
to sustain and please ancestors in thousands of households each day.!
Periodic offerings of money, clothes, food, and durable goods are also
required. In part, these offerings are intended to prevent the deceased
from sliding into poverty in the afterlife. But the distress ofthe deceased
might mean misfortune for descendants, and so these offerings are part
of the exchange between humans and spirits which occur at all nodes of
sacred power.
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While the gods receive burnt offerings ofgold paper, signifying gold
bars, ancestors are also provided with hell bank notes. The practice of
burning piles of afterlife-money for use by ancestors evidently dates
from the beginnings ofcirculation of bank notes in China in the twelfth
century (Hou 1975:35-6), and has continued into the modern era. In the
densely crowded metropolis, the smoke from such inter-world
transmissions of funds creates pollution at those times of the year
when every family is engaged in sending such money to deceased
parents and grandparents. In Taiwan, the city government of Taipei has
tried to reduce the volume of smoke by issuing 'bank of hell' credit
cards, so that a family could burn one of these instead of the usual large
piles of paper currency.
To date, such an innovation has not appeared in Hong Kong.
However, in other respects the worship of ancestors reflects the
modernising of Hong Kong society. While the gods still ride around
their territories in sedan-chairs - the most exalted means of transport at
the time when their iconography and rites became fixed in old China -
ancestors who lived in modern Hong Kong must be provided with a
contemporary afterlife. Thus, offerings burnt for their benefit by their
affluent offspring include paper models of air-conditioned houses,
colour T.V.s, cars, watches, computers, and even jet airplanes. Hong
Kong life has thus modernised the Hong Kong afterlife. Can the old gods
in their mandarin robes and sedan-chairs really rule such a world?
Indeed, what is the presence and fate of these old gods in the modern
metropolis?
TEMPLES AND SHRINES: STATICS AND DYNAMICS
Most gods live in shrines and temples. Their fates are intimately linked
to the fates of these sites. To survey shrines and temples properly, we
need to classify them into types and discuss the functions and activities
of each type. However, a static typology of shrines cannot capture the
dynamics which operate over historical time-scales. I will begin with the
'statics': the main types of nodes of sacred power. In discussing each
type, some of the 'dynamics' will also be indicated.
Types of deities
In the late 1970s, Keith Stevens counted nearly 400 shrines and temples
in Hong Kong. About 135 were Buddhist or devoted primarily to
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Buddhist deities such as GUn Yam, while only a small number were
Taoist (Stevens 1980). More than 240 of the remaining temples and
shrines were dedicated to deities from Chinese folk religion. Nearly 100
of them shelter gods and goddesses worshipped by people who derived
part oftheir living from the sea (Stevens 1980:29), ofwhich about 70 are
devoted to the goddess Tin Hauh. The oldest Tin Hauh temple site in the
territory apparently dates from 1266 A.D. (Watson 1985:302). Many of
the villages in the inland New Territories2 also built Tin Hauh temples,
beginning in the seventeenth century, though they did not make their
living directly from the sea. They adopted Tin Hauh, in part, because the
goddess's cult was recognised by the imperial authorities. By embracing
her cult the villagers could claim orthodoxy and adherence to the
national religious culture and, not incidentally, politically correct
allegiances. But they also believed and hoped that Tin Hauh would
protect them from the coastal pirates and bandits who operated
throughout the region (Watson 1985:308).
It is likely that all of the deities worshipped in Hong Kong were
carried here by migrants from other parts of China. Even deities which
appear to be local, such as Taahm GUng were brought from elsewhere
(Siu 1987). Only the faintest traces of possibly original local gods and
goddesses can still be found (see, for instance, Watson 1985:310-311).3
Following Stevens (1980), we may estimate that about 5% of the
shrines and temples in Hong Kong are Taoist, about 35% are Buddhist,
and about 60% are for deities popular among ordinary people but not
necessarily among ordained clerics. The most striking differences
between shrines are not in the types of deities worshipped in them,
however, but in the size and constituencies of the shrines.
Types of shrines and temples
There are several ways to classify shrines and temples besides the types
of deities represented and the religious affiliations of the shrines. One
way is to determine the communities which they serve. Most temples are
small and serve only the local neighbourhood or village. Others attract
worshippers from a larger but still restricted community such as a group
ofvillages or an urban district, or an ethnic group such as the Chiu Chow
or the Fukienese. A few draw worshippers from the entire territory and
from among overseas Chinese.
There are ofcourse rough correlations between the constituency of a
temple and its size and wealth. The smallest and most primitive shrines
serve only the local neighbourhood, and contain some of the most
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primitive kinds of gods. At the other end of the scale are four or five
massive urban god-palaces occupying an acre or more ofland. Between
the two extremes are more than three hundred temples ranging in size
from a small hut to a large house. I will begin with the simplest and most
primitive shrines, and conclude with the grandest and most magnificent.
The Earth God: T6u Deih Gang
The simplest shrines in Hong Kong, outside of the home, are the small
open concrete boxes and platforms scattered throughout the urban and
rural districts. There are thousands of these shrines in the territory. Most
attract only people who live in the immediate neighbourhood. The most
common deity at these shrines is the Earth God, or T6u Deih Gang
Earth God shrines are tended by residents in urban Hong Kong and in
the villages of the New Territories. Many ofthese shrines consist ofonly
a three-sided concrete box with a rock inside representing the deity. In a
few urban districts, the Earth God sits in a free-standing temple, with the
annual festival organised and managed by a local committee, usually
chosen by lot - that is, 'chosen by the god' (Hayes 1983a). In the walled
villages of the New Territories the Earth God shrine typically sat inside
the tower at the gateway to the village (Stevens 1980:19). In rural China,
the Earth God was petitioned for a good harvest (Chamberlayne
1993:71). Earth-god-districts with a radius of as much as three miles
have been reported in China (Shryock 1931: 129), but this is larger than
most of the earth-god districts in Hong Kong.
The Earth God is like a low-level bureaucrat. In some parts ofTaiwan
births and deaths were reported to the Earth God at the same time that
they were reported to the secular authorities (Wolf 1974:134). In one
Earth God temple inShau Kei Wan, local people offered a pig's head to
the god on the birth of a son, and a chicken on the birth of a daughter
(Hayes 1983a:129). The Earth God also monitors local residents. We
might imagine him as a faceless being living in the shadows in each
neighbourhood.
The Earth God must be honoured to induce him to protect the
neighbourhood against the forces which might intrude and cause harm.
These forces may include local ghosts. One Earth God temple in Shau
Kei Wan, for example, is linked to the local Yuh Naahn Festival,
designed to feed and appease hungry ghosts, reportedly because of the
many deaths in the area during the Japanese occupation: the Earth God
is mobilised to help control and appease the spirits of these restless and
homeless dead (Hayes 1983a:129). At some Earth God temples, the god
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is also credited with protecting or rescuing residents of the district from
a particular crisis such as an epidemic (Hayes 1983:121).
The Earth God has the most limited long-term prospects ofany ofthe
deities in Hong Kong. Plagues no longer threaten local residents. Ghosts
are better cared for, now pitied more than feared, and in any case the
city's bright lights drive them away without the Earth God's help.
A marriage and fertility shrine: the yan yuhn sehk
Some prominent rocks are thought to be inhabited by potent spirits, and
attract worshippers seeking some benefit from their power. The most
striking of these in Hong Kong is a natural stone pillar jutting out above
a walking path which snakes through the hills above the business district
on Hong Kong Island. This pillar-shrine attracts women who want to
find a good marriage partner (hence the name yan yUhn sehk, or
marriage-fate rock). It also attracts women who wish to become
pregnant with a son. Petitions for a male child may be the earlier form of
worship at this shrine.
Whatever the original nature of the spirit of the rock, some
worshippers have humanised it by legendizing two lovers who
committed suicide there, and who now, with the supernatural power
which they earned by their tragic fate, are able to help petitioners. These
two spirits are known to worshippers as Sehk GUng and Sehk M6uh, the
'father and mother' of the site (Chek and So 1987). A nineteenth century
observer recorded another tradition about the rock: that it was associated
with immoral influences on the population, and that 'those who profit
from immoral practices [presumably, prostitutes] actually go and
worship that rock' (Eitel 1984 [1873]:43), a type of patronage which
has evidently continued up to the present.
The shrine has no influential patrons, and is vulnerable in the event that
planners conceive other uses for the site.4 But it seems in no imminent
danger ofremoval, and the trickle of female patrons will probably ensure
that this extraordinary shrine survives into the twenty-first century.
Standing behind this pillar, one sees the great modem towers ofcommerce
rising up out ofHong Kong's central business district just below one ofthe
most archaic cult-objects in the history ofreligion.s
Dragons ofstone
The Hong Kong landscape also hides other primitive but potent forces.
For villagers in the suburban districts, the mountains and valleys are
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charged with latent power. Specialists infimg seui (literally, wind-water)
sell to villagers their expertise in the analysis of this latent power. They
tell villagers where to put their houses to take advantage of it, and how to
avoid the calamities which could result from disturbing it.
The forces bound tightly into mountains and valleys may send
destructive ripples through the lives of the village clans, causing
innumerable misfortunes, if these forces are disturbed by bulldozers
excavating the ground for roads or reservoirs. The determined resistance
of the clans to some ofthese projects has thus caused the government to
abandon or revise some excavations to avoid confrontations with
anxious villagers. Occasionally, the government has paid for the services
of a geomancer (1Ung seui specialist) to make progress in negotiations
with them (Hayes 1983c).
Some of the forces rippling through the landscape are personified as
'dragons', 'white tigers', 'crabs', and other extraordinary creatures.
These forces are considered by 1Ung seui theorists and perhaps by most
urbanites to be secular and mechanical, and are called by the names of
sentient beings only as a metaphorical convenience. However, the
concept of the 'dragon' in hillsides and mountains (Eitel 1984:17-19)
preserves a vision ofa powerful 'earth-being which must be propitiated.
The ceremony of 'pacifying the dragon' (ngim luhng) , which has
survived into modern times in some villages in the New Territories
(Ward and Law 1993:80) may be based on such a belief.
Above the level of spirits lurking in rocks, trees, and hills, we find
local potentates who reside in dwellings like those of humans and are
represented by human-like icons. The smallest of these dwellings are
rooms or flats comparable to the dwellings of ordinary urbanites. The
largest are comparable to the yamens of the mandarins in old China.
Neighbourhood and village temples
Some of the New Territories villages include a temple owned by the
village. (The deed may indicate that a god is the real owner ofthe temple
- but elders of the village serve as his trustees [Stevens 1980:29]). For
example, the village of Tai Wai near Shatin includes a Hduh WOhnl
temple at which only villagers worship (Hase 1984:130). The temple
was supported in part by property owned communally by the villagers,
including several village houses. Every ten years, the village holds a jiu
festival, centred on the temple, to purify the village from accumulated
spiritual pollution of various kinds, and to renew its pact with the gods.
The temple has a side hall dedicated to the founders of the village and
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to village heroes who died in its defence during earlier centuries when
such villages might be attacked by rival villages, or by pirates. These
village martyrs are worshipped in the side-hall on a certain day each year
by village elders (Hase 1984:130). In a village such as Tai Wai, with
sixteen different surnames by the 1890s, the temple has probably been
used to promote village cohesion and identity (Brim 1974). If the god
earns a reputation for particular benevolence, he or she may be invited
by local people to serve as the god-father for some of their sons and
daughters (e.g. Hayes 1983b:215).
VILLAGE TEMPLES AND URBANISATION
Sometimes the growing metropolis surrounds a village but does not
destroy it, and the village and its temple can still be discovered nestled
among the high-rise residential blocks, as in the case of the village of
Nga Chin Wai and its Tin Hauh temple, near Kai Tak Airport (Hayes
1983b:216).7 In some urban districts, distinctive communal ceremonies
also survived long after the village was engulfed by the city - but only if
the older low-rise buildings and their family businesses also survived.
A number of temples on the Kowloon peninsula built or rebuilt in the
nineteenth century, such as the GUn Yam and Tin Hauh temples in the
villages of Mong Kok and Yau Ma Tei (Hayes 1983c, Chapter 3), once
served as convenient meeting places for committees of local leaders
when they gathered to decide on matters ofgeneral importance (Watson
1985:26). Such meetings first occurred to discuss and arrange
communal rituals linked to the temple, but could easily be adapted to
the resolution of other secular communal problems.
Many rural and village temples, however, have lost their communal
functions and most of their constituencies during urban redevelopment.
Some village or neighbourhood temples absorbed into the metropolis,
however, continue to serve an important secular function even though
their communal functions have disappeared and patronage continues to
dwindle: they become colourful repositories of traditional culture,
visited by tourists and the curious as much as by worshippers.
Temples as museums
A museum displays objects made by earlier generations of people.
A good museum tries to provide some context for each object, to show
us how it was used. So a museum is also an aid to the cultural memory of
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a society. Some local temples contain bells, drums, incense burners, and
god-statues which would be eagerly acquired by real museums if they
were for sale. The grander temples also preserve the architecture of
temples and palaces in pre-modem China.8 Some temples in China, such
as the Bak Dai temple in Foshan, have survived difficult times in the
P.R.C. because of their value as museums of cultural history. In Hong
Kong, temples are not explicitly museums. But they serve this function
nevertheless: for tourists, for local scholars, and for Hong Kong's young
people. For some local people, to visit a grand temple is to savour the
richness of Chinese cultural history, and thereby to nourish one's
identity as a Chinese.
In addition to preserving artifacts and architecture, temples may also
preserve reflections of the social system of old China. Some gods still
dress and comport themselves like the mandarins on whom they were
modelled. Some of them also preserve the memory of specific imperial
officials. For example, the patron deity of the Daaih fffihng Yeh spirit-
medium temple in Kwun Tong described by Myers (1975) was said to
have been, during his life on earth, an official of the Tang dynasty who
was given a posthumous title by the emperor for his loyalty, filiality, and
frugality. A scroll at the temple claimed that the memory and worship of
this person had been brought to the area by a descendant during the
Southern Sung dynasty. His worship was revived, after the temple
became decrepit, by Chiu Chow migrants into the area after World War
II (Myers 1975:20).
A temple may also preserve relics of the honour once accorded to
long-dead imperial officials who performed some service for the local
population. For example, a temple which stood in Sheung Shui until
1955 commemorated two seventeenth century officials in Guangdong
who earned the intense gratitude of the local population by helping to
convince the emperor to let them return to their villages after the coastal
evacuation of 1662-1669 (Faure and Lee 1982). After the temple's
destruction by fire in 1955, it was relocated to a small flat in Sheung
Shui, where it survived into the 1980s. Worship at the temple by an
alliance representing the major old clans in the area continued.
Presumably, they resumed worship of these two officials at the shrine
because they perceived some continuing benefit from doing so. But the
temple is also a relic of the tumultuous political history of the region,
and preserves a local reflection of these events for residents or scholars
who may be interested.
The Tin Hauh Temple complex in Yau Ma Tei also preserves some
relics of folk religion which are extinct or fading toward probable
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extinction in the area. For example, it includes a shrine for Sehng Wohng,
the so-called City God, and a rock representing t~e Earth God, though
most people visiting the temple have little interest in these deities. The
complex also includes a statue ofWong Tai Sin, wearing golden robes as
his statues once did in China before all of the temples and statues to this
god in China were destroyed between the I920s and the 1950s (Lang and
Ragvald I 993:Chapter 2). This is the only intact image of the god which
preserves the original iconography of this god's cult in China. (All the
other images of the god in Hong Kong are modelled after a painting of
him in the main temple in Kowloon). The statue is a genuine museum-
piece, valuable as a relic ofan earlier and now extinct version of the cult
of this deity.
From village temple to district temple
If a village temple is large enough, and by luck or strong communal
support avoids destruction during urban development, it may eventually
become a focus for worship among the urbanites who have moved into
the area, and the village temple becomes a district temple with a much
larger constituency of worshippers. It may thus escape the fate of other
temples which attract fewer and fewer worshippers and gradually turn
into museums. During this transition from village-temple to district-
temple, control over the temple by the villagers may be challenged by
other groups living in the area, as in the case of the Shatin Che Gimg
Temple, which was taken over by the Chinese Temples Committee after
disputes between rival villages over control ofthe temple (see also Smith
1973, on struggles for control over a temple on Ap Lei Chau).
The powers and character of the deity may also change, as the temple
acquires new patrons among the urbanised population of the district. As
a particularly interesting case study, we could consider the Che Gimg
Temple in the New Territories.
Che Gimg temple
This temple, located near the new town of Shatin behind the hills north
of the Kowloon peninsula, would seem like any other district temple in
the Hong Kong region except during the second and third days of
Chinese New Year, when it attracts more than 100,000 worshippers.
They come from all over the territory, and the crowds during these few
days are exceeded only by the multitudes who press into the Wong Tai
Sin Temple in Kowloon during the New Year period.
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The Shatin temple had remained a rural shrine for local villagers for
two hundred years, until epidemics in the nineteenth century induced the
villagers to carry the statue of Che around the villages. The apparent
success ofthis act in halting the epidemic may have led to the renovation
ofthe shrine by the alliance ofvillages. In any case, the temple was used
as a base for the jiu ceremonies (Issei 1989) which are held every few
years to cleanse the villages of accumulated evil spirits.
The opening ofthe Kowloon-Canton Railway (KCR) at the beginning
ofthe twentieth century brought a major change in the temple's fortunes.
The temple was not far from the Shatin train station, and could now be
reached easily from Kowloon. Indeed, it was probably easier to get from
Kowloon to the CM Gt'mg temple in Shatin than to reach the Wong Tai
Sin temple in Kowloon, then separated from the main villages in the area
by a kilometre of dirt roads and paths. The Chi: Gt'mg temple keepers
eventually added the concept of a brass propeller-wheel which could be
turned to petition for a change of luck, and the shrine began to become
well-known for this feature, and attracted those who had suffered
reverses of fortune. The transformation of the KCR trains into a mass-
rapid-transit system in the early 1980s, and the addition of a station at
Tai Wai, a short walk from the temple, further increased its convenience
for worshippers and it became a major pilgrimage site at New Year.
The god has proved able to attract a curious mixture of urban
worshippers. Interviews at the temple9 have shown that his worshippers
now include drivers (possibly influenced by the fact that the character
che means 'vehicle'), and government workers responsible for the
difficult and sometimes risky task of policing hawkers (Che was a civil
servant and a general, hence a very appropriate god for them, according
to one of these hawker-control officers interviewed at the temple). Chi:
Gt'mg has also developed a reputation for helping gamblers and people
involved in somewhat disreputable business dealings (known as
pinmuhn saangyi),!O perhaps because he is not burdened with the
ethical doctrines which cluster around well-known Taoist and Buddhist
saints such as Wong Tai Sin and Gt'm Yam.
Because ofthe extraordinary popularity ofthe Shatin temple among a
growing number ofurbanites, a new larger temple was recently built on
the site by the Chinese Temples Committee, which spent nearly US$6
million on the project.!! A giant new statue of 'General Che' now stands
in this temple, while worshippers bang drums and turn wheels on an
enlarged plaza outside the temple to attract the god's attention and to
petition for better fortune in the future. Seldom has an obscure figure at
an obscure rural shrine achieved greater renown in a shorter time. Only
252
SHRINES AND TEMPLES IN HONG KONG
Wong Tai Sin has had a more dramatic success from humble beginnings.
But both cases illustrate how a well-placed and cleverly managed temple
can achieve fame and success in the expanding metropolis.
IMMIGRANTS AND TEMPLES
The construction or reconstruction of temples in Hong Kong since the
1840s may have occurred more frequently during certain periods
(Stevens 1980:26): the I840s, when many immigrants from China
entered Hong Kong; the 1870s to 1880s, with rising prosperity; the
1890s, particularly after 1894, during the waves ofbubonic plague in the
region; and the 1950s, when large numbers of immigrants again arrived
from China. The period after the 1911 revolution also led to the
founding ofseveral major temples in the territory, as religious specialists
and many others fled from conditions in China. Other waves of
immigrants and refugees have also been associated with the opening of
new temples. For example, Fukienese monks and nuns fleeing the
attacks on shrines in Fukien during the Cultural Revolution in the late
1960s set up a number of apartment-temples in the Fukienese areas of
North Point (Guldin 1977:122). In any case, except for the temple
construction associated with the bubonic plague and with other
epidemics, all of this activity was directly related to the arrival of
immigrants.
Several of these new temples became nodes of secular as well as
sacred power. The Mdhn M6uh temple on Hong Kong Island, for
example, was established in 1847 by two immigrants who became
leaders, temporarily, of the Chinese community soon after the founding
of Hong Kong. One had gained wealth and influence helping to
provision the British forces during the so-called Opium War, and
thereafter invested in local dwellings, a gambling house, and brothels
(Smith 1971:81). The other had become wealthy as a contractor. They
periodically held court in the Mihn Mouh temple, evidently deciding
disputes of various kinds until the early 1850s, when the local
shopkeepers elected a committee to meet in the temple and decide
cases of public interest (Smith 1971:81). Perhaps the presence of the
gods in the shrine helped to sanctify the proceedings and legitimate their
decisions; with the gods looking on, what leaders would dare choose
selfish interests over the interests of the community?
By the last decades of the nineteenth century, the wealthy directors of
the Tung Wah Group ofHospitals had become the unofficial government
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of the Chinese community in Hong Kong and decided many matters of
communal importance (Sinn 1989). It was no longer necessary for them
to meet at the Mdhn M6uh temple to carry out their deliberations, but
they still went to the temple every year to celebrate the Spring and
Autumn sacrifices to Confucius, following the custom of their
contemporaries and peers, the magistrates in imperial China
(Lethbridge 1978:62). The temple continued to provide a public
setting for the display of their authority and power in the community.
The processes of invasion and succession described for urban inner-
city neighbourhoods by urban sociologists occasionally have a
counterpart in the succession of ethnic groups who control a local
temple. If a community swells with migrants from a different home-
county in China, the migrants may take over a feeble or decrepit local
temple as their own (e.g. Myers 1975). If the local temples are too
strongly held by existing communities in the area, the migrants build
their own shrines nearby, in apartments (e.g. Guldin 1977:122), or on
hillsides. This is especially likely where the religious practices of the
immigrants were markedly different from those of the local Cantonese
population, as with Chiu Chow migrants (Myers 1981). The hillside
shrines may attract the hostile attention of the state (as it struggles to
regulate squatting on vacant land), or of the proprietors of other local
temples with which the new shrines begin to compete.
The 'squatter' temples survive only as long as they stand on land
which is not immediately coveted by planners and developers, and some
have been destroyed during urban development (e.g. Stevens 1980:7), to
be rebuilt elsewhere only if the shrine had sufficient and reputable
community support (e.g. Jen 1967:31). But not all temples started by
immigrants are small and vulnerable.
The largest and most striking temples in Hong Kong were also started
by immigrants. The most successful of these temples were established
on large plots of land by religious entrepreneurs from China who had
managed to line up enough financial support from interested patrons in
Hong Kong (see Lang and Ragvald 1993; Tsui 1991). One of the major
reasons for the success of these temples was that their founders had the
vision and ambition to build shrines on large plots of land, rural at the
time but close enough to the city to draw urban patrons, and which were
eventually surrounded by the expanding metropolis. These shrines
include the grand temple complexes ofthe Sik SikYuhn devoted to Wong
Tai Sin in Kowloon, of the Fuhng Yihng Sin Gun in Fanling, and of the
Ching Chuhng Gun in Tuen Mun. Ofthese, the most famous and popular
is the SIk SIkYUhn's Wong Tai Sin Temple.
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In the urban environment, of course, high population densities can
support a number of temples within a district, and can provide a high
income for a successful temple. In this environment, the better class of
temples compete with each other for patrons (Stevens 1980:5). Such
competition can be documented in China from at least as early as the
Sung dynasty (Katz 1992:208, citing Hansen 1991), facilitated by the
polytheism of Chinese folk religion. In India, competition between
temples can be extravagant and dramatic, as in the Spring Pooram
festival in Kerala, where rival temples compete in a public display in
which 'both will try to display the largest elephants, the best musicians,
the most beautiful parasols, the most astonishing fireworks' (Miller
1988:612). In Hong Kong, the competition is less dramatic, but the
organisations which manage these shrines are keenly aware of their
competitors, which helps ensure that the shrines are as appealing as they
can be with the funds available. These grand shrines draw worshippers
from all around the territory. Many visitors are attracted to such a temple
because it serves as an oasis of tranquillity and beauty, and provides a
respite from the concrete canyons of the metropolis.
Thus, while most small temples in the territory are declining, the
major urban god-palaces, along with a few conveniently reached
suburban ones, have prospered. The organisations which operate those
grand temples have grown rich on the services which they offered to the
post-war generation ofurbanites as they struggled upward in the general
social mobility of the last four decades. In harmony with their religious
belief, but also for the sake of harmony with their political
environment,12 these organisations channel a proportion of their
wealth back into the community in the form of free medical services,
schools, and homes for the elderly (e.g. Lang and Ragvald 1993:64-5).
Thus, these temples now playa part in the circulation of funds in Hong
Kong from private pockets through intermediary organisations and
finally into public facilities (a part, however, dwarfed by the much more
massive circulation of money through the Hong Kong Jockey Club's
betting operations into public projects and services).
Unlike the old village and district temples which have been absorbed
into the metropolis, these new urban god-palaces are able to attract the
younger generation of worshippers (Lang and Ragvald 1993 chapter 5).
They go to these temples to try divination using fortune-sticks (kiluh
chim) to ask for help and guidance, and rely on the fortune-tellers at
these temples to interpret the god's messages. The gods of these grand
temples (aided immeasurably by the fortune-tellers based at these
temples) thus become adept at dealing with the problems of modem
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urbanites, such as housing, investments, job choices, marriage, and
career changes. With such services to offer, these temples are likely to
have a strong presence as the major nodes of sacred power in the
metropolis of the twentieth-first century.
SHRINES TO THE SUPREME DEITY, FOR THE
PROTECTION OF THE STATE
The only major shrines in imperial China not represented in Hong Kong
are those in which high officials conducted annual worship rituals of
great importance for the well-being of the empire, such as the 'altar of
heaven' complex in Beijing (Meyer 1991:80-99). Indeed, in such cities,
temples and altars were often a key part of the design of the city. These
shrines were used to ensure that the state preserved a harmonious and
beneficial relation with the highest supernatural powers, represented
abstractly by the term 'heaven' (tin). Major administrative centres ofthe
empire in provincial capitals and county towns also had temples
officially incorporated into the state religion. Hong Kong did not even
have a county town; the villages in the region were nominally under the
control of the nearest county seat in Hsin An - now called Pao An - in
Guangdong province (Stevens 1980:32, fn.8). The official religion of
the empire is thus conspicuously absent among Hong Kong templesP
However, the St. John's Anglican Cathedral, not far from the
Governor's residence on Hong Kong Island, may be considered to have
served a nearly equivalent function for the ruling British elite up to World
War II. The central location of the Cathedral indicates its importance to
the early colonial government in Hong Kong, and it served nearly the
same kind offunction for the regime as Westminster Cathedral in London.
Because the ruling elite was British rather than Chinese, we should
expect, and indeed we find, a British 'altar of heaven' in the city.
Unlike the 'altar of heaven' in Beijing, however, the St. John's
Cathedral also served individual interests and needs, in addition to those
ofthe state. In this sense, it offered a far less lonely form ofworship than
that of the Emperor of China, who faced heaven, ultimately, alone.
THE FUTURE OF FOLK RELIGION IN HONG KONG
Many local temples and shrines have been adversely affected by urban
redevelopment. Removal of old buildings to make way for the
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construction of new housing estates has resulted in the demolition of
many temples. Some temples were rebuilt nearby with government
funds, but have lost any communal functions and survive on the business
brought by a relatively small number of local patrons. Many former
patrons have been dispersed into new housing estates farther away, and
cease to visit these shrines.
Urban development has also separated a number of temples catering
to boat people from their natural clients. For example, some of the Tin
Hauh temples were originally built near a beach for convenient access by
boat, but vast land reclamation projects have cut them off entirely from
any access from the sea. The changing geography of Hong Kong has
masked the original geographical logic of many temples in this way
(Stevens 1980).
A more serious problem for the future of most of the temples and
shrines in Hong Kong is the decline of belief in 'folk-religion' among
Hong Kong's young people. With each passing decade, there are fewer
ofthem who are interested in what they consider to be archaic devotions.
A survey carried out in 1988 shows the trend (Hui 1991). Among those
over age 65, 46% believed in 'Chinese traditional religion', while 41 %
professed no religion (Hui 1991: 105). By contrast, among people under
30, less than 2% believed in 'Chinese traditional religion', while about
70% professed no religion. By comparison with their elders, the young
are overwhelmingly irreligious.
However, a thoroughly scientific world-view is not dominant
anywhere in the world. Most people feel that science cannot explain
everything. The gaps are filled by strange powers and strange beings
which live within the local culture. For example, ghosts and supernatural
warriors provide endless material for Hong Kong films and T.Y. dramas,
watched by the young as much as the old. Young people also
occasionally hear stories about remarkable predictions by fortune-
tellers. Thus, even the most irreligious of youth may be prepared to
believe that fortune-tellers can sometimes predict the future, or that
ghosts can sometimes afflict the living. Some youth experiment with the
occult out ofcuriosity. Christian teachers may reinforce such beliefs by
giving credibility to belief in demons and spirits.
Some young people are also attracted to Protestant religious groups
which offer individual salvation and strong social bonds. Folk-temples
cannot compete with a form of religion which offers close
companionship with other fervent young people, lively singing and
group activities, an intense personal relation with a caring supernatural
friend/godfather, and the prospect of personal salvation with few
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conditions attached. It appears that Protestantism is growing among
young people who have rejected the folk-beliefs of their ancestors. 14
The trend is partly a function of education: the more educated the
population, the fewer the people who believe in Chinese traditional
religion, and the larger the proportion who believe in some form of
Christianity (Hui 1991:107). Part of the reason for the impact of
education is that many of the elite schools in the territory are Christian
schools which promote Christianity, to varying degrees, within the
curriculum. As the Hong Kong population becomes more educated, on
average, with each passing decade, it is likely that the proportion of
young people who are willing to support traditional religious practice
will continue to decline.
However, some types of traditional religious practice will be carried
into the twentieth-first century by communal and sectarian groups
operating out of apartments or halls, and offering many of the same
rewards and benefits as those offered by the evangelical Protestant
groups.
HOUSE-SHRINES
Some religious practitioners who cannot raise the funds to build a
temple manage instead to set up a house-shrine. These shrines are found
in many ofthe residential districts (see, e.g. Guldin 1977:122), and cater
to residents through specialised services and personal attention to their
needs. The services may include looking after the tablets of a deceased
family member (much cheaper than buying a gravesite), or providing
spirit-writing oracles for petitioners, offering them medical advice and
healing prescriptions, personal counselling, and careful predictions
about their future. Some of these groups are novel and syncretistic,
combining elements from several religious traditions (e.g. Tsui 1985).
Some of these house-shrines are linked to sectarian religious
organisations based outside of Hong Kong. They occasionally receive
important visitors from branches of the sect in other countries, and see
themselves as part of an international network of believers. These
sectarian groups are able to attract young people just as the Protestant
evangelical groups have done, and for the same reasons. Like the
Protestant groups, they offer communal solidarity and social ties (some
extending beyond the city into other territories), desirable roles and
leadership positions for laypersons, and a much more intimate and
personalised communion with a god or gods than at most public temples.
258
SHRINES AND TEMPLES IN HONG KONG
They may also be able to provide various kinds of practical assistance.
Like the Protestant house-churches, such groups are probably growing
among urbanites also in China, for the same reasons (Chan and Hunter
1994; see also Seiwert 1981, on the Yilt Gun Douh sect in Taiwan).
House-shrines cannot easily be counted. They are usually invisible
from the street, and may operate for years without being discovered by
researchers. With the benefits and services they provide, their niche in
the urban religious economy is secure, and their numbers will grow as it
becomes more and more difficult to build a free-standing temple in a
metropolis where, as local people say, 'a foot of land [is worth] an inch
of gold'.
CONCLUSIONS
The cultural transition to a technical-industrial society has proceeded
with increasing speed in Hong Kong over the past 40 years. The
traditional society of the villages in the New Territories was protected
from secular revolutionaries by a colonial regime which deliberately
avoided interference with the rural customs and lifestyle of these
villages for the sake of political stability. Hence, the villages preserved
forms offolk-religious practice which were suppressed if not eradicated
in China. But many of the smaller village and district temples which
survived urbanisation have entered a long period of decline as their
natural patrons are displaced, physically and socially, by the new
populations and constructions of the metropolis.
The younger and better educated metropolitan dwellers neglect most
of these older shrines, preferring the large urban god-palaces. Thus, the
distribution of sacred power in the city is shifting. Some of the power,
along with the money which such power attracts, are flowing away from
many small old shrines and temples into a few large new ones.
In addition to visiting these temples, the younger urbanites also join
apartment-cults and small Christian congregations. The spread of these
groups shows that sacred power is mobile and opportunistic. If some of
the power of these small groups derives from their creation of
community, and if the need for community is increasing as the
metropolis shrinks families and dissolves social bonds, they are likely to
be more prevalent in direct proportion to continued modernisation.
Temples and shrines in Hong Kong, however, also serve as museums,
preserving classical architecture, old visions of gods, and ancient
religious practices. Their survival in the city provides exotic experience
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for both residents and tourists. Thus their value in the city is greater than
the sum ofthe power which they offer to believers, and we can see them
as nodes of cultural memory as well as nodes of sacred power.
NOTES
1 In the mid 1970s, a survey of households in Kwun Tong found that about
64% of them included an ancestral altar, while about 60% of the wives and
55% of the husbands in these households participated in the ancestral rites
(Myers 1981:279). 1 do not know of a more recent comprehensive survey
which can provide a current estimate of the number of households with such
shrines. But many of the children of these families probably did not
continue the rites once they moved into their own apartments, since only
about half of children in households with such shrines in Kwun Tong in the
1970s participated in the rites (Myers 1981:280).
2 The New Territories comprises most of the territory of modem Hong Kong
outside of Hong Kong Island and urban Kowloon. The area, inhabited
largely by farmers and fishermen until the 1960s, now includes six cities
and a large number of towns and villages. It was added to the territory of
Hong Kong in two stages, in 1868 and in 1898. China will resume
sovereignty over Hong Kong after the termination of the 99 year lease over
most of this area which commenced in 1898.
3 In Ha Tsuen in the New Territories, oral tradition suggests that a local deity
called 'Sand River Mother' was once worshipped there, but was supplanted
by the later Tin Hauh cult. The process is vividly illustrated by the local
belief that Tin Hauh had 'eaten' Sand River Mother, thus absorbing her
powers as well as her duties (Watson 1985:310-311). This nearly extinct
deity comes to life again only during the jiu festivals in the area, when she is
invited back, in company with a flock ofother obscure deities, to witness the
operas organized for the festival.
4 According to Eitel (1873:43), some local residents in the nineteenth century
believed that disturbing the rock could bring misfortune, and related stories
of stonecutters who died suddenly after attempting to remove stone from
around the base of the rock. Modem planners are not as easily intimidated
by the rock's powers.
5 The rock is perceived by a number of observers as a phallic object,
petitioned by women for fertility - and perhaps for vigorous male
children - for that reason (e.g. Mo 1978:22). Phallic pillars are a very
ancient type of cult-object in some societies, as in ancient Greece where
the phallus was paraded in rites associated with fertility (Durant
1939:178,199,231). However, some worshippers at the yan yilhn sehk
may conceptualize its powers quite differently (as in the figures of Sehk
Gimg and Sehk Mouh).
6 Hauh Wohng, according to a local legend, was a Sung dynasty official who
arrived in the area not long before the fall of the dynasty in the thirteenth
century.
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7 Nga Chin Wai was still standing in 1995, but has been scheduled for
removal in connection with urban redevelopment.
8 For example, the design of the Wong Tai Sin Temple, renovated in the early
1970s, was influenced by the design of temples and palaces in Beijing.
9 Interviews were conducted in early 1993 by a research assistant and by
student interviewers as part of a project on folk religion supported by a
small-scale grant from City Polytechnic of Hong Kong.
10 One worshipper interviewed at the temple in 1993 was asked what business
he was in. He replied, 'electronics goods'. Doing what, asked the
interviewer: manufacturing? sales? 'Smuggling', he mumbled after a pause.
11 The Chinese Temples Committee was established in 1928 to oversee and
control temples in the colony. It manages or leases out a number of public
temples, and collects rents or lease fees from persons to whom it allocates
the day-to-day operation of the temples. The funds are used for occasional
renovations of these public temples. f
12 Since 1928, when the Chinese Temples Ordinance was passed, the
government has had the right to expropriate any temples or shrines deemed
to be operating purely as profit-making enterprises without substantial
community support. Influenced by the passing of similar legislation in
China at the time, and wary of the influx ofreligious entrepreneurs allegedly
eager to 'exploit' the population's desire for religious services, the
government did expropriate some temples, allocating their management
and income to the Tung Wah Group of Hospitals or appointing temple-
keepers directly. Of course, it is impossible in practice to distinguish 'profit-
making' from 'genuine religion', since the two are inevitably intertwined.
But organizations which manage highly profitable temples know that they
need the government's good will to continue their operations without
interference. Substantial investment of their resources in community
services have proved to be a good way to foster such good will. Communal
support for a shrine is also important. From the government's point ofview,
temples sit in a social field, and may have more or less 'weight' according to
the breadth and power of that social field. Temples strongly supported may
be left alone. Temples with little local support are vulnerable to take-over or
removal. Temples which are the object of struggle among competing local
groups are also vulnerable to takeover. Some shrines play little or no role in
the communal life of a district. Other shrines are the focus of periodic
communal rites organized by local committees for the benefit of a village or
district. Such shrines have more weight in the social field than purely c1ient-
shrines, and their supporters have much more bargaining power with the
government.
13 Some of the most 'imperial' of the Chinese deities have also not taken
strong root in the Hong Kong context. The Jade Emperor, the highest
supernatural official in the Chinese pantheon, is present in only a handful of
lesser temples in the territory, accompanied by some of his ministers and
officials (Stevens 1989:25), but he is too remote from the experience of the
new generations ofurbanites - too politically dated, perhaps - to retain their
interest.
14 Data on Protestant Church growth are scarce. However, according to Luk
Fai and Lee Kin-wah, in a Christian publication titled The Challenge ofthe
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Nineties (Hong Kong: Hong Kong Gospe1l2,000 1991:93-101), the number
of Protestant churches in the territory grew from 610 churches in 1977 to
872 churches in 1990. The number of Sunday church-goers increased from
84,590 in 1985 to 124,900 in 1989, a growth of 47% in only four years. (I
would like to thank Ko Tin-ming for providing me with these data). A
survey of 1644 respondents in 1988 showed that about 7.2% identified
themselves as Protestant (Hui 1990: 104), a figure higher than the proportion
of Buddhists in the territory, and nearly a third of the number who indicated
belief in Chinese traditional religion (indicated by the response 'baai
sahn'). Protestants are disproportionately found among those under age 30,
compared with other religious believers (Hui 1990:105).
REFERENCES CITED
Abbreviations:
JHKBRAS = Journal of the Hong Kong Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society
Brim, John A.
1974 Village Alliance Temples in Hong Kong. In Religion and Ritual in
Chinese Society. Arthur P. Wolf, ed. pp. 93-103. Stanford: Stanford
University Press.
Chamberlayne,JohnH.
1993 China and Its Religious Inheritance. London: Janus.
Chan, Kim-Kwong, and Hunter, Alan
1994 Religion and Society in Mainland China in the 1990s. Issues and
Studies 30:52-68.
Chek May Chee, and So Shiu Miu
1987 Stone Worship and the Analysis of the Condition of Chinese Women.
(unpublished) Department of Religion, The Chinese University of
Hong Kong.
Choi, Chi-cheung
1993 Studies on Hong Kong Jiao Festivals. JHKBRAS 30:26-43.
Eitel, Ernest 1.
1984 [1873] Feng-Shui: The Science of Sacred Landscape in Old China.
London: Synergetic Press.
Faure, David, and Lee Lai-mui
1982 The Po Tak Temple in Sheung Shui Market. JHKBRAS 22:270-279.
Feuchtwang, Stephan
1992 The Imperial Metaphor: Popular Religion in China London: Routledge.
Guldin, Gregory E.
1977 Little Fujian (Fukien): Sub-neighbourhood and Community in North
Point, Hong Kong. JHKBRAS 17:112-129.
Hansen, Valerie
1991 Changing Gods in Medieval China, 1127-1276. Princeton: Princeton
University Press.
Hase, Patrick
1984 Observations at a Village Funeral. In From Village to City: Studies in
262
SHRINES AND TEMPLES IN HONG KONG
the Traditional Roots of Hong Kong Society. David Faure, James
Hayes, and Alan Birch, eds. pp. 129-163. Centre of Asian Studies,
University of Hong Kong.
Hayes, James
1983a Secular Non-gentry Leadership of Temple and Shrine Organisations
in Urban British Hong Kong. JHKBRAS 23:112-138.
1983b The Kwun Yam Tung Shan Temple of East Kowloon, 1840-1940.
JHKBRAS 23:212-217.
1983c. The Rural Communities of Hong Kong: Studies and Themes. Hong
Kong: Oxford University Press.
Hou, Ching-lang
1975 Monnaies d'Offrande et la Notion de Tresorerie dans la Religion
Chinoise. Paris: Press Universitaire de France.
Hui, C. Harry
1991 Religious and Supernaturalistic Beliefs. In Indicators of Social
Development: Hong Kong 1988. Siu-kai, Lee Ming-kwan, Wan Po-
san and Wong Siu-Iun, eds. Pp. 103-143. Hong Kong Institute of
Asia-Pacific Studies, The Chinese University of Hong Kong.
Issei, Tanaka
1989 The Jiao Festival in Hong Kong and The New Territories. In The
Turning ofthe Tide: Religion in China Today. Julian Pas, ed. pp. 271-
298. Hong Kong: Oxford University Press.
Jen, Yu-wen
1967 The Travelling Palace of Southern Sung. JHKBRAS 7:21-38.
Katz, Paul R.
1992 Changes in Wang-yeh Beliefs in Postwar Taiwan: A Case Study in
Two Wang-yeh Temples. Journal of Chinese Religions 20:203-213.
1995 Demon Hordes and Burning Boats: The Cult ofMarshall Wen in Late
Imperial China. Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York Press.
Lang, Graeme, and Lars Ragvald
1993 The Rise ofa Refugee God: Hong Kong's Wong Tai Sin. Hong Kong:
Oxford University Press.
Lethbridge, Henry
1978 Hong Kong: Stability and Change. Hong Kong: Oxford University
Press.
Mak, Jenny WH., and Bernard WK. Lau
1992 Stress as a Social Phenomenon in Hong Kong. In Indicators of Social
Development: Hong Kong, 1990. pp. 33-51 Hong Kong Institute of
Asia-Pacific Studies, The Chinese University of Hong Kong.
Meyer, Jeffrey F.
1991 The Dragons ofTiananmen: Beijing as a Sacred City. Columbia, S.C.:
University of South Carolina Press.
Miller, Peter
1988 Kerala: Jewell of India's Malabar Coast. National Geographic 173,
May:592-617.
Mo, Timothy
1978 The Monkey King. London: Penguin.
Myers, John
1975a Hong Kong Spirit-medium Temple. JHKBRAS 15:16-27.
263
---
ANTHROPOLOGY OF HONG KONG
1981 Traditional Chinese Religious Practices in an Urban-industrial
Setting: The Example ofKwun Tong. In Social Life and Development
in Hong Kong. Ambrose Y.C. King and Rance P.L. Lee ,eds. pp. 275-
288. Hong Kong: The Chinese University of Hong Kong.
Roper, Geoffrey
1990 Report on Visit to Tai Hang Fire Dragon Dance, Mid-Autumn
Festival, 1992. JHKBRAS 30:307-8.
Seiwert, Hubert
1981 Religious Response to Modernisation in Taiwan: The Case ofI-Kuan
Tao. JHKBRAS 21:42-70.
Shryock, John K.
1931 The Temples of Anking and their Cults. Paris: Librairie Orientaliste.
Sinn, Elizabeth
1989 Power and Charity: The Early History of the Tung Wah Hospital,
Hong Kong. Hong Kong: Oxford University Press.
Sill, Anthony K.K.
1987 Tam Kung: His Legend and Worship. JHKBRAS 27:278-9.
Smith, Carl T.
1973 Notes on Chinese Temples in Hong Kong. JHKBRAS 13:133-139.
Stark, Rodney, and William S. Bainbridge
1987 A Theory of Religion. N.Y.: Peter Lang.
Stevens, Keith
1977 Under Altars. JHKBRAS 17:85-100.
1980 Chinese Monasteries, Temples, Shrines, and Altars in Hong Kong and
Macau. JHKBRAS 20:1-33.
1989 The Jade Emperor and His Family: Yuh Huang Ta Ti. JHKBRAS
29:18-33.
1990 Chinese Local Semi-divine Deities. JHKBRAS 30:75-88.
Tsai, Wen-hui
1979 Historical Personalities in Chinese Folk Religion: A Functional
Interpretation. In Legend, Lore, and Religion in China, Essays in
Honor of Wolfram Eberhard on his 70th Birthday. Sarah Allan and
Alvin P. Cohen, eds. pp. 23-42. San Francisco: Chinese Materials
Centre.
Tsui, Bartholomew P.M.
1985 Tan Tse Tao: A Contemporary Chinese Faith-healing Sect in Hong
Kong. JHKBRAS 25:1-17.
1991 Taoist Tradition and Change: The Story of the Complete Perfection
Sect in Hong Kong. Hong Kong: Christian Study Centre on Chinese
Religion and Culture.
Watson, James L.
1985 Standardising the Gods: The Promotion of Tien Hou ('Empress of
Heaven') along the South China Coast, 960-1960. In Popular Culture
in Late Imperial China. David Johnson, Andrew 1. Nathan, and
Evelyn S. Rawski, eds. Pp. 292-324 Berkeley: University of
California Press.
Watson, Rubie S.
1985 Inequality among Brothers: Class and Kinship in South China. N.Y.:
Cambridge University Press.
264
I
.J
----
SHRINES AND TEMPLES IN HONG KONG
Ward, Barbara, and Joan Law
1993 Chinese Festivals in Hong Kong. Hong Kong: The Guidebook
Company.
Wolf, Arthur F.
1974 Gods, Ghosts, and Ancestors. In Religion and Ritual in Chinese
Society. Arthur F. Wolf, ed. pp. 131-182. Berkeley: University of
California Press.
265
ANTHROPOLOGY OF HONG KONG
The 'Next Magazine' cover at the height of the rumour (13 November 1992).
It reads: The Truth of the TV Ghost Advertisement Rumour'.
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GHOSTS AND THE NEW
GOVERNOR
THE ANTHROPOLOGY OF
A HONG KONG RUMOUR
Grant Evans
In early November 1992 the Chinese population of Hong Kong was
suddenly enthralled by a ghost story. In trains, buses, schools, offices
and homes people swapped information, investigated and discussed the
'ghosts' which allegedly had appeared in a most unlikely location - a
TV commercial. It was all very 'hou keihgwaai ge' - very strange.
The rumour, like an epidemic, flared up at the beginning of
November, reached a peak around the middle of the month and then
abated, so that by December it had all but disappeared.
The rumour focused on two commercials placed on Hong Kong
television by the Kowloon-Canton Rail Corporation (KCRC). One
commercial, which ran for 30 seconds and which attracted most
comment was of a group of very young children (ages 6-8) in a line,
hands on each others' shoulders, playing trains. This I will call the 'ghost
train' commercial. The second which ran for 40 seconds showed
children playing a traffic light game - 'yat, yih, saam, hung luhk dang'.
Both of these commercials were made in 1991; the 'ghost train' had
been on air in Hong Kong from May 1991 until June 1992, the second
commercial from September 1991 to October 1992. So, they both had
been taken off the air at the time the rumour erupted. The interesting
question is, why, after all these months on air, did a powerful rumour
suddenly attach itself to these commercials?
But first, what was the nature ofthe rumour and where did it begin, if
anywhere?
Of course, there are various folk theories concerning the origins of
the rumour. It is possible that the ghost story had been around for a while
before November, and indeed some people claim to have first heard it
some months before. However, these claims made at the height of the
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story cannot be checked, and we know that a feature of rumours is that
there is a tendency for people to 'back-date' their knowledge of a
particular story and consequently we have reason to be sceptical of such
claims. Furthermore, we are really interested in why a rumour acquires
mass circulation rather than origins.
Nevertheless, it does seem that the key take-off point for the ghost
story was a radio programme on Commercial Radio Two on the 31
October, Halloween night, when the DIs Lam Hoi Fung and Kuok Man
Fai, adepts of Hong Kong's mouh leih tiLU ('nonsense') verbal repartee,
were asking listeners to call in with ghost stories. One listener called in
with a KCRC ghost story:
DIs: 'Happy Halloween! Hallo Bin Bin.
A: Happy Halloween! I am Dorothy. I want to talk about the
commercial ...
DIs: What commercial?
A: The commercial ofthe KCRC ... The kids are playing 'Traffic
Light', remember? ... Some people saw seven kids altogether.
One of them is strange. When the others are playing happily he
is the only one with a very white face. This is very strange.
DIs: Yes. People are saying this outside.
A: Some telephoned to complain. But when a check was made the
exact number of kids is only six ...
DIs: One, two, three, four, seven, nine, six, twelve. I saw twelve kids!
Why? Did you see the commercial yourself?
A: I felt something strange, but I didn't notice anything in
particular.
DIs: You should go to the Consumer Council to complain.
A: Some people could see the kids bleeding from their seven
orifices ...
DIs: Who did you say was bleeding? Were the persons bleeding?
Maybe you have a dirty TV screen. Did you see it yourself? It is
strange.
A: I felt something strange, but it wasn't clear.'
Later that evening 'Christine' rang the same programme:
A: 'I want to talk about the train commercial. In fact it came from a
report on the 60 minutes programme on an English TV channel
a few days ago. They interviewed the director of the
commercial. There should originally be six kids altogether.
268
I
--~---------------------------------'
-GHOSTS AND THE NEW GOVERNOR
The second kid is obviously bleeding from the face, as can be
seen on the TV screen . . .
(Scary sound)
DJs: Put on your pants ... Yes, let's continue.
A: It has been discovered that the commercial was filmed
somewhere in China. I don't know whether the kids are from
China or Hong Kong, but two of them died and four of them
have disappeared.
(Mysterious sound)
DJs: Did you see the programme yourself? Or did others tell you?
A: My friend told me all this today.
DJs: So you are being deceived! Today is Halloween. Your friend is
just playing with you!'
Where these listeners got the story from we don't know, and perhaps can
never know. The 60 Minutes programme, we should note, does not exist.
But, the actual origin of the story is not all that important, even though
the origins of rumours fascinate people.
Despite the radio presenters' ironic and mocking tone on Halloween
eve the rumour sprang to life and on the following programme the DJs
felt compelled to play the following jingle:
'Someone in our audience on Halloween mentioned something
about the KCRC commercial rumours on our programme. After
that the news unexpectedly spread from one to ten, from ten to one
hundred, from one hundred to one thousand, from one thousand to
ten thousand. From slow to fast, from false to true, from true to
very true, from very true to frightening.
Unexpectedly, in this confusing time, not just one person, but
children and adults alike from all over are inventing stories and
associating thoughts. The young children are scared.
We hope that we should have a proper attitude in the face of such
rumours. Please remember do not hear, believe or spread news that
is not real.
But who is the one who tried to fool the people with evil words,
making something out of nothing and setting the fire alight?'
From this point the story quickly spread into the press and television,
and fanned out into the Hong Kong population. Soon there was hardly a
Chinese person in Hong Kong who had not heard the rumour. In
contrast, and typically, the expatriate community remained largely
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unaware of the scale of the rumour and it received little coverage in the
English press.
There are many minor variations of the rumour, which is to be
expected, because variations help keep the rumour alive. Variations give
the illusion of having new information. In a sense, what happens with
most rumours is that a core storyline crystallises, to which can be added
small and often localised variations. There are many famous examples
of this from elsewhere, and I do not need to go into them now (see
Brunvand 1981). The core elements ofthe KCRC'ghost story' were that
one of the children in the line was a ghost (often identified as the third
child in the line, sometimes the last), and that this ghost had caused the
death of several of the children, and serious illness or disappearance of
the others. Part of the 'evidence' for this was that the girl in front of the
third 'ghost' child was bleeding from the mouth. Another piece of
'evidence' was that the childrens' feet appeared to not touch the ground.
They drifted along like ghosts.
I should point out that generally I will treat the various sources I tap in
Hong Kong as a single 'informant'. My reason for doing this is that
rumour is a collective phenomenon and perhaps provides an insight into
the 'collective unconscious' of, in this case, Hong Kong society. But in
doing this we must keep in mind that it is a very special kind of 'public
opinion' we are tapping. As anthropologist Peter Lienhardt comments,
'rumour has its associations much less in the field of logical thought
than in the field of metaphorical thought. It is figurative. Hence the
attitudes it expresses do not have to be consistent with each other. A
bizarre set of 'facts' - and it has to be bizarre here for the rumour to
work - is invented to fit in with the attitudes of the public' (1975: 128).
So, what does this rumour tell us about Hong Kong society?
RUMOUR AND THE STRIVING FOR MEANING
To many people rumours and panics are irrational and meaningless. But
psychologists, sociologists and anthropologists who have studied these
phenomena see in them a social and cultural logic. Allport and
Postman's late 1940s study The Psychology ojRumor, which arose out
of the rumours that circulated during World War 2, saw them as an
'effort after meaning'. Rumours, they wrote, 'sometimes provide a
broader interpretation of various puzzling features of the environment
and so play a prominent part in the intellectual drive to render the
surrounding world intelligible' (1947:45). Shibutani's sociological study
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called rumours 'collective problem-solving . .. men caught in an
ambiguous situation attempt to construe a meaningful interpretation of
it by pooling their intellectual resources' (1966: 17). And Lienhardt
writes that 'rumours of the more fantastic sort can represent, and may
generally represent, complexities ofpublic feeling that cannot readily be
made articulate at a more thoughtful level' (1975:130).
When people are faced with missing details and secrecy then
conditions are created for people to attempt to fill in the details in order
to make the situation less ambiguous. These situations can be more or
less extreme. The news we receive everyday through the mass media is
selective, and therefore it always allows some basis for speculation. In
fact knowledge of this selectiveness is the basis for much scepticism
about the press. Such scepticism was voiced at the height of the rumour
when the advertisement was re-screened to allay public fears. One
rumour claimed that the ghosts had been edited out of the original
version of the commercial. The more selective (censored) the news, the
more room there is for speculative rumour.
One aspect of the striving for meaning is the attempt to discover the
'real' origins of the rumour, in order to prove that it did not just emerge
capriciously from thin air, and with the hope of providing the rumour
with some motivation. Only rarely, however, can the origin of a rumour
be isolated. Most often, as in the ghost commercial rumour in Hong
Kong, the source of 'hard information' about a rumour disappears along
the endless trail of a 'friend of a friend of a friend told me'.
In studies of rumours elsewhere it has been found that 'explanations'
will often attribute the rumour to malicious motives of rivals. Ronald
Baker's study of 'The Department Store Snake' concerning K-Mart in
the US says that 'several K-Mart managers ... swear the story was
started by a competing department store .. .' (1976:371). Similarly, in
Hong Kong some commentators suggested that the 'ghost train' rumour
was started by commercial rivals (a 'theory' which overlooked the fact
that the KCRC does not have any rivals). Advertisers Olgivy & Mather,
however, do have rivals and some hinted that 'jealousy' (Eastweek 12/11/
92) over the success ofthe commercial caused them to spread the rumour.
A similar allegation was made by the Teacher's Federation statement on
the rumour (Wan Wei Pao 12/11/92). Still other 'origin' stories pointed
more diffusely to the advertising industry. For example the Tin Tin Daily
News (6/11/92) wrote: 'According to our investigations, the source ofthis
rumour started with a preview ofthe concerned commercial. Among the
previewers, a programme host and a columnist reported their discovery of
"strange images" in the commercial. At first these stories were restricted
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to the "in" circle. But the story soon spread' (see also The Metropolitan
Weekly, 14/11/92). Several of the people I interviewed about the
commercial claimed to have a 'friend of a friend who works in
advertising' (on several occasions there was confusion about whether the
friend ofa friend actually worked for O&M), and this person said that the
ghost was real and that there was an attempt at a cover up. One story
suggested that KCRC employees whose pay rise had been delayed were
'subtly' associated with the TUmour (Hong Kong Economic Journal Daily
11/11/92). None of these 'origin stories' were ever confirmed.
Nevertheless they continued to circulate at the time of the TUmour
because they offered an 'explanation' in terms of 'dirty tricks' between
competitors. Others simply hinted darkly that 'evil people' started the
TUmOur and were perpetuating it.
Other 'origin stories' claimed the TUmOur started in Sha Tin and Tai
Po (Hong Kong Daily News 13/11/92), or started in the Tuen Mun area
(Fresh Weekly, November, No.588), while yet another report said the
source of the TUmOur was 'from a message left in a pager station' (Ming
Pao Daily News 15/11/92). We shall return to such apparently senseless
variations below.
There were also sober, 'rationalistic' attempts to explain the origins
of the story. The South China Morning Post (14/11/92) reported: 'it
began in the New Territories where television reception may not be
perfect and may lead to "ghosting" of images on screen.' This was
followed by several attempts in magazines and in TV programmes to
explain the technology ofediting, TV photography, and so on. But what
these rationalistic interpretations overlook is the fact that the
commercial was collectively appropriated to carry cultural, social and
political messages. By way of comparison we can turn to a fascinating
study of the introduction of photography into the United States last
century by Barbara Allen who points out how the novelty of
photography was used to articulate themes of spirit appearances, and
so on. She writes: 'While the newspaper accounts marvel at the apparent
wizardry of photography, the folkloristic accounts use the imperfectly
understood photographic process as a vehicle for treating traditional
themes such as love, justice, revenge, and retribution - human concerns
far more lasting than technological wonders; . . . ordinary portraits
become ghostly images, prepared glass plates [used in early
photography] become windows and mirrors [in which images of
ghosts are seen] .. .' (1982: 101). Viewed in this light, attempts to
give technical explanations in order to disperse the ghost TUmOur were
beside the point.
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MASS MEDIA & RUMOUR
Not surprisingly one of the themes in the debate surrounding the 'ghost
train' commercial was the role of the mass media, especially as the
rumour pivoted on a Television advertisement. As we all know there is
an ongoing 'moral' debate in modern societies - not just in Hong Kong-
about the impact of advertising on the minds and habits of people, and
on young people in particular. The mass media penetrates the home and
this is often perceived as an invasion of outside influences into the
family. Perceptions of such influences were a subterranean theme in the
'ghost train' debate, and one writer spoke of media coverage of the
rumour 'invading the family' (Express News 13/11/92).
However, in this case, no-one could seriously target such a 'cute,
innocent' advertisement in terms of improper influence on the minds of
youth. Public ire instead was directed by segments of the media at other
segments of the media, joined by 'responsible' public figures, who
attacked irresponsible reporting and sensationalism. Ching Kai Ming,
writing in the Hong Kong Economic Daily News (17/11/92) called on the
media to show some moral responsibility, and not just chase money:
'When discussing the social responsibility of the media some suggest
that there should be self-discipline, but this could have political
implications. Political self-discipline would inhibit the reporting
function of the media: political self discipline would be media suicide.
On the other hand, moral discipline ensures popular support for the
media. To not emphasize moral discipline would be suicidal for the
media too. Slow suicide. When the rumours were spreading and
reaching their climax ... the media should cooperate. But the fact is that
the media has been fighting to search for the most sensational story.'
But, as this commentary shows, there was also considerable sensitivity
concerning the problems ofpolitical censorship, and lying at the back of
this was anxiety about post 1997 Hong Kong.
Some of the strongest criticism, however, was directed at ATV who,
in a special programme on the rumour, invited a hei gUng sifu, Mr Ho, to
comment on the commercial, whereupon he affIrmed that there were
ghosts. The Teachers Federation, among others, condemned the
programme: 'We believe the electronic media is irresponsible. Their
attitude in spreading superstition and in hurting the feelings of the
children should be criticised. They should apologize.' (Wan Wei Pao 12/
11/92)
There is no question that the mass media today can speed up the
transmission of rumours through both straight reporting, and through
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radio 'hotlines'.' In the 'ghost train' story the mass media both recorded
and further disseminated variations on the rumour. However, a closer
analysis of the course of the rumour tends to contradict simplistic
assumptions, made by many commentators on the media, of a passive
public at the mercy of media interpretations. In the 'ghost train' rumour
we see a complex interaction between a public actively constructing
explanations of the rumour and media recording and re-ordering of that
process.
Indeed, much of the rumour was spread by word of mouth, in
schools, offices, on trains and buses and around dinner tables. As Jan
Brunvand, author of The Vanishing Hitchiker (1981: 11) writes:
'Apparently the basic human need for meaningful personal contact
cannot be entirely replaced by the mass media and popular culture. A
portion ofour interest in what is occurring in the world must be filled by
some face-to-face reports from other human beings.' These discussions
produced continual variations in the detail of the rumour and kept it
alive. The media in turn tried to keep up with these variations by
occasionally attempting to systematise them, only to be eclipsed by new
variations. In the process, however, the media no doubt communicated
some new variations to people who had not yet heard them. This
ongoing attempt to systematise the story is, in one sense, an attempt by
the media to gain control over the story, and perhaps this is one reason
why we begin to see the construction of obscure interpretations of the
commercial. In his discussion of rumours in the US Donald Bird notes
that people begin to invent complex numerologies or provide obscure
interpretations for ordinary events (he refers for example to a rumour
around the alleged death of then Beatles member Paul McCartney. The
story was based, among other things, on the fact that he was not wearing
shoes on the Abbey Road album cover), he writes: 'Some ofthese games
appear to go beyond a search for understanding to a deliberate
construction of obscure codes and meanings which arise not from lack
of information, but rather, it seems, from a desire by participants to
savour, toy, or manipulate the item under discussion' (1976:300). I
would suggest that one of the things we are seeing in these obscure
interpretations is an attempt by the public to maintain a discourse which
is autonomous from the media. To some extent, this is a generationally
specific autonomous discourse, something we shall return to below in
the discussion of children.
Eastweek (12/11/92), Fresh Weekly (No.588, November 1992) and
The Metropolitan Weekly (14111/92) all provided systematisations ofthe
rumour, reducing it to seven variations in the cases of the first two
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magazines, ten in the latter. The following is a typical example from
Eastweek:
(l) Among the kids in the line playing the moving train game there was
an extra girl (or shadow) at the end of the line. Some claimed that
her face was bloody all over.
(2) The third boy in the line has a trace of blood on his face.
(3) All the children in the commercial floated along without touching
the ground.
(4) The girl whose shoulders were being held by the extra girl died after
the filming of the commercial.
(5) Among the six participating kids, four of them are reported to have
disappeared, while the other two died for no obvious reason.
(6) Five of the ten children died after the filming.
(7) Babies cried after seeing the commercial, and children could see
blood on the faces when it is played in slow motion.
In the other summaries there were further variations - rumours of the
death of the director of the commercial, and so on. Such inventiveness
on the part of the Hong Kong public kept the rumour moving at a
cracking pace for several weeks.
We should not overlook the sheer thrill of participating in a rumour
like this which helps to break the routine ofeveryday life. As one Hong
Kong journalist half-joked it comes 'from the sense of entertaining
oneself with pain' (Hong Kong Economic Times 11/11/92). Despite the
fear associated with the rumour, for a short while it also created in Hong
Kong's metropolis a sense of communitas and shared experience and
knowledge, which conveniently did not impinge on anyone directly and
so, in that way, was uncontentious. Thus the rumour was simultaneously
a symptom of anxiety and an outlet for it.
THE NEW GOVERNOR
It would be absurd to claim that Hong Kong people were not anxious
about the consequences of impending union with China in mid-1997
before Chris Patten made his fateful policy speech of 7 October 1992.
Indeed, since the Joint Declaration between China and Britain in 1984
many people have been voting with their feet and leaving Hong Kong.
But Patten's speech and China's strong reaction to it galvanised fears
concerning Hong Kong's future. It was in this general atmosphere of
intense political and social anxiety that the ghost rumour sprang into life.
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The relationship between the general political context and the rumour
was sometimes acknowledged in the press reporting at the time.
Eastweek (12/11/92) was one of the first to make the connection: 'The
ghost story serves as an alternative to the talks on the airport and the
Governor and his policy.' On the following day, four separate
newspapers made the connection. The Hong Kong Economic Journal
Daily News (13/11/92) followed a similar line of thought to Eastweek:
'we lack something in common to talk about. The politics between the
two governments are deadlocked. What else is more exciting than the
eerie talks? ... the kids are in China and are hard to contact, therefore
the ghost story can become as horrible as it likes .. .'. In one of the
reports that appeared in Ming Pao one writer cornmenting on the alleged
"crowd psychology" of the rumour, claimed: 'People immigrating
because of the 1997 issue is an example of 'crowd psychology' being
developed into "hysteria"' (Education & Culture section 13/11/92).
Another report in the same edition by Shek Kee drew attention to how
small incidents can highlight the unsettled relations between China and
Hong Kong. The writer refers to threats made to a Hong Kong actress,
Wo Wai Chung, when she was in Beijing, and to the commercial.
I have two apparently unrelated cases here. In fact they are both
related in the sense that they both took place in China. The
relationship between Hong Kong/Taiwan and China is growing
closer. The award winning commercial was filmed in Beijing
using Beijing kids. There is also another award winning
commercial by Marlboro, this time of a spectacular Lion Dance
and Drum Dance. These kinds of commercials arouse nostalgic
and positive feelings toward the mainland. And it is a trend for
stars to make money in the north. When communication begins at
a fast pace it is not surprising to find a mismatch. And China
herself is changing. There are no established rules to cater for the
new, or to settle the old. Therefore, rumours will be generated ....
The writer in Express News (13/11/92) commented: 'The ghost story is
much more mysterious than the political debate ... We do not know if
there are secret talks between the governments. But the commercial won
even more attention than the political gossip.' Some days later Eastweek
(19/11/92) rejoined: 'Everybody is frightened, afraid and excited at the
same time, in another strong whirlwind after Patten's (Fei Pahng)
speech. The rumour of the KCRC commercial is a hundred times more
marvellous than the Sino-British talks.' Pro-Beijing paper, Wan Wei Pao,
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suspected anti-Beijing motives behind not only this rumour, but others
as well:
The KCRC commercial used a few Beijing kids as the
protagonists ... A few years back, it was rumoured that children
here were being kidnapped and taken to Shenzhen. Some people
were in a panic and the image of Shenzhen was affected. The case
died down slowly without any conclusion ... Coincidentally, the
various rumours are related to China. It is unclear whether the
motive is to blackmail China, or to abuse the backwardness of the
mainland's media.
(15/11/92)
While no-one analysed the issue at length, and while it was not a main
theme in the commentary on the rumour, various commentators did
draw attention to the broader political context of the rumour.2 This
context included suspicions ofthe actions ofboth governments - 'secret
talks' - and of course in the absence of openness rumours will, as we
have seen, attempt to fill in the gaps in our knowledge either in a direct
or displaced way. Secondly, and as Wan Wei Pao recognizes, the rumours
do reflect a general fear, or at least suspicion, of Beijing among Hong
Kong people. But, Wan Wei Pao embarks on its own political 'search for
meaning' by seeking a political culprit for the rumours - a vain search,
of course.
The many rumours one has heard in Hong Kong about the fate of
unspecified individuals in Shenzhen are illustrative of this general
projected anxiety. There are many stories of Hong Kong individuals
being dragged into large limousines in the streets of the New Economic
Zone, drugged, having organs removed from their bodies3 and then
dumped back on the streets again. One can only be amazed by the extent
to which this implausible story is believed or retailed in Hong Kong (for
reports of other stories concerning Shenzhen see Eastweek 19/11/92).
The only thing which makes it intelligible is both a displaced anxiety
about China and the sense of difference many Hong Kong people feel
when they travel there, even to a place as close and as similar as the
NEZ.
Ghost stories and rumours of various kinds circulate, of course, on
the mainland.4 Hong Kong television is watched in the NEZ and in
Guangdong, so not only had many people there seen the 'ghost'
commercial, but many had also heard of the rumour. In fact the rumour
was reported in the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone Daily on 21
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November 1992. Yet the rumour never took off there. I asked a friend of
mine who taught at the University ofShenzhen to ask his students (at the
beginning of December) what they had heard of the rumour and what
they thought about it. Sixty-one gave written replies. Besides one
student who wrote 'I am so stupid that I don't know anything about this
story,' the other sixty had known about it for around one month. Most
had heard about it from a friend, although some had received their
information from either Hong Kong radio or television or newspapers.
Forty-eight of the students thought it was 'nonsense', and some added
'striving after explanation' type reasons for the rumour, such as attempts
by advertising competitors to slur the companies involved. Among the
other 12 some wrote 'maybe it's true' or 'It makes me wonder what
happened', through to simply 'it frightens me'. The rumour, however,
did not develop into any kind ofmass hysteria in Shenzhen and appears
to have remained at the level of idle chatter.
The explanation for the different reactions to the rumour lies in the
contrast between the political contexts of Hong Kong and Shenzhen.
One may want to suggest, as did one of the Shenzhen disbelievers, that
'Hong Kong people are superstitious', but I think it would be difficult to
argue that Hong Kong is more 'superstitious' than other parts of China
(or any less!).
So, the new Governor's speech about democracy and political
'through trains', and Beijing's strong reaction to it, cathected with
general anxiety about 1997 to send the 'ghost train' rumour racing down
the tracks.
GHOSTS AND CHILDREN
A fundamental feature of the whole rumour was its focus on children -
both on those in the advertisement, and a concern for the effect of the
rumour on children in Hong Kong.
First, let's focus on the children in the commercial. Certainly before
the rumour began the children were generally considered to be 'cute'
(diikyi). Nevertheless, they were marked as somehow different. The
designers of the advertisement set out to evoke a world of childhood
innocence, a world we have lost. At the end of the 'ghost train'
commercial we read the words: 'Trains. When you were small, they were
wonderful. At KCRC we're working hard to keep it that way for you.' In
order to find 'suitably innocent-looking kids' for the commercial the
makers had to go to China. According to O&M's executive director,
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'Hong Kong kids are too slick. They're more likely to play Ninja turtles
than chugga-chugga.' (cited by Lim 1991:15) This idea was repeated to
me by the company's senior copywriter for the commercial, K.C. Chang
during an interview in December 1992. Hong Kong kids were, he said,
too 'street-wise and too camera conscious.' So they went to Beijing
where they selected the children from a kindergarten on the outskirts of
the city. 'We chose some cute ones, but also some deliberately not cute.
Such as the third kid in the line who has slightly bulging eyes, or the last
kid who was chubby. We did not want kids who had a plastic look like in
other commercials.' Their idea was, he said, to create a softer image for a
faceless, large organisation like the KCRC. Greenish, sepia like tones
were also used to evoke a sense ofmemory and nostalgia. And they were
successful. Early reactions to the advertisement were positive. Lim, in
his 1991 survey of Hong Kong advertisements cites a public relations
person who placed the commercial at the top ofhis list: 'I never get tired
of seeing it. It has a nice, nostalgic way ofpresenting children's concept
of trains and linking it with the service of the KCRC. The music is also
particularly good.' Another person he interviewed at the time responded:
'Kids these days won't play like this but those in their 30s and 40s will
recall the days when they did.' (Lim 1991:15). And similar accolades
were given to the commercial when it won advertising awards in May the
following year.
The 'innocence' of the children in the commercial, their style of
dress, the game, all marked them as somehow separate from Hong Kong
kids, and this separateness, perhaps even strangeness, was one of the
reasons the commercial became an appropriate vehicle for a rumour.
Once the rumour had begun, this difference was highlighted in the media
and by some of my informants. Some of the latter denied the children
were at all 'cute', and said they were a non-Hong Kong idea of pretty
kids. 'Their eyes are too big, they are too pale and their clothes are not
pretty. The problem with the commercial is that there is too much green
in it and green is a deathly colour. The children are too pale and ghostly.'
Of course, here we have a retrospective view of the commercial which
reconstructs an original perception of separateness as something now
foreign and ugly.
The Hong Kong Economic Journal Daily (17/11/92) almost laments
that 'Hong Kong kids are mini-adults ... Only in Beijing could they
find fresh and innocent kids ... Everyone is impressed by the faces of
the lovely and simple kids. In fact, the kids in the commercial, their
costumes, movement and even facial expressions, are all different from
the Hong Kong kids.' Similar ideas had been expressed earlier in Tin Tin
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Daily News (10/11/92) where the kids used in the commercial were
identified by name: 'The five kids in the "train commercial" are Wu
Shong, Cheng Kin, Chiu Yu, Chiu Han and Chow Wai. They are naughty
and cute. They are not mini-adults like Hong Kong kids. According to
one crew member the kids are compliant, polite and cute. When they
met ladies they would say, "Hello Auntie!". When they received a candy
they said "Thanks Auntie!". When the assistant directress said she
would like to be Wu Shong's Godmother, Wu replied: "I don't want a
Godmother from Hong Kong". Why? The child replied: "Because Hong
Kong people do not speak genuine Chinese".' Not only do these children
mobilise feelings about a 'world we have lost', but perhaps even feelings
about 'the country we have lost'. Indeed, Hong Kong's ambiguous
relationship with China, is suddenly spotlighted by Wu Shong's barb
about Cantonese not speaking 'real Chinese'.
The controversy surrounding the commercial mobilised views
concerning children in contemporary Hong Kong, and anxieties about
them. These anxieties have several sources: changing family relations in
modern Hong Kong are leading to a gradual cultural reformulation of
ideas parents have towards children. However, like everywhere, people
feel they are stepping into unchartered waters and this in itself creates
anxiety. Thus there are many attractions in reconstructing a fantasy ofa
more 'innocent' past. Second, Hong Kong society is beginning to
experience many of the trials and tribulations of families in other
modern industrial societies, and these are voiced in the debate over the
commercial. People in Hong Kong are aware ofthe pressures on children
to succeed in the modern world. This pressure along with others has
been blamed for the rising rate of suicide among children up to 1992,
and beyond. This too, created a general, diffuse feeling of anxiety.
Naturally, children represent the future, and so anxiety about the
future of Hong Kong was therefore mediated via anxieties concerning
children.
Take, for example, the following reflections by Lee Pik Wah writing
in Oriental Daily News (21/11/92):
To be a child in modern times is not an easy job ... This is a
generation who lack childishness. They no longer have lullabies,
cartoons or simple playthings. They have nothing to be nostalgic
about when they grow up. The songs they sing are the love songs
of the Karaoke, the films they see are full of bloodshed and
violence, the toys they play with are complicated and expensive.
Most of their games are the "fighting games". Children live in
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crowded conditions with their families due to rising property
values. They have no choice but to follow around the Filipino maid
or the elderly when their parents go off to work. They meet their
parents only once a week. They lack love,just like lacking oxygen.
It is extraordinary that a TV commercial about kids playing a
game could arouse such intense fear. When I hear friends talking
about the situation of children I feel sorry for the poor kids.
Eventually, even babies will not know what happiness is ...
Others linked the issue to child abuse. The Oriental Daily News (26/11/
92) noted the irony of the fact that the press release by O&M and the
KCRC entitled "It is unfair to the innocent kids", was coincidentally the
same title the paper used on the same day for a story on child abuse in
Hong Kong. People may consider outsiders and the rumour spreaders as
evil, but there are also 'evil parents in the world. And what about the rest
of the six mil)ion other people here? Parents are quarrelling everyday. It
is unfair for the kids.' In their ruminations on the effect of the
commercial on 'the innocent children' still others complained that not
enough attention was being paid by society to childrens' 'psychological
well-being ... For instance, our news stalls are one of the most filthy
parts ofour society. We have no choice but to look at nude photographs
at the news stalls. To cite another example: we do not have censorship of
comics which convey unacceptable messages to the youngsters' (Hong
Kong Economic Daily News 17/11/92). The vulnerability of children
was also focused on by the numerous reports of children being too
scared to go to the toilet alone, or being scared to sleep alone at night
during the height of the rumour. Indeed, this hysteria swept through the
halls ofthe University ofHong Kong where students also reported being
scared ofgoing to the toilet and ofgathering in groups in rooms to sleep
together. And perhaps what is not too far from the minds of these
students is their impending loss of 'sexual innocence'.
In some respects, therefore, the discussion ofthe rumour also took on
features of a moral panic relating to young children.
There are many reasons why a society's anxiety should focus on its
children. For a start they represent the future and cultural continuity. In
the context of Patten's speech and feelings of insecurity about Hong
Kong's future, it is not surprising that these anxieties should be re-
channelled through children. Indeed, one may want to suggest that this
kind of displacement is one consequence of the lack of democracy in
Hong Kong, in that the political channels for expressing disquiet are
restricted.
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Around the same period there had also been growing concern about
child suicides in Hong Kong. Many of these appear to be a result of
growing strains and stresses within families and on individuals.
Pressures to succeed at school, both peer and parental, is one source
of strain. The other would appear to be the result of something like a
'generation gap' in Hong Kong where, within the modem nuclear
family, ideologies of companionship and mutuality mix in confusing
ways with lingering authoritarian parental attitudes. And in many
families girls are still treated as less valuable than boys, while at the
same time they are encouraged to succeed intellectually, which ofcourse
has an important impact on their self-esteem. The suicides also formed
part ofthe background to the atmosphere surrounding the rumour, and in
fact surfaced in the rumour itself. One of my informants retold the
following story: 'The ghost is one of the children who was not selected,
out of all the children that could have been selected for the
advertisement. The child was scolded by his mother when he got
home for not getting the job. Therefore, the child committed suicide and
became a ghost and wreaked havoc on the other children.' One can
quickly see in this story a re-cycled version ofreal events in Hong Kong
where children have committed suicide after their parents have scolded
them for poor school results. Several variations of the rumour speak of
vengeance by a child who for one reason or another was excluded from
being featured in the commercial. To give another example: 'A woman
whose child had died two years before saw her child in the commercial.
She consulted a shaman who told her that her child was very lonely and
wanted to participate in the choo-choo-train game. The other children
wouldn't let her join and so the child took revenge.'
Perhaps at an even deeper level there is an association of children
with the dead. The fact that the rumour took offat the time ofHalloween
is very suggestive in this regard. Halloween is not well known in the
Chinese community, but many people do know that 'the foreigners' have
their own ghost festival - 'gwailou gwai jit' - and as we have seen a
radio station took this opportunity to ask its listeners to phone in with
ghost stories. In the Halloween festival children dress up as ghosts or as
the dead and are able, during this rite of reversal, to go and demand
propitiation from adults who offer them sweets or money. They are
placated in the same way as ghosts are in Chinese society and elsewhere,
by making offerings to them. In his discussion offestivals preceding and
associated with Christmas, Levi-Strauss has drawn attention to the fact
that children are, by definition, uninitiated into adult society, and in
important respects they remain at the margins of society. Thus, he asks,
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in festivals of the dead 'who can personify the dead in a society of the
living if not those who, one way or another, are incompletely
incorporated into the group, who, that is, share the otherness which
symbolizes the supreme dualism: that of the dead and the living?'
(1993:49). Children, or foreigners, or in the past, slaves, could all
perform this role for 'the fact ofbeing other is the nearest image we can
get ofdeath' (1993:50). I take Levi-Strauss's observations as suggestive
because the boundaries between adulthood and childhood will be more
sharply drawn in some cultures than in others.
Although there is no direct parallel role for children within, for
example, the Chinese Ghost Festival that I am aware of, we can stilI
reflect on the role of children as symbols of the culturally anomalous.
The deaths ofchildren and young people (especially women) before they
become adults makes them potential 'hungry ghosts', a fear clearly
expressed in the havoc allegedly wreaked by the child in the ghost
commercial. People who die before they are fully incorporated into
society are cultural anomalies and therefore most likely to become
avenging ghosts. This is one of the central explanations for 'ghost
marriages' in Chinese society (Martin 1991). The boundaries between
adulthood and childhood remain strongly drawn in Hong Kong, although
this is in the process of change. Indeed the renegotiation of relations
between parents and children in modem Hong Kong probably heightens
adult perceptions of 'lost innocence', and probably explains the
references to Hong Kong children as 'mini adults' in the discussions
around the rumour. There are other clues within the rumour itself that
suggest that children, at least unconsciously, are somehow regarded as
liminal. For example babies were said to cry uncontrollably after seeing
the commercial (Eastweek 12/11192). Others suggested that only people
with 'yin eyes' (yam ngaahn) could see the ghost, and that children
especially were able to see the ghost.
These distinctions between children and adults have further
implications for the course of the rumour. Studies of urban societies
have drawn attention to the existence ofsub-cultures who have their own
networks ofcommunication, 'shared symbols and meanings, an esoteric
language, cultural objects, a vocabulary of motives,' and so on (Laba
1979). And in their studies ofurban folklore some have drawn attention
to the fact 'that the young possess their own oral culture' (Opie
1980:65). Several have also referred to the importance of school
children as a group for the oral transmission of rumours and urban
legends (Baker 1969; Fine 1979; Kapferer 1992). Not surprisingly then,
schools in Hong Kong became a hotbed for the 'ghost train' rumour.
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Teachers from around the territory reported hysteria among students,
and in response the Education Department Counselling Unit set up a
hotline to deal with any problems (Hong Kong Daily News 13/11/92;
Ming Pao Daily News 13/11/92 & 17/11/92). Indeed, it would seem that
the rumour began among children and made its way into adult society.
Children in modern Hong Kong used telephones to stay in touch with
school friends and others throughout the course of the rumour.
Telephones were, of course, an important source of oml transmission
for everyone. But what was abundantly clear was that there was a distinct
child/youth based circuit for the rumour, and this in itself was a further
source ofanxiety for adults who were unable to control this autonomous
source of authority.
Indeed, the visual imagery and theme of the commercial encoumged
children to identify with it, but it was also evident from early on that
younger people responded to it differently from adults. Lim in his
September 1991 survey wrote: 'older viewers among the twelve polled
understood the commercial better . . . a few of the younger women
interviewed said they had to watch it several times before they realised
what product was being promoted.' The nostalgic allusions made sense
to the adults but not to the children, for whom the whole presentation
was new, not nostalgic. Even the use ofharmonica as background music
was problematic. The association of harmonicas with steam trains was
established as a musical trope within American popular music through
black migration from the south to the north of the US and through blues
music. Hong Kong adults may have been exposed to this musical trope
and identified harmonicas with steam trains, but among my informants
it seems that some of the younger children had no such nostalgic flash-
back. Instead, they identified the harmonica only as the 'ghost music'.
Tin Tin Daily News reported: 'Some children ran into their bedrooms
and hid under the blanket when they heard the background music' (12/
11/92). This contmsts with the advertising executive, cited above, who
especially liked the music. Gaps in perception like this are, of course,
unforseeable, but they do underline the separation of child from adult
experience;
In her perceptive analysis of modern media panics Kirsten Drotner
argues that children and youth are often the focus of these panics
because in the modern world they occupy 'a pioneering cultural
position' (1992:56). Media is youth oriented and this, she says, 'has not
escaped adult attention' (1992:56). Therefore, 'On a social level, media
panics basically attempt to re-establish a generational status-quo that the
youthful pioneers seem to undermine' (1992:57). In fact, some of my
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older infonnants indicated that at times they would jokingly refer to the
ghost rumour to scare younger children, thus using ghosts as a fonn of
adult intimidation or discipline.
Children, Drotner goes on, are also panic targets 'because they
inevitably represent experiences and emotions that are irrevocably lost
to adults: one cannot go back in time and become a child again. Perhaps
this common human condition becomes a particularly painful realisation
in modernity because modernity is based precisely on evolution and a
linear progression of time. To modem adults, children become captive
symbols of what is lost not only in an individual sense, but in a social
sense' (1992:59).
We can see from our analysis that children can become an extremely
potent cultural symbol, and like most powerful symbols they articulate
simultaneously several discourses, some ofwhich cross-cut. Children as
a potent polyvalent symbol is the reason why the KCRC's 'channing,
innocent' commercial could become such an effective vehicle for Hong
Kong society's anxieties.
RUMOUR 'RATIONALITY' AND 'SUPERSTITION'
The discourse on 'rationality' and 'superstition' surrounding discussion
of the commercial is also very revealing. When the KCRC and O&M
released their press statement denying the rumours ofghosts they argued
that 'Rumours stop with rationality.' This sentiment was echoed by
many other commentators, who in order to demonstrate their rationality
pointed to the folly of previous rumours in Hong Kong. Or their
rationality was couched in that of technology. The ATV programme on
the rumour went to great lengths to demonstrate the various effects that
could be achieved by modem photographic technology, methods of
cutting, editing, varying shades of colour or speed, and so on. Or, for
example, take the remarks of Dr Tso, a lecturer from the Chinese
University who was invited by ATV to comment on the claims by hei
gimg Master Ho that the light, floating steps of the children could not
even be achieved even by a master of hei gring, thus affinning the
ghostliness of the children. Dr Tso remarked: 'please note that the
advertisement is shown in slow motion. In slow motion everything is
light. Next time you see him show it to him at nonnal speed, and perhaps
he will reduce his suspicions.' And, so on. He also disputed Master Ho's
specific claim that there were tree ghosts in the commercial: 'He said
that there are two ghosts in the tree. I really cannot see any. It is just the
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shadow ofthe trunk.' Note the slight shift ofmeaning here; the existence
ofghosts are not being denied, it is just that he cannot see the ones being
pointed to by Ho. Indeed, Dr Tso is willing to agree that demons reside
in trees. 'It is true,' he says, 'big trees might develop demons.' The
important point here, ofcourse, is that the representatives of 'rationality'
do not deny the existence of ghosts, they simply deny the existence of
these specific ghosts.
This contradiction was, culturally, not acknowledged and perhaps
unacknowledgeable by most Chinese engaged in the debate over the
ghosts. People who were calling on parents and adults to explain to their
children that there were no ghosts in the commercial, were, by their
actions, continually confirming the existence ofthe ghosts. For example,
the host ofthe ATV programme mentioned above is well-known in Hong
Kong as a strong believer in the spiritual power ofhei gimg to overcome
evil forces in the world. When, in late November he went to Beijing to
locate the children in the commercial and interview and photograph
them in order to 'rationally' dispel the rumour of their deaths, he carried
with him Buddhist protective beads and a lung seui ldh gaang (a
geomancer's compass) for protection. 'He found a few tombs around the
site [the original location for the filming], but nothing ghostly' (Oriental
Daily News, 29/11/92). A Ms. Ho Kim Hong, the manager of the Public
Affairs Department at the KCRC, in charge of helping dispel the
rumour, saw its propagation as a kind of 'curse' on the children (Ming
Pao daily News 17/11/92). And indeed, this is how the parents of the
children felt and they could 'not understand why Hong Kong people had
cursed their kids' (Shing Pao 29/11/92).
One parent explained the dilemma in a letter to Eastweek magazine
(19/11/92) after watching are-run ofthe commercial designed to dispel
the rumour: 'The third kid in the line made me scared. It makes me
shaky even when I'm writing now. How am I supposed to teach my
children?'
Indeed, the whole campaign against the rumour within a cultural
context which believes strongly in ghosts proved to be self-defeating.
According to many people I interviewed, and according to press reports,
on the night when the commercial was re-screened on 9 November many
families gathered around their TV sets to watch the commercial. Some I
interviewed videod the advertisement and played it back three or four
times, each time debating the various rumour-theories concerning the
ghost. Ofcourse any child watching all this activity and attention to the
commercial would in fact be observing adults taking the issue very
seriously, thereby confirming that something important was afoot.
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Naturally, the re-screening and the lounge-room discussion that
followed served to allay some peoples fears.s But for many it simply
scared them, as we saw above with the mother who wrote to Eastweek, or
provided new impetus to the ongoing rumour. The next day at school, on
the bus or train, or at work, people discussed yet again the commercial
which had been played the night before, helping the rumour on its way.
In fact the discourse surrounding the commercial in a sense reflected
a more general discourse concerning social and cultural change in Hong
Kong: Modernity (or 'Westernization') versus Chinese 'tradition', or,
modern 'rationality' versus Chinese 'superstition'. This discourse on
Hong Kong is a complex and contradictory one, as we pointed out in the
introduction to this book, for, depending on the context, modernity is
regarded as either 'good' or 'bad', just as Chinese traditional ideas are
regarded as 'good' or 'bad'depending on the context. In everyday life
this discourse becomes especially complex because people
unconsciously code-switch from one discourse to another. We can see
this in the examples given above; people using the language of
rationality but through their actions confirming 'superstitious' practices.
Rapid modernization may produce fantasies and anxieties about a
total break with the past. Of course, such a radical break never happens.
Nevertheless, while all modern societies celebrate change they
simultaneously express deep anxieties about it. Such ambivalence
seems to be part of the modern condition. In Hong Kong social change
has occurred very rapidly, with processes that took hundreds of years in
Europe being telescoped into three generations here, which in turn has
produced significant generational shifts in experience. Elements of
'tradition' are, naturally, rejected or left behind in the process of change,
others are retained and perhaps reinterpreted, or even re-invented, and
they provide a sense of cultural continuity, as does the overlapping of
generations. Not surprisingly this produces overlapping and cross-cutting
discourses on tradition and modernity within the society at large and
within the minds of the individuals within that society. In other words,
individuals may, depending on the social context, express contradictory
views concerning a particular social or cultural phenomena. This is one
source of the complexities of inarticulable public feeling that, as
Lienhardt suggested earlier, provide the fuel for rumours.
Illustrative of this ideological bricolage, for example, is the fact that
fung seui sin silang (geomancers) and other experts in Chinese
metaphysics were given significant roles to play in the debate over the
rumour. In the ATV programme it is not unimportant that, formally,
Master Ho's views were treated as equal with Dr Tso's, although the
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gestures and mannerisms ofthe presenters tended to at least genuflect in
the direction of the higher prestige of the university academic.6 Of
course the intellectual elite of modem Hong Kong society publicly
proclaim the scientific values of modernity, but many of them also
'listen' to the discourse of 'superstition'.
Psychologists were also consulted about the rumour, though the most
they seemed to be able to say was that it was a matter of 'crowd
psychology' and therefore 'irrational' (Fresh Weekly, No.588, November
1992; Ming Pao Daily News 13/11/92). The Education Department
responded calmly and sensibly, and appealed to scientific rationality:
The Education Department ... thinks that the incident might well
serve as a good lesson for the young people. Mrs. Lau Wing Man,
Chief Inspector from the Education Department told the Media
that the case may enable the children to realize that it was all
merely a product of their imagination. Thus they may have learnt
to distinguish similar problems in the future, with the help of
newly acquired scientific minds.
(Ming Pao Daily News 17/11/92)
By and large, however, the voice of a hegemonic rationality had
relatively little to say about the rumour, and perhaps there was little it
could say, and simply had to wait for the rumour to run its course and for
the dominant modem rationality to re-assert itself. I should also say that
the rational anthropological analysis offered in this article would also
have had little effect on the course of such a rumour.
The other major protagonists in the debate were the traditional
metaphysicians, and their participation was strongly criticised in some
quarters. Wan Wei Pao, for example, criticising Master Ho's appearance
on TV said 'it is common in Hong Kong to have such deceiving and
disreputable men who deal in 'black magic' and fool people' (14/11/92).
Master Ho's appearance on television, and the subsequent reporting of
what he had to say in the press, was heavily publicised. As we have
already seen Master Ho claimed the children must be ghosts because of
their light steps. Could he see ghosts in the commercial? the presenter
asked: 'I can see two, in the upper left-hand comer here [of the screen].
Let me put it this way, they are not ordinary spirits. Since this
advertisement was made in the morning it is a time when ordinary spirits
cannot appear, so these must be vampires.' The appearance ofMaster Ho
on television legitimised his views and the cultural beliefs in ghosts
among his audience.
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A few days later he was asked to elaborate on his views by the
Oriental Sunday: 'Look at their gaze, it is completely empty of
childishness. Kids at that age cannot have that kind ofgaze. Their souls
and spirits are already beyond their control. The only one who looks
natural is the first one. Maybe it is because his 'yilhn hei' (core spirit) is
stronger' (15/11/92). He then continues with an elaborate description of
the different kinds ofevil spirits, devils, vampires and so on who may be
acting on the children.
The Metropolitan Weekly (14/1 1/92) asked the chief Buddhist monk
of Sai Fong Temple to comment. He had not seen the commercial, but
after the reporter explained the situation he replied that ofcourse it was
possible for spirits to appear in the film. 'Under What conditions?' the
reporter asked: 'The spirits waiting to be reincarnated. They wander here
and there, and may be seen by people by chance. Appearing on screen or
in reality makes little difference.' As for the appearance ofa child ghost:
'He may have been attracted by the laughter ofthe other kids, and joined
the group without any intention to cause harm.' Can anything be done to
appease this spirit? 'All we need to know is his name, or his photo, say
prayers and give offerings for his sake.' He ended by saying that 'not
everybody can see the ghost. Only small children and people with clear
minds [in the Buddhist sense], and those who have "ghost eyes" can see
them.'
But one of the most interesting contributions to the whole debate
came from Lee Kui Ming, writing in the magazine Strange News (no.77,
November 1992). He called for the immediate withdrawal of the
commercial from TV and for an immediate cessation of discussion, 'we
should forget the incident at once.' He too added his comments on the
unsettled relations between Hong Kong and China and claimed that an
unsettled heart will produce evil: 'The evil psycho of the city has been
cast onto the KCRC, a rail linking up China and Hong Kong. It reflects
the mind of the Hong Kong people. Everybody is passive and negative.
We are full of "yin".' Unlike the rationalists Lee Kui Ming is convinced
that there are ghosts in the commercial, but underneath his metaphysics
there is in fact a compelling sociological logic:
The problem is that the commercial is "evil". The "evilness" in
the commercial brings out the "monster" in the heart of Hong
Kong people ... The third child is possessed. He is covered with
"yin air" (yam hei). The spirit belonged to an old woman, a
deceased member of his family. People having the same
"magnetic field" with the child will be able to see the spirit in
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the commercial. In fact there are spirits everywhere. The force of
the "yin" will gradually increase as more and more people talk
about it. Just imagine the situation when the commercial is played
again! Six million people are pinning their eyes to the screen. All
the "yin" forces are concentrated, and little ghosts will become
large ghosts. This is the reason why the commercial has to stop.
Ifwe ignore the metaphysics ofthis article we are in fact left with one of
the most sociologically insightful pieces of the whole episode. Consider
the logic: when people are disturbed due to the breakdown in relations
between China and Hong Kong then in that context it is not surprising
that their 'unsettled hearts' will be projected as something 'evil'; and
secondly, that the more people watch and discuss the advertisement the
more plausibility and power they will give to the rumour. Just stop
everything, and it will stop. It is an interesting case of what
anthropologists have observed elsewhere about shamans, that is, because
they have their finger on the pulse of the society around them they are
able to articulate its moods and motives most accurately, albeit in a
specific rhetorical or metaphysical idiom which has to be deciphered by
the anthropologist.
In this case, despite the subliminal sociological logic which no doubt
makes the Lee's case more compelling to his audience, he in fact
reconfirms the actual existence of the ghost and therefore helps the
rumour on its way, adding his authority to its existence.
At the same time, however, each of these metaphysicians were
participating in the society's striving for meaning by providing
culturally recognisable explanations for the ghost thus asserting some
cultural control, or imaginary control, over the seemingly inexplicable
phenomena.
CONCLUSION: RUMOUR IN MODERN SOCIETY
Thus while it was the context of the new Governor's speech which
galvanised this rumour, there were many other elements coursing
through Hong Kong society that conspired to make the KCRC's 'cute'
commercials an appropriate vehicle for the rumour.
Anthropological analyses of modem society are still relatively rare.
For various historical reasons anthropologists have tended to leave the
study of urban and modem societies to sociologists. But now that they
are turning their gaze toward modem societies the corpus of
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anthropological work, with its cross-cultural emphasis, has primed
anthropologists to see familiar human themes in what for others is at
first culturally strange. In my own case, some years ago I published a
book in which one of the central concerns was the study of the growth
and spread of a rumour among a hilltribe group in Laos (Evans
1983:Chapter 6). Confronted with a rumour in modern Hong Kong, I
was intrigued rather than mystified. Furthermore, compared with other
fields of social science, anthropology has been more sceptical of the
claims of modernisation theory concerning the emergence of a
rationalised world in which religious or metaphysical thought is
banished to the sidelines. Indeed, Ernest Gellner has said, 'it is
possible that fully industrial society will exceed in ritual and doctrinal
fantasy anything achieved by "primitive" society' (1973:133). So, in
contrast to one expatriate writer in the South China Morning Post who
was mystified as to why 'normally level-headed Hong Kong people' (14/
11192) were gripped by the ghost rumour, the anthropologist approaches
it as a cultural puzzle.
Chinese society, modern or 'traditional', is not the only society which
sees ghosts, and ghosts everywhere represent disharmonies and
anomalies or provide explanations for random tragedies. For this
reason they will not disappear from modern 'rational', 'scientific'
societies because the workings ofmodern societies, and modern science,
remain as mysterious and opaque to many of its members as the workings
of the world did for many people in pre-modern societies, and tragedies
continue to occur inexplicably and with seeming capriciousness. One
might want to argue, however, that the Chinese have a higher propensity
to see ghosts than some other people. The reasons for this are complex
and are related to the cultural codification of ghosts in Chinese culture,
and to the fact that, in Hong Kong at least, one has not seen concerted
campaigns against superstition conducted by Church and State that we
saw in Europe, although we have yet to understand the full cultural
impact of the communist interlude on the mainland and its modernising
campaigns against so-called 'feudal superstition' (see Siu 1989).
Because ghosts are alien to ideas of order then perhaps societies which
place a higher stress on order, like even modern Chinese societies do, are
more likely to be haunted by fantasies of disorder.?
Anthropologists are prone to point out that people do not see just any
ghosts, they see the ghosts that their cultures construct for them. These
elements of cultural coding are, of course, part of the rumour we have
been discussing. Historically, there has been a high propensity to see
female ghosts in Chinese culture, and this has been explained by the
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anomalous position of women within the patrilocal and patrilineal
family (Harrell 1986). In the rumour around the commercial one is
struck by the attention paid to young girls. For example, it was often said
that it was a young girl ghost who had joined the group of children, and
attention focused on her alleged long vampire-like fingernails. Attention
also focused on the girl who was said to be bleeding from the mouth. The
focus was on females, although the reading was somewhat ambivalent -
in some cases a girl was the ghost, in others she was one ofthe victims of
the ghost, and sometimes this ghost was male. The ambivalence perhaps
reflects changing evaluations of girls/women in Hong Kong society.
Newspaper reports on the commercial often referred back to another
rumour in 1983 when people saw the faces of foxes in the marble of a
Wanchai building, and these allegedly were causing people to die. This
also points to the re-cycling and re-formulation in an urban context of
old Chinese cultural themes about fox fairies who lure men in particular
to their doom. Further analysis offilm, comics and other popular culture
media would no doubt reveal modem refigurations of older ghost
themes.s
Rumours circulate continuously in modem societies, though only
rarely do they become full blown rumours. Special conditions are
required for that. The modem mass media is obviously capable of
speeding up the spread of a rumour, but as we have seen it can only
imperfectly control it. In Hong Kong minor rumours surface all the time
(Next Magazine 13/11192; TV & Entertainment Times 23-29/8/93;
Varsity, April 1994). These rumours emerge out of the gaps in our
understanding and as expressions of inarticulate thoughts and feelings.
Rumours produce a temporary integration of feeling without thought
and in this sense are irrational. But ultimately rumours burn themselves
out because they are unable to answer the questions they pose. The
striving for meaning ends in incoherence.
The final episode of the 'ghost train' rumour resembled a farce.9
Almost two months after the rumour had died down in the wider society
it was debated in the Legislative Council on 17 February 1993. Mr Tik
Chi-yuen said: 'the recent coverage on supernatural matters ... will
have undesirable psychological effect on children and my daughter is
one of the victims', and wanted to know what action the government
would take. Would it, Mrs Peggy Lam asked, consider 'prohibiting'
programmes on 'fortune telling, supernaturalism, spiritualism, evil
spirits and weird phenomena.' Veteran politician Mrs Elsie Tu for her
part chose to dramatise for us the difference between the pre-TV
generation and the modem generation because she, one of the very few
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in Hong Kong, had not heard of 'these advertisements that have been
referred to'. In suitably sober tones, the Secretary for Recreation and
Culture, replied that there is freedom of expression in Hong Kong and
that no laws had been transgressed. 'However, I ... remind those in the
media to act responsibly and have regard to public sensitivity and
feeling.' And so this rumour which so enthraled the people of Hong
Kong for one whole month died a dreary death at the hands of the
colony's politicians.
Finally, this article is pertinent to the long standing debate within
anthropology concerning the role of 'insider' and 'outsider' analyses of
a culture (Evans 1993:15-19). During the research for it one fact became
very clear: almost every Chinese person I spoke with, from true
believers in ghosts, to Chinese Christians (fundamentalists included),
and academics, through to self-proclaimed atheists, all acknowledged at
least the possibility of a ghostly realm. Earlier, in the section on
'rationality' versus 'superstition', I remarked that debate over the
commercial took place within a culturally circumscribed logic which
was self-defeating. So, perhaps it requires an outsider to recognize the
importance of studying Chinese cultural beliefs in ghosts in modem
Hong Kong. For, when all Chinese are only seeing ghosts then it is only a
gwailou who can see the cultural structure of the apparition.
NOTES
I Unfortunately, except for the original Halloween radio programme I have
little data on how the issue was discussed on radio talk-back shows, but see
Eastweek (12/11/92) and Next Magazine (13/11/92) for some commentary
on radio reporting. I have no reason to believe that the themes raised in these
programmes were much different from the material I have managed to
gather for this article.
2 There was one other way the politics of Chris Patten and the rumour
intersected and that was a dispute between political pollsters concerning
measuring Pattern's popularity. Mr Robert Chung of the Social Science
Research Centre at the University of Hong Kong claimed that polls tended
to become self-fulfilling prophecies, and compared them with the 'ghost
train' rumour (Sunday Morning Post 29/11/92).
3 There has been a controversy over organ transplants in China, and
significantly it is Hong Kong people who are the recipients of these organs
(Sunday Morning Post 30/10/94; Eastern Express 24/11/94). Vague
knowledge of the organ trade in China may provide the raw material out
of which a rumour can be convolutedly spun, but it does not provide the
motivation.
4 For example, the following rumour reported from Chongqing, south-west
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China: "Terrified youngsters are refusing to go to school over fears that a
child-eating robot is running wild ... The US made robot favours victims
wearing red clothes and has already devoured several children ... Parents
gave their children cloves of garlic and chopstick crosses to ward off the
monster, causing a garlic shortage at markets, said the city's legal News'
(Hong Kong Standard, 22/3/93). I will restrain myself from commenting!
5 The commercial was re-screened several times between 9 November and 19
November, alternating with the KCRC's new commercial featuring two
young children, also from Beijing, on a pump trolley in a forest. This latter
commercial attracted no interest, and continued to be screened.
6 As Freedman (1979) notes, in the past the geomancer was a respected
person because of his association with the traditional literati, of which he
was a 'pseudo member'. 'But the geomancer puts his metaphysic to
common use. He mediates, then, between the two main strata of Chinese
society, the learned ... and the common; and occupies a status which is, in
consequence, both hampered and advantaged by ambiguity' (1979:323). In
modem Chinese society there has been a tendency to transfer some of the
prestige of the traditional literati to University professors. Geomancers have
retained some of their traditional prestige, certainly among ordinary people,
but they have had to make strategic shifts in the direction of science. Thus,
'upper class' geomancers in Hong Kong like to present their knowledge as
'scientific', thereby bowing to the higher prestige of modem science.
7 After finishing this article I came upon an excellent study of ghosts in
modem Singaporean society by a French anthropologist. See Gilbert
Hamonic (1995).
8 For example, some 1994 programmes on Chinese TV have featured Chinese
shamans in Malaysia who claim to be able to use aborted fetuses, no more
than two hours old because they still have the spirit of life in them, which
they then can raise as a spirit child who will do their bidding. What is
immediately apparent here is the theme of the problems of child control in a
world where they are felt to be increasingly beyond parental control, and
secondly a wider debate about abortion (bearing in mind that the Shamans
are in Muslim Malaysia, and Muslims object to abortion). This is only to
suggest initial directions for interpretation.
9 In mid-December there was a highly publicised Christmas party for the
children in the advertisement, with photos of them with Father Christmas,
among others, to prove that they were alive. (See especially Ming Pao
Weekly 21/12/92). But by this time the rumour had already exhausted
itself.
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BAD BOYS AND BAD
LANGUAGE
CHOU HAu AND THE
SOCIOLINGUISTICS OF SWEARWORDS
IN HONG KONG CANTONESE
Kingsley Bolton & Christopher Hutton
The frequency [of swearwords in Cantonese] is so high that ... some
speakers of Cantonese [have remarked that]: (a) Cantonese sounds
very "odd" and "obscene". (b) One out of three utterances by
Cantonese people is "obscene" (Tse and Yu 1980:50).
John Chen kept his polite smile but screw you he thought Screw
you in spades. Dew neb lob mob on all your generations .
(Clave111981 :36).
In popular belief in Hong Kong, the use of swearwords (or chou haul *11.
t1) is associated with a number of partially contradictory, partially
interlocking stereotypes. On the one hand, there seems to be wide
acceptance for the notion that Cantonese, as a living, vibrant dialect,
actually distinguishes itself from other varieties (particularly the
standard varieties of Chinese) through its use of punning, double
entendre, slang and racy word-play: an aspect of language often seen as
'naughty but nice'. At the other extreme, the use of swearwords is
associated with insults, threats, male language at its most offensive, and
the language of the labouring and criminal classes. It is 'bad' language
used by 'bad people', with strong associations with 'nastiness' in a
range of behavioural forms.
Whether we approach the study of 'bad language' from either a
linguistic or anthropological perspective, there seem to be few easy
answers on offer. Linguists and lexicographers have made various
attempts to define precisely terms such as 'slang', 'argot', 'jargon',
'swearword' and 'cant' (Epstein 1994), but such taxonomies end up as
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futile attempts to legislate a parallel vocabulary to the one actually and
historically in use. Allen's definition can serve as a point of orientation
(Allen 1993:6):
Slang is, at bottom, just a highly informal register of speech and does
not differ from standard usages in any purely linguistic way. Slang
shares indistinct boundaries with other informal levels ofvocabulary,
such as colloquial usages, subgroup argots, and regional, class and
ethnic dialects. Slang is such a slippery concept that the idea of
"popular speech», a broader concept that includes slang, is now
preferred by many writers on language.
Allen speaks however of 'general slang', with its roots in the various
sub-group languages of the city (1993:6): 'General slang is mostly
words and phrases that have escaped from the myriad subcultures of
society and found favor in wider usage'.
What seems to distinguish the situation in Hong Kong from the
situation in Western societies is that there is much less official tolerance
of bad language in the territory than is the case, for example, in Britain.
Although censorship criteria appear to have relaxed somewhat since the
1980s, television and films in Hong Kong are still monitored closely.
One important area of concern here is the so-called 'triad language' of
Chinese criminal societies. Triad rituals and signs may not be shown,
nor may triad language be used. The use of chOu htiu is often seen as a
marker of criminality or triad-membership, and official agencies tend to
view the spread of chou htiu into the mainstream of Hong Kong society
and its media as indicating a general crisis, as being symptomatic of a
rising tide of social disorder and alienation. Nonetheless, triad language
or triad-associated language is an important source of innovation in
Hong Kong Cantonese. In an earlier paper, we discussed notions of
'bad' and 'banned' language in Hong Kong (Bolton and Hutton 1995).
Our discussion there centred on the status of this 'triad language', and
on the role of this sub-group language as a source of innovation for
general slang in Hong Kong. Another target of censorship is the use of
sexually-explicit taboo words, or chou htiu, which are still relatively
strictly censored on television, in feature films, and the print media.
One indication of the continuing enforcement of linguistic taboos is the
simple fact that the five swearwords of the Cantonese chou htiu lexicon
are rarely, if ever, found in print (these are the Cantonese equivalents to
'dick', 'cock', 'prick', 'fuck' and 'cunt', see section 3 below). Equally,
it is also significant that even today no publisher has included any of the
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most commonly used core swearwords in a dictionary of Cantonese.
The current situation in Hong Kong is therefore in this respect
analogous to that in Britain pre-1963, before the Lady Chatterley trial
paved the way for the liberalisation of publishing norms with respect to
the English swearwords listed above, as well as many more related
items. What makes the issue more complex today is the fact that,
however strict today, censorship has relaxed considerably from the
more rigid norms of the 1960s and 1970s. This occurred particularly
with respect to the classification of films in the 1980s, when a whole
series of local triad films in the Godfather mould were filmed and
marketed to packed houses in Hong Kong cinemas, and family
audiences through video stores. The popularity of socially-realistic
crime films of the 1980s, combined with the rise ofcomics depicting the
same milieu, was both cause and symptom of a dislocation of the pre-
existing organisation of language and social space.
Allen (1993: 18) argues that one important conduit for the diffusion
of slang in the United States of the 1940s and 1950s was the comic, but
concludes that '[t]elevision has all but supplanted this role of the
newspaper comic strips in the talk of the town'. However the comic
book continues to be central to the popular culture of East Asia, with
Japan exerting a powerful influence on graphic art in Korea, Hong Kong
and Taiwan (Lent 1993). Glain (1994: 1, 7) reported Korean anxieties in
the face of Japanese comic books which threaten to 'fuel the demise of
Korea's comics trade and the decay of Korean morality, according to an
alliance of local cartoonists, censors and ethics groups'. Comic books,
along with video games (Krakinowski 1994), loom large in the minds of
psychologists, social workers and teachers in Hong Kong, who tend to
see them as contributing to social alienation and delinquency (Mosher
1994).
The following scenario might therefore be adduced to explain the
recent history of Hong Kong slang. What previously may have been the
language of lower working-class males, criminals and construction
workers became the texture of Hong Kong film and cartoon culture and
the linguistic property of the Hong Kong people as a whole. Fairly
rapidly, it seems, knowledge and/or use of slang, triad jargon, and even
chOu htiu spread to other social classes in Hong Kong, including
middle-class males and middle-class females (even perhaps to the kind
of 'straight' people, who in the dismissive words of the publisher of
Hong Kong's most notorious triad comics, Cowman, 'split the bill at
lunch', Mosher 1994). As a result, private space and public space were
redefined, and the bounds ofgood linguistic order tested. For many, the
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spread of bad language can be linked to a wider social crisis, reflecting
what Harris terms (1990:414) the 'social thermometer' view of bad
language.
In this paper, we set out to deal with a range of questions relating to
'bad' language in Hong Kong. In Section 1, we discuss various
anthropological and linguistic issues in the study of bad language. In
Section 2, we focus on the sociological background to bad language in
Hong Kong. In Section 3, we present the results of our own empirical
work on this topic, which is based on a survey of 60 schoolboys,
between the ages of 15 and 18. This section also includes a basic word
list of 96 chou htiu items, which we believe provide the core of the chou
htiu lexicon. Further analysis of these words, together with a
commentary on the written representations is also provided. Section 4
comprises the conclusion.
ISSUES IN THE STUDY OF BAD LANGUAGE
The issue of bad and taboo language is surrounded by confusion and
uncertainty. For some, insults, racial slurs and obscenities only have
power so long as we fear and avoid them: 'the word's suppression gives
it the power, the violence, the viciousness' (Bruce 1972:79). For
others, swear words are an anti-language of non-conformity, a free
domain not yet levelled by ideologically correct language planners
(Epstein 1994: 10, reviewing the Random House Historical Dictionary
of American Slang): 'Perhaps the only thing to be said on behalf of
political correctness is that, in an otherwise latitudinarian society, it
may help to keep slang alive by sending it underground.' Both these
views might be labelled liberal, yet they offer diametrically opposed
views of bad language. As Harris puts it (1990:413): 'We may argue
about bad language endlessly: but it is far from clear that anyone has any
adequate theory about it as a form of linguistic behaviour'. In part, this
confusion reflects the inability of linguistics to come to terms with the
phenomenon of meaning in general, but it also reflects a sense that
linguistic taboos are irrational (Trudgill 1983). Yet to call a belief or
kind of behaviour irrational or illogical is a polemical admission that
one does not understand it. Jay (1992:30) quotes Flexner as follows
(1976:157):
There is, of course, no logical reason why fuck, screw, make [...], or
any other term should be "dirty", shocking, or taboo, no logical
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reason why they should be considered any different than such
synonyms as copulate, sexual intercourse, or feces. It's a matter of
conditioning and etiquette.
What, one might ask, is the force of the word 'logical' here? Why 'of
course'? Jay gives this quotation with approval, but he himself seems to
contradict it in the introductory section of his book (1992:9):
One can see that what is considered taboo or obscene revolves around
a few dimensions of human experience and that there is a logic or
purpose behind dirty word usage. They are not simply outbursts of
hot air, devoid of meaning and communicative intent.
Is taboo a rational and comprehensible part of human social life, or is it
a murky area where we are conditioned to accept a primitive belief in
word magic otherwise absent from our modem philosophies?
Both Davis (1989) and Harris (1990) discuss the cricket test between
England and Pakistan held in December 1987 where an altercation
involving bad language led to play being suspended the following day
(Davis 1989:1-2; Harris 1990:416-419). Subsequently, of the British
newspapers, only the Independent printed in full what the umpire is
alleged to have called the England captain, namely a 'fucking cheating
cunt'. The editor of the Sun attacked the Independent for publishing the
words in a family newspaper, and suggested that he should have used
forms such as! .. , c... instead. Harris remarks on the fact that there are
not only taboos about the use of bad language, but also about its mention
(he terms this a 'double prohibition', 1990:421). Mentioning bad
language means making literal what is otherwise not heard as language
with meaningful, referential content. To cite and discuss bad language
foregrounds the literal meaning rather than its other functions. In this
sense, bad language may be at its most shocking when it is written down
and 'glossed', for in writing it down, its segmental 'reality' and literal
meaning come to the fore. This factor will come into play below when
we discuss some of the data we collected at a Hong Kong boy's school.
Harris' argument however takes on a twist when he argues that those
who rail against bad language are those who have the most stake in it.
The diffusion of swearwords into general use heralds, he argues, a
breakdown of the distinction between public and private domains of
life, and public and private English, one that 'automatically threatens
the sacrosanct distinction between the rights of the individual and the
rights of the community' (1990:420). The loss of this private world
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means the loss of a place into which one can withdraw 'into a world of
inviolable, timeless privacy' (1990:421). Those who condemn bad
language are those who most value it, since they are preserving a valued
distinction: 'The epitaph on the tomb of British bad language in the
1980s should read: "Valued most by those who most vehemently
condemned it" , (1990:421).
This raises a complex and interesting issue. Censorship involves a
recognition of the power of bad language. In this sense, it pays respect
to that power and serves to bolster it. But censorship serves also to draw
a line between different social domains, so that the language that can be
overheard on the minibus or in the street is prevented from entering the
public media and especially the private home (television is more heavily
censored than film). Censorship marks out certain core areas of social
space and indicates certain social groups as being in need of protection.
The fact that children swear may not necessarily invalidate censorship,
for in protecting them from bad language the censor is in effect
protecting them from a loss of social orientation. The recognition that
children themselves use bad language does not of itself invalidate
special rules concerning their exposure to bad language.
In discussing these issues one should distinguish between four
contexts in which bad language is used. The first is when swearing is
used as an intra-group norm, when it appears as part of the routine
speech of a particular group, where bad language reinforces boundaries
between groups. One could imagine various levels of sensitivity among
such 'foul language' using groups. Swearing may occur when there are
no outsiders present, or in situations such as on the street or in public
transport, where other people are only present as (involuntary)
eavesdroppers. Some schoolchildren who swear in the school
playground might drop the bad language from their speech when they
are in the presence of a teacher or parent. Media representations of such
groups (e.g. gangsters) will use slang and obscenity as a key element of
characterisation ('realism'). The second case is the deliberate use of bad
language to insult, threaten, shock or offend. An example would be a
verbal attack on someone who does not use bad language and feels
threatened by it, where bad language is used to break down social
barriers temporarily, to violate someone's social integrity. The third is
the use of bad or suggestive language in jokes or for comic purposes.
Suggestive punning by comedians or mouh leih tauh in Hong Kong
films may be experienced as a pleasurable (and temporary) regression to
a childish state. In some contexts (e.g. joke-telling in a group) people
may be cajoled or prompted into laughing. The fourth context would be
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the use of swearwords to express strong emotions such as surprise or, as
in the classic hammer-and-thumb situation, pain. Responses in
Cantonese may vary from the mild (pi kei) to the very strong (diu M)
and may be gender-graded: pi kei might typically be used by a young
woman, and diu by your average male taxi driver. Young people may
also often use the English 'Shit!', which is often claimed to be free of the
heavier connotations of Cantonese equivalents. We could term these
four uses of bad language integrative, aggressive, regressive, and
expletive.
THE CASE OF HONG KONG
In Hong Kong one could study the issue of bad language at a number of
levels. First, there is the question of the official policy towards bad
language; second, the language behaviour of particular groups with
regard to swearing; and third, informal attitudes to the acceptability or
otherwise of using certain language in particular contexts. At first
glance, swearing in Hong Kong seems to be the province of working
class males. For example, an informant (a Hong Kong Chinese business
executive) defined swearing as 'male language, taxi-driver language'.
Received beliefs about Cantonese include the notion that it is
particularly rich in swearwords and invective, but, leaving aside the
difficulty of measuring such things, such a notion most likely reflects a
set of cultural values operating within the pan-Chinese world. These
values may be viewed by Cantonese speakers themselves with mixed
feelings. As 'Chinese' they must accept the overall cultural pre-
eminence of Mandarin and the associated modem standard written
language and therefore the secondary status of Cantonese as a 'dialect'.
As a non-standard language, it is thus a more private possession of the
speakers, a purer identity marker. To the extent that Cantonese has
gradually widened its functions within Hong Kong (to include the civil
service, some lower courts, the Legislative Council and many other
social forums formerly dominated by English) it is also a quasi-national
language, studied by non-native speakers and with a wide number of
different social functions (including high cultural functions such as
formal reading styles for use in religious contexts, for reciting poetry,
Cantonese opera, etc.). But, within the pecking order of languages, it
still must give way in Hong Kong to the official languages ofthe present
and future sovereign powers and can be emotionally set off against these
two languages as a 'private' (and therefore 'vibrant', 'authentic',
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'natural') language, even while serving many of the social functions of
a 'high' variety.
However, many factors enter into the societal equation. One
important issue that relates to language within Hong Kong is social
mobility. A society with a relatively high degree of social mobility
might be expected to place a great deal of emphasis on linguistic
markers of social success, in the same way that Hong Kong people are
stereotypically said to enjoy the use of material and portable status
symbols such as expensive watches and mobile phones. But in terms of
pronunciation, there is not the same social awareness ofclass markers in
Hong Kong that one is alleged to find in Britain. The so-called 'lazy
pronunciation' (ldahn yam '1fjl-i-)2 is of concern primarily to teachers of
Chinese.
This lack of clear class-related norms reflects in part the status of
Cantonese as a semi-private language. However the use of 'foul
language' may be such a class marker. A group of boys or men using
'foul language' among themselves in public may be marking themselves
as marginal or deviant (junior triads, bad schoolboys, petty criminals),
or as labourers with no pretensions to gentility or social mobility. But it
seems that they are not always perceived as acting wrongly; for
example, other 'respectable' passengers in earshot of a barrage of chou
htiu in the minibus seem oblivious. The taxi driver involved in a near
collision swears because that is what taxi drivers do in such situations.
He is talking in the way that taxi drivers talk. There is an element of
reassurance that the world is in place. In this context, swearing is not
always 'matter out of place' (Douglas 1991). It is out of place when it is
used to break down social boundaries, to insult or attack. But when
overheard in the minibus, it may not be deeply shocking because it is not
heard as communication, but as a part of a social role acted out and
understood. Social boundaries are being strengthened. In a sense, the
respectable can feel at ease in the presence of this language since it is not
'their' language and it is not directed at them or intended to include
them. Everyone knows who they are and where they sit. One hypothesis
would be that if the boundaries between these groups were less clear -
perhaps in a society where there is a greater ideology of social equality
- then this language would be threatening since there is no water-tight
social-class division to keep it out. In Britain obscenities can be heard on
national television and are printed widely in the media, but their use by
a taxi or bus driver in public might well cause greater offence than in
Hong Kong. It is also interesting to consider what it means to overhear
bad language. To what extent do people know 'what the words
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(literally) mean' as opposed to their simply identifying the language as
bad?
Other groups who reportedly use bad language in Hong Kong are
'Yuppie' foreign exchange dealers and other 'macho' type financial
dealers; here there may be an attitude of indifference or hostility to
traditional methods of social advancement or wealth acquisition and a
cynicism about the social hierarchy (since a successful dealer can
achieve 'unnaturally' rapid affluence). This language may serve to
exclude outsiders, e.g. women, from fully participating in the
institution, for women who swear seem to be involved in a more radical
form of self-stigmatisation than men. But there are women who swear
(some in an attempt to integrate into male culture in the workplace,
Coates 1986:10), and others who do not swear but are not particularly
offended by it or by discussion of it. Perhaps again some women
recognise that swearing makes clear and secure a gender boundary with
defined gender roles.
That swearing has made inroads into the general population can be
seen from this comment from a female student at the Chinese University
of Hong Kong, defending the production of a controversial campus
newspaper called 'Little Door' (s{u mithn bou IJ\r~¥fn: 'I always hear
male schoolmates speaking in foul language in the dormitory. Why
can't this language be used in publications or in public?' (quoted in
Tsang 1994:23).
SURVEY DATA:
THE LANGUAGE OF HONG KONG SCHOOLBOYS
As mentioned above, one important source of language data for our
research was a questionnaire survey that was conducted at a boys'
secondary school in Hong Kong. The background to this research was as
follows. In order to investigate the use of slang and 'bad language' by
Hong Kong schoolchildren, we decided to replicate an experiment
discussed by Andersson and Trudgill (1990), in which British school
children were asked to list expressions meaning 'stupid person'. The
British survey produced a list ofover 120 slang words. The twelve most
frequently cited expressions were the following: wally, stupid, dimbo,
idiot, prat, dumbo, dickhead, dippy, dumb, silly, thicko, and nerd
(Andersson and Trudgill 1990:88-89). The field research for our survey
of Chinese slang was largely conducted by a twenty-year-old Hong
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Kong Chinese acquaintance of the authors. When informed by us that
we intended to conduct questionnaire research at a Hong Kong
secondary school, he suggested that we distribute questionnaires at his
alma mater. The school in question was not one of the 'lower band'
schools in the local hierarchy and was generally regarded as having a
good academic reputation. It was also apparently renowned for the chou
hau resources of its pupils. This latter reputation may well be connected
to the fact that it is an all-male school.
A short, single-sheet questionnaire was then prepared by the authors.
The instructions to respondents on page one read as follows: 'This is a
questionnaire about Cantonese slang and vulgar language [chou haul in
Hong Kong. You have to write down your age, your form, and answer
all the five questions.' To summarise, the five questions asked for (i)
expressions meaning 'a foolish or stupid person', (ii) expressions
meaning 'a bad or evil person', (iii) expressions used to insult 'a person
you hate', and (iv) expressions used to tell someone to 'go away!'. The
fifth question then asked respondents to indicate those expressions that
they 'would not use themselves in everyday life' .
We later concluded that the first four questions worked rather well in
eliciting a core corpus of slang and taboo language. The fifth question
worked rather less well; largely because of the imprecision of the
question. Our assumption had been that this question would provide
some kind of rough guide to the 'taboo rating' of the words and
expressions listed by the boys. In the event, the results were unclear:
they might reflect perceived taboo norms, but might also reflect other
reasons for avoiding an item. Some expressions, for example, might be
regarded as dated or childish.
The questionnaire was administered by our informant to some friends
within the upper forms of the school and, in tum, by them on a
'friends-of-friends' basis to a substantial number of older pupils
throughout the school. The questionnaires were distributed and
collected over a period of one week in March 1991. In all, 60
questionnaires were completed and returned. The majority of
respondents (75 %) were Form 6 pupils in the age range 17-18. Smaller
numbers of Form 4 and Form 5 pupils (25%) aged 15-16 were also
included.
The amount and quality (in terms of this research exercise) of
language data collected was impressive and intriguing. Question 1
('stupid person') yielded a total of 85 different items; Question 2 ('bad
person') produced 96 items; Question 3 ('a person you hate') 52 items;
and Question 4 ('go away! ') 84 items. In all this produced a total ofover
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300 chou htiu and slang items, although many of these items occurred
only once in the data.
In order to provide a clear and more focused analysis of the slang and
taboo vocabulary collected, we decided to draw up a core list of chou
htiu and slang vocabulary which included only those items which
occurred more than twice in our data. Subsequent research suggest that
this list does in fact hold up as a basic word list for Hong Kong chou hdu
(although we shall later try to show that the items we have included here
maybe further categorised into subtypes of chou him language).
Hong Kong slang and chou htiu - a basic word list
In the list below, all words and expressions occurring more than once in
the survey are included in the list. The entry for each word includes the
Chinese characters for each expression, the Yale transcription followed
by a bracketed number indicating how many times a particular item was
cited, a 'literal' translation into English, and an explanatory gloss. In all
there are 96 items and expressions, which are set out in order of
frequency in Table 1 overleaf:
TABLE 1: A List of Core htsults in Cantonese (Chou Htiu and Swear-
words)
Chinese Yale Transcription Literal Meaning in Approximate
Characters English English slang
equivalent
F,J' diu (46) fuck fuck
1~4if pUle gaai (43) fall down in the you bastard!
street
'J;~g1 hahm gaa chaan (30) whole family die fuck you in the
heart !
*M bahn chaht (27) stupid dick ~tupid dick
F.tlt! hin yeung (24) prick face prick face
nil Flt' Ian hOi (17) fuck away fuck off!
~*' jyil dau (16) pig dish/bowl (pig illy willypenis)
1!Fn:l ohng gau (14) stupid cock ~tupid prick
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~~ jihnjting (13) cheap species ~cumbag
~~ kai daih (12) younger god- JIomo
brother
ftr~ soh hili (12) stupid cunt ~tupid cunt
:lM~ laan taan (11) creep paralysed rreep
*r~ hahm Ian (10) hold suck prick p,cksucker
!!/k ohng geui (10) simple-minded Imoron
a#.U baahk chi (9) plainly crazy ~imbo
r~~ hilijting (9) cunt species Pmt
:lMne.ttJl} laan si gabt 1000 (9) creep corpse limp beat it, bozo!
road
JjtJt sau peih (9) withdraw foreskin push off!
ft.11f, sei hOi (9) die away piss off!
Mill chabt tcioo (8) dick head dickhead
felk Of (8) fuck off fuck off!
Hr~r,fJ haahng Ian hOi (9) walk prick away fuck off!
r~ hili (8) cunt r-;unt
~A. jihn yahn (8) cheap person ~cum
~r~ jyil hili (8) pig cunt runt
MrJ~ Ian diu (8) prick fuck ifucking prick
llf~ moh lUle (8) short/medicore ~hortarse
a#.UfI- baahk chi jai (8) plain crazy boy Wcko
~r~ chau hili (7) smelly cunt stupid cunt
rMt-fal JJ;p ding teih go fai (7) pierce your lung :screw you!
It.~Jt si fat gwai (7) ass ghost asshole
'J;~* hahm gila ling (6) whole family bell go to hell!
~~ jyil biu (6) pig dart stupid idiot
~;f1 maOO lei (6) prosperous profit wally
!!~H' ohng gau jai (6) stupid cock boy :stupid little
prick
1~{jj-1f pUle gclai jai (6) fall down in the ittle bastard
street boy
*-~ bahn chaahk (5) (c.f. stupid thief stupid cretin
bahn chabt)
*";{i bahnjiu (5) stupid banana ~tupid moron
ttM gabt hOi (5) creep away get lost!
*-r~r,n jau Ian hOi (5) walk prick away ifuck off!
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J!tift. jihn laih (5) cheap soil ittle shit
?E.l1 stH cMan (5) dead spade ~o to hell, you
bastard!
-¥v~ gau chaahk (5) dog thief ~hithead
i/!.i. gwo jyli (4) across lord bush off!
FIll!1f hilijcii (4) coot boy ittle coot
J!t jihn (4) cheap ~heap
~ jyu (4) pig ~tupidpig
?E.1f stHjcii (4) dead boy ittle shit
*M bahn Ian (3) stupid prick stupid prick
*F.i1M bahn Ian chaht (2) stupid prick dick fucking stupid
dick
JH.i1 cMoo bin stupid prick stupid prick
$rF.i1~ chi Ian sin (3) crazy prick fucking crazy
1MiMf diU lelling jcii (3) low ability boy etard
J!t~ jihn gaak (3) cheap character "heap bastard
~o$. jyil milk (3) pig mark wally
F.i1 r-t, Ian chaht (3) prick dick fucking dick
F.i1 Fill! Ian hili (3) prick coot fucking coot
i!l'lllt, l:ian hoi (3) creep away piss off
11 F.i1.1f) m6uh Ian yuhng (3) no prick use fucking useless
~M ohng chaht (3) stupid dick stupid dick
~F.i1M ohng Ian gau (3) stupid prick cock fucking stupid
prick
lJt"f sau de (3) shut chat ,hut your face!
lJtMJt sau gau peih (3) withdraw prick skin ,hut the fuck up!
?E.11-1fT sei pUk gaai (3) dead fall down in fucking bastard!
the street
~ sl (3) shit shit
pI!. ;ii. yaakjiu (3) eat banana fuck yourself!
* Fill! bahnhili (2) stupid cunt stupid coot
*1.i bahnje (2) stupid sugar cane stupid wally
~ cMak (2) (c.f. chaht) thief dick
$r~ chi sin (2) nerves stuck crazy
together
1t\B1f diU bi jcii (2) low ability boy ~ummy
1M~~~ diU gau lelling (2) low cock ability lfucking moron
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1M~ dai IMmg (2) low ability "diot
~£~~~ fcian ngUk keih go back your home go fuck
ngaaOO je (2) to bite sugar cane yourself!
1ft#< fai chilaih (2) waste firewood stupid wanker
f~~ hilijUng (2) coot species cunt
-!-1Hif$ heui pUk gam. hi (2) fall down in the drop dead, you
street bastard!
#~ jaahp jUng (2) mixed species bastard
1lt± EI joOO saang yaht (2) mark birthday I'll) get you,
you bastard!
~~ jyiI bing (2) inferior pig thick as pig shit
ifJl ~, laai hili (2) lick cunt fucking cunt
~MM lcian Ian hOi (2) creep prick away fuck off
-t#J;."~ lau chilu all (2) provoking a beating (you) want
trouble!?
~ lUk (2) one (classifier for dick
penis)
1'fH~ m600 1600 (2) no brain dumb
'flfltl mUng Ian (2) stupid prick tupid prick
~~~ ohng gau gau (2) stupid prick fucking cretin
~M ohng Ian (2) stupid prick gormless prick
1H~' pUk hOi (2) fall down away od off!
ft.r.t, sei hOi (2) die away hove off!
1t";{( sihkjiu (2) eat banana sod you!
ft~t soh gep (2) stupid cunt tupid coot
1tft: soh 16u (2) stupid man wally
i~l!t yahmjihn (2) obscene cheap eering
.ijHr yeuhkji (2) weak intelligence dim wit
.ij~~1t yeuhk ji jill (2) weak intelligence dimbo
boy
General commentary on word list
Timothy Jay, in Cursing in America (1992) attempts to provide a
category analysis ofvarious types of swearwords and taboo language. In
brief, his taxonomy includes ten categories ofcursing. These categories
are: 'cursing' (in the sense of involving harm and injury to others),
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'profanity', 'blasphemy', 'taboo', 'obscenity', 'vulgarity', 'slang',
'epithets', 'insults and slurs', and 'scatology'. There are obvious
problems with this type of categorisation, however. There is an overlap
between 'profanity' and 'blasphemy' in one instance, 'obscenity' and
'taboo' in another, and vulgarity with virtually every other category. In
spite of these problems, however, some of the terms he discussed can be
applied to the chou htiu data we are discussing here.
Crucially, it should be noted that at the core of our chou htiu list
above is a set of items that are sexually taboo swearwords. These five
key Cantonese swearwords (or chou htiujih *.Jto *) are diu M('fuck'),
chaht rt1 ('dick'), gilu f~ ('cock'), ldn fltl ('prick') and hili fo!il ('cunt').
Of the 96 expressions in the list, 36 of the items either comprise, or
include, the five 'core' items of chou htiu vocabulary. The other 60
items on the list may be explained by such categories as curses (e.g.
hahm gil chtianJ; ~t1 ,puk gilai 11-{if), scatological items (si ~,sifilt
gwai ~.~>t), animal taboo words (jyu dilu ~!fe.,jyu milk ~P$., etc.),
or other categories of description (see section 3.5 below).
Diu rl~ ('ruck')
Diu ('fuck') is the most frequently cited expression, appearing in the list
with a count of 46. All the diu expressions were elicited by question no.
3 ('the insult to someone you hate'). The range ofexpressions here often
displayed almost Elizabethan flair in creative word-play. Diu
expressions included both crudely explicit insults, as set out in Table 2,
and the less direct insults that rely on word-play and puns, as in Table
3.
TABLE 2: Diu (i)
-.,.
Diu Leih.
'Fuckyou'.
Diu Leih l6uh m6u.
'Fuck your mother'.
Diu leih hili hahn.
'Fuck till your cunt's itchy'.
Diu chaht baaul Leih
l6uh m6u go hili.
Fuck dick crack your mother's cunt.
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Oh diu leih lOuh mei,
hOu nih h6u a?
'I fuck your mother, is that okay?'
Diu zeih 16uh mOu go
chau fila hili.
'Fuck your mother's smelly, flowery cunt' .
TABLE 3: Diu (ii)
6h diu lc~ih 16uh meL
'Fuck your old roasted meat'.
TIuh leih m6uh mouh.
'Piece of tongue no hair'.
Siu leih sou bOu.
'Burn your ledger-book'.
Biu, leih yauh m6uh.
'A watch, do you have (one)?'
Mahn hauh leih 16uh m6u.
'Give my regards to your mother' .
Mahn hauh leih 16uh dauh.
'Give my regards to your father' .
~r.M·tiJ'*­
-ffP~-ffP-t?
M1.t~#:1IJl
jH~r..n
In addition, one boy displayed his literary aspirations in the submission
of a short piece of doggerel, which is apparently sung aloud to the tune
of 'Colonel Bogey':
Diu leih 16uh mOu hahm gila cMan,
r.M~~#:::I;~i1 '
Daai leih 16uh mOu seuhng tin btiang,
1.IHt~#:J:.~~ ,
Gong hah yilt go yUhn jidaan,
ftT-1IJl~.:r~,
faa dou leih 16uh mOu bin liJan ttian.
;Iif.fH~~#:~~. 0
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In English translation, this reads a lot less smoothly as follows:
'Fuck your mother and may your whole family die
Take your mother up on the roof,
Drop an atom bomb from the sky,
Explode it on your mother so she is paralyzed!'
ChahtM, ran ri1, and gau~
Expressions using chaht M, !tin ri1 and gau r~, all meaning 'penis', all
proved popular amongst our schoolboy informants. Bahn chaht ~M
('stupid dick') received 27 attestations; ian yeung ri1#. ('prick face'), a
score of 24; and ngohng gau '!~ ('stupid cock') a score of 14.
Previous explanations of these terms (e.g. Tse and Yu 1980) do not
provide a consistent translation for the three items. We now propose to
introduce some lexicographic systematicity into the translation of these
expressions, and suggest 'dick' for chaht M, 'prick' for !tin ri1 and
'cock' for gau ~. This suggestion is largely motivated by a
consideration of the translatability of compounds and derivations. Thus
bahn chaht ~M and chaht tauh r-c, ill become 'stupid dick' and
'dickhead', and ngohng gau !!~ becomes 'stupid cock'. This then
leaves 'prick' for combinations like !tin yeung ri1 #., bahn !tin ~ ri1, and
hahm ian *' ri1, which may be translated as 'prick face', 'stupid prick';
and 'suck my prick' respectively.
Lan r.t1 may also be used for a range of grammatical purposes. It can
appear as a noun in ngohng ian !!ri1('stupid prick'); as a verb in /tin hoi
ri1 ~ ('prick [fuck] off'); and as an intensifier in m6uh !tin yuhng ;{f ri1
m('no prick [fucking] good'). Its function in examples of the latter type
is that of an intensifying morphological infix. We have other examples
of this list, including haahng !tin hoi ~tri1 ~ ('walk pricking away'),
jau ian hoi *.M ~('go pricking away'), bahn ian chaht ~ri1 r-cWstupid
pricking dick'), and Man ian hoi ~ ri1 nt-, (' creep pricking away').
Combinations using hili r~ ('cunt') also proved popular. Soh hai ftr~
('stupid cunt') gained 12 citations, haijung r~-ft ('cunt species') 9, hai
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f<.\l ('cunt') 8,jyu hai ~r~ ('pig cunt') 8, chau hai ~ f<.\l('smelly cunt')
7. Other expressions included bahn hai ~f<.\l ('stupid cunt'), and ldai
hiLi ;fJir~ ('lick cunt'). As in English, this is the item that carries the
heaviest taboo.
Other slang expressions
In the list of 96 expressions provided in table 1, 36 items, as mentioned
earlier, include the five core chou hdu words. The other 60 items in the
list would be typically regarded by most Hong Kong speakers as slang
(juhk yuh 1~"t~) rather than chou hdu. They are of interest in their own
right, as they can be loosely grouped into a number ofdistinct sets. One
set would include pig words, e.g. jyu dau ~!It ('pig dish'),jyu b,u~
~ ('pig dart'),jyu milk ~P$- ('pig marklbrand'); a set similar to taboo
words in other languages, using animal categories (Leach 1964).
Another group relates to words with phallic connotations, such as bahn
jlu ~;{! ('stupid banana'), bahnje ~1!F. ('stupid sugar cane') and yaak
jiu ~;{! ('eat a banana').
A further grouping is composed of words relating to physical or
mental handicap. In this category we have expressions such as baahk chi
E1;;;' ('plainly crazy'), chi sin ;;;.~ ('crazy'), dai bi jdi 1~B1f ('low
ability'), dai nahng 1~~~ ('low ability'), andyeukjijdi ~~ t'1f ('weak
intelligence boy').
Finally, yet another category perhaps embodies a typically Hong
Kong distaste for 'cheapskates' in all their forms. Thus we have jihn
jung ~~ ('cheap species'),jihn yahn ~A. ('cheap person'),jihn naih
~iJt. ('cheap soil') andjihn gaak ~~ ('cheap character').
Orthographic obscenity and Cantonese taboo language
The claim that the five chou hdujih 4'11.0"* discussed above be regarded
as the core items in the Cantonese lexicon of obscenity can be supported
in a number of ways. One way of approaching this issue, however, is by
looking at the written form of the language. In the case of the obscene
lexicon of the English (and the written use of words such asfuck, cunt,
prick, etc.), the last thirty years have seen a considerable relaxation in
films, literature and even lexicography. Today even the Oxford English
Dictionary carries a number of entries for each of these words. Other
dictionaries, such as the Collins English Dictionary include multiple
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entries for such words and their derivatives. Oxford also publishes a
dictionary of modem English slang (Ayto and Simpson 1992). This has
been a rather recent process; but in earlier times, dictionaries of 'vulgar
language' had included such items in their word lists. These chou htiu
characters in Cantonese, however, have never to our knowledge found
their way into print outside pornographic contexts. They are certainly
not recorded in dictionaries of Cantonese. Our research into the spoken
language shows that in speech the acceptability of such language varies
according to the gender, setting and context, but in writing the use of
chou htiu has hitherto been taboo. When the vernacular is transcribed,
the 'real' obscene characters are avoided in favour of orthographic
euphemisms of various kinds.
One medium where clear examples of this can be found is that of
comic books. The publishers of these books, no doubt fearing the wrath
of the Television and Entertainments Licensing Authority (the TELA)
and, perhaps, awed by the power of taboo linked to the written Chinese
language routinely avoid the use of 'authentic' obscene characters
through a variety of written devices. Table 4 below sets out a list of the
most commonly-occurring euphemisms:
TABLE 4: The Five Chou Hau • t1 Characters and Their
Euphemisms
'Authentic' character Euphemism (plus Yale) and
(plus Yale) and English English
m(d{u, 'fuck') .]- (siu, small)
r:t: (nah)
fMt (tiu, to shoulder)
ruck ifak)
Pc (iksih)
M(chaht, 'dick') -t: (cMt, seven)
q (kiu)
X (iksih)
r;,j (gau, 'cock') ~ (kau, pigeon)
:Jr.. (gau, nine)
~ (gau, dog)
Q (kiu)
X (iksih)
r~ (kin, 'prick') ",Wan)
Q(kiu)
X (iksih)
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~ (sai. west)
Q (kiu)
X (iksih)
The question then begged is obviously this: if these authentic
characters simply do not appear in dictionaries or in any other kind of
print media, where then do they occur, and how are they recognisable as
the real thing? The brief answer to the first part of the question is that
they appear as graffiti, inscribed in toilets and on the seat backs of
buses, and in the halls of juvenile courts, and as (the perhaps age-
graded) secret language ofschoolchildren in Hong Kong. The answer to
the second part of the question is that one can tell that these characters
are the 'real thing', because they are precisely the ones that are banned.
While there is no list of forbidden characters and censorship in Hong
Kong is context-sensitive to a degree, it seems likely that any comic
book printing these characters would be classed as Category III under
the Obscene Articles Ordinance (Le. banned as obscene). However
Hong Kong comics do use a range of graphic euphemisms.
In Table 4 above, X, K and Q are generic euphemisms, and take
their value from the context, like the use of mat as in maah matjaahn J#.
-t:!..ffl. They can be pronounced as characters in their own right (baa kei
bai EKrt" baa Iks bai EXrf]) reflecting actual speech forms. But in
the case of X Leih 16uh m6ul X1,t.~~(see figure 1, below) we are not
being asked to imagine a triad member in full cry actually using a
euphemistic form of this kind. A second category are the simplified
versions of the full obscene character, with the'gate' character removed
and the 'phonetic' standing for the whole character. These simplified
characters to an extent represent the pronunciation of the taboo
character. Alternatively, characters with identical or related
pronunciations are employed. Again these may reflect actual
euphemistic speech patterns, or may simply be graphic euphemisms.
Euphemism can be dermed as the replacement of a charged or taboo
form by a relatively neutral one. As such it is a complex form of
representation, since it both refers and avoids referring. It is easy to make
fun of the futility of graphic conventions such as 'f---'; these euphemistic
devices however, if nothing else, pay symbolic tribute to the established
hierarchy of values (see Figures 1and 2 on pages 372 and 373 overleaf).
In this connection it is important to stress the extent to which both the
official world of government bodies, teachers' associations, concerned
social workers etc. and the media underworld oflurid comics a re operating
with a shared value-system and within shared norms. In part this shared
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value system is the result of the coercive powers available to the TELA and
the Obscene Articles Tribunal. The comics have to suppress the five
forbidden characters in order to stay on the right side of the law. But there
is nonetheless a shared cultural understanding between these two sides of
society so commonly juxtaposed. There is an agreed hierarchy of linguistic
values, and this consensus extends to the realm of ideology. Hong Kong
comics often depict the dangers of dabbling in the occult, the risks for
women of hanging around triads, the dangers of promiscuous sex, the
possibility that pornography can lead to rape. Much popular culture of a
melodramatic kind has the moral ambiguity of the fairy-tale. Little Red
Riding Hood is a warning to young girls not to stray from the path, but it
draws its excitement from the fear and danger. Beneath this overtly
subversive sub-culture of triad glitz and sexual provocation is a
conventional morality of sin, degradation and fall.
BAD LANGUAGE, BAD BOYS,
AND THE BOUNDARIES OF POPULAR SPEECH
As a follow-up to the questionnaire research which yielded our survey
data, we conducted in 1993 face-to-face interviews with five schoolboys
aged between fourteen and fifteen years old. The five boys were all from
lower-class backgrounds, were living in public housing estates and
attending low-prestige secondary schools. They were recruited for the
interviews by a student at the university, who was given the task of
finding five lads who had reputations as 'bad boys' and who readily
admitted to speaking chou htiu. The boys in question Big Ear, Leon,
Meatball, Mikey and Raymond, were interviewed about their use of
chou htiu and their perception of its role in their world, Le. the world of
housing estates, video games parlours, fifth-rate schools, and as it
turned out, the world of gang-fights and triads.
Their experience varied somewhat. Generally, they all claimed that
they learned to swear in school, as early as P6 (Primary 6), from friends
and classmates. They also learned to read and write chou htiu from
friends, comics, from graffiti in buses, toilets and in the juvenile courts.
They used this language in conversation, for fun, with 'bad boy'
friends, and when they were angry or in a bad mood. Usually they
would not use chOu htiu to parents or teachers, though Mikey claimed
that he would use it with anyone he was angry with. They also reported
that the girls in their gang also used chOu htiu and accepted the use of
this language by the girls. According to Big Ear, it was 'not a
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FIGURE 1: Depiction of a Triad Fight in a Hong Kong Comic
(Chinese original)3
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FIGURE 2: Depiction of a Triad Fight (English translation)
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problem ... [as] we're all bad people'. What emerged very clearly from
the interviews was that these five boys all regarded themselves a 'bad
boys'. In their view, 'good' standards in their school did not use this
kind of language; highly educated people, like office workers and
lawyers, did not use bad language either. Or at least, so they thought;
Mikey and Meatball, on reflection, were unsure because '[w]e don't
know any people like that, we're only guessing'.
On the question of censorship, three of the boys actually favoured
more censorship of the media, asserting that the government should
intervene to censor the mass media. Mikey was against all censorship,
but Meatball was in favour of censorship of sex, but asserted that
violence and bad language should be left alone.
Towards the end of the interview, Mikey admitted his own
membership of a triad society (and the membership of the other four
boys as well), and went on to give an explanation of the use of in the
context of the triad societies activities in secondary school:
Dosou dou haih ganjo haksehw6i sin gong ...dosou haih 6hdeih ligo
lihngei hohkdak g6ng Ie, rungseuhng dou haih yahpjo haksehw6i sin
gong ge. Uih pOurung yat go hohksaang m6uh mat dim m$hw6ih
gong ...
~ it~~Nl"£.~:fl.-t-;\:.~...~ it~~-Jt~fI!l-+ k.!f~4~~~ , i!
't~i~A.."£.~:fl.-t-;\:. ~plt' 0 1~-ti!-fI!llf!i1f-t:!..J.5,,~-t-~ ...
In most cases those who use [chOu lulu] are triad members ... most of
those ofour age who have learnt it usually also joined triad societies.
Your ordinary students don't have to use these words.
The view from 'housing project hill' in Hong Kong seems fairly
straightforward. Chou hau marks out the 'bad boys' and 'bad girls'
from the good students in school. It is the language ofthe their group,
it is the language of their gang, it is the language of their jokes and
insults (for comparison, see Labov 1962, on black street gangs in
south-central Harlem). But what is more serious, more damning in a
social sense perhaps, is that for these boys the use of chou hau is
effectively a badge of membership in a triad society, one stage away
from pricking your finger and having your name 'written down' by a
triad big brother.
With this social self-stigmatisation comes a parallel psychological
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effect. All the boys interviewed showed few traces of self-esteem or
self-worth. They were, in their own minds, 'bad' children, 'bad'
students and general 'bad people'. And this sense of their badness was
confirmed to themselves by their membership of a triad society. They
had all joined the society at the age of eleven, when entering the F1 class
in secondary school, in order to get protection from bullies and other
gang members. According to currently available statistics, crimes by
young people are now reaching unprecedented heights. Much of this
crime is associated with schoolchildren placed in the Band 5 category
schools in Hong Kong (17,032 in 1993), who are classed as
'academically low achievers' and 'culturally deprived' (Fitzpatrick
1994: 10).
We might now attempt to evaluate the use of chou hau amongst this
group. In our earlier paper (Bolton and Hutton 1995), we quoted a
high-ranking officer in the Hong Kong police force explaining that
'triad language swims in a sea of chou hau'. For Big Ear, Leon,
Meatball, Mikey and Raymond the use of chOu hau in their world is a
marker of class membership, specifically criminal-class membership. It
is the language of their comic books, their video parlours, their street
life; it is the language of their 'big brothers' who run the street gangs of
school kids. This equation is not absolute; Mikey pointed out that not all
students who use chou hau are triad members. For these boys, chOu
hau, has a clear integrative function; it is the language of bad boys, and
also bad girls, though Meatball pointed out that in their group the girls
use less chou hau than the boys. When asked if they would let their
sisters use bad language, they replied that if they were 'bad' girls they
would allow it, but if they were still good girls, they would not. It also
has an aggressive function: it is the deadly serious language of gang
confrontations, street fights, and perhaps the occasional 'chopping'.
What seems most ironic about this view of themselves is the
expectation that the 'good people' of Hong Kong - the 'office workers'
and 'lawyers' - would never swear themselves or use chou hau. As we
indicated earlier, our belief is that Cantonese triad slang, street slang,
and even swearwords, are a source of lexical innovation throughout the
Cantonese vernacular generally, and throughout all classes of society.
What will vary however is the range of contexts in which this occurs,
and the frequency with which individual speakers will use this
language.
What Mikey and the boys fail to recognise, with good reason, is that
their speech, their chou hau, their triad jargon and their slang may often
provide the lead for the language of the middle class and the rich. The
323
BAD BOYS AND BAD LANGUAGE
survey of the 'good' schoolboys shows that the language the 'bad' boys
see as a mark of their own stigmatisation is actually the common
property of schoolchildren, or at least schoolboys, across Hong Kong.
An informant in the legal department of the Hong Kong government
told us that lawyers had taken to expressing their frustration at the slow
pace of the legal machinery through the regressive use of the phrase
'delay no more', which, pronounced in Hong Kong English, sounds not
unlike diu leih 16uhm6u F-JHt ~-lt. The 'bad' boys are living in a social
time-warp when they speculate that office workers and lawyers are chou
hdu free.
Allen, commenting on the rise of New York slang between 1850 and
1900 and the interaction of categories like 'public' and 'private' with
social class, concludes (Allen 1993:32) 'that the socially constructed
reality of city life was just as often negotiated from below as imposed
from above.' For Mikey and the boys, the fact that their language use
may be the driving force behind Hong Kong vernacular Cantonese is not
evident; it is not transparent to them. They showed no signs of linguistic
invention and did not have any particular idea or theories about where
the language they used came from. For, while from the outside, from
the point of view of a sociolinguist like Labov, it may seem that
adolescent bad boys are in the vanguard of linguistic innovation,
conscious linguistic creativity in Hong Kong is the domain of media
personalities like the mouh leih tauh masters Lam Hoi Fung and Got
Man Fai on Commercial Radio, and Stephen Chau, the film actor and
media personality. Mikey and the boys are the embodiment of social
passivity; they lack the assertive anti-identity of Labov's urban Black
youths.
For the other social classes in the territory, the street slang of TV and
movie culture has now entered the 'mainstream' of Hong Kong slang.
Phrases like kiJu leui ~* ('to chat up or chase girls'), chyun »t
('stuck-up, arrogant') and giu gai "~# ('to go to a prostitute'),
although risque, are widely used and accepted. The mouh leih tauh of
the 1990s, according to some sources, originated in the street life of
Hong Kong's less privileged citizens. But whatever its social origins, it
became for a while the property of music radio and the Hong Kong_film
industry, and was accepted as a local 'nonsense speak'. While this
variety of local slang left many educators and moralists aghast, it was a
source of general amusement in the population as a whole, again
regressive, again 'naughty but nice'. Behind mouh leih tauh is chou
hdu, since much of the word-play hinted at or played with suggestive
puns, but in a way that escaped the conventional grading of slang from
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the colloquial to the obscene. An example of this from a list of
fashionable slang published in Next magazine is the mouh leih tiluh
expression daan ... Ieih go silhn ~ ...1~-wlA ('egg your morning!')
which parodies slang constructions such as gong Ieih go sei yilhn tiluh
·~~H7--wI ?t.A..il!, chou htiu 'echo-expressions' such as dIng Ieih gofai TJ{
1.7- -wi JJ;ji (itself only recently acceptable in the media) and of course chou
htiu itself.
An example of a mouh leih tiluh dialogue is the following from the
Steven Chau film Fight back to school (touh hohk wili luhng~~ JiA.it),
involving a search for a lost pistol:
-- keuih haih yat ji sihn leuhng ge cheung!
-- cheung dou yaub sihn leuhng?
-- ng6h ji cheung bUn sing sihn leuhng ga rna, jeui pa lohk Mi di
waaih hohk saang sau seuhng...
-- 19if. - :t.-!-~"!tit!
-- it~;fj -!-~?
-- -i\:t.it*-,t.t-!- ~"~':4.\ ' iH6 it1>{f."W!~±+J:....
-- It's a very kind pistol.
-- Is there such as thing as a kind pistol?
-- Its nature is kind. But I'm afraid that it will fall into the hands of
bad schoolboys...
Behind this lurks not only the phallic associations of 'pistol', and the
things that bad boys might do with it if they got hold of it, but also the
familiar opening line of the Three Character Classic (silam jih ging .=..
!'ft&.): yilhnji cho, sing bun sihn A...z...;fl1 ' ·t.t*--!-. Thus both classical
Chinese and chOu htiu are 'behind' the word-play. Mouh Ieih tiluh ~
J.f.jJi plays with linguistic meaning and draws people into a set of puns
and allusions that challenge conventional boundaries of what is proper
and what is obscene. Unlike other forms of slang, its register is
indeterminate, and it relies on hectic innovation and a sense of
regressive spontaneity. It is also in this sense a parody of slang and of
the devices of slang, including the punning 'sandwich' (the kit hauh yuh
litAt"ti discussed in Baker 1991).
In Freud's discussion of humour (1905) the joke is, in effect, therapy
for the dramatically socially mobile. It is a controlled regression which
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makes fun of unintentional slips of the tongue or behaviour and parallels
psychoanalysis in that it aims to strip away layers of socialisation to get
at some earlier, more primary, more authentic self. That self is a
suppressed ethnic (Jewish) identity: vibrant, sloppy, noisy, indecorous,
vulgar. There is also an element of aggression in the joke-telling
process, since anyone who gets the joke and laughs has come out (or
been 'outed') from the social closet. People are not neatly divided into
the securely socially mobile and the insecurely socially mobile; the
pressure in joke telling is both on the teller to solicit the laugh, to make
the successful seduction and on the listener to understand and to allow
the regression. When we laugh at a dirty joke or understand innuendo
we are revealed as co-conspirators in the silence surrounding sex, death,
or the particular taboo in question. This idea of a controlled slip of a
tongue, a regressive performance can be applied to mouh leih tauh.
We can think of chou hau as a source of energy, an unspoken driving
force not only behind mouh leih tauh but Hong Kong slang in general.
The schoolgirl who calls someone a pi kei ('PK') is both avoiding using
the 'full expression' puk gaai 11-{if (one which lies on the borderline
between chou hau and slang) and drawing on its 'naughtiness'. Chou
him serves as a badge ofstigmatisation (but also of macho meanness) for
the 'bad boys', the 49 junior triads; but for the middle-class Yuppie it
symbolises social mobility. ChOu hau is no joke for Mikey and the
boys; their experience of it is 'heavy'. But for the naughty boys of the
elite secondary school it serves as much as anything as a mark of their
social mobility. For these boys chou hau is literally a laughing matter.
A strong underlying assumption behind modem linguistics is known
as uniformitarianism (Sampson 1980:24). This basically is the belief
that the same processes and forces are at work in all languages at all
times, and in general is a working assumption about linguistic change
(Labov 1994:23):
To the extent that this principle depends on uniformities in the
physiological basis of language, it must be correct, since there is no
indication of differences between the linguistic past and the present in
this respect. But the uniformitarian principle is more problematic
where social differences are concerned, and we must be alert to its
limitations...
Andersson and Trudgill seem however to apply this uniformitarian idea
to the 'problematic' level of social differences: (1990: 194-195): 'There
is no reason to [...] claim that bad language threatens our society and
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civilisation. "Bad language" has always been part of our language and
will be so in the future' .
Like many fundamental tenets of linguistics, the uniformitarian
principle implies an attack on ordinary or 'lay' view of language. For
example, in the face of the growing acceptance of bad language in the
media, conservative critics often assert that standards are declining. Bad
language is taking over and corrupting previously 'clean' aspects of
public and private discourse. Harris (1990) accepts that bad language is
spreading into new realms, but laments this as heralding a loss of its
power to demarcate clearly distinct public and private spheres. So both
Harris and conservative critics take a basically non-uniformitarian view
of the question of bad language; but for Harris the spread of this
language is not a symptom of its increasing power but of its waning
potency. This is the logic behind Lenny Bruce's position: the more we
repeat racial slurs, the faster they lose their power to shock and hurt.
The uniformitarian linguist might predict that other racial epithets will
arise in their place.
There are therefore here three basic views. One states that with the
spread of bad language there is a rising tide of moral corruption; the
second that with the spread of bad language there is an entropic decline
in its ability to shock and an either desirable or undesirable decline in its
taboo value. The third is that all societies have swearing and taboos and
in some general sense there is little that can be done to change the
situation, because this is the quasi-natural order of things. This being
so, we should not get worked up about bad language. But on closer
inspection the uniformitarian view looks a little like the entropic view,
since if 'lay' speakers were to adopt this sanguine approach to bad
language ('all societies have swearing, so what's the big deal?'), then
clearly the nature of swearing would change. This is the complicating
factor in any discussion of taboo and bad language. For the most part,
linguists, even sociolinguists, tend to dismiss linguistic taboos on
swearing as primitive or quaint. Sociolinguistic models are
overwhelmingly 'consensus' rather than 'conflict' models implying
uniform social attitudes, and they parallel a model of society found in
Parsonian structural-functionalist sociology (Williams 1992:204),
where individuals are depicted as in effect 'judgmental dopes' without
insight into their own actions and beliefs (Heritage 1984:27).
Anthropologists in recent years have, by contrast, become increasingly
sensitive to their own impact on their object of study, and the 'new
anthropologists' (Barley 1983, Geertz 1988, Sodusta 1993) take some
pains to foreground their roles as 'professional strangers' (Agar 1980).
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The complication comes when sociolinguists present a glossary of taboo
language, as we have in this article by printing the 'obscene' Cantonese
characters. The situation is rather as if an anthropologist, on being told
that a piece of land was sacred, were to rush over and trample about on
it. The regressive pleasure in playing with bad language should not
obscure from view the fact that it remains a serious business for those
who are still caught up 'in the culture'.
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NOTES
1 The Yale transcription used here to transcribe Cantonese is one of
many competing systems. The version used in this article recognises
six tones: high (mim), mid-rising (man), mid-level (man), low-level
(mahn), low-rising (mahn), and low falling (mahn). In this article we
transcribe a in open-syllable by aa.
2 The term 'lazy pronunciation' reflects a normative view of sound
changes currently in progress in Hong Kong. These changes involve,
for example, the substitution of I for initial n in words like mHh 1~
('you') and g for gw in words like gwok iJ ('country').
3 The illustration on page 372 is taken from a popular 'triad' comic-
book, au Waahk Jai ('Teddy Boy'), page 7, volume 1, in the 1993
compendium version. In a newspaper interview in 1994, 'Cowman'
the owner-publisher of au Waahk Jai asserted that 'most of my readers
are night people - bad people'. But in spite of this disclaimer,
Cowman's publications seem to be reaching a much wider adolescent
audience; in just one year (1995-1996), three films based on the au
Waahk Jai comics have appeared in Hong Kong and have gained a
popular following. Another of Cowman's triad comics au Waahk N
eui ('Teddy Girl') has also been turned into a film.
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-~
amah 5.2.
Bak fong y3.hn ~C1JA
Mau yi jek Iffi2:tRWli
baai sahn ffffi$
chan m
Chiu ]flU lou i!m?JtI~
Chiu ]flU Wa i!m?JtI~5
Chiu Jau yahn i!m?mA
Che Gung ]/[1}
cheuhng saam ~f3
chi ga iM~
chi tong j1J-m:
Ching ChUhng Gun 1lf:f0B
ching leuhng chah m~~
Ching Mihng m~
ching yiht m~
chOu hau ~lI.D
ch6h yuht ~Fl
daam faan maaih seui
~i\JIJ;[Jj(
daaih luhk y3.hn :k~A
Daaih Wohng Yeh :k.:Eim
dakyi 1~~
ding T
ding ngiik T~
doi mouh f-t£J:
Fa Muhk Naahn :ffi*l91
fa paau :ffiJ,fg
Hi Pahng nElW
fahng m
Fiikgin yahn ffri~A
Fiikjau y3.hn ffri1HA
tUng che j\.]j[
tUng seui j\.Jj(
tUng seui loh gaang
j\.7.MTfJ!
tUng seui sin saang
j\.Jj(%1:
gaisihng ~*
gam fa ~:ffi
gei jf ;fcr
gieu tsoi [H] 1§$R
Gun YamB1?f
Gun Yam Duhng Saan
B1?f~t1l
Gwaan Dai MJW
gwailou *~
gwail6u gwai jit *~*fm
gwai lihng gau ~~'Jf
gwat yuhk [C] gud ngyug [H]
it~
gwokga ~~
gwongdiulgwa JJ.Bf[~5
Gwongdiulg y3.hn JJi!f[A
Gwongtil y3.hn JJi1&A
Gwongfujau JJi1&1H
Gwongtilwa JJi1&~
Gwongjau yahn JJi1HA
Gwongjauwa JJi1H~5
Haakga y3.hn '4f~A
Haakga '4f~
HahmUhn yahn Mr5A
hai tU ~x
Hauh Wohng ~.:E
hei ~
hei gung si til ~:Jj]gijj-M
Heung Gong Yahn ~mA
ho neuih gu leuhng ga
H:9:mrm~
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Hohkl6u Qm
hohng r-r
H6iluhkfUng W~JI
hau keihgwaai ge H~'f?fn~
j ingfU ilYX:Jf.f
jiu ~
j6u Wr§.
j6u ngiik W!§.J~
jungmaIm rp:t
jungyeung rpJJjt
jyuht doih ~{~
jyuht f6hng neuih ~mP:
kauhchim *m
leuhng chah $*
Mahn ~
mahn juhk l§Mje
maIm maih p6 rJJ*~
mahn m6uh :tftt
mouh leih tau 1!tJiOO!m
mouh yahn mouh maht
1!tJiA1!tJi~~
muhn yuht ~fj
neih haih tnatyeh yahn
{fJlP1*i:21i!fA
ng6h haih GW6ngdung yahn
~P1*Jnf!A
ngoi deih yahn 5'}!i3A
ngoi saang yahn 5'}~
ngoi ga neuih 5'}~P:
ngonlUhng 3l:§~
pinmUhn saanyi ~r5~~
P6utiingwa ~~~
puih yuht ffl fj
STIc STIcYuhn 'iHi~
saangsihngwa ~~15
sai mahn *Hl~
sai yahn ft§A
sai yI ft§U
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sehkm6uh Ee
sei hei ~*"
Seuhngh6iyahn J:WA
siu sok maIm juhk jr~~:&3C
siik poh [C] sug po [H) ~~
Taahm Gung fIl.0
tehngga yahn ]r*A
tin :;R..
tinhai :;R.r
Tin Hauh :;R.]§
tohng ~
t6u deih giing ±!i30
tUhng Mung ~~
tuhng sih '1fi:JJ
Wohng Daaih Sin Ji*{W
wuigUn wrtm;
yamchah ~*
yam hei ~*"
yam ngaahn ~1tN
yan yuhn sehk ~~E
yat gun douh -.~
yat, yih, saam, hUng luhk dang
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yUh m
yUh naahn ~Ii
yUhn hei 5t~
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